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The redwoods have long been a source of inspiration and conflict.  By the end of 
the twentieth century, disputes over logging Redwood Country had helped transform 
American environmental politics.  Historians have largely neglected the redwood wars, 
but their impact on environmental politics was great.  After 1945,  the redwood wars 
ended official corporatist timber regulation in California, established a series of legal 
precedents governing private property management, and prompted the reordering  of the 
federal environmental protection regime.  This dissertation describes those 
transformations in detail, and helps situate the long history of conflicts over logging the 
redwoods in American history.   
The history of the redwood wars demonstrates the ways in which local activism 
influence the development of environmental politics, Northcoast activists complicate our 
understanding of radical environmentalism and wilderness ideals, and conservation 
methodologies persist in the priorities of modern environmentalism.  
The redwood wars were one of the longest and most violent environmental 
disputes in American history, beginning during the 1970s and lasting into the twenty-first 
century.  Northcoast residents had grown increasingly concerned about the future of the 
ancient forest, timber jobs, and their rural culture as the rate of clear-cutting increased 
and as corporate giants swallowed up land.  Some residents organized and challenged the 
industrial logging regime because of its threat to the health of their rural society.  
Eventually, the Northcoast was awash in daily direct actions, persistent litigation, and 
intense media scrutiny.  After 1986, the citizen activists focused more and more on 
Pacific Lumber’s plans to harvest its remaining old growth groves in Humboldt County.  
Pacific Lumber owned nearly all of the unprotected ancient redwood forest in the world, 
and the forest complex that contained those old-growth groves became known as 
Headwaters Forest.  In 1999, after more than a decade of violent and protracted conflict, 
Pacific Lumber, California, and the federal government consummated an agreement to 
publicly acquire several old-growth groves and manage the rest of the company’s land 
under a comprehensive land management plan.  Even so, the wars continued because of 
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Chapter One:  The Battle over Headwaters Forest and the 
Transformation of American Environmental Politics 
 
 
This land is your land, this land is my land 
From California, to the New York Island 
From the Redwood forest, to the gulf stream waters 
This land was made for you and me 
 
As I was walkin'  -  I saw a sign there 
And that sign said - no tress passin'* 
But on the other side  .... it didn't say nothin! 
Now that side was made for you and me! 
 
--Woody Guthrie 1956 
 
*note: in the original 1944 version, the sign said “private property” 
 
 
When Woody Guthrie wrote This Land is Your Land in response to Irving 
Berlin’s God Bless America, he had no way of knowing how well the preceding verses 
would describe the battle over Headwaters Forest forty years later.  The competing 
visions of America described by Guthrie and Berlin were similar to those of opponents in 
the Headwaters Forest conflict because on each side different visions of American 
property rights and obligations were pitted against one another.  The similarities between 
Guthrie’s song and the Headwaters Forest conflict run even deeper.  The Headwaters 
conflict began in California, was escalated by Wall Street activities on “the New York 
Island,” and its major epicenters were located in the Redwoods and in Houston — on the 
Gulf, and near the Gulf Stream, if not exactly on the “gulf stream waters.”  The 
Headwaters Forest conflict was one of the longest, most violent, and most intractable 
environmental conflicts in postwar America.  But its impact on American history has 
been neglected.  In many ways, the Headwaters conflict and the broader redwood wars of 
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the late twentieth century were the physical manifestation of the battle between the 
competing national values Guthrie and Berlin identified in their songs.  Though related to 
the Spotted Owl conflict and the western Timber Wars, the battle for Headwaters Forest 
stands alone because of the symbolism of the giant redwoods, the hostile takeover that 
precipitated the conflict, the role of private property in the conflict, and the local nature 
of the conflict.1   
Unfortunately, the most prominent narrative and analysis of the Headwaters 
conflict and the redwood wars is still defined by the popular press, journalistic books 
such as David Harris’ The Last Stand: The War Between Wall Street and Main Street 
Over California’s Ancient Redwoods, and several firsthand accounts by participants.  
Historians rarely grant the conflict more than a page in histories of late twentieth century 
environmental politics, and well-known scholars have botched the simplest details of the 
conflict, referring to the incorrect timber company and name of the forest.2   
The dominant narrative of the Headwaters conflict, as defined by the popular 
press, David Harris, Alston Chase and othes, reduces the battle to a simple morality play.   
                                                        
1 In the dissertation, ancient forest and old-growth forest are used interchangeably. 
2 The first hand accounts are: Judi Bari, Timber Wars (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1994), Joan 
Dunning, From the Redwood Forest: Ancient Trees and the Bottom Line: A Headwaters Journey (White 
River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 1998), Dave Foreman, Confessions of an Eco-warrior (New 
York: Harmony Books, 1991), and Julia Butterfly Hill, , David Harris wrote the only journalistic bookthat 
deals solely with the Headwaters conflict (The Last Stand: The War between Wall Street and Main Street 
over California’s Ancient Redwoods (New York: Times Books, 1995). The journalistic and polemical 
treatments that attend briefly to the Headwaters conflict include, Chase, In A Dark Wood, David Helvarg, 
The War against the Greens: The “Wise-Use” Movement, the New Right, and the browning of America 
(boulder, CO: Johnson Books, 2004), Christopher Manes, Green Rage: Radical Environmentalism and the 
Unmaking of Civilization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), Jacqueline Vaughn, Green Backlash: The History 
and Politics of the Environmental Opposition in the U.S. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), and 
Susan Zakin, Coyotes and Town Dogs: Earth First! and the Environmental Movement (Tuson, AZ: 
University of Arizona Press, 1993).  A few scholarly books that are focused on environmentalism briefly 
mention the Headwaters conflict, including Hays, Wars in the Woods, Carolyn Merchant, Radical Ecology: 
The Search for a Livable World (New York: Routledge, 2005), and Rik Scarce, Eco-warriors:  
Understanding the Radical Environmental Movement (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, Inc, 2006).  
Hays and Merchant are the historians who erred. 
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In that narrative, Wall Street and environmentalists battle over the fate of Pacific 
Lumber’s Headwaters Forest, located approximately 250 miles north of San Francisco on 
the California coast.  The once benevolent feudal landlord, Pacific Lumber Company, 
was the victim of a hostile takeover by Maxxam Corporation in 1985.  Charles Hurwitz, 
the CEO of Maxxam, leveraged the takeover with “junk bonds” underwritten by Michael 
Milken of Drexel Burnham & Company.  The takeover effort was aided by Ivan Boesky 
and Boyd Jeffries’ insider trading activities.  After the takeover, the new Pacific Lumber 
tripled its logging efforts to meet the company’s obligations to its new $800 million high 
interest debt.  Workers and environmentalists feared that the company would cut down 
the forest and abandon America’s last company town, but the tentative alliance did not 
last long.  National environmentalists flocked to rural Humboldt County to stop Pacific 
Lumber’s attempts to destroy the last unprotected ancient redwood forest in the world.  
Years of court cases, protests, direct actions, and halted timber harvests pitted the 
company and its employees against the outsider environmentalists in a battle for the 
forest and the local economy.  In 1996, President Clinton stepped in and negotiated a deal 
with Hurwitz that protected part of Headwaters Forest and gave Pacific Lumber $500 
million.  Activists challenged the terms of the deal in court, and Julia Butterfly Hill sat in 
one giant redwood for more than two years, but the national fervor largely died out.  In 
2007, however, the company filed for bankruptcy either because of its risky financial 
strategies or because its land was overregulated.  Either way, the fate of Headwaters 
Forest was once again uncertain. 
The morality play is compelling, but the story is far more complex, and the 
narrative neglects the central nature of the conflict, which was a local fight over the 
  4 
future of the rural county’s social and ecologic character.  The fight was never as simple 
as jobs versus trees and birds; it was a local fight over land use and social vision.  Big 
business and proponents of corporatism fought against local insurgents and back-to-the-
landers for control of a specific territory—Humboldt and Mendocino Counties.  The 
activists and the timber industry actively and persistently vied for the support of workers 
and the state during the rural uprising.  And Pacific Lumber was never as benevolent as 
often portrayed.  Though it retained its small town image, the company was a fully 
diversified conglomerate by the 1970s, and the seemingly sudden change in logging 
activity after the Maxxam takeover had been in the works for years.  The environmental 
activists were predominantly locals who worked to protect Northcoast logging and forests 
alike.  Those activists appeared more like an amalgamation of Gifford Pinchot, John 
Muir, David Brower, Bill Devall, Wavy Gravy, Edward Abbey, and Rachel Carson than 
they did urban middle class professionals working to protect “nature” from human 
engulfment.  In essence, the battle over Headwaters Forest was one battle in the war 
between competing social visions for northern California—a war nobody won.3  
                                                        
3 Much of the literature treats “environmentalists” and modern environmentalism as a single, nationally-
defined, white middle class phenomena.  In particular, see J. Baird Callicott and Michael P. Nelson eds., 
The Great New Wilderness Debate: An Expansive Collection of Writings Defining Wilderness from John 
Muir to Gary Snyder, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998) and William Cronon, ed, Uncommon 
Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature  (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), Thomas R. 
Dunlop, Faith in Nature: Environmentalism as Religious Quest ( Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2004), J. Brooks Flippen, Nixon and the Environment (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
2000), Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993), Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental 
Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and -- A History 
of Environmental Politics since 1945 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), Roderick 
Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973),  Richard J. 
Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), Adam Rome, 
The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and Joseph Sax, Mountains Without Handrails: 
Reflections on the National Parks (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980). Cronon, in his critique 
of “wilderness,” admonishes environmentalists for separating humanity from wilderness.  The activists in 
this study do not so easily fit into the dominant definition of modern environmentalists.  While they are 
more similar to the depictions of Bob Marshall, Aldo Leopold, Brenton Mckaye, and Robert Yard Sterling 
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This study addresses a set of questions generated by my years of experience as a 
political organizer.  As an undergraduate at Humboldt State University, I witnessed the 
frenzied height of the Headwaters Forest conflict and attended a number of the large 
logging protests.  When I graduated, I worked on grassroots campaigns to protect ancient 
forests, to end logging road subsidies, and to expand Clean Air and Clean Water Act 
protections, among other campaigns.  My experiences in Humboldt County and with state 
and national politics led me to ask a number of questions, among them:  why did the 
national environmental groups largely stay out of the Redwood wars and the Headwaters 
conflict?  Why did the conflict seem to dissolve from the public consciousness?  Why 
have scholars ignored the conflict?  What does the conflict over Headwaters Forest tell us 
about American politics?  How did the conflict begin, and how is it related to the 
development of the modern environmental protection regime?   
Accordingly, this close study of the battle over Headwaters Forest explores the 
influence of the late twentieth century redwood wars on American politics, analyzes the 
underappreciated role of local activism on environmental political development, and 
complicates our understanding of twentieth century environmental ideology and politics.  
Specifically, this dissertation argues:  1) the battles over California redwoods, and 
especially the Headwaters Forest conflict, resulted from local conflicts about the 
valuation of specific redwood groves, about the development of local rural communities, 
and about humanity’s place among the redwoods; 2) the local conflicts were driven by 
activists who largely rejected middle-class work and culture; 3) the local conflicts 
                                                        
from Paul Sutter’s study of interwar wilderness advocates (Driven Wild: How the Fight against 
Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 
the Northcoast activists were more interested in the independent value of non-human life than Sutter’s 
subjects.   
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influenced the development of state and national environmental politics and policies in 
significant ways; 4) on the Northcoast, conservation priorities and methodologies fused 
with preservation, ecologic, and spiritual values; and 5) the localism of the conflict, the 
non-middle-class nature of the activists’ ideas and tactics, and the centrality of private 
property rights helped confine the conflict to the Northcoast until 1996, after which they 
took on significance on the national stage. 
 
Summary of the Redwood Wars and the Battle over Headwaters Forest 
 
The history of conflict over redwoods is long, and the intensity and hostility of the 
conflicts grew over time as the ancient redwood forest shrank and their cultural and 
economic values increased.  The Northcoast grew in fits and spurts during the twentieth 
century, and along with that growth numerous conflicts over the fate of Redwood 
Country developed.  The redwoods’ economic value increased as logging depleted the 
Eastern and Midwestern forests, as the region’s transportation options improved, and as 
the rot- and insect-resistant properties of the timber produced from the giant trees became 
better known.  Simultaneously, the Coastal Redwoods’ cultural value increased due to 
expanded public exposure to the trees.  The redwoods and the redwood forest quickly 
became symbols of American grandeur as well as laboratories for the study of evolution.  
Conflict sparked nearly as quickly as the trees were celebrated, and citizens fought over 
the relative economic and cultural values of specific groves of giant redwoods.  The 
redwood wars grew out of local activists’ desire to prevent further logging in the 
remaining ancient forests on the Northcoast and to preserve the long term viability of the 
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county’s rural society based on timber and agriculture.  By 1985, approximately 1.8 
million acres of ancient redwood forest had been harvested and approximately 76,000 
acres of ancient redwood forest were protected in various state parks and in Redwood 
National Park, while nearly 14,000 acres of ancient redwood forest remained on private 
land.  10,000 of those acres developed into the center of gravity of the Headwaters Forest 
conflict4  
Social vision and giant redwoods lay at the heart of the redwood wars.  The 
redwood wars were one of the longest and most violent environmental disputes in 
American history, beginning in earnest during the 1970s and lasting into the twenty-first 
century.  During the 1970s and 1980s, Northcoast residents grew increasingly concerned 
about the future of the ancient forest, timber jobs, and their rural culture as the rate of 
clearcutting increased and as corporate giants like Louisiana Pacific swallowed up land 
previously owned by small local timber producers.  Some Northcoast residents organized 
and challenged the industrial logging regime because they viewed corporate timber 
liquidation as a serious threat to the health of their rural society they believed was built 
on sustainable resource extraction and healthy ecosystems.  The California Board of 
Forestry and the timber industry stiffly resisted the challenge, which soon turned into 
conflict.  Eventually, the rural Northcoast was awash in daily direct actions, persistent 
litigation, and a degree of press attention never before directed at the counties.  Louisiana 
Pacific’s Mendocino County land and operations were the initial targets in the widened 
                                                        
4 Michael Barbour, Sandy Lydon, Mark Borchert, Marjorie Popper, Valerie Whitworth, and John Evarts, 
Coast Redwood: A Natural and Cultural History (Los Olivos, CA: Cachuma Press, 2001), IX, 10, 96; The 
Trees Foundation, “The Headwaters Forest Stewardship Plan: A Citizens’ Alternative to Maxxam 
Management of Headwaters Forest,” (Redway, CA: The Trees Foundation, 1996), 3.  Elliot Diringer, 
“Cutting a Deal on Redwoods:  A tangled tale of trees, takeovers and a Texas S & L,” The San Frandcisco 
Chronicle 4 Sept. 1996: A1,  
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war on industrial logging.  The Mendocino activists were largely interested in sustainable 
forestry because much of the old growth had already been harvested and the future of the 
local timber industry and wildlife depended on preventing the continued denuding of the 
landscape.  After 1986, however, the citizen activists focused more and more on Pacific 
Lumber’s plans to harvest its remaining old growth groves in Humboldt County as proxy 
for the fight against industrial logging and ecosystem destruction.  The company’s land 
drew intense interest because by the 1980s, less than 4 percent of the estimated pre-
colonial old growth redwoods forest remained on the planet (90,000 acres).5  Pacific 
Lumber owned nearly all of the unprotected ancient forest, and the forest complex that 
contained those old growth groves became known as Headwaters Forest.6  
The conflict over Headwaters Forest was a microcosm of the nature of the 
redwood wars because it combined the long-running disputes over sustainable forestry, 
ecosystem health, and the spiritual values of old growth redwoods.  The battle for 
Headwaters Forest began in 1985 when Charles Hurwitz set his merger and acquisition 
sites on The Pacific Lumber Company of Scotia, California.  However, the conflict was 
deeply rooted in the early century battles over Founders Grove and Humboldt Redwoods 
State Park, and it was an outgrowth of the fights over Redwood National Park in 1968 
and 1978.  The battle for Headwaters was also related to the timber wars fought over the 
old growth Douglass fir forests of the Pacific Northwest.  More closely, the battle over 
Headwaters Forest was an integral part of the 1980s and 1990s redwood wars on the 
                                                        
5 The Trees Foundation, “The Headwaters Forest Stewardship Plan: A Citizens’ Alternative to Maxxam 
Management of Headwaters Forest,” (Redway, CA: The Trees Foundation, 1996) page 3. 
6 Diringer, “Cutting a Deal on Redwoods,” Unlisted Staff Writer, “Deal Saves Giant Redwoods: 2,000-
year-old Forest on Pacific Coast to be Made a Preserve,” The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec), 3 March 1999: 
A14.  I say “relatively untouched” because though we know that those groves had not been logged, we do 
not know whether the Yurok Tribe utilized the groves as hunting grounds, or whether they modified the 
underbrush. 
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Northcoast during which local environmental activists challenged the corporate logging 
regime of Humboldt and Mendocino Counties.  The Headwaters conflict, as was true for 
the broader conflicts over logging the redwoods, became a battle of attrition.  In 1986 
there were 14,000 acres of old-growth forest on Pacific Lumber’s 210,000 acres.  
Activists were united and energized.  By 1995 there were only 8,000 to 9,000 acres 
remaining and the negotiations between the state and the company regarding the public 
purchase of Headwaters splintered the activists at the same time as fatigue set in on the 
community.7     
Local activists drove the resistance to the development of industrial logging just 
as they drove the process of protecting individual stands of ancient redwoods earlier in 
the century.  The late twentieth century campaign was largely the product of a small 
group of Northcoast residents—a cohort that included Mendocino residents Kathy Bailey, 
the volunteer state chair of CA Sierra Club’s state forestry program; Sharon Duggan, a 
native Northcoast attorney working in the Bay Area; Gary and Betty Ball of the 
Mendocino Environmental Center; and Judi Bari, co-founder of North Coast Earth First!.  
In Humboldt County, the effort was guided by the activists who created the 
Environmental Protection Information Center (EPIC), and the Humboldt residents of 
North Coast Earthfirst!, including Robert Sutherland, Darryl Cherney, Alicia Litteltree, 
Richard Geinger, and Cecelia Lanman.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, these activists 
combined direct action, litigation, legislative and administrative advocacy, earned and 
paid media, protests and rallies, and grassroots organizing to defend the giant trees and 
                                                        
7 Jane Kay, “Last Stand: Fighting for the Tall Trees,” San Francisco Examiner, 16, December 1995 
(www.sfgate.com/special/Redwoods/part1.html), Mendocino Environmental Center, “Spring Headwaters 
Campaign,” Headwaters Updates, Issue 30 (Winter 1998), page 5 
(www.mecgrassroots.org/NEWSL/ISS30/30.10H, accessed May, 2006). 
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the ancient forest ecosystem, and to promote their development vision for the Northcoast 
of California. 
By the end of the twentieth century, the timber wars of the American Northwest 
that once demanded the attention of the national press, Congress, the President of the 
United States, Wall Street, and Hollywood had been reduced to low-level skirmishes led 
by the persistent local activists that initiated the war during the 1970s.  In 1999 the public 
purchased 7700 acres of Pacific Lumber land for nearly $500 million, and the company 
placed the rest of its land under Habitat Conservation- and Sustained Yield Plans that 
regulated its activities in sensitive habitats.  Together, the purchase and the plans became 
known as “The Deal” by the press and environmental activists.  In 2000, Julia Butterfly 
Hill came down from her two-year tree sit protesting the The Deal.  Afterward, the battle 
over Headwaters Forest faded from the public eye even as EPIC, Earth First! and others 
continued to fight the terms of The Deal.   
 
Historiography and Argument 
 
This dissertation speaks to numerous bodies of literature, specifically, 
environmental history, American Political Development and political history, and 
business history.  In addition to challenging the dominant narrative of the Headwaters 
Forest conflict, this dissertation confronts the largely federal scope of the historiography 
of United States environmental history and suggests ways that local perspectives might 
alter the dominant narrative.  Specifically, this history of the Headwaters Forest conflict 
challenges the nationalization and professionalization narrative of environmental politics, 
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and many of the conclusions of the Great New Wilderness Debate.  For political 
scientists, my study speaks to American Political Development Theory, especially with 
respect to the role of private property and environmental politics.  Business historians 
will find this study useful because it challenges the postwar narratives about the 
development of the timber industry and the postwar attacks on corporate America.  
Additionally, this study fills a void in the literature on the 1980s mergers and acquisitions 
wave.  The 1985 Pacific Lumber takeover was the first takeover investigated by Congress 
for insider trading allegations, and led directly to the investigations of Ivan Boesky, Boyd 
Jeffries, and Michael Milken, a takeover ignored by business historians. 
Much of American environmental history has been occupied with two sweeping 
goals:  1) tracking the history of the relationships between humans and the non-human 
world and 2) studying the rise of “modern environmentalism.”  Out of both sets of 
literature, one common theme arises:  that the “environment” was something to fear 
and/or civilize for the early European settlers, but by the 1960s, an increasing number of 
Americans believed that the “environment” was valuable and needed to be protected from 
human activities.  That line of thinking was strong enough to force the federal and state 
governments to pass an unprecedented series of laws regulating the relationship between 
American society and the non-human world, and those new laws elevated the non-
economic values of the non-human world.   
The once-dominant narrative of postwar environmental politics, as constructed by 
Stephen Fox, Samuel Hays, Robert Gottlieb, Michael Kraft, Richard Lazarus, and others, 
emphasizes the nationalization and professionalization of “modern” environmentalism 
and the development of command-and-control federal environmental regulation (though 
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to be fair, Fox’s argument primarily revolved around the role of the “radical amateur” in 
the environmental movement, despite the professionalization of the movement).  At its 
core, the narrative explains how the expanded, largely white middle class, animated by its 
understanding of popular ecology and of the destructive forces of modern industry, rose 
up and demanded a cleaner, more beautiful environment filled with greater recreation 
opportunities.  Earth Day 1970 represents the culmination of that popular upsurge, and 
from there, professional “environmentalists,” politicians, and bureaucrats took the reins 
and built the modern environmental protection regime.  Environmental politics was then 
integrated into the everyday horse-trading of Capitol Hill.  There, DC-based 
environmental groups, business interests, and state actors lobbied and debated the scope 
and intent of the new environmental laws, and the courts rendered judgments.  Many of 
the debates were over science, specifically, whose science contained the best prescription 
for the management of the environment. 8   
                                                        
8 On the rise of modern environmentalism see especially:  Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and 
Permanence and -- A History of Environmental Politics since 1945 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American;  Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of 
Environmental Policy; Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside; Paul Sutter, Driven Wild: How the 
Fight against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2002; and Thomas R. Wellock, Preserving the Nation: The Conservation and Environmental 
Movements, 1870 – 2000 (Wheeling, WV: Harlan Davidson, 2007).  Rome, Sutter, and Wellock each argue 
there were more continuities in the pre- and postwar environmental movements than Hays and Nash 
argued.   
 
On the nationalization and professionalization of modern environmental politics and the environmental 
movement see:  Thomas R. Dunlap, Faith in Nature; J. Brooks Flippen, Nixon and the Environment; 
Stephen Fox, The American Conservation Movement: John Muir and his Legacy (University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1985),; Paul Hirt, A Conspiracy of Optimism: Management of the National Forests since World War 
Two (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring; Michael E. 
Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007); Dennis C. Lemaster, 
Decade of Change: The Remaking of Forest Service Statutory Authority during the 1970s (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1984) ; James Salzman and Barton H. Thompson, Environmental Law and Policy (New 
York: Foundation Press, 2003); Joseph Sax, Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on the National 
Parks (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); and James Morton Turner, The Promise of 
Wilderness: A History of American Environmental Politics, 1964-1994 (Dissertation, Princeton University, 
June 2004). 
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With respect to forests, the debate revolved around visions of a healthy forest:  
was a healthy forest intensively managed to maximize wood growth and timber 
production, or was a healthy forest one where human management was minimized?  As 
the nation’s timber operations moved from east to west during the seventeenth, 
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, Americans became concerned about an impending 
timber famine.  By the time timber companies reached the West Coast during the late 
nineteenth century, companies and governments experimented with timber conservation.  
On private land, tree farming and even-age silviculture became the norm.   
The history of redwood timber harvesting differs from the developments of the 
Pacific Northwest industry.  Unlike the Weyerhauser example offered by the classic 
study by Hidy, Hill, and Nevin – heavily drawn on by Michael Williams-- the history of 
Pacific Lumber logging incorporates greater forest diversity.  Partly due to the public 
pressure on Northcoast timber firms and partly a result of the differences between 
Douglass firs and redwoods, Pacific Lumber operations utilized fewer clearcuts and more 
selective harvests.  The industry trends across the West came under fire during the 
postwar era as concerns about recreation, scenic beauty, and biodiversity gained 
popularity.  Because the answers and the science behind the debates and management 
proscriptions were always contested, politics was the final arbiter.9    
According to the standard narrative, the separation of humanity and “nature,” 
represented most dramatically by the so-called wilderness ideal, gave direction to modern 
environmentalism and the environmental protection regime.  With respect to forest 
management of public lands, what is less well known are the battles and debates over 
                                                        
9 See Ralph W. Hidy, Frank Ernest Hill, and Allan Nevins, Timber and Men:  The Weyerhauser Story (New 
York: The MacMillan Company, 1963) and Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical 
Geography (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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private land management like those involved in the redwood wars.  The general narrative 
rings true when viewed at the national scale, but it frays the deeper one gazes into local 
history.10  Studies of federal developments have illuminated the dramatic postwar 
changes in federal policy for public land management, the rifts and tensions between 
local and national environmental groups during the Spotted Owl conflict, and the ways 
local groups acted on the federal scene regarding federal land issues.  Many scholars have 
addressed local activism and its effects on the federal environmental protection regime 
and public land management, but there are relatively few treatments of the local politics 
of forestry on private land.11 
                                                        
10 The classic texts on the ways humans physically, culturally, and economically accommodated  the hon-
human world and modified the non-human world are: William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, 
Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983);  Cronon, Nature’s 
Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991); Richard White, 
The Organic Machine (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The 
Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986, second 
edition 2004); Ari Kelman, A River and Its City: The Nature of Landscape in New Orlean, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003); Theodore Steinberg, Nature Incorporated: Industrialization and the 
Waters of New England (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts, 1991); W. Prescott Webb, The Great 
Plains (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1931); and Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of 
Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997). The classic texts covering the rise of 
modern environmentalism and the Great New Wilderness Debate are: J. Baird Callicott and Michael P. 
Nelson eds., The Great New Wilderness; Gary C. Bryner, Blue Skies, Green Politics: The Clean Air Act of 
1990 and Its Implementation (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995), Cronon, 
Uncommon Ground,” Dunlop, Faith in Nature, J. Brooks Flippen, Nixon and the Environment; Robert 
Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring; Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence, and -- A History of Environmental 
Politics since 1945, Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, Nancy Langston, Forest Dreams, Forest 
Nightmares :The Paradox of Old Growth in the Inland West (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1995), Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Policy; Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside; 
James Salzman and Barton H. Thompson, Environmental Law and Policy;, and Sax, Mountains Without 
Handrails. 
11 Hirt, Conspiracy of Optimism, and LeMaster, Decade of Change are great studies of the transformation 
of federal land management.  Some of the recent treatments of local forestry activism as it related to federal 
laws such as the Wilderness Act of 1964, the Endangered Species Act, and the National Forest 
Management Act include:  William Dietrich, The Final Forest: The Battle for the Last Great Trees of the 
Pacific Northwest (New York: Penguin Books, 1993); Kathie Durbin, Tree Huggers: Victory, Defeat & 
Renewal in the Northwest Ancient Forest Campaign (Seattle, WA: The Mountaineers, 1996); Kevin R. 
Marsh, Drawing Lines in the Forest: Creating Wilderness Areas in the Pacific Northwest (Seattle, WA: 
University of Washington Press, 2007); and Samuel P. Hays, Wars in the Woods: The Rise of Ecological 
Forestry in America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007). Henry F. Bedford produced a 
wonderful study of the local activism in New Hampshire regarding the NEPA impacts on the nuclear 
industry (Seabrook Station: Citizen Politics and Nuclear Power (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1990).  The literature on the redwood wars are largely journalistic and autobiographic, including: 
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Despite the national notoriety of the Headwaters conflict, scholars have almost 
completely ignored it.  The Spotted Owl conflicts dominate the analyses of forest and 
endangered species politics, which are largely centered on national institutions.  The 
literature examining the late twentieth century timber wars largely focuses on the debates 
over the economic impacts of conservation policies, the role of scientists determining 
conservation policies, and the ways local and national citizen groups challenged the 
implementation of the National Forest Management Act and the Endangered Species Act.  
Studies of the conflicts over federal land also shed light on the postwar politicization of 
“science” and the importance of having “science” on one’s side (here, I am reminded of 
Bob Dylan’s song, “With God on our Side,” as well as David Waldstreicher’s book, In 
the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820).  The 
result was not policy clarity, but confusion, with politics arbitrating final decisions.  The 
current literature is not well developed with regard to private property issues, and there is 
only one other scholarly treatment addressing the redwood wars, and it deals exclusively 
with the conflict over Headwaters Forest in the 1990s.12  
                                                        
Judi Bari, Timber Wars (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1994), Joan Dunning, From the Redwood 
Forest: Ancient Trees and the Bottom Line: A Headwaters Journey (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea 
Green Publishing, 1998), Dave Foreman, Confessions of an Eco-warrior (New York: Harmony Books, 
1991), and Julia Butterfly Hill, , David Harris wrote the only journalistic book that deals solely with the 
Headwaters conflict (The Last Stand: The War between Wall Street and Main Street over California’s 
Ancient Redwoods (New York: Times Books, 1995). The journalistic and polemical treatments that attend 
briefly to the Headwaters conflict include, Chase, In A Dark Wood; David Helvarg, The War against the 
Greens: The “Wise-Use” Movement, the New Right, and the browning of America (Boulder, CO: Johnson 
Books, 2004); Christopher Manes, Green Rage: Radical Environmentalism and the Unmaking of 
Civilization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), Jacqueline Vaughn, Green Backlash: The History and Politics 
of the Environmental Opposition in the U.S. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), and Susan Zakin, 
Coyotes and Town Dogs: Earth First! and the Environmental Movement.  A few scholarly books that are 
focused on environmentalism briefly mention the Headwaters conflict, including  Hays, Wars in the Woods, 
Carolyn Merchant, Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World (New York: Routledge, 2005), and 
Rik Scarce, Eco-warriors:  Understanding the Radical Environmental Movement (Walnut Creek, CA: Left 
Coast Press, Inc, 2006).   
12 Some of the best examples of studies about the interest group jockegying and scientific and political 
confusion are:  Alston Chase, In a Dark Wood: The Fights over Forests & the Myths of Nature (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001), Samuel P. Hays, Wars in the Woods: The Rise of Ecological Forestry 
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Richard Widdick’s Trouble in the Forest argues that the Headwaters conflict of 
the 1990s was one in a long series of violent conflicts in Humboldt County over land, 
working conditions, and environmental degradation.  Widdick examines three historical 
violent conflicts: the massacre of Wiyott Indians in 1860, the slaughter of striking loggers 
in 1935, and the violence during the Headwaters conflict.  His study illuminates the 
pattern of violence against groups resisting American capitalist developments in the 
county, and argues the Headwaters conflict embodies the evolution of those conflicts 
from fights over settlement, then the rights of business managers, and finally private 
property rights.  Widdick’s conclusion is that the persistent conflicts in the county 
produced a social environment infused with a narrative about resisting the advances of 
free market capitalism, making the county ripe for conflict over environmental values.13 
This dissertation more closely examines the long history of patterns of conflict 
and politics among the redwood preservation movement, timber companies, and the state.  
In particular, it dissects how those particular groups of local combatants influenced the 
development of forestry regulation, redwood preservation efforts, and the modern 
environmental protection regime.  The two studies are related; Widdick’s study highlights 
the volatile role of the timber industry on various Northcoast populations over time as 
                                                        
in America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), Langston, Forest Dreams, Forest 
Nightmares, Victor M. Sher, “Travels with Strix: The Spotted Owl’s Journey Throught the Federal Courts,” 
Public Land Law Review, Spring 1993 (14 Pub.Land. Rev.41), Brendan Swedlow, “Scientists, Judges, and 
Spotted Owls: Policymakers in the Pacific Northwest,” Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum, 
Spring 2003 (13 Duke Envtl.L. & Pol’y F. 187), John Lowe Weston, “The Endangered species Committee 
and the Northern Spotted Owl: Did the ‘God Squad’ Play God?” Administrative Law Journal of the 
American University, Fall 1993/Winter 1994 (7 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 779), and Stephen Lewis Yaffee, The 
Wisdom of the Spotted Owl: Policy Lessons for a New Century (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1994). 
13 Richard Widdick, Trouble in the Forest: California’s Redwood Timber Wars (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009).  Douglas Bevington (Rebirth of Environmentalism: Grassroots Activism from the 
Spotted Owl to the Polar Bear (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2009) contains a chapter about the 
Headwaters Conflict.  Bevington’s larger argument about the localism of the biodiversity groups, the 
uncompromising nature of their strategies, and their use of traditional political tools fit in well with my own 
analysis and arguments. 
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well as the persistent tension over the property rights and prerogatives of private timber 
companies, specifically in Humboldt County.  My dissertation digs deeper into the 
broader redwood wars on the entire Northcoast, and the environmental policy 
implications of the redwood wars.  The broader redwood wars, along with the longer 
history of conflict and accommodation between timber companies and redwood 
preservationists are a part of the historical tensions over property rights behind the 
Redwood Curtain.  As such, it this study helps delineate the policy and political 
implications of the competition among the state, redwood preservationists, and timber 
companies on American environmental politics. 
This dissertation challenges the traditional interpretation of modern 
environmentalism as an urban middle-class movement; it challenges the nationalization 
and professionalization narrative of environmentalism; and it challenges the dominance 
of the so-called wilderness ideal over resource conservation in postwar environmental 
activism.  The West Coast timber conflicts changed the landscape of American 
environmental politics, and the battle over Headwaters Forest occupied the fevered center 
of the timber wars from 1993 to 1999.  Unlike the Spotted Owl conflict, the redwood 
wars were a state and local war for most of their duration, though they powerfully 
influenced national politics and culture.  For example, the conflict played a large role in 
the Clinton administration’s development of administrative tools to negotiate endangered 
species claims on private land.  Additionally, Congress appropriated $300 million to 
purchase part of Headwaters Forest.  And the federal courts, for the first time, used the 
Endangered Species Act to stop logging on private land.  The conflict also changed the 
national environmental movement.  The local Earth First! activists feminized and 
  18 
humanized the radical movement, eventually causing Earth First! to divide into numerous 
smaller groups.  Because of the private property issue, DC-based groups did not embrace 
the locals’ campaign until the conflict was federalized after 1995.  In California, the 
redwood wars undercut corporatist timber regulation, and forcefully asserted citizens into 
the decision-making process.   
This history of the Headwaters Forest conflict offers new perspectives on 
American politics and postwar environmentalism as it addresses a hole in the 
historiography.  Based on the standard postwar environmental narrative, one might 
assume that the battle over Headwaters Forest was between middle-class 
environmentalists who worked to prevent permanent human activity from invading the 
forest, and a timber industry intent on creating a tree farm out of the forest.  In reality, the 
battle was over how best to integrate human society with non-human communities.  
Nearly every local participant wanted humans to actively manage the landscape so that 
giant redwoods, Douglass fir, timber workers, farmers, marbled murrelets, northern 
spotted owls, giant pacific salamanders, and the other inhabitants of the Northcoast could 
cohabitate in perpetuity.  Recognizing those ideals of the Northcoast activists undercuts 
historians’ arguments about the dominance of the wilderness ideal.  In fact, Dave 
Foreman, co-founder of the national Earth First! movement, has been the poster child for 
historians of the modern wilderness ideal that removes humanity from the wild.  But 
probably the most well known local affiliate of his group pursued goals that integrated 
humans and their surroundings.  Additionally, while the Northcoast activists utilized 
many mainstream political tools, including lawsuits, lobbying, and public relations, as a 
group they largely rejected middle-class work and culture and heavily leaned on direct 
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action and civil disobedience as tactics.  In fact, many of the most prominent local leaders 
had migrated to the Northcoast in order to escape urban and suburban middle-class 
politics and life.14   
The two major protagonists in the redwood wars differed dramatically in their 
approaches to management, however.  The activists wanted to rid the county of distant 
corporate landlords, place local people in charge of county development, create a matrix 
landscape composed of a variety of habitats and work environments, and prevent the 
harvesting of the last ancient redwoods.  The leaders of the Pacific Lumber Company 
wanted to maximize new wood growth and efficiently harvest trees.  Their approach was 
based on the eighteenth and nineteenth century European model of sustainable forestry 
that emphasized sustained yields and rotational harvests to maximize annual timber 
yields and growth, an approach that treated forests in ways similar to cultivated food 
crops.  The company believed enough ancient redwoods were protected to provide 
adequate old-growth habitat, and that species previously found in old-growth forests 
would adapt to second growth habitat.   
The standard postwar narrative, until recently, overestimated the diminished 
influence of those types of resource conservationism on environmental thought.  Adam 
Rome, Paul Sutter, Thomas Wellock, and others have highlighted the oversimplification 
of the conservation, preservation, environmentalism divides.  This study is a part of the 
efforts to dismantle the pre- and postwar divide in environmental historiography.  Sutter 
emphasized the interwar wilderness advocates’ utilization of conservation methodology 
to pursue preservationist goals.  Rome highlighted how the state addressed suburban 
                                                        
14 See Cronon, “The Problem with Wilderness;” and Calcott and Nelson, The New Wilderness Debate 
especially regarding Foreman and modern wilderness ideals, along with the more expansive debates 
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pollution and sprawl with conservation strategies.  Wellock described modern 
environmentalism as combining “resource conservation, pollution control, and wilderness 
preservation” into one movement.  The activists in the redwood wars approached local 
landscape management with conservation tools, but their goals differed from Sutter’s 
activists when they created the The Wilderness Society.  The Northcoasters were far 
more concerned about sustainable logging, workers, and biodiversity than about 
recreation, reserves or game management.  On the Northcoast at least, Pinchotian 
conservation was a powerful source of ideas throughout the twentieth century, and was 
easily integrated with modern ecological theories and Muirian preservationism.  Pinchot 
believed in efficient resource use based on scientific forestry as a necessary path to the 
improvement of human society to prevent resource scarcity and resulting social conflicts.  
Additionally, Pinchot believed the government as promoter of the public good needed to 
safeguard the nation’s resources from profit-focused corporations.  Muir was also 
skeptical of business’ ability to protect natural resources, but Muir was interested less in 
protecting the economic value of resources, and more on protecting the sublime qualities 
of the grandest landscapes in America.  He viewed wild places as sources of spiritual 
renewal to better enable individuals to fight off the ills of industrial society.  The 
Northcoast activists believed they could create a landscape that utilized conservation 
methodology to protect economic, spiritual, and ecologic resources.15 
                                                        
15 See Henry E. Lowood, “The Calculating Forestrer: Quantification, Cameral Science, and the Emergence 
of Scientific Forestry Management in Germany,” in Tore Frangsmyr, J.L. Heilbron, and Robin E. Rider, 
eds., The Quantifying Spirit in the 18th Century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990) 315 – 
342 regarding the origins of scientific forestry.  See Rome, Bulldozer in the Countryside; Sutter, Driven 
Wild; and Wellock, Preserving the Nation, 128.  See also, Richard White, “Are You an Environmentalist 
Or Do You Work for a Living?,” in Cronon, Uncommon Ground for a good description of the most popular 
critique of modern environmental activists as middle-class activists.  Additionally, see Carolyn Merchant, 
Columbia Guide to American Environmental History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).   
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Similarly, the history of the redwood wars offers a new perspective on the 
development of the modern environmental protection regime.  In California, 
environmental activists not only contended with the client-agency traditions of the Forest 
Service and Bureau of Land Management, they also had to contend with corporatist 
hurdles.  Under corporatist governance, the state granted industries the ability to improve 
efficiencies via self-regulation.  The state facilitated industry participation by forming 
official regulatory boards on which industry held a majority of seats.  The Forest Service, 
Bureau of Land Management, and the Fish and Wildlife Service were never managed by 
corporatist boards, and accordingly, national advocates of the modern environmental 
protection regime only needed to address agency action and statute interpretations.  
However, the states utilized corporatist boards more frequently, which complicated the 
shift to the modern environmental protection regime.  The battle over Headwaters Forest 
was a part of a long effort by environmental activists to break down corporatist 
regulation.  Though the redwood wars were fought over state laws and traditions, they 
had a profound effect on national politics, and emphasize the bottom-up forces that drove 
the development of the modern environmental protection regime.  The intractable nature 
of the Headwaters conflict forced the federal government and other national institutions 
to grapple with the fate of ancient redwoods and ultimately the interaction between 
federal environmental law and private property.16  
                                                        
16 Corporatism, as used here, refers to the definition Ellis Hawley used in his classic article, “The 
Discovery and Study of a “Corporate Liberalism,” The Business History Review, Vol. 52, No. 3, Corporate 
Liberalism (Autumn, 1978), 309-320.  Hawley defines corporatism as a system whereby industries are 
guided by “officially recognized, non-competitive, role-ordered occupational or functional 
groupings…where the state properly functions as a coordinator, assistant, and midwife rather than director 
or regulator.”   
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The history of the Headwaters conflict fits well with some of the key recent 
findings of American Political Development Theory, while at the same time raising  
questions about its overall direction.  APD Theory, as defined by Stephen Skowronek and 
Karen Orren, states that American political development is defined by shifts in 
institutional authority “from prescriptive to positive lawmaking” driven by the 
“intercurrence” of authority.17  APD theorists argue that American political institutions 
have been increasingly abandoning precedent and the Constitution in favor of decisions 
based on contemporary values and circumstances.  .   
Certainly, much of environmental political history demonstrates that phenomena, 
and Orren and Skowronek discuss the history of federal land management to support their 
argument for the direction of APD.  The shifts from acquiring and distributing public 
land to managing natural resources on public land to protecting the health of ecosystems 
represent progressive movements away from the authority delegated to the federal 
government by the Constitution and common law.  Each shift was the result of positive 
lawmaking, driven by a crisis of authority.  Conservationists, motivated by progressive 
notions of technical management, did not fit easily within the General Land Office, 
whose mission was to sell land into private hands.  Conservationists wanted the 
government to maintain a supply of public land, and pushed for the creation of the Forest 
and Park Services and for some semblance of bureaucratic independence.18  The move to 
environmental protection resulted in transfers of authority and positive lawmaking as 
                                                        
17 Orren and Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development, 172-201.  The quoted phrase 
about the direction of development is from page 178. 
18 In addition to Orren and Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development, 156 – 171 re: 
federal land history, see Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy:  Reputations, 
Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862 – 1928 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2001). 
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well.  The environmental protection regime required all agencies to accommodate new 
laws and values.  Simultaneously, Congress and the courts more actively managed 
agencies, and the agencies were further stripped of authority when citizens were 
effectively deputized by the environmental protection laws in order to watchdog industry 
and agencies.   
While the APD trajectory works for public land policy, the history of the 
Headwaters conflict does not conform so neatly—in part because the conflict revolved 
around private land and corporate prerogative.  The basics of APD theory are present in 
the history of the conflict:  an older regulatory tradition and arrangement (the corporatist 
Board of Forestry) butted uncomfortably against new priorities (i.e. the 1973 Forest 
Practice Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the California 
Environmental Quality Act) and authority (“deputized” citizen groups, the legislature, 
and the courts).  However, rather than resolving the issue via positive lawmaking, federal 
agencies, the President, Congress, and the California State Assembly abandoned the 
relatively new environmental laws to forge compromises to protect traditional private 
property rights.  Thus, the Headwaters conflict points out that private property traditions 
may block the institutional pathways necessary to true positive lawmaking.   
Additionally, this dissertation challenges at least two prominent frameworks for 
analyzing postwar business history.  In their history of Weyerhauser, Ralph W. Hidy, 
Frank Ernest Hill, and Allan Nevins asserted that technological advances, scientific 
management, and conservation were the dominant trends of the twentieth century timber 
industry.  Pacific Lumber’s history partially supports their contentions, but it also sets the 
company apart from companies like Weyerhauser that focused their expansion efforts on 
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increasing market share through increased production and through related diversification 
efforts (i.e. adding paper products to the timber product lines).  Rather, Pacific Lumber 
increased its market share by cutting its prime asset—1000-year-old redwoods -- slowly, 
and by doing so it gained a monopoly position by holding on longest in a war of attrition.  
While Weyerhauser and others entered the paper business during the postwar era, Pacific 
Lumber behaved like a conglomerate, adding cutting and welding operations, a hotel, and 
a Central California tomato and rice farm.19   
David B. Sicilia has argued that the American corporation went through five 
postwar stages: 
success and optimism immediately following the war; sustained challenges by 
social movements; increasing regulatory control by the ‘new social’ regulatory 
sate of the early 1970s; new accommodationist public relations strategies and 
tactics; and involvement in large-scale tort litigation. 
 
The history of Pacific Lumber demonstrates that Sicilia’s stages need not follow 
the order of his three case studies (the chemical, tobacco, and nuclear industries) nor 
involve exclusively tort litigation.  Pacific Lumber moved from success to social 
movement challenges to increased regulation to administrative and enforcement litigation 
battles to more accommodationist public relations.  Additionally, the history of the 
lawsuits brought against Pacific Lumber and the timber industry challenge Sicilia’s 
argument that the increased use of tort law when government enforcement of regulations 
waned may indicate the gradual dismantling of the progressive era regulatory state.  By 
contrast, the lawsuits filed against Pacific Lumber and other timber companies 
                                                        
19 Hidy, Hill, and Nevins, Timber and Men; Michael V. Namorato, “Lumber and Wood Products, 24.0,” 
Chapter 6 in David O. Whitten and Bessie E. Whitten, eds, Manufacturing: A Historiographical and 
Bibliographical Guide, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 117-131; Joseph Zaremba, Economics of 
the American Lumber Industry, (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1963) 2-3; and Paul V. Ellefson and 
Robert N. Stone, U.S. Wood-based Industry: Industrial Organization and Performance (New York: 
Praeger, 1984) 359 also identifies transportation, automation, and conservation as the three major timber 
industry trends during twentieth century. 
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strengthened the state’s regulatory power and were based on prevention and enforcement, 
not “retribution” for past harm.20 
 
Organization and Methodology 
 
To accomplish its goals, this dissertation gives voice to the local participants on 
both sides of the redwood wars in order to enhance our understanding of the conflict and 
its role in American history.  Accordingly, the research is largely based on the 
unprocessed archives of the Environmental Protection Information Center located in 
Garberville and Arcata, Califorrnia; the personal papers of Kathy Bailey, former state 
forestry chair for California Sierra Club, located in Philo, California; the personal papers 
of Congressman Dan Hamburg, located in Ukiah, California; the personal papers of 
Alicia Littletree, Earth First! organizer, located in Ukiah, California; and the public 
records of The Pacific Lumber Company and Maxxam Inc.  Oral histories conducted with 
local leaders Dan Hamburg; Kathy Bailey; Sharon Duggan, EPIC attorney; Kevin Bundy, 
EPIC media spokesperson; Darryl Cherney, North Coast Earth First! co-founder; Robert 
Sutherland, EPIC co-founder; Alicia Littletree; John Campbell, former CEO and 
President of Pacific Lumber; Richard Geinger, EPIC activist; Paul Mason, former EPIC 
Executive Director; and Kate Anderton, former Save-the-Redwoods League Executive 
Director and Dan Hamburg Chief of Staff, provided me with invaluable information 
about the conflict and the participants.  These sources, I believe, allowed me to 
                                                        
20 David B. Sicilia, “The Corporation Under Siege: Social Movements, Regulation, Publid Relations, and 
Tort Law since the Second World War,” Chapter 7 in Kenneth Lipartito and David B. Sicilia, eds., 
Constructing Corporate America: History, Politics, Culture ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 188-
222.  The quoted sections are on pages 189 and 213 respectively. 
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understand what was important to the local participants and why they acted the ways they 
did.  My hope is that the resulting analysis furthers our understanding of the complexities 
of American environmental politics and ideologies, and that it helps dissolve some of the 
false boundaries we’ve erected between pre- and postwar environmentalism. 
The dissertation is organized chronologically to foreground the story itself as well 
as my arguments about the historical continuities of environmental ideology and values.  
As such, each chapter tracks the developments of the three key institutions involved in 
the redwood wars and the battle over Headwaters Forest:  The California Board of 
Forestry, The Pacific Lumber Company, and citizen activist organizations.  This 
chronological structure focused on three institutions highlights how and when the 
Headwaters Forest conflict became more intractable, and the ways the locals’ actions 
influenced the development of national politics.   
Chapter Two examines the deep roots of the redwood wars, beginning with the 
earliest incarnations of the Board, The Pacific Lumber Company, and Northern 
California redwood conservation activists, and how different valuations of the redwood 
sparked the early conflicts and set the stage for the late twentieth century redwood wars.  
During this period, each of the three institutions developed traditions, strategies, and 
tactics that, not without modification, remained the primary tools in their respective 
toolboxes for interacting with each other throughout the twentieth century.  A common 
conservative-progressive social vision eased the negotiations between parties during the 
early part of the century.  Between 1900 and 1964, The Save-the-Redwoods League, the 
Sierra Club, Pacific Lumber, the Board of Forestry, and other interested parties worked 
out deals to protect some representative groves of giant redwoods through private 
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negotiations funded with private dollars.  The negotiations were not as gentlemanly as 
often portrayed, however, and after World War II, the cracks in the system widened and 
expanded 
Chapter Three covers the genesis of the redwood wars and the related 
transformation of redwood politics after 1968.  The chapter argues that the development 
of a concerted attack on the Board’s corporatism, the aggressive conglomeration of 
Pacific Lumber, and the migration of key new residents to the Northcoast paved the way 
for the redwood wars of the 1980s and 1990s.  Additionally, the chapter argues that even 
though new ecological and political ideas about “nature” and humanity’s role in “nature” 
drove a wedge between Sierra Club and Save-the-Redwoods in the fight for a National 
Park, and even though the Wilderness Act of 1964 and the 1970s environmental 
protection laws were largely based on the newly popular ideas, Pinchotian conservation 
remained a powerful influence on Northcoast environmentalists and California’s logging 
regulations. The 1973 Forest Practice Act and the 1976 Timber Production Act were 
good examples because they were based on the active management of the landscape to 
provide timber, water, recreation opportunities, wildlife habitat, and aesthetic 
preservation.  Likewise, citizen challenges to California’s logging regime were based on 
the activists’ belief that the regime was not providing and could not provide landscape 
management that would fulfill their sustainable harvest and ecological health goals.  
The campaign against the corporatism of the Board and the Board’s development 
focus turned into the redwood wars during the late 1970s and early 1980s when 
Northcoast residents who were veterans of the 1960s social movements not only attacked 
corporatism and its lack of commitment to sustainable forestry and ecological health, but 
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also the social structure of the Northcoast.  Robert Sutherland, Kathy Bailey, Richard 
Geinger, Dan and Carrie Hamburg, and others relocated to the Northcoast during the 
early 1970s as weary refugees of the 1960s San Francisco Bay Area.  They moved north 
to escape political strife and to live a more rural, less destructive lifestyle.  Gradually, 
they were dragged back into politics.  At first, it was very local politics:  school boards, 
Agent Orange use on the adjacent hillside, county development plans.  Those political 
fights led inexorably to larger targets — corporate logging, the Board of Forestry, the 
Roadless Area Review and Evaluation.   
Chapter Four examines the escalation of the redwood wars between 1985 and 
1989.  The gulf between the different social and environmental visions of the activists 
and the local timber leaders was never bridged. and their respective positions hardened 
over time.  The war then became one of attrition—of money and trees and will.  It did not 
have to end up that way.  Around the core of early 1970s activists, more recent 
transplants like Judi Bari and Darryl Cherney joined the war and raised the stakes and the 
profile of the redwood wars.  Finally, the Headwaters conflict dragged them all into the 
national spotlight, and a local fight over local governance, local trees, and local society 
pushed, and was pushed by, larger institutions. 
North Coast Earth First! was not like other Earth First! groups.  Judi Bari, Darryl 
Cherney, Judy Ball, and Gary Ball were not misanthropes working to push humans off 
the countryside and into the cities in order to create a vast pre-colonial-style wilderness.  
North Coast EF! reached out to workers, and its leaders agreed with EPIC and California 
Sierra Club that smart landscape management was the most desirable end game for the 
Northcoast.  John Campbell at Pacific Lumber also desired a sustainable logging regime 
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so that his company could operate in perpetuity.  There could have been a way out of the 
war.  Acts of violence, unproductive rhetoric, and hardened positions, however, 
prevented reconciliation.  The sticking points were Headwaters Forest, corporatist 
governance traditions, and corporate ownership of logging companies.  There, in 
Humboldt County, the recurrent American battles between individualism and 
communalism, capitalism and socialism, and Woody Guthrie and Irving Berlin once 
again played out on the national stage.  The activists wanted Maxxam out of the county 
and wanted the whole Headwaters Forest complex managed by a nonprofit community 
logging company.  Hurwitz would not leave, however, and would not sell Headwaters 
until its sale value was maximized.  The activists wanted the Board of Forestry to strictly 
enforce the sustainable logging provisions of the Forest Practice Act according to 
conservation biology principles.  Campbell believed sustainability was achieved by 
maximizing new timber growth and improving harvesting efficiencies.  Both sides dug in 
their heels and refused to compromise. 
Chapter Five examines the process that catapulted the local conflict out of the 
Northcoast and into legislature and courtrooms at the state and federal level.  The local 
Headwaters combatants forced the state and federal governments to respond to the 
conflict over local values.  The conflict also forced national environmental groups to 
make a decision about the last ancient redwoods, to somehow reconcile private property 
rights and sustainable logging.  After 1990, the federal government further backtracked 
from the 1970s legacy of environmental protection, as it had in 1982.  It was no 
coincidence that the feds backed off at a time when the national media was drawn to the 
conflict, Dan Hamburg was elected to Congress, EPIC filed suit against Pacific Lumber 
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in federal court, the Spotted Owl conflict raged in the Pacific Northwest, and the 
Republicans mounted legislative challenges to the environmental protection regime.  
Curiously, the national environmental groups were active in the Spotted Owl conflict, but 
almost completely absent from the Headwaters Forest conflict, despite the fact that the 
Headwaters conflict was the result of two of the main systemic problems environmental 
groups wanted to address:  the political influences of corporate America and the lack of a 
more holistic environmental protection regime capable of comprehensive resource 
management.  The main difference between the two conflicts was that the Spotted Owl 
fight was over public land and the Headwaters conflict was over private land.  Once the 
conflict was federalized, however, national groups were forced to get involved to varying 
degrees. 
Chapter Six covers the events that led to the unprecedented Headwaters 
Agreement signed in 1996 and the ways the conflict transformed American 
environmental politics.  The chapter argues that President Clinton was forced into the 
negotiations by the local actors, and that the Agreement was the consummation of efforts 
to balance private property rights, endangered species law, sustained yield forestry, and 
aesthetic preservation.  The Gingrich Revolution, the Ninth Circuit panel ruling in favor 
of EPIC, a FDIC suit against Maxxam for its role in the Texas Savings and Loan scandal, 
the Spotted Owl negotiations, and Pacific Lumber Company’s takings suit against the 
federal government forced President Bill Clinton to ask the Department of the Interior to 
come up with a plan to prevent endangered species conflicts in the future without needing 
an act of Congress.  President Clinton also pushed his administration to the negotiating 
table with Charles Hurwitz to end the conflict over Headwaters Forest as he had done in 
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Oregon in 1993 to end the Spotted Owl conflict.  Environmental activists were not at the 
table, though they were kept abreast of the negotiations and occasionally consulted.  The 
results were the September 1996 Headwaters Agreement and Bruce Babbitt’s “safe 
haven” and “no surprises” policies intended to bring private landowners to the 
negotiating table with the Department of Interior before a conflict sparked.  The 
agreement was supposed to end the redwood wars, but it unexpectedly widened it.    
 That transformation in the conflict eventually restricted the war to a policy battle 
in the state house and in the federal government, but the terms of the Agreement and the 
exclusion of Northcoast locals in the negotiations initially galvanized the Northcoast 
activists and widened the war.  The newly expanded war resulted in the two largest anti-
logging protests in American history, an unprecedented forest occupation by tree-sitters, 
nationwide rallies every September 20th, and increased state violence against the 
protesters.  By 1999, when the California Assembly had to decide whether to appropriate 
its share of the cost of the Headwaters purchase, the consummation of the Agreement was 
in jeopardy.  The state was not pleased with the company’s Habitat Conservation Plan 
and Sustained Yield Plan.  The company was not pleased with the Assembly’s proposed 
changes, and environmentalists decried the “ransom” offered to Hurwitz.  The agreement 
was literally signed at the eleventh hour, but the legal challenges to the plans and anti-
Maxxam sentiment remained.    
 To state that the legacy of the redwood wars is complicated would be an 
understatement.  The redwood wars further divided an already combustible Northcoast; 
helped push endangered species protection out of the legislative arena; launched a series 
of legal challenges to private property “takings;” protected more than 3000 acres of 
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ancient redwood forest; allowed for the harvest of another 7000 acres of ancient redwood 
forest; and ultimately led to the removal of Louisiana Pacific and Pacific Lumber from 
the Northcoast.  The redwood wars did not change the social structure of the Northcoast, 
but they did begin to break down California’s corporatist regime.  The war was an epic 
battle between competing social visions, and as with the battle between Guthrie and 





Chapter 2: Deep Roots, 1850 – 1968 
 
 
The roots of the redwood wars stretch back into the second half of the nineteenth 
century, when the institutions, governance traditions, values conflicts, and Northcoast 
radicalism that fueled the Headwaters Forest conflict were born.  This chapter charts the 
development of the first era of redwood politics from the late nineteenth century until 
1968.  Beginning in 1968, redwood politics was dramatically transformed by the state, 
the courts, and the newly radicalized redwood preservation movement.  Despite the 
transformation of the conflicts in Redwood Country, deep ties to the first era remained.  
 The four most important aspects of the first era of redwood politics were:  the 
emergence of conflict over the management the redwood forest; the development of the 
first system of resolving the conflicts; the development of California’s corporatist system 
of private forest regulation; and the growth of Pacific Lumber and the redwood 
preservation movement.  The redwood wars of the late twentieth century, like the earlier 
conflicts, were rooted in a conflict over land managment, and the drama and violence of 
Headwaters Forest conflict was due to the power of the preservation movement and 
Pacific Lumber.  However, the redwood wars became a protracted conflict because they 
were a battle over the inherited systems of governance and conflict resolution as much as 
they were about land management.   
From the mid 1800s to the onset of the redwood wars in the 1970s, there were 
four important continuities in redwood politics.  First, many of the institutional players of 
the late twentieth century were the same as those at the turn of the twentieth century.  The 
Pacific Lumber Company, the California Board of Forestry, and the Sierra Club all were 
created during the late nineteenth century, and all were engaged in redwood politics from 
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that point forward.  Second, redwood politics throughout the period was defined by the 
debate over how to best manage the land to accommodate recreationists, scientists, 
industrialists, agriculturalists, and the redwood forest.  The debates did not truly resemble 
the oft-described competition between John Muir and Gifford Pinchot on the federal 
stage.  Muir despised industrialists and Pinchot strove for industrial efficiency in forestry.  
However, the activists, regulators, and timber operators on the Northcoast strove for 
coexistence, and developed a set of competing hybrid environmental ideologies that 
incorporated conservationism, preservationism, and ecology. The conflicts arose because 
people disagreed on end goals and on operations, each of which were a moving target 
throughout the century, especially for the state and for environmental activists.   
Third, women activists provided great leadership and initiative from the earliest 
redwood preservation campaigns through the late century redwood wars.  And fourth, 
during both eras, national and state institutions were forced to accommodate local 
Humboldt activists because the locals were often more forceful, confrontational, and 
independent than the larger institutions.  Thus, the development of redwood politics from 
the nineteenth century until 1970 directly set the stage for the protracted redwood wars of 
the late twentieth century.  
 
The Development of a Rare Forest 
 
The history of conflict in the redwoods is inextricably tied to the character and 
history of the redwood forest itself – its age, size, and geographic range.  The trees are 
tall, they are old, and they have a exist in a small geographic range, all of which has made 
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them valuable as timber, as research specimens, and as cultural symbols.  The forest 
dominated by the redwoods also is old and rare, as are many of the inhabitants, making 
the forest ecologically valuable as a source of biodiversity.  Redwood, however, is a 
rather recent name for the species of giant coastal trees found on the West Coast of the 
United States.  Native Americans have referred to the giants as gahsay, cholay, and 
loomeen.  When Father Juan Crespi of Spain penned the first known written description 
of the coastal trees in 1769, he gave them the Spanish name palo colorado (red wood).  
During the nineteenth century, botanists first named them Taxodium sempervirens, and in 
1874, the trees were reclassified as Sequoia sempervirens.  By the turn of the twenty-first 
century, the trees that long occupied a prominent space in the minds of artists, scientists, 
businessmen, workers, citizens, and politicians are best known as coast redwood, 
California redwood, or simply redwood.21  
The “Sequoias” of the Taxodiacae family, including the redwoods that stood in 
the middle of the persistent twentieth century conflicts, were the product of both 
individual longevity and communal shrinkage. The coast redwoods are the sole surviving 
species of the Sequoia genus, but they have two extant relatives: Metasequoia (dawn 
redwood) and Sequoiadendron (giant sequoia).  Each genus lives on a single continent, 
Sequoia and Sequoiadendron on North America, Metaswauoia on Asia -- testimony to 
their long evolution.  The Sequoias. the tallest trees in the world, can live for more than 
1000 years, and are the result of more than 100 million years of evolution.  Despite their 
individual longevity and size, however, the “Sequoias,” like the dinosaurs, retreated after 
the early Tertiary Period (approximately 65 to 24 million years ago).  Unlike the 
                                                        
21 Barbour, Coast Redwood, 1-2, 88 and Reed F. Noss ed., The Redwood Forest: History, Ecology,  and 
Conservation of the Coast Redwoods (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000), 2-4. 
. 
  36 
dinosaurs, the coast redwood, the giant sequoia, and the dawn redwood remained extant, 
albeit in a shrinking range.  Beginning in the late Tertiary, due to cooler and drier 
conditions, the “Sequoias” that had occupied a wide belt around the globe (from current 
Alaska to Oregon) migrated south and west toward warmer climates.  Three million years 
ago, redwoods disappeared from Europe, Asia, Greenland, and Japan.  Today, they 
remain only in a narrow belt along the central and northern California coast and in a 
small patch of southwest Oregon from 42° 09’ latitude north to 35° 41’ latitude north.22 
Despite its relatively small acreage—approximately 1.9 million acres of forest at 
the time of the European arrival on the west coast of North America -- the modern 
redwood belt is surprisingly diverse.  The coastal belt is five to twenty-five miles wide, 
generally under 2500 feet elevation, and mostly absent from the immediate coast.  The 
belt is drenched in summer fog and winter rains, with only mild seasonal temperature 
fluctuations.  The redwoods dominate this landscape for several reasons.  Their thick bark 
protects the trees from fire.  They are not reliant on pollen or seed distribution because 
they have the ability to sprout new saplings from basal buds and stumps.  And they can  
thrive in shade-suppressed environments for centuries.  Eighty-eight percent of modern 
redwoods reside in California’s Sonoma, Mendocino, Humboldt, and Del Norte counties 
in three types of forests.  The alluvial flats of the northern rivers of the belt such as the 
Eel, Smith, and Klamath are dominated by redwoods and contain the tallest trees.  Many 
of the alluvial flat redwoods grow to heights of more than 350 feet with 15-foot 
diameters.  As slope and elevation increases, tree size decreases and species diversity 
increases.  On the slopes rising above the river bottoms throughout the redwood belt exist 
a mixed forest of redwood and Douglass fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii).  Mixed in with the 
                                                        
22 Barbour, Coast Redwood, 7-9; Noss, The Redwood Forest, 7-24, 39. 
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conifers are more drought-resistant trees such as tanbark oak and madrone.  Above 1000 
feet elevation, the redwood and Doug fir forest is accompanied by an understory of 
Western hemlock, Sitka spruce, huckleberry, California rhododendron, along with 
tanbark oak and madrone.23 
Along with diverse plant communities, the modern redwood forest is home to an 
array of wildlife species, especially within the remaining old growth forests of the belt.  
A redwood forest is considered old growth, or ancient, if it is “relatively old and 
relatively undisturbed by humans,” according to redwood ecologist Reed Noss, with eight 
trees per acre greater than 300 years old, and a complexly layered canopy.  Additionally, 
an ancient forest contains considerable numbers of snags (standing dead trees) and 
downed trees and branches.  Colloquially, an ancient forest often is defined as a forest 
that has not been logged since the European migration to North America.  Many insect 
and animal species of the redwood belt are nearly or totally endemic, such as the banana 
slug and redwood bark beetle, and including eleven of the twenty-nine amphibians found 
in the belt, such as the red-bellied newt, lungless salamander, Pacific giant salamander, 
and the world’s most primitive frog – the tailed frog.  The forest also is home to rare 
mammals such as the Roosevelt elk, the northern flying squirrel, ring-tailed cats, and the 
Humboldt marten.  It was, however, the bird and fish species of the forest that, aside from 
the redwoods, received the most popular attention, especially the various salmonids, the 
northern spotted owl, and the marbled murrelet.   
The rare species of fauna, the giant trees, the forest’s limited range, and the 
deafening silence of the forest captivated Europeans and Americans from the nineteenth 
century forward.  Because of the myriad economic, cultural, and scientific opportunities 
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the forest held, Americans battled during the entire twentieth century over the fate of the 
giants.24  
 
Seeds of Conflict Planted 
 
Although humans have occupied the west coast of North America for at least 
8,600 years, conflict over the redwoods was a modern phenomenon.  The clashes 
emerged when citizen activists proposed land management regimes for specific groves of 
redwoods that were at odds with the plans of the landowner.  Early residents, such as the 
Yurok tribe, resided on the “balds” – hilltops devoid of trees – and used fire to clear the 
understory, in ways similar to Native Americans on the East Coast.  There is no evidence 
the West Coast inhabitants logged the giant trees, and because of the sparse population, 
conflict over the vast forest was unlikely.   
As the logging industry and the European population of northern California 
expanded, however, conflict over the future of the ancient redwoods seemed almost 
inevitable.  During the late nineteenth century, logging practices became controversial 
because of a nationwide fear of a timber famine, but conflict over the redwoods in 
particular ignited because people feared the loss of giant trees, not lumber.  To timber 
companies and to the Board of Forestry, the giant trees represented economic 
opportunity.  To some influential citizens, the giant trees represented scientific and 
recreation opportunities, as well as monuments to American greatness.  As the giant’s 
                                                        
24 Barbour, Coast Redwood, 58-74.  Noss, The Redwood Forest, 87-90 re: old growth definition 
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range receded, the economic, cultural, and scientific values of the remaining redwoods 
increased, and the stakes were raised over the management of those final forests.25 
 
Birth of the Redwood Preservation Movement 
 
 In the mid nineteenth century, the giant redwoods captured the imagination of 
Americans and became symbols of American aspirations.  Those aspirations fueled a few 
unsuccessful efforts to retain some of the redwood forest as public property.  Redwood 
Country was relatively undeveloped by Europeans until after the California Gold Rush, 
when American and European immigrants built the redwood logging industry and 
introduced Americans to the giants.  Nearly simultaneous with the influx of new settlers 
came calls for the preservation of some redwood groves as public parks and as 
monuments to American aspirations.  In 1852, California Assemblyman Henry A. Crabb 
introduced a resolution to prevent the “trade and traffic” of redwoods as well as the 
settlement of redwood land owned by the federal government.  His effort failed, and 
much of Redwood Country was transferred into private hands after the passage of the 
Timber and Stone Act of 1878.  In 1874, Walt Whitman published “Song of the 
Redwood-Tree,” a poem that memorialized the redwoods and described Whitman’s 
vision of American society replacing the redwoods as nature’s highest forms of life.  
                                                        
25 See Barbour, Coast Redwood, 81-84 and Noss, The Redwood Fores, 22-27 regarding the early Yuroks 
and other Native American inhabitants.  Also, see Nash, Wilderness and American Mind, and Susan R. 
Schrepfer, The Fight to Save the Redwoods: A History of Environmental Reform, 1917-1978 (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 7 regarding monuments and exceptionalism; and Samuel P. Hays, 
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 1959), and Gifford Pinchot, Breaking New Ground (New 
York: Harcourt, Bruce, 1947) regarding the rise of forestry and the fear of timber famine. 
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Whitman valued the trees as a reminder of what he saw as humanity’s best aspiration.  It 
was this combination of reverence for the trees and hopes for America that drove the 
early activists.  Like Crabb, Whitman and others saw spirituality, purity, and regality in 
the redwoods. 
Not wan from Asia's fetiches, 
Nor red from Europe's old dynastic slaughter-house, 
(Area of murder-plots of thrones, with scent left yet of wars and scaffolds every 
where,) 
But come from Nature's long and harmless throes—peacefully builded thence, 
These virgin lands—Lands of the Western Shore, 
To the new Culminating Man—to you, the Empire New, 
You, promis'd long, we pledge, we dedicate.   
 
In the redwoods, Whitman saw American exceptionalism and the rightful place of white 
Americans in the natural order.  Five years after Whitman published his poem, the 
Secretary of the Interior, Carl Schurz, recommended that 46,000 acres of Redwood 
Country be withdrawn from sale and held in public trust.  Like Henry Crabb, Schurz 
failed to withdraw any land for preservation.  At the time, the redwood forest seemed too 
vast to worry about, so the federal government continued to sell its public holdings rather 
than manage them.26 
It was during the closing decades of the nineteenth century that conflict finally 
erupted over the fate of the giant redwoods and public access to them for scientific, 
recreational, and spiritual endeavors.   Scientists and progressive professionals developed 
a fondness for the ancient redwoods and perceived the forest as a source of knowledge 
and human salvation.  However, the rather young logging regime of the American settlers 
in California had already dramatically reduced the size of the forest, and Bay Area 
professionals feared the forest would be lost before society could benefit from its non-
                                                        
26 Barbour, Coast redwood, 8, 94, 122-124; Schrepfer, Fight to Save Redwoods, 6-7; Walt Whitman, "Song 
of the Redwood-Tree,” Harper's Monthly Magazine   48 (February 1874):  366-367. 
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market resources.  During the 1860s, the areas around Berkeley, Marin, and Santa Cruz 
were heavily logged, and during the 1880s, newspaper editors sounded the alarm about 
the decimation of the giant trees.  For example, Ralph Sidney Smith of the Redwood City 
Times and Gazette, a town just south of San Francisco, suggested the state establish a 
park and resort on either Butano Creek or at Big Basin, near Santa Cruz.   Other citizens 
also sounded the alarm.  In 1887, the Eighth Convention of California Fruit Growers 
passed a resolution that requested the California Board of Forestry investigate and pursue 
the creation of a redwood park for scientific research and conservation experimentation.  
The Board sent some staff members to Big Basin, but the department took no action.27 
During the 1890s, efforts were made to enlist the Sierra Club in the redwood park 
preservation effort.  William R. Dudley, a Stanford botanist, close friend of John Muir 
and Gifford Pinchot, and a founding member of the Sierra Club, studied the redwoods 
and developed into a major force in redwood politics.  On November 23, 1895, Dudley 
addressed the annual meeting of Sierra Club members and urged the Club to address the 
fate of the redwoods and to work to establish “several federal redwood parks” including 
Big Basin.  Previously, the Club had advocated intensely on behalf of high Sierra 
recreation areas and the preservation of giant sequoia, but not for the coastal ranges or 
coast redwood.  Dudley believed that the redwoods also needed the Club’s “immediate 
attention” because redwood was the highest valued timber, it was the “loftiest species of 
conifer,” and like their Sierra relatives, it needed protection from the “rapacity of men 
and scourge of fire.”  As such, the forest needed more active management, in Dudley’s 
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view, to provide timber, fish and game habitat, and opportunities for scientific study and 
recreation.  In many respects, Dudley’s analysis differed from Muir’s and other Club 
members who focused on outdoor recreation and scenic preservation as a means to uplift 
humanity in the rapidly industrializing modern world.  Dudley was seemingly as 
interested in sustainable forestry as he was in “typical” Sierra Club endeavors.  For 
example, Dudley wrote “Forestry Notes,” which discussed park creation, forestry 
techniques, and forestry policy for every Sierra Bulletin during the 1890s.28 
 Dudley seemed to single-handedly push the Club toward the coast, and toward 
technical forestry issues; tension over forestry practices remained at the heart of redwood 
conflicts from that point forward.  In fact, Dudley’s ideas and proposals laid the basic 
foundation for all the twentieth century redwood preservation efforts.  Despite Dudley’s 
efforts, the movement to create the first public redwood park did not develop until -- 
much like the late twentieth century redwood wars -- there was an on-the-ground conflict 
about private property.  In 1898, Dudley foresaw the greatest challenges park advocates 
faced, as well as the advocates’ greatest asset.  The first challenge was acquiring the 
requisite park land.  Since the failure of the 1850s and 1870s efforts to prevent the sale of 
some tracts of federal redwood land, virtually all of Redwood Country had been 
purchased by private interests.  Dudley argued for the creation of a citizen fund to 
purchase the Big Basin grove, and for the deliverance of the grove to the state for use as a 
park.  The fund was feasible, he argued, because the public’s motive to create such parks 
                                                        
28 See Barbour, Coast redwood, 128; Sierra Bulletin Vol. I, No.1,2,3, and 7, Vol. II, No. 4 and 6, 
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was “almost wholly one of sentiment,” and all that was required was a vigorous appeal to 
spark action.29   
 The spark that ignited the first broad movement to preserve redwoods took place 
in early 1900.  Photographer Andrew P. Hill was shooting the redwoods inside the private 
Welch’s Big Trees Grove park when the owner approached him.  Mr. Welch tried to 
confiscate the photograph plates because the trees were on private property, and he had 
not authorized the photo shoot.  Outraged, Hill took his story to newspapers and 
prominent citizens.  On March 7, opinion-editorials appeared in the Santa Cruz Sentinel 
and the San Jose Herald calling for the public acquisition of Welch’s park, near Santa 
Cruz.  On May 1, Hill; John F. Coope, a Santa Cruz winemaker; Dudley; Carrie Stevens 
Walker of the San Jose Women’s Club; and Dr. C.L. Anderson met at Stanford to discuss 
the Welch’s incident and redwood preservation in general.  At the meeting, they decided 
to focus on Big Basin, not Welch’s, no doubt at Dudley’s urging.  On May 15, the group 
surveyed Big Basin and created the Sempervirens Club of California while sitting around 
the campfire.  They created the group to advocate for a public redwood park, to preserve 
the redwoods for future generations, and to save the fauna and flora for scientific study.30   
 Soon after the camping trip, the Sempervirens Club launched the first grassroots 
political campaign to protect the redwoods, and what appears to be the first grassroots 
environmental campaign in American history.  More importantly, the political tactics of 
the Sempervirens Club were repeated by environmental groups during the fights over 
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Hetch Hetchy, Dinosaur National Park, Redwood National Park, Love Canal, Headwaters 
Forest, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, and nearly every other major 
environmental battle of the twentieth century.  In July 1900, the Sempervirens met to 
discuss strategy.  They decided against a federal appeal to avoid jeopardizing a pending 
bill that authorized the federal purchase of Calaveras Big Trees in the Sierra Nevada 
range.  Instead, they decided to create a citizens fund as Dudley had urged two years 
prior.  The activists developed a news campaign of photographs and text that conveyed 
an imminent threat; Andrew Hill lobbied the Assembly in Sacramento with photographs; 
and they enlisted the support of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, the American Forestry Association, and other scientific groups.  Additionally, 
the group enlisted the support of sympathetic business leaders such as H.L. Middleton, 
the largest stockholder of the Big Basin Lumber Company.  Middleton used his position 
to forestall logging in the basin while the activists rallied support for a bill.31   
The publicity and lobbying campaigns followed Dudley’s prescription to appeal 
to sentiment, describing the “solemn grandeur” of the redwoods and their “silent 
majesty.”  The advocates argued that the groves were important to the “nation and world” 
so that people could “seek health and restoration” in “God’s own temple.”  And like Walt 
Whitman had decades earlier, the new redwood advocates described the trees as “the last 
of their race,” possibly in an attempt to equate the vanishing redwoods with many 
Americans’ fears of the vanishing “white” race.  In November, the California Assembly 
considered a bill for the public purchase of a park.  On March 16, 1901, Governor Henry 
Gage signed the bill that appropriated $250,000 for the purchase of 2500 acres of ancient 
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redwood forest.  On September 6, 1902, the state completed the purchase of 3800 acres of 
land in Big Basin.  The nation’s first successful redwood preservation campaign was 
completed with minimal conflict, and it established of a blueprint for future 
environmental campaigns.  The combination of urgency, sentimentality, scientific 
credibility, graphic imagery, accommodation with private interests, elite citizen support, 
lobbying power, and news coverage became the standard strategy for nearly all twentieth 
century environmental activist campaigns.32 
   
The Domination of Redwood Logging by a Modern Company with Anti-
modern Traditions 
 
The Pacific Lumber Company played no role in the early contests over the fate of 
ancient redwoods, but its development as a diversified business with a small-town image, 
like the development of the environmentalists’ campaigns, influenced the later redwood 
wars.  The company straddled the worlds of national corporations and of small-town 
proprietors, which enabled it to develop a near-monopoly position in the old growth 
redwood lumber industry while securing the loyalty of workers and the local community.  
It was not an easy balancing routine, but it was usually successful. Timber companies, 
like Louisiana-Pacific, that never established deep roots on the Northcoast were able to 
retreat when profit margins dwindled and the heat of the redwood wars escalated.  
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However, Pacific Lumber could not, or would not, retreat because of its business model 
and its corporate culture.  The company thought it had steeled itself against attacks from 
corporate raiders and from environmental activists, but instead, its strategy of trying to 
satisfy diverse stakeholder groups made it an ideal target for both.   
The Northcoast was far from California’s population centers, and there were no 
roads or rail lines up the coast, so the northern logging outfits operated autonomously for 
nearly seventy years.  Like business more broadly in the nineteenth century, Northcoast 
logging was a boom and bust industry, and one that became increasingly dominated by 
larger companies.  The logging operation that would become The Pacific Lumber 
Company was founded in 1863 when A.W. McPherson and Henry Wetherbee bought 
6000 acres of land for $7500 in northern California, approximately 250 miles north of 
San Francisco near the coast.  In 1882, “various interests” merged to establish the 
company town of Forestville, a large lumber operation on the Eel River, and a railroad 
that ran from the site to Humboldt Bay.  For the rest of the nineteenth century, the 
Forestville operation and its Northcoast colleagues innovated, worked to improve logging 
and transportation options, and grew steadily.  By 1888, the company had 300 
employees, and was the largest lumber producer in Humboldt County, producing 20 
million board feet of lumber annually.  The company’s growth accelerated in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because eastern and midwestern forests were 
depleted of their timber, a destructive earthquake near San Francisco in 1906 
dramatically increased demand for redwood lumber and shingles, and Pacific Lumber 
was sold to eastern investors who folded the company into their diverse holdings.33  
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Simon Jones Murphy and his family transformed Pacific Lumber by injecting the 
company with their aggressively expansionist and innovative business outlook.  Simon 
Jones was a second-generation American born in Maine on April 22, 1815.  Simon 
bought his first lumber mill in Maine in 1840, and when the Maine forest stock was 
largely harvested, he moved his family to Wisconsin to take advantage of the Midwest 
lumber boom.  From there, Murphy acquired an iron ore mine in Michigan, moved his 
family to Detroit, and expanded his business empire.  Out of Detroit, Murphy acquired a 
copper mine in Arizona, railroad interests in New Mexico, a citrus ranch in southern 
California, oil interests, and real estate.  Back in Detroit, Simon Jones founded the 
Murphy Power Company, which eventually became a part of Detroit Edison Company.  
He also created the Detroit Automobile Company in 1899 to build “fordmobiles.”  Henry 
Ford was the chief engineer for Murphy Power, and he convinced Simon his automobile 
model was viable.  Ford eventually left the company, and the Murphy’s changed the 
name of the automobile company to Cadillac in 1902.  Simon Jones’ expanding empire 
led him to Humboldt County when the Midwest timber boom faded and when the 
railroads became interested in the Northcoast of California.  During the late nineteenth 
century, Southern Pacific Railroad and the Santa Fe Railroad moved in on the Northcoast 
to connect the area to San Francisco and to Seattle via rail.  Murphy purchased land 
around Humboldt Bay, near Forestville, on behalf of the Santa Fe Railroad and on behalf 
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of his own timber interests, the first steps that transformed Pacific Lumber and the 
redwood industry.34 
  By World War I, Pacific Lumber claimed in its annual reports that it was the 
world’s largest manufacturer of redwood lumber, that it was a nearly fully vertically 
integrated corporation, and that it was akin to a benevolent feudal landlord.  The 
company’s position in a vast business empire, its isolated location, its company town of 
Scotia (formerly Forestville), and its patriarchal family owner combined to distinguish 
Pacific Lumber from the timber industry and corporate America alike.  The company was  
a large vertically integrated firm and acquired some unrelated businesses like a proto-
conglomerate, yet retained its small-town image.  That process of expansion and 
integration began the same year the Murphy’s formed Cadillac.  Simon Jones Murphy 
and Hiram Smith of San Francisco purchased Pacific Lumber in 1902 for an unknown 
sum and relocated company headquarters to Detroit.  In 1905, the same year Simon Jones 
Murphy died, The Pacific Lumber Company incorporated in Maine, setting into motion 
its thrust toward growth and modernity.  A Murphy would either run the company or sit 
on the board of directors from 1905 until 1986.  By 1913, the company had acquired 
65,000 additional redwood timberland and produced 106 million board feet of lumber 
annually.  By 1920, Pacific Lumber employed 1500 workers, and operated two mills and 
one railroad line.35 
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In many ways the company’s strategy foreshadowed the path of timber industry 
development after World War II:  it lowered overhead, relied on contractors, diversified, 
and aggressively planted seedlings.  In 1915, Pacific Lumber closed its Oakland, San 
Francisco, and Wilmington lumber yards, and transferred all operations to the Scotia 
mills in an effort to lower overhead while maintaining production levels.  Similarly, the 
company sold Pacific Lumber Transportation and its ships, betting that the new Scotia 
railroad tracks would be sufficient to get the lumber to market in the Midwest.  To 
accommodate the workload, the Scotia mills were updated and run “’round the clock,” 
resulting in what the company claimed inspectors called the largest and most modern 
redwood mill complex in the world.36  As it grew, the company cultivated the image of a 
friendly and benevolent neighbor focused on the town, people, and forests of Scotia, 
while it rapidly clearcut old growth groves and diversified operations for the benefit of 
shareholders—most of whom were from the East and Midwest.  For example, in 1916, 
Pacific Lumber acquired $59 million worth of cattle and in the next decade reportedly 
“denuded” miles of forests behind the tree-lined and forest-surrounded town of Scotia.  
For the remainder of the century, the company’s attempts to straddle the worlds of big 
business and small town America would prove to be its greatest strength and its greatest 
vulnerability.37 
 
The Board of Forestry:  Rooted in Corporatism 
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 Like the Pacific Lumber Company, the California Board of Forestry played no 
role in the creation of Big Basin, but the agency’s corporatist development was crucial in 
the redwood wars.  The California Board of Forestry was a model of corporatism long 
before Herbert Hoover popularized the concept, and the Board remained an official 
corporatist body until 1970.  In 1885, California became one of the first states to regulate 
private timber land through the use of an appointed Board of Forestry, and that Board 
appears to be one of the first incarnations of corporatist regulatory entities.  Under 
corporatist governance, the state grants industries the ability to improve efficiencies via 
self-regulation.  The state facilitates industry participation by forming official regulatory 
boards on which industry holds a majority of seats.38  Specifically, the Board of Forestry 
was created and designed to ensure that those with intimate knowledge of the industry 
could guide the development of California timber operations.  The Board’s mission was 
not to wrest control of the timber industry from large companies and landholders, but 
rather to efficiently manage the industry by safeguarding its interest in long-term timber 
harvests.  However, the Board was more committed to its economic development goals 
than it was to its conservation mission.39 40  
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The 1885 Board of Forestry was established to ward off the predicted timber 
shortage, so accordingly the governor appointed its five members based on their 
knowledge of the timber industry.  Rather than address harvest methods or forest 
regeneration to head off the projected crisis, the first Board mostly concerned itself with 
recommendations to the Assembly to protect the inventories of the state’s private timber 
operators.  Indeed, from 1885 until its dissolution in 1893, only one law was passed that 
dealt with a forestry issue other than the prevention of fires and trespassing.  Chapter 498 
of the 1888 Assembly called for the encouragement of the planting of shade and fruit 
trees along highways in order to protect travelers from the heat and to provide a source of 
food in case of emergency.41  
In 1905, the Assembly reorganized the Board, but retained its corporatist 
structure.  The new Board was formally charged with preventing fires, protecting public 
and private land from trespass, managing the state parks, and purchasing clearcut land to 
manage as state forests in an effort to regenerate the timber supply.  Timber harvesting 
methods were left to the judgment of individual timber operators.  The forest regeneration 
duty of the Board demonstrated that the California Assembly leaned more toward the 
statist wing of progressivism and did not entirely trust the free market.  However, the 
State Forester -- who was charged with coordinating fire-fighting efforts and the 
dissemination of information -- clearly believed that private timber companies were best 
suited to manage timber lands.  From 1905 until the reorganization of the Board in 1927, 
every report from the State Forester on record recommended the state authorize more fire 
                                                        
during the twentieth century because the regulatory Boards were comprised of business experts focused on 
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fighting money, more money for the acquisition of state nurseries, and for a change in the 
land taxes to make it more profitable for land owners to hold onto clearcut land during 
the unprofitable period of regeneration in order to prevent the conversion of timber land 
into ranch land.42 
 
The Redwood Preservation Movement Institutionalized 
 
The corporatist tradition of the Board of Forestry eventually pit citizens 
concerned with redwood preservation against the Board and the timber industry, but 
during the interwar period, citizen groups and specific timber companies, primarily the 
Pacific Lumber Company, fought and negotiated largely without the state’s intervention.   
Several key developments defined the era.  First, the Northcoast was finally connected to 
San Francisco via land routes, making the Northcoast accessible to tourists, 
preservationists, and commerce.  Second, the citizen movement to preserve ancient 
redwoods became a permanent part of California politics.  Third, the state authorized the 
purchase of state parks.  And fourth, Pacific Lumber adapted to the encroachments of the 
outside world.  It was an era of progressive voluntarism for citizen activists, and an era of 
technological change and increased public scrutiny for the timber industry.  The Board of 
Forestry remained a non-player as it retained its production-oriented corporatist mission 
focused on fire and pest control, and state nurseries. 
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 The redwood preservation movement institutionalized and moved its sights north 
during the interwar years because members of the professional class grew interested in 
evolution and eugenics, because the Redwood Highway was built, and because the only 
remaining ancient redwood forests of significant size were located at the northern end of 
the highway.  As late as 1925, an estimated two-thirds of the ancient redwoods were still 
standing, with the vast majority located in Humboldt and Del Norte Counties.  
Construction of the Redwood Highway had begun in 1915, and as it edged northward, 
some citizens got their first glimpses of the vast forest up north, as well as of the impact 
of clearcut logging regimes on the landscape.  
 The institutional redwood preservation movement was founded by professional 
elites from the Bay Area and from New York City who were active in the progressive and 
national parks movements.  William Dudley and other academics and writers sounded the 
first redwood alarms, and during the Theodore Roosevelt administration, this elite activist 
community expanded to include wealthy individuals and nationally prominent figures, 
including Roosevelt himself. Most notably, the group grew to include William Kent, the 
independently wealthy progressive Marin County resident.  In 1903, Kent purchased 
nearly 300 acres of ancient redwood forest in Redwood Canyon, near his Marin home, to 
forestall development of the area.  Kent hoped to turn his property into a public park that 
would allow urbanites to escape the modern world and restore themselves in nature.  In 
addition to the spiritual attributes of what he called wilderness, Kent, like his fellow 
California progressives, but unlike Muir, was devoted to preventing private monopoly 
from subsuming the public interest.  The Northcoast Water Company began 
condemnation proceedings against Kent’s land in 1907 so the company could build a 
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reservoir.  Kent responded, pressed by the women of the California Club of San 
Francisco, and put to good use his personal relationships with Gifford Pinchot, U.S. Chief 
Forester; James R. Garfield, Secretary of the Interior; and President Theodore Roosevelt.  
Congressman Kent supported the Hetch Hecthy municipal damn in order to prevent the 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company from building the dam at Hetch Hetchy.  That kind of 
anti-monopoly spirit would create tensions within the Headwaters Forest preservation 
movement as well.43 
The Bohemiam Club retreat in the summer of 1917 provided the forum that led to 
a permanent institution devoted to redwood preservation.  After the retreat, Madison 
Grant, Dr. John Merriam, and Henry Fairfield Osborn drove north to see the giant 
redwoods of the Northcoast.  The three men were primarily interested in the redwoods’ 
cultural and scientific values.  Grant was a New York attorney and author, best known for 
his eugenics manifesto, The Passing of the Great Race (1916).  Merriam was a 
paleontology professor at the University of California in Berkeley.  Osborn was a 
professor of paleontology at Columbia University, President of the American Museum of 
Natural History in New York, and, like his friend Grant, a firm believer in eugenics.  For 
these men, the ancient redwood forest, as it had for Walt Whitman, represented 
evolution’s highest achievement, something for humanity, especially white northern 
Europeans, to aspire to.  Understanding the redwoods, they believed, could help humans 
better understand evolution and how to direct it.  To celebrate the redwoods was to 
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celebrate American and Nordic superiority.  When they finally arrived on the Northcoast, 
however, the three travelers saw clearcuts and destruction all along the highway.44  
Appalled at the seemingly wanton destruction, Grant, Osborn, and Merriam 
decided to create an organization to protect groves of ancient redwoods for posterity and 
for science.  The Save-the-Redwoods League was thus born in 1918, its mission and 
strategy reflecting the progressive and scientific beliefs of its founders.  The group 
dedicated itself to preserving representative groves of ancient redwoods by enlisting the 
private support of the wealthy and professional classes.  Alongside Grant, Osborn, and 
Merriam, the League recruited Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane to be president, 
and secured its first donations from William Kent; Stephen Mather, Director of the 
National Park Service; Grant; Osborn; and E.C. Bradley, Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior.  Like the first donors and officers, the early members were nearly all doctors, 
lawyers, professors, scientists, writers, and men and women of independent wealth – 
typical California progressives wary of big business, but committed to private property 
and competitive capitalism.  Accordingly, they believed that those who wanted redwoods 
protected would need to raise private money and negotiate with private landholders for 
the purchase of specific groves.  The groves could then be donated to the state or federal 
government to be managed as public parks or as laboratories to benefit the public interest.  
The original strategy, with help from the state from time to time, stayed in place for 
nearly fifty years.45  Local Humboldt County residents – separately from the Bay Area 
activists -- created their own redwood preservation movement that sometimes acted 
alone, but often worked in concert with the other preservation groups.   
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The local Humboldt movement was driven largely by women who seized political 
opportunities that fit into their family caretaker roles.   In 1902, the Eureka Monday Club 
sent a delegation of women by ship to San Francisco for the first convention of the 
California Federation of Women’s Club.  The Humboldt delegation learned that the 
Federation was interested in the redwoods because forests provided clean water and 
beautiful landscapes.  The Monday Club spurned the Federation’s efforts to push for a 
redwood park, however, because one third of the members were tied to the timber 
industry and they did not want to engage in controversial issues.  Despite their early 
resistance to redwood preservation, the Monday Club and its Humboldt network of 
women’s clubs offered local women the opportunity to build relationships and to gain the 
civic experience they would rely on when they finally engaged redwood politics.46 
While the Bay Area activism dissolved after Big Basin, and while William Kent 
worked on his personal crusade, local Humboldt citizens organized to fight for a 
Humboldt redwood park.  In 1905, George Kellog, head of the Humboldt Chamber of 
Commerce, petitioned the state Assembly to pass a law to promote tourism to the 
Northcoast by creating a redwood park in the ancient forest.  In 1908, local women’s 
groups and the Chamber of Commerce delivered to the U.S. Forest Service a two-
thousand-signature petition created by Eureka school children.  Theodore Roosevelt 
responded to the petition, voicing his support for their cause.  In 1909, the Humboldt 
County Federation of Women’s Clubs officially joined the movement.  The Chamber was 
primarily interested in using the park idea to extract state funding for a railroad to 
connect Eureka to San Francisco.  The women wanted a park to study, to enjoy, and to 
buffer their families from commercialism.  In 1912, the Humboldt Federation convinced 
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their congressman to introduce a bill authorizing the investigation of a national park in 
Humboldt County.  The legislation stalled until 1913, when then Congressman William 
Kent pledged to donate $25,000 to acquire land for a national redwood park.  The 
Humboldt Federation, led by Laura Perrot Mahan, organized a petition drive, developed a 
set of site recommendations for a park, and even hired a Washington, D.C., lobbyist.  The 
Raker-Kent bill died in 1915, however, and the Federation set aside its park fund for a 
better day.47    
 Despite the loss of the federal park bill, the League and the Humboldt activists 
reorganized to work toward their park goals.  One of the League’s first actions was to 
publicize the giant redwoods to garner national support.  The officers of the League, via 
their personal connections, recruited The Saturday Evening Post and National 
Geographic Magazine to write articles about the redwoods and the increased harvest 
levels that accompanied the highway, the railroad, and the war.  In 1919, National Park 
Director and League officer and donor Stephen Mather visited Humboldt County to tour 
the redwoods.  Mather was investigating the possibility of a national redwood park.  The 
visit and the pledges encouraged local redwood activists and the League.  The Humboldt 
County Federation of Women’s Clubs created the Women’s Save-the-Redwoods League 
in Humboldt County to work on behalf of a local redwood park.  The Save-the-Redwoods 
League hired Newton B. Drury to raise money, run a public relations campaign, and to 
lobby on behalf of redwood park creation.  The local Women’s League created a park 
committee, headed by Laura Mahan, to survey Humboldt lands and to recommend site 
locations.  However, as would be the case throughout the century, redwood activists did 
not always agree on substance or tactics.  The League wanted the groves along Bull 
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Creek – a tributary of the Eel River in southern Humboldt -- protected as a park because 
of their immense size and potential for scientific study.  The Women’s League wanted a 
park located at Dyersville Flat, closer to the highway and more suitable for a family park 
and picnic area.  During the frenzied pace of redwood politics during the 1920s, both 
groups would get what they wanted, even though they would utilize different tools.48 
 During the 1920s, the patterns of conflict and negotiation took root that would 
drive redwood politics until the 1960s.  The California Assembly played a minor role, 
leaving the preservation organizations and the timber companies to work out 
arrangements on their own.  The state did, however, kickstart the acquisition process in 
1921, when the Assembly appropriated $300,000 to acquire the redwoods along the 
Redwood Highway to halt the local timber companies’ practice of logging up to the edge 
of the road.  The move by the Assembly was designed to encourage the use of the 
highway by tourists, and to prevent public outcry about unsightly clearcuts lining the 
road.  Notably, the League and Pacific Lumber worked together to make sure the 
appropriation only authorized purchases in southern Humboldt; a restriction that kept 
Pacific Lumber land safe from condemnation.  Although we cannot be certain, given the 
League’s subsequent acquisition strategy, the early cooperation between the company 
and the League were likely designed to generate goodwill to improve the League’s 
chances for more ambitious purchases.  Regardless, their work on the highway 
appropriations bill was the first step in the development of a long-standing working 
relationship between the League and the company.49 
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 After the state’s land appropriation, the League aggressively worked to acquire 
ancient groves on the Northcoast and to create a state park system that included an 
expansive set of redwood parks.  In August 1921, the League made its first purchase, the 
Bolling Memorial Grove.  Dr. John C. Phillips donated all the money used to acquire the 
grove at the southern end of the proposed Humboldt Redwoods State Park, just north of 
Phillipsville.  In 1923, the League secured a donation of 166 acres of ancient redwoods in 
northern Humboldt to create the Prairie Creek Redwoods State Park.  In 1924, the first 
acquisition of redwoods in Del Norte County was completed, a 288-acre grove that would 
become a part of the Del Norte Coast Redwoods State Park.  True to the interwar pattern 
of voluntarism and philanthropy, the first groves acquired for the redwood park plan were 
acquired in private negotiations between timber companies and the League.   
Once the acquisitions began to roll in, the League looked to the state to develop a 
management system.  In 1925, the League began lobbying the Assembly to create a Parks 
Commission and to survey proposed park sites.  In 1927, the Assembly created the 
Department of Natural Resources, which housed a reorganized Board of Forestry and a 
Parks Commission that authorized park acquisitions so long as the state footed only half 
of the bills.  Governor C.C. Young also authorized funding to allow Frederick Law 
Olmstead to survey and design a state park system.  Donations, bi-lateral negotiations, 
and state infrastructure assistance became the three-pronged model of redwood 
preservation, except when Humboldt locals found the process inadequate for their 
needs.50   
 While the League acted quickly and quietly, Humboldt County locals pushed 
more aggressively, in ways that foreshadowed the trends of the battle over Headwaters 
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Forest during the 1980s and 1990s, when local activists watch dogged logging activity, 
tried to change corporate policy by force of will, and used the police powers of the state 
when necessary and available.  The League, on the other hand, wanted to avoid state 
involvement in real estate negotiations and to avoid on-the-ground conflicts.  While 
working to secure the Dyersville Flat park, local Humboldt women aggressively used 
state and national public support to gain leverage with Pacific Lumber.  It appears the 
women of Humboldt County became the first environmental activists to put their bodies 
in harm’s way to stop the logging of redwoods at the site of production.  In 1924, after 
the company rejected its offers, the Women’s League convinced the Board of Supervisors 
to condemn the Pacific Lumber land for the park.  To prevent this, the company offered 
the county a purchase agreement, but one that did not include Dyersville Flat.  Laura 
Mahan and the County Board of Supervisors obtained a court order that halted the harvest 
of Dyersville Flat until the condemnation could be finalized.51   
On November 10, 1924, Mahan and her husband received word that Pacific 
Lumber had violated the court order by beginning to log the Flat.  Mahan and her 
husband ran to the woods to witness the logging, alerted the press, and recruited a group 
of activist women to occupy the grove.  According to one source, the women encircled 
trees to prevent the loggers from working.  Pacific Lumber subsequently agreed to halt 
the logging operation near Dyersville Flat and to negotiate a purchase agreement.  
However, the involvement of national groups was crucial to the locals’ success.  First, the 
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League informed Pacific Lumber that an anonymous donor was ready to contribute $1 
million for the acquisition of Dyersville Flat.  Additionally, The Women’s League 
enlisted the support of the national Garden Clubs.  Both actions increased the pressure on 
Pacific Lumber to return to the negotiating table.  It took seven years to negotiate the 
deal.  Although the depressed land prices and timber demand during the onset of the 
Great Depression certainly helped make the deal more attractive to Pacific Lumber, the 
Dyersville Flat purchase was completed in 1931, along with the acquisition of other 
Pacific Lumber groves, to create the Rockefeller Forest of the Humboldt Redwoods State 
Park—the largest contiguous ancient redwood forest remaining in the world, named after 
the League’s 1924 anonymous donor, John D. Rockefeller.  The 13,629-acre Rockefeller 
Forest was purchased with $1.8 million from a state bond and $1.4 million from private 
donors to the League and the Women’s League of the Humboldt County Federation of 
Women’s Clubs.   
The conflict over the Humboldt park highlights the vital role local women played 
in the fights over the redwoods.  From Josephine Clifford McCracken in the nineteenth 
century, to Laura Mahan in the early twentieth century, to Judi Bari, Kathy Bailey, 
Sharon Duggan, Alicia Littletree, Cecelia Lanman, and the other leaders of the late 
twentieth century redwood wars, women in leadership roles in the redwood conflict have 
roots as deep as the conflicts themselves.52 
 
                                                        
52 Pacific Lumber Company. [Ca. 1970] “The Pacific Lumber Company and The Redwood Parks.” Pacific 
Lumber Company file. Forest History Society Library, Durham, NC; S.B. Show, "Timber Growing 
Practice in the Coast Redwood Region of California" Technical Bulletin 283, March 1932, in USDA 
Technical Bulletins No. 276-300 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932). 
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Strengthened Position:  Pacific Lumber Adjustments to Interwar 
Politics and Economics 
 
Faced with a surprisingly aggressive redwood preservation movement and a 
dynamic competitive environment, Pacific Lumber changed its business model to 
improve its competitive position in the industry and to improve its position in the 
community.  The Pacific Lumber Company seems to have pioneered modernization 
efforts in the timber industry in response to the industry’s two primary problems during 
the first half of the century:  stagnant worker output and declining log quality.  Because 
of the fierce competition in the industry, R&D investment was low and production gains 
were typically achieved through expanded land holdings and/or procurement of 
additional federal timber contracts.  But increased logging depleted old growth forest 
inventories, which in turn decreased lumber quality.  So technological gains were offset 
by decreased quality of the timber harvested and the increased distances of new harvest 
areas to population centers.  Pacific Lumber acquired more land, but it also looked for 
ways to improve efficiency and price.  Additionally, because of the density of the 
available timber in the redwood forest, the company didn’t have to travel very far to 
acquire new land.  The company built a second mill in 1920 to increase its production 
volume, and began producing cigar boxes out of redwood scraps to reduce waste.  In 
1935, Pacific Lumber introduced Presto Logs made of sawdust for use in home 
fireplaces.  The culture of innovation and efficiency helped the firm develop into a 
formidable foe for redwood activists.  The company was financially sound, and earned 
the loyalty of workers and the community because of its stability. 
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The company’s early support of conservation measures also differentiated Pacific 
Lumber from the larger timber industry.  During the 1920s and 1930s, the company, 
unlike most of its competitors, experimented with selective harvesting techniques instead 
of clearcuts.  In 1923, the company hired some of the state’s first private foresters and 
developed a tree nursery to aid second growth regeneration.  In 1928, Pacific Lumber 
chief Albert Stanwood Murphy met with Newton Drury of the Save-the-Redwoods 
League and committed to protect some old growth groves of redwoods along the Eel 
River until the League could raise the money to purchase the groves.53  During the early 
1940s, Pacific Lumber officially adopted a selective harvest policy for its old growth 
forests, whereby the company removed 70 percent of the timber volume of a particular 
stand instead of ninety- to one hundred percent of the trees.  Conservation values 
certainly played a role the those decisions, but so too did the change in California tax 
code that gave companies incentives to leave some trees standing.  Another contributing 
factor was the company’s desire to improve its market share of upper grade redwood 
lumber by hanging onto old-growth while other companies cut them fast and furiously.    
The sale of the Rockefeller Forest and other groves to create the Humboldt Redwoods 
State Park helped to decrease the supply of old-growth timber and it helped Pacific 
Lumber develop an amicable relationship with the League.  Combined, the conservation, 
preservation, and efficiency programs improved the outlook of the company’s business 
model.  Its development patterns suggest Pacific Lumber was trying to insulate itself 
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  64 
from industrial competition and activist agitation.  The strategy worked well for more 
than six decades, and when activists eventually challenged the firm’s land management, it 




The Board of Forestry, meanwhile, continued its work to promote timber 
production and to protect industry investments, which helped cultivate a close 
relationship between the Board and the industry. The second Board, created in 1905, like 
the original Board, was a corporatist body concerned primarily with protecting timber 
inventories.  The Board was formally charged with preventing fires, protecting public and 
private land from trespass, managing the state parks, and purchasing clearcut land to 
manage as state forests in order to regenerate the timber supply.  On the recommendation 
of the Board, the Assembly passed five fire prevention laws, including the 1923 
Compulsory Fire Patrol Act, as well as an insect abatement law in 1923, all in an effort to 
protect the timber supply.  Not surprisingly, given the national parks movement of the 
time, and despite the lack of interest from the State Forester and the Board, the California 
Assembly also passed a number of laws funding the acquisition of state parks, including: 
chapter 268, to protect the “last trees” of the San Bernadino Valley; chapter 762, to buy 
trees along the Tahoe Wagon Road; and the first acquisition of Humboldt State 
Redwoods Park in 1921.  The Board may have been singly interested in timber 
production, but Californians and the Assembly had begun to consider the recreational and 
                                                        
54 Clar, California Government and Forestry (Vol. I), 214, 268-269, 297, 402, 411, 433, 445.  And see 
Dana, California Lands, 64 and 68 and Schrepfer, Fight to Save Redwoods, 23. 
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educational values of the state’s timber lands, as demonstrated by the park appropriations 
and the success of the redwood activists during the early to mid-1920s.55 
In 1927, the Board was reorganized within the new Department of Natural 
Resources; the new Board’s duties -- still a corporatist body of five members appointed 
by the Governor based on knowledge of the timber industry – officially recommitted its 
members to timber supply and water (as if they needed any encouragement).  The new 
Parks Commission took control of the management of recreation resources.  In 1943, the 
third Board passed (in addition to the usual fire prevention, state nursery, and 
regeneration laws and recommendations) a minimum diameter law that prohibited the 
harvest of trees smaller than 18 inches in diameter. That law marked the first time the 
Board encroached on the management prerogatives of private industry in the name of 
conservation, and it came long after a 1932 Department of Agriculture report that 
recommended selective cuts in Redwood Country in order to prevent deforestation.56 
  
Postwar Cracks in Corporatist Regulation and Progressive Voluntarism 
 
 During the first twenty-plus years of the post-World War II era, the basal buds 
that sprouted the redwood wars emerged from the established roots of bilateral 
negotiations, minor state involvement, and largely zero federal involvement.  The 
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redwood preservation movement, the Board of Forestry, and The Pacific Lumber 
Company all faced challenges during the postwar era that dramatically changed the 
relationships among the three institutions, as well as the tenor and nature of conflict over 
the redwoods.  As America transformed after World War II, so did the timber industry 
and redwood politics.  Official corporatist timber regulation continued to direct the 
Board’s activities, but the California Assembly, other state agencies, and groups of 
citizens grew increasingly frustrated with the system and its consequences for the forest. 
 By the end of the 1960s, California corporatism was under intense attack.  The 
national timber industry capitalized on high timber demand and high prices driven by the 
postwar housing boom to increase old growth harvests on the West Coast and to increase 
efficiency, but Pacific Lumber continued to buck industry trends and recommitted to its 
strategy to remain in the old growth timber business and to diversify into unrelated 
business.  The company also continued to sell and donate land to the League, as it 
aggressively moved to solidify its image as a small town, family-centered enterprise.  
Like the Board of Forestry, Pacific Lumber was also on the verge of significant changes 
by 1970, changes that eventually propelled the company into the center of the redwood 
wars.  The redwood preservation movement split during the postwar era as the Sierra 
Club adopted new strategies and philosophies based on ecology, mistrust of corporate 
America, and state intervention.  The League remained committed to voluntarism, 
progressive evolutionary ideas, and industrial cooperation.  The split complicated the 
battle over a national redwood park, escalated the challenges to corporatism, and 





Of the three institutions, the Board of Forestry faced the most serious challenges 
during the postwar era, despite its independence from the public and the Assembly. After 
World War II, the legislature made some cosmetic changes to the regulatory regime, but 
maintained its corporatist orientation.  Without legislative oversight, the Board continued 
to support development but not forest conservation.  For example, the 1943 law 
prohibiting the harvest of trees less than eighteen inches in diameter may appear to mark 
a move away from corporatism, toward greater legislative oversight, but that law was in 
fact another in the long history of regulations devised by businesses in order to protect 
their markets.  In this case, the minimum diameter law protected big timber companies 
from competition from small, independent, “gyppo” contractors best suited to harvest 
small trees.  Like the minimum diameter law, the 1945 Forest Practice Act that governed 
timber operations on private land also appeared to undercut corporatism while promoting 
conservationism.  The law required the Board to create forest practice rules to ensure that 
the state’s private timber operators used the best conservation practices.  However, it also 
perpetuated industry self-regulation.  The Board the law reorganized still included a 
majority of members from the timber and grazing industry, and when the Board created 
the rules, it predictably declined to include penalties for violations.   
As with the minimum diameter rule, the Board was able to move away from pure 
corporatism without eroding the practical operation of the corporatist model.  In 1960 the 
Board, despite the recommendations of Northcoast timber reports, began approving large 
clearcuts because the timber industry wanted to capitalize on the housing boom and on 
  68 
decreased timber production in the Pacific Northwest.  None of these postwar logging 
developments are surprising.  The Board’s own assessment of its postwar priorities were 
to prevent fire from destroying timber and to protect the timber industry from unfair 
competition from within—priorities that reveal the influence of the postwar housing 
boom on the timber industry as well as The Board’s commitment to helping the timber 
companies operate profitably.57 
 The resilience of California’s corporatist Board of Forestry stands in stark relief 
against the rising tide of “modern environmentalism” and the resulting changes in 
environmental politics after World War II. The popularity of outdoor recreation increased 
dramatically, as did concern about suburban development and humankind’s impact on the 
planet.  As a result, national environmental groups like the Sierra Club and The 
Wilderness Society grew in size and stature.  And local groups arose to combat local 
pollution, local land management, and suburban development.  While the nation’s 
environmental attention swung from nuclear fallout, to Dinosaur National Monument, to 
the Wilderness Act, the California Board of Forestry remained beyond reproach for the 
most part.  Apart from loud complaints, no active opposition to the Board’s operation was 
apparent until the late 1960s.  And why would there have been?  Most of the state’s 
residents did not live near enough to timber lands to witness the increased logging and 
clearcutting.  The Save the Redwoods League purchased grand redwood groves and 
created parks out of them for recreationists and scientists.  Appreciation of the non-
economic values of forests did not become widespread until well after World War II.  
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And the timber industry was a major contributor to California’s postwar prosperity.  As a 
result, residents of the Northcoast seemed unwilling to bite the hand that fed them, and 
other Californians were not concerned with Northcoast logging.58   
Challenges to the Board’s predominance first emerged in the 1950s, when citizen 
groups such as the Sierra Club complained about the rate of timber harvesting and the 
prolific use of clearcutting in Redwood Country.  As a result, the legislature took steps to 
increase its oversight of the timber industry.  In 1962, the legislature commissioned a 
report that concluded that the forest practice rules “failed to provide adequate 
enforcement” to protect public values in water, fishing, and recreation.”  In 1967, another 
legislative report concluded that the rules needed to be broadened if California was to 
avoid major damage to its most important watersheds.  A final legislative committee 
study of the forest practice rules concluded in 1971 that logging was one of the primary 
causes of the 80 percent decline in salmon and steelhead runs in Northern California.  
Agitation by Sierra Club and others thus helped undercut confidence in the corporatist 
regulatory regime by pressuring the legislature to study the industry in more detail. 59    
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Pacific Lumber’s Crusade 
 
While the Board of Forestry worked to aid the development of the timber industry 
and faced its first set of environmental attacks, Pacific Lumber worked to solidify its 
position and to prevent challenges to its regime.  Because of its investments in mill 
technology, old growth inventory, and a permanent workforce in the company town, 
Pacific Lumber did not scramble to capitalize on the postwar housing boom.  The timber 
industry at large, however, did scramble to modernize and mechanize, and with great 
success.  Worker output increased from 0.8 percent annually from 1896 to 1947 to 2.1 
percent annually from 1958-1980.  And like Pacific Lumber had done earlier in the 
century, timber companies horizontally diversified after 1950, though most companies 
diversified into related industries like paper.   
Pacific Lumber also diversified, and expanded its property holdings to improve its 
position in the old growth redwood market.  In 1940, the company bought 22,000 acres of 
timber land in the Lawrence Creek and Yager Creek watersheds of Humboldt County.  In 
1950, Pacific Lumber acquired Dolbeer & Carson Lumber Company of Eureka and its 
property along the Elk River that adjoined Pacific Lumber’s land near Freshwater and on 
Lawrence Creek.  The company acquired Hampton Plywood Corporation that same year 
to capitalize on the new plywood market and to aid its efforts to more fully utilize 
redwood logs.  In 1958, Pacific Lumber acquired Holmes-Eureka Lumber Company and 
its land along the Van Duzen River.  All together, Pacific Lumber doubled its assets from 
1931 to 1961, improved its position as the world’s largest redwood lumber producer, 
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diversified its product line, and acquired what eventually became known as Headwaters 
Forest.60   
Meanwhile, the company continued to cultivate its image as a small town company 
with small town values.  In 1951, Pacific Lumber  cooperated with The Saturday Evening 
Post to produce an article about Scotia.  The article referred to the town as a “workers 
paradise,” where 950 employees lived and worked among the 131,000-acre “tree farm.”  
The author described Scotia as a place where the resident manager of Pacific Lumber was 
the “mayor,” and his office repainted houses, fixed leaky pipes, and repaired windows.  
The article portrayed Pacific Lumber as a giant family; resident employees resented the 
term “company town” and competed over the quality of the gardens they planted on their 
rented land.  The Post and the Christian Science Monitor marveled at how welcoming the 
company was to tourists and the way it openly encouraged tourists to tour the Scotia 
complex using a printed tour guide.  In 1961, Pacific Lumber began offering college 
scholarships to all employee children, and in 1964 it touted its generous nature by 
pointing out to a New York Times reporter that the company promised to hold onto the 
Pepperwood Groves near the Avenue of the Giants -- despite the taxes it paid for not 
logging the land -- because it hoped the Save-the-Redwoods League would be able to buy 
the ancient trees.61  
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  Those initiatives were generous to workers, environmentalists, and tourists, and the 
company benefitted as well.  The Pacific Lumber workforce was not unionized, and the 
company likely hoped that promoting paternalism would insulate it from the postwar 
union drives and the excitement generated by the United Auto Workers ”treaties” with 
Ford and others.  Additionally, the timber industry was under attack in the state of 
California after World War II for what many residents and visitors considered destructive 
practices, more readily and frequently observed than ever from the Redwood Highway.  
Good business practices dictated that Pacific Lumber try to avoid new drains on 
resources in order to fully maximize net returns during the building and remodeling 
heyday.   
 
Redwood Preservationism on the Brink 
 
The early years of the postwar era began with a familiar routine for redwood 
activists, but by the 1960s the activists were swimming in a cacophony of success, in-
fighting, expanded public and political support, and renewed militantism.  In many ways, 
the early postwar era was more similar to the early twentieth century than it was to the 
interwar period.  On the Northcoast, there was minor conflict over the purchase of a 
grove, but mostly the negotiations plodded along and the redwood state park system grew 
thanks to the Save-the-Redwoods League.  On the other hand, the Sierra Club, as it had 
during the Hetch Hetchy conflict in the first decade of the twentieth century, made 
national news organizing the media and citizens to oppose a proposed dam.  The interwar 
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partnership between the League and the Club fizzled as their tactics and goals diverged 
during the effort to create a national redwood park in the 1960s.   
One reason for the strain was the League’s unwavering commitment to private 
negotiations with no state intervention.  From the 1940s until the mid-1960s, Save-the-
Redwoods League negotiated with landholders to expand California’s redwood parks the 
way they had during the 1920s and 1930s.  Groves along the Smith River and a National 
Tribute Grove that recognized the service of men and women during World War II were 
established in Jedediah Smith Redwoods State Park.  The Montgomery Woods State 
Reserve in Mendocino County was donated to the League as well.  The Avenue of the 
Giants was completed forty years after its conception, then expanded during the late 
1960s.  And Prairie Creek Redwoods State Park was expanded when the League acquired 
Gold Bluffs Beach and Fern Canyon from Pacific Lumber in 1965.  
While the League negotiated with landholders, the Sierra Club, was by the 1950s 
engaged in more public and political disputes, which ushered in a new era of militantism 
and conflict in redwood country.  Three events drove the Club in its new direction:  the 
conflict over a proposed dam near Dinosaur National Monument, the hiring of David 
Brower as Executive Director, and winter floods on the Northcoast during 1954-55.  The 
growing understanding and appreciation of ecology and of so-called wilderness areas 
helped forge a national constituency for the redwood parks movement, which at the same 
time widened the wedge between the Club and the League.  The Club grew more 
concerned with ecological health, while the League remained committed to preserving 
exquisite specimens of redwoods for evolutionary studies.  The Club, under David 
Brower, reached out to the public in ways similar to John Muir’s old tactics of public 
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relations, anti-big business rhetoric, and grassroots organizing, while the League retained 
its faith in private negotiation, industrial cooperation, and private voluntarism.  On the 
other hand, the Club demanded federal action to protect ecosystems.    
In 1952, David Brower, a military veteran and long-time Club activist, was hired as 
the Club’s first Executive Director, a move that cemented a change in Club culture from 
genteel advocate to public organizer.  The Club’s more militant, public roots date back to 
John Muir, of course, but from the time of Muir’s death until 1950, the organization 
seemed to take the form of a literary and educational club concerned with national parks 
and adventure stories.  In May 1950, however, a feistier element reared its head.  Joseph 
R. Momyer organized a letter-writing drive that resulted in the delivery of three hundred 
letters to the U.S. Forest Service opposing a tramway project in the San Jacinto Valley.  
That winter, the Club formed its first chapters outside the West Coast, and during March 
1951, the Club held its second biennial wilderness conference in Berkeley.  Two of the 
major themes of the conference were, “Wilderness and Mobilization” and “Conflicts in 
Land-use Demands.”  Late in 1951, the Club re-published an opinion-editorial by 
paleontologist and Isaak Walton League officer Joe W. Penfold that roundly criticized the 
Assistant Secretary of the Interior for proposing a dam near Dinosaur National 
Monument.  The Club’s drive toward national constituencies and public organizing was 
in full motion.62 
                                                        
62 See, David Perlman, “The Local Boy Who Made Good,” Sierra Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 1, January 1956, 
3-4; Richard M. Leonard, “Directors Hold February Meeting,” Sierra Bulletin, Vol. 35, No. March 1950, 
14; Richard M.. Leonard, “Board Holds Organization Meeting,” Sierra Bulleting, Vol. 35, May 1950, 11; 
and Richard M. Leonard, “Directors Hold Winter Meeting,” Sierra Bulletin, Vol. 35, December 1950, 5-9. 
McGee Young (“From Conservation to Environment: The Sierra Club and the Organizational Politics of 
Change,” Studies in American Political Development, Vol. 22 (Fall 2008), 183-203) argued that the 
Dinosaur controversy marked the emergence of a new Sierra Club with a focus on public organizing and a 
more militant position.  McGee is correct for the most part, but he largely ignores the importance of the 
Hetch Hetchy conflict on the “new” tactics of the Club.  Muir led a national public relations and letter-
  75 
The 1950s conflict over the dam in Dinosaur National Monument and Echo National 
Park has received the most attention from scholars as the campaign that transformed both 
the Club and postwar environmental politics, but the winter floods of 1954 and 1955 
trained the Club’s sites on the redwoods, forestry, and private property issues.  The 
tactics the Club used during the Dinosaur controversy energized the expanding postwar 
environmental community and constituency; the Club’s focus on the redwoods and 
logging practices on private land transformed redwood politics.  During the Dinosaur 
controversy, the Club revived many of the tactics used during the unsuccessful effort to 
stop the damming of the Hetch Hetchy Valley near Yosemite.  It published This is 
Dinosaur in 1956, and launched a public relations and citizen organizing campaign to 
pressure Congress to defeat the proposed dam that would have flooded portions of 
Dinosaur National Monument.  The Dinosaur conflict of the 1950s and the Wilderness 
Act campaign of the early 1960s provided Club leaders with national campaign 
experience.  The revival of public strategies on national issues increased the popularity of 
the organization.  The new nationally powerful Sierra Club eventually grew into a major 
player in the Redwood National Park campaign of the late 1960s.63   
But it was the damage to the giant redwoods of Bull Creek Flats within the 
Rockefeller Forest of Humboldt Redwoods State Park during the 1954/55 winter that led 
to some of the earliest evidence about the transformation of the Club’s philosophy 
regarding the natural world and environmental politics.  That winter, heavy rains flooded 
                                                        
writing drive in his effort to protect the Hetch Hetchy Valley, and he blasted opponents as purveyors of 
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and eroded major parts of the Bull Creek groves and destroyed part of the Redwood 
Highway that ran around Humboldt Redwoods Park.  The Club published an account of 
the damage in its October 1956 Bulletin, in which Henry Saddler, the Park Ranger at 
Weott in Humboldt, along with Carl Anderson, the Chief Ranger of Humboldt State 
Parks, declared that the damage to the park and the road were due to “poor logging 
practices” and wildfire.  The State Highway Commission maintained complete power of 
domain within the state parks, and they chose to rebuild the highway directly through the 
park.  The State Park Commission and the League believed it was futile to protest the 
plan, and focused their energies on park rehabilitation.  The Club, however, was outraged 
by the lack of protest over the highway and over the logging practices that created the 
mass wasting on the slopes above Bull Creek.  There was a visible change in Club 
rhetoric and goals over the next several years.  In 1957, the Club urged changes in the 
law to prevent the abuse of private land as well as public land.  In doing so, the Club 
vilified the timber industry, and worked to generate public outcry at the logging practices 
allowed by the Board of Forestry by, for example, charging that, “although chainsaws 
don’t discriminate, men could” choose which trees to cut down.  In 1958, the Club’s 
presence on the Northcoast was solidified when it formed the Redwood Chapter.64  
By the end of 1960, the Club was fully engaged in redwood politics, albeit with a 
different tenor, a different set of goals, and a different strategy than those of the Save-the-
Redwoods League.  In 1959, the Club tracked the winter threats to the Rockefeller Forest 
and again charged the timber industry with creating the threat of floods and mass 
                                                        
64 J.W. Penfold, “The Dinosaur Controversy,” Sierra Bulletin, Vol. 36, No. 10, December 1951; Henry 
Sadler, “Winter Damage in Redwood Parks,” Sierra Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 8, October 1956, 12-18; Peggy 
Wayburn and Edward Wayburn, “Our Vanishing Wilderness,” Sierra Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 1, January 
1957, 6-9; and George Ballis, “Havoc in Big Trees,” Sierra Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 5, May 1957, 10-11. 
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wasting.  In early 1960, the Club published the two-part series, “The Tragedy of Bull 
Creek,” written by Peggy Wayburn of the Sierra Club and Newton Drury of the League.  
The article traced the damage to Bull Creek Basin back to clearcuts performed in 1947 
above the basin.  The article chastised the resurgence of clearcutting and highlighted the 
California Division of Beaches and Parks’ critique of the Board of Forestry’s logging 
regime, but the Club did not demand the Board be challenged.  Instead, it proposed that 
the state buy the cutover land above the basin, add it to the state park, and rehabilitate the 
slopes.  The Club also published, The Last Redwoods and the Parkland of Redwood 
Creek, which chronicled the damage to the redwood forest and proposed a very large 
national park in northern Humboldt County that could protect the health of an entire 
ecosystem, not simply a stand of grand trees.  Thus, by the end of 1960, with 
approximately 10 percent of the pre-colonial ancient redwoods still alive, the Club had 
positioned itself as the challenger of timber industry prerogative, the defender of 
ecosystems, and the group willing to use the power of the federal government to remove 
the last ancient redwoods from the timber market.65 
The campaign to create Redwood National Park during the 1960s exemplified the 
evolution of the National Park System because the fight focused on the preservation of an 
ecological unit.  As best articulated by historian Alfred Runte, the National Park System 
developed in three overlapping stages:  the protection of grand scenery, the development 
of public recreational parks, and the preservation of ecosystems.  The earliest parks, 
                                                        
65 “Board Adopts Policy Guide, Sets Budget,” Sierra Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 1, January 1960, 5; Peggy and 
Edward Wayburn, “Bulletin,” Sierra Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 9, December 1959; Peggy Wayburn, “The 
Tragedy of Bull Creek,” Sierra Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 1, January 1960, 10-11; Newton B. Drury, “Chapter 
II – Bull Creek Story: Redwoods and You,” Sierra Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 4, April/May 1960, 10-13; 
Schrepfer, Fight to Save Redwoods), 108-110, 112, 117, 144; and  Francois Leydet, The Last Redwoods 
and the Parkland of Redwood Creek (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1960). 
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including Yosemite, Yellowstone, Mount Ranier, Glacier, and Sequoia, were designed to 
protect majestic landscapes from the encroachment of industry and development, and to 
avoid the degradation and humiliation that occurred at Niagara Falls.  The park 
boundaries encompassed only those areas not believed to be economically useful.  After 
the turn of the century, partly a result of the loss of the Hetch Hetchy Valley, activists 
promoted parks as economically beneficial tourist and recreational sites.  By the 1930s, 
many activists looked to the parks as places to protect ecosystems, watersheds, and 
wildlife.  The Everglades was the first attempt at such a system; Redwood National Park 
and Olympic National Park were the subsequent attempts.  The Everglades and Redwood 
National campaigns pushed the envelope of watershed protection, but fell short in the 
end.  Still, they were important steps in the process of shifting the nation’s goals with 
respect to the Park System to a regime designed  to balance recreation and ecological 
preservation goals.  The emergence of ecological goals in the Park System reflects the 
simultaneous transformation of the redwood preservation movement during the postwar 
era.66 
By the end of the1960s, what was once a strong partnership had frayed into a tense 
rivalry between the League and the Club.  But it was repaired because the actions of 
private landowners on the eve of the creation of the Redwood National Park drove them 
back together.  Different goals and different strategies separated the two environmental 
institutions, but in the end, and as would happen again and again during the late twentieth 
century redwood wars, the actions of timber companies pulled the groups back together 
to fight a common opponent.  During the 1960s, the Club called on the federal 
government to protect redwoods -- very publicly and with the goal of protecting a vast 
                                                        
66 See Runte, National Parks for a full discussion of the evolution of the parks. 
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ancient forest.  At the 1961 Sierra Club Wilderness Conference, the Club requested that 
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall and President John F. Kennedy purchase enough 
private redwood forest to create a Redwood National Park.  In 1962, Brower decreed that 
any new park should cover the greatest number of acres possible, and should not simply 
focus on protecting the tallest trees, because it was the redwood ecosystem that was most 
important.  Previously, the redwood preservation movement had emphasized finding and 
protecting the biggest trees as examples of evolution.  Brower’s call demonstrated the 
popularity of newer ideas about ecology and the importance of biodiversity for a healthy 
planet.   
The Club’s efforts were boosted in 1963 when the California State Highway 
Commission announced its plans to rebuild the Redwood Highway and Highway 199 
freeways through Prairie Creek Redwoods State Park and Jedediah Smith State Park.  
The Ford Foundation pressured President Lyndon Johnson to convince Governor 
Edmund Brown to stop the proposed project because the foundation had donated money 
for the Gold Bluffs Beach purchase, and Udall and the National Park Service 
subsequently investigated two potential park sites: one at Mill Creek and one at Redwood 
Creek – both near Prairie Creek and Jedediah Smith.67  
The League bristled at the reengagement of the Club into redwood park issues 
because the League was working to complete the Humboldt Redwoods State Park by 
negotiating agreements with Pacific Lumber for land along the Eel River and near Bull 
Creek Flats to complete the Avenue of the Giants.  The group’s goal remained to protect 
specimens of the “best” trees and to do so by acquiring the groves in the marketplace.  
They did not want the federal government to use its powers of condemnation because of 
                                                        
67 Schrepfer, Fight to Save Redwoods, 119-130, and Barbour, Coast Redwood, 146.  
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the potential to disrupt negotiations with private landholders, and because they believed 
private citizens should take the initiative to protect redwoods.  However, once a national 
redwood park became a real possibility, the League engaged in the process to make sure 
that a national park contained the “best” trees, and that the park disrupted industrial 
cooperation as little as possible.   
The problem was that the Club’s goals and the League’s goals were not compatible.  
In September 1964, the Park Service proposed a 30,000 to 50,000-acre park located 
around Redwood Creek.  The League had pushed for a location near Mill Creek because 
of its wide alluvial flats and grand grove of very tall trees, and because the Mill Creek 
site was smaller and more removed from the major corporate landholders of the 
Northcoast.  Thus, a Mill Creek site might cost less, and was less likely to raise the 
hackles of the biggest timber companies.  The Club had pushed for the Redwood Creek 
location because the area contained a much larger ancient forest that covered a diverse 
biologic and geologic range.  However, the Club had proposed a 90,000-acre park, so 
they weren’t satisfied with the Park Service proposal either.  The disagreement over the 
location of a national park was only the beginning of the temporary alienation of the Club 
and the League because their different operating models and strategies put them on a 
track that escalated and publicized the conflict between them. 
The desire of the Club to represent the public and to fight for ecosystem protection, 
and the desire of the League to use quiet diplomacy and to not alienate business and 
industry leaders, created an awkward situation for Congress and the Johnson 
Administration.  After the 1964 Park Service report, the Club organized students and 
professors at Humboldt College to write letters in support of the Redwood Creek site.  
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Sierra also ran advertisements in newspapers across the country.  Those two actions 
marked a dramatic change in redwood politics.  They were signs that the public, as with 
the Hetch Hetchy and Dinousaur conflicts, would be called upon to engage in the 
movement to bolster the efforts of organizational leaders who lobbied and negotiated in 
the halls of the legislatures.  They were not welcome signs for the League, who believed 
genteel discussions, not mass protest, provided the best results for the redwoods and 
society – the former was, after all, a metaphor for the latter.  In 1966, much to the 
surprise of the Club, a bill was introduced to create a 40,000-acre park at the Mill Creek 
site.  The Club publicly accused the League and the timber industry of colluding to 
reverse Park Service policy in back room negotiations, and then in their own back room 
deal of sorts, the Club was able to attach an amendment to the park bill that substituted its 
ninety thousand acre plan at Redwood Creek for the bill’s own Mill Creek plan.  The bill 
and the amendment were defeated, and the debate in Congress continued.  Most 
environmental groups, along with the United Auto Workers, supported the Club’s 
position, and it appeared that an ugly round of redwood infighting might threaten the 
legislation altogether.   
The Northcoast timber industry reacted rashly, however, and thus provided the 
political cover that enabled President Johnson to demand a park bill, and that enabled the 
Club and the League to reconcile their differences and fight for a common bill.  After the 
1966 bill was defeated, the timber industry apparently decided to help Congress define 
the boundaries and location of any national park in the redwoods.  Miller Redwood 
Company clearcut land right up to the boundary of Jedediah Smith Redwoods State Park, 
then harvested a line of trees right through the middle of the part of its property slated to 
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become part of the national park adjacent to Jedediah Park.  Miller then logged a circle 
around the Mill Creek site.  The three harvests isolated Mill Creek and Jedediah Smith 
Park from the surrounding forests, and fragmented the ancient forest on Miller land.  
Meanwhile, Georgia Pacific began a harvest operation near the Redwood Creek site, and 
the League announced that it would no longer oppose the Redwood Creek site.  The joint 
work of Sierra and the League helped push President Johnson to plea for Congress to 
“save the redwoods” during his 1968 State of the Union Address, and on October 2, 
1968, Johnson signed the law that authorized a 58,000- acre Redwood National Park at 
the Redwood Creek site.68 
The confluence of the postwar changes in timber regulation, within The Pacific 
Lumber Company, and inside the redwood preservation movement opened a new era in 
redwood politics, an era during which conflict escalated, relationships frayed 
periodically, and the nation’s eyes turned to the last privately owned ancient redwood 
forests in the world.  Though the late twentieth century redwood wars would be fought in 
a greater number of arenas, and would be more public, more hotly contested, and more 
violent than the earlier eras of redwood politics, they were not separate from those earlier 
contests.  The more recent activists drew from the pool of tactics developed by Robert 
Dudley, William Kent, Laura Mahan, Newton B. Drury, John C. Merriam, and David 
Brower.  They also drew from the ideas handed down by Muir, Gifford Pinchot, Aldo 
Leopold, and Brower.  They repeated the public relations campaigns suggested by 
Dudley and implemented by Muir, then perfected by Brower.  They continued to look to 
private donors as had Drury, Kent, and Merriam.  And they would take to the woods like 
                                                        
68 Susan Schrepfer,(The Fight to Save the Redwoods, 130-161) offers a very detailed account of the 
legislative and public campaigns to create Redwood National Park. 
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Mahan.  Intellectually, they accreted the spiritualism of Muir, the ideals of the greatest 
good for the greatest number for the longest time from Pinchot, and the ecological 
perspectives of Leopold and Brower.   
The Pacific Lumber Company continued to rely on its past philanthropy, paternalism 
and small town image to protect it from environmental activists and regulators.  The 
Board of Forestry remained committed to development-focused corporatism.  However, 
after the National Park fight shined a bright light on Northcoast forests and Northcoast 
timber companies, citizens redoubled their efforts and attacked the corporatist regime that 
governed timber harvest practices on private land.  With most of the remaining ancient 
redwood forests protected inside state and national parks, the activists set their sites on 
the condition of the remaining old growth groves and of the second growth forests of the 
Northcoast.  By doing so, they transformed redwood politics and put themselves on a 






Figure 1: Distribution of Coast Redwood. (from Michael Barbour, Sandy Lydon, Mark 
Borchert, Marjorie Popper, Valerie Whitworth, and John Evarts, Coast Redwood: A 
Natural and Cultural History (Los Olivos, CA: Cachuma Press, 2001) 11). 
  85 
 
Figure 2: Map of the Northcoast (Humboldt and Mendocino Counties), (from Lynwood 
Carranco and John T. Labbe, Logging the Redwoods (Caldwell, ID: Caxton Printers, 




Figure 3: 1937 map of the northern California redwood state parks (from Susan R. 
Schrepfer, The Fight to Save the Redwoods: A History of Environmental Reform, 1917-
1978 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983) 19). 
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Chapter 3: The War Begins, 1968 - 1985 
  
 This chapter, like Chapter 2, analyzes the development of the three main 
institutions involved in the redwood wars and the battle over Headwaters Forest:  The 
Board of Forestry, the redwood preservation activists, and The Pacific Lumber Company.  
During the 1970s and early 1980s, tensions among the three institutions escalated, and 
the actions of each forced the others to adjust their goals and strategies.  Citizen groups 
attacked the Board of Forestry’s priorities, and although the courts destroyed official 
corporatism, the Board’s corporatist traditions did not disappear.  The Board continued to 
pursue development-focused policies, and resisted attempts to reign in its traditional 
independence and the independence of the Northcoast timber industry.  During the 1970s, 
a new breed of activist emerged on the Northcoast with a set of tools different from those 
used earlier by the Save the Redwoods League .  The new activists were experienced 
movement organizers who created new redwood preservation organizations on the 
Northcoast that used litigation, direct action, civil disobedience, and public relations to 
attack corporatism and industrial development-focused forestry.  Meanwhile, The Pacific 
Lumber Company leaped headlong into the world of corporate conglomerates.  Contrary 
to popular belief, the company did not suddenly enter the world of industrial logging in 
1986 when Charles Hurwitz purchased Pacific Lumber.  Pacific Lumber was always a 
sophisticated, shareholder-focused company, and in 1970, it accelerated and expanded its 
range of business activities.  By the time of the Hurwitz takeover, Pacific Lumber was a 
full-fledged conglomerate already having abandoned its strategy of holding on to ancient 
trees as long as possible and had reintroduced clear cuts into its logging regime.  
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The Redwood wars began in earnest during the early 1980s, after redwood 
politics grew from skirmishes about park purchases into fights over the overall 
management of private timber land.  The key developments that led to the widened 
redwood wars of the mid-1980s and 1990s -- especially the Headwaters Forest conflict – 
were the development of litigation and civil disobedience campaigns by Northcoast 
activists; the changing patterns of the operations of Georgia-Pacific, Louisiana-Pacific, 
and Pacific Lumber; the migration of key activists to the Northcoast; and the interaction 
of those forces on the Mendocino-Humboldt Border during the late 1970s.  Of particular 
importance were the citizen-driven transformations of redwood politics and The Pacific 
Lumber Company’s energetic conglomeration and diversification.   
As a result of the citizen campaigns, the focus of redwood politics shifted away 
from simple park purchases toward a more active and broader land management regime 
that opened doors for citizen engagement with state agencies.  In response to the Board of 
Forestry’s intransigence, some activists adopted direct action techniques to compliment 
the legal campaign, and in the process, they raised the stakes and volatility of the 
conflicts.  Meanwhile, Pacific Lumber attenuated its ties to its patriarchal image, and  
opened itself up to the advances of Wall Street investors in ways that eventually led to the 
unsolicited Maxxam takeover of the company in 1985.   
Those developments led directly to the Headwaters Forest conflict because they 
transformed California forestry regulation; provided the Headwaters activists with their 
most effective tool; steered Pacific Lumber into the world of mergers and acquisitions 
that placed the company in the crosshairs of corporate raiders; and delivered to the 
Northcoast a group of activists, reluctant as they often were, with leadership and 
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movement experience, as well as with staunchly rural, anti-corporate, conservation, and 
ecologic ideologies.  For redwood activists, the development of the legal tools to attack 
the management of the redwood forests that remained in private hands was the single 
most important factor in their later success.  It was a development that forced Pacific 
Lumber, the Board of Forestry, the California Assembly, Congress, the Executive 
Branch, the federal courts, national environmental groups, and the national media to 
accommodate the actions and demands of local Northcoast activists. 
 
The Decline of Corporatism 
 
The first time Charles Hurwitz, CEO of Maxxam Group Holding, Inc., addressed 
his new employees at The Pacific Lumber Company in 1986, he replied to a question 
about his intentions by telling the crowd, “There’s a little story about the golden rule.  
Those who have the gold, rule.”  That twist of the biblical Golden Rule about treating 
others as you’d like to be treated became shorthand for an oft-told morality tale in the 
popular press about a conflict between Wall Street and local environmentalists over the 
fate of Headwaters Forest.  Hurwitz’s quotation also epitomized the history of California 
forestry regulation to that point.  Until 1971, state law granted the timber industry the 
authority to regulate itself in order to maximize timber production.  Starting in the late 
1960s, however, citizens successfully leveraged the courts to challenge the state’s timber 
regime, with its focus on timber production.  By the time Hurwitz orchestrated the 
takeover of The Pacific Lumber Company and uttered his infamous phrase in 1986, the 
California Board of Forestry – although still heavily influenced by the needs of the timber 
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industry – had endured two decades of legal assault on the state’s long-standing 
production-focused logging practices and institutions.69 
 Litigation was the local reformers’ most successful tool in the case of redwood 
politics.  A small group of citizens leveraged the power of the courts and the legislature, 
while simultaneously garnering more power themselves.  Their litigation efforts 
accomplished four things that advocacy, protests, and direct action alone could not 
accomplish.  First, citizen suits forced the state to legislatively abandon the official 
corporatist and development-only focus of state forestry laws.  Second, the cases forced 
the Board of Forestry to back away from its traditional alliance with the timber industry 
at crucial times.  Third, the litigation permanently blocked proposed harvests of many 
old-growth redwood groves.  And finally, the cases drove President Bill Clinton, 
Governor Pete Wilson, and Pacific Lumber to negotiate a settlement of the Headwaters 
Forest conflict.  As scholars have pointed out, public demonstrations created the 
necessary political will to act at times during the establishment of the modern 
environmental protection regime, advocacy helped build the national and state laws, and 
national litigation pushed the implementation of the laws along.  In California, however, 
the long corporatist tradition mitigated the usefulness of those tools because the 
Assembly had previously abrogated its legislative duties to the timber industry.  As a 
                                                        
69 The quote can be found in numerous articles, including, Ellen Schultz, “A Raider’s Ruckus in the 
Redwoods,” Fortune, April 24, 1989, 72, and John Skow, “Redwoods: The Last Stand,” Time, Sunday, 
June 24, 2001 (accessed at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101940606-
164513,00.html on March 7, 2008).  The best description of the incident at Scotia is by David Harris, The 
Last Stand: The War Between Wall Street and Main Street over California’s Ancient Redwoods (New 
York: Times Books, 1995).  
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result, citizens took their case to the courts to dismantle corporatism and production-
focused timber regulation.70  
The California forestry challenges deserve to be counted among the most 
important environmental law developments in the postwar United States because they 
transformed fundamentally transformed an entire system of governance.  The 
environmental litigation of citizens at the federal level expanded, clarified, and enforced 
particular aspects of the modern federal environmental protection regime.  For example, 
NEPA and other laws expanded the responsibilities of federal agencies to non-market 
landscape values such as endangered species habitat, and it empowered citizens to 
participate in agency decisions and act as private Attorneys General.  More than that, 
citizens turned to the courts using NEPA and other legal tools to force agencies to better 
consider public and ecological health, and to comply with the new environmental laws.  
In the case of the Forest Service, local citizen groups sued the agency during the early 
1970s and drove Congress to pass sweeping legislation that overhauled the agency’s 
mission and oversight.  However, I argue that as dramatic as the changes in 
environmental regulation and oversight were at the federal level, the fundamental 
structure of governance that was handed down from the Gilded Age and the New Deal 
remained unchanged.  The U.S. regulatory system maintained its command-and-control 
structure.  The Forest Service still maintained a client-agency relationship with the timber 
                                                        
70 Some good analyses of general postwar citizen group legal history are Hays, Beauty, Health, and 
Permanence, Chapter 14, Lazarus, The Making of Environmenta Policyl, Salzman, Environmental Law and 
Policy, Joseph L. Sax, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action, (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., 1971), David B. Sicilia, ”The Corporation Under Siege: Social Movements, Regulation, Public 
Relations, and Tort Law since the Second World War,” in Kenneth Lipartito and David B. Sicilia, 
Constructing Corporate America: History, Politics, Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), and 
Richard B. Stewart, “A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?,” Capital University Law Review 
(2001), 21-182.   
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industry.  The litigation campaign orchestrated by Northcoast activists was different 
because it dealt with state law and private land, it was designed to gut a governance 
structure and philosophy -- corporatism, and it was set up to destroy the vestigial remains 
of the corporatist tradition.71 
The federal cases are important because they clarified legislative mandates and 
forced agency action to fulfill new legal obligations, but they did not re-order institutions 
in the same way as the Northcoast activists’ efforts in California.  The litigation involving 
the implementation of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, the Endangered Species Act, 
and the National Forest Management Act are prominent in the literature.  Those cases 
helped define the scope and intent of the modern environmental protection regime.  The 
literature is rich with analysis of those cases and their effects. This chapter focuses on the 
eight most important cases in the movement to transform California forestry governance.  
Because the movement set its sights on the fundamental transformation of institutions, on 
increased regulation of private property, and on giant redwoods, it led to, and was part of, 
one of the most important environmental battles of the late twentieth century.   
 
The First Litigation and the Deconstruction of Official Corporatism 
                                                        
71 The most well known environmental cases include Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal 
Power Commission (1972) because it was the first time an environmental group was granted legal standing.  
Subsequently, Sierra Club v. Morton (1972) changed the traditional injury-in-fact standing requirements to 
allow citizens to use the citizen suit provisions of the federal environmental laws if they could demonstrate 
they had suffered recreational or aesthetic injuries.  Previously, standing was granted only if the plaintiffs 
could demonstrate specific economic or personal harm to themselves.  The literature also prioritizes the 
cases that clarified the 1970s environmental laws.  Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (1978) clarified that 
the Endangered Species Act was to be implemented without consideration of the economic impact of 
protecting species.  Likewise, Lead Industries Association v. EPA (1980) established the principle that the 
EPA must only base air quality standards on health considerations, not on economic or technical 
considerations (Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission (407 U.S. 926, 10), 
Sierra Club v. Morton (405 U.S. 727, 25, 73), Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (437 U.S. 153, 261), Lead 




The inability or unwillingness of the postwar Board of Forestry to accommodate 
the public’s desire to consider the non-economic value of the forest led directly to citizen 
actions that repealed the 1945 Forest Practice Act and the Board it authorized.  In 1969, 
Bayside Timber Company obtained a logging permit from the Board for land in San 
Mateo County near a residential neighborhood.  Down-slope residents in the Skylonda 
neighborhood objected to this logging plan because of projected erosion and watershed 
damage, fire hazards, traffic congestion, and the destruction of the neighborhood’s scenic 
beauty.  The residents organized themselves into the Skylonda-Skywood Citizens 
Committee and successfully pressured the County Board of Supervisors to reject 
Bayside’s road-building permit.  Bayside Timber argued that the state law pre-empted the 
county’s authority and sued the county.  With the aid of the Sierra Club, the county 
prevailed in 1971, when the First District Court of Appeals in California ruled in favor of 
the county’s right to block the logging.  The Court declared that the 1945 Forest Practice 
Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to “persons pecuniarily interested in 
the timber industry.”72 
The Court identified two main problems with the 1945 Act, despite recent its 
amendments.  First, the act authorized the governor to appoint a five-person Board 
comprised of three representatives of the timber industry, one from the grazing industry, 
and one from the general public.  Second, all forest practice rules were to be approved by 
two-thirds of the timber owners in any forest district before finalized by the Board.  The 
two sets of requirements established a system whereby the industry self-regulated and 
                                                        
72 “landmark Decision by Council,”  The San Mateo Times, July 23, 1969, Section II, page 25.  Bayside 
Timber v. Board of Supervisors, California 1st Appellate District, Division One, 1971. (20 Cal.App.3d 1, 7). 
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had the additional power to legislate its own financial interests.  While the Bayside case 
was working its way to appeal in 1970, the legislature attempted to fix the self-regulation 
problem by increasing the Board to seven members.  The additional two members were 
to be public members with “an interest in and knowledge of the environment.”  The Court 
noted that the additional Board members did not change the fact that two-thirds of a 
district’s private timber owners had to approve all forest practice rules, and so the court 
declared the 1945 act unconstitutional.  Northcoast timber operators were “stunned” and 
prepared themselves for, according to reporter Dan Walters, a “bitter legal and legislative 
fight over who should manage the state’s timber resources.”   
As the first successful attack on the Board’s independence and the dominance of 
development-focused corporatism, the Bayside decision marks the beginning of citizen 
actions to overhaul California’s forestry regime.  Previously, the Sierra Club and the 
Save-the-Redwoods League had focused largely on removing ancient redwoods from 
timber production via park creation.  Bayside opened the door for the state to manage 
timber operations more tightly in order to protect a more expansive definition of public 
interest in the state’s forests.73  
 Like NEPA’s passages establishing federal environmental policy procedures, 
passage of the Forest Practice Act in 1973  marked a sea change in private land use law in 
California.  This was because the law was designed to shift the state’s policy away from 
                                                        
73 Sec. 4572 of the 1945 FPA, as amended in 1970.  Quoted on 9 in, 20 Cal.App.3d 1.  Dan Walters, 
“Timbermen Stunned as Forestry Act Declared Void,” The Times Standard, September 21, 1971, page 1. 
20 Cal.App.3d 1, 9.  Sharon Duggan, “Citizen Enforcement of California’s Private Land Forest Practice 
Regulations,” Journal of Environmental Law & Litigation, Spring 1994 (8 JENVLL 291).  Duggan rightly 
argues that Arcata provided motivation for citizens to watchdog the timber harvest plan review process 
(page 4).  However, Bayside marks the beginning of the citizen watchdog era because citizens and citizen 
groups pressured the County Board of Supervisors to reject a harvest plan and argue the unconstitutionality 
of the 1945 FPA on appeal.   
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development-first corporatism and toward resource conservation and public oversight.  
The 1972 and 1973 legislative session took up the issue of forestry regulation in what one 
reporter called a “basic philosophic tug-of-war.”  The question, as the reporter saw it, was 
“whether the public interest in California’s 8 million acres of privately owned timberland 
takes precedent over private property rights.”  In early 1973, the state Senate 
unanimously approved a bill offered by Republican John A. Nejedly that he claimed 
“[went] as far as we can go in regulation of private property.”  The Assembly reviewed a 
different bill offered by Democract Edwin L. Z’berg that required timber operators to put 
up a performance bond before beginning any logging operation, in addition to the 
increased citizen and agency oversight measures included in the Nejedly bill.  
Environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and the Planning and Conservation League 
negotiated with the legislature and the industry throughout the spring to develop a 
compromise bill both houses would approve.  However, in July, the Planning and 
Conservation League withdrew its support from the compromise bill because the group 
opposed the removal of the requirement that subjected timber harvest plans to public 
hearings, the exclusion of environmental impact reports for harvest plans, and the 
removal of the performance bond.   
Despite the Planning League’s opposition, the bill passed with the support of the 
Reagan Administration, the timber industry, and the Club.  In part, the bill succeeded 
because Nejedly argued that the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970 required 
Environmental Impact Reports for development projects and so to include the 
requirement in the Forest Practice Act would be redundant.  Though the new law marked 
a dramatic transformation of California timber regulation, environmental groups, the 
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Board, and the industry would battle repeatedly over the relationship between the Forest 
Practice Act and the California Environmental Quality Act for the next twenty years.74 
The new law reflected the more powerful status of scientists and environmental 
groups in postwar environmental politics, and was based on the Assembly-ordered 1972 
University of California at Davis Report’s recommendation of a system of “resource 
conservation standards to protect watersheds and ecological values.”  The law charged the 
Board and the Division of Forestry it oversaw with creating forest practice rules to end 
the depletion of timber resources, thereby “giving consideration to values relating to 
recreation, watershed, wildlife, range and forage, fisheries, regional economic vitality, 
employment and aesthetic enjoyment.”  The law also required timber companies to 
submit Timber Harvest Plans before any new cutting, and to allow the Department of 
Fish and Game and the Water Quality Control Boards to comment on the plans.   
The most important sections of the new law for citizen groups provided greater 
citizen oversight of the Timber Harvest Plan process.  The new legislation mandated 
public review of Timber Harvest Plans before final approval, while another section 
allowed citizens to challenge Forestry and Board decisions in court (following the model 
of the NEPA and the federal Clean Air and Water Act amendments of 1970 and 1972, 
respectively).  The citizen suit provision specifically allowed citizens to sue Forestry and 
the Board to obtain judicial review of administrative decisions.  Additionally, the state 
                                                        
74 Staff Writer, “Ecologists and Timbermen Gird for Legislative Tug-of-War,” Los Angeles Times, January 
15, 1973, pg. 3; William Endicott, “Senate OKs Stiff Rules on Logging,” Los Angeles Times, March 1, 
1973, A3; William Endicott, “Conservation Group Withdraws Support of Logging Control Bill ,” Los 
Angeles Times,  July 20, 1973, A3,; “An End to Logging Confusion ,” Los Angeles Times, September 14, 




Code of Civil Procedure granted citizens the right to challenge discretionary agency 
actions.  
Environmental activists eagerly embraced these new tools and were able to 
aggressively use the citizen suit provisions because, unlike federal environmental cases, 
issues of standing regarding environmental group plaintiffs never became an issue in 
California.  The courts had long recognized an exception to the specific economic 
injury/interest test for cases involving a “public right…to procure the enforcement of a 
public duty.”  The new act also reconstituted the Board with five members from the 
public, three from the forest products industries, and one from the livestock industry, a 
move naively meant to break the timber industry’s grip on the Board.  Out of this system, 
a legal and political battle arose over control of Board policies and California’s last 
unprotected ancient forests. 75 
 
The Resilience of  De Facto Corporatism and of the Citizen Campaign 
 
The Board, like its federal counterparts, largely resisted its new responsibilities 
during the 1970s, and citizens continued to challenge the state’s corporatist tradition for 
logging regulation, just as citizen groups challenged federal agency actions under NEPA.  
In 1973, over the objections of the National Park Service, the Board ruled that clear 
                                                        
75 Institute of Ecology at the University of California at Davis, Public Policy for California Forest Lands 
(U.C. Davis, 1972), quoted in Duggan, Guide to Forest Practice Act, 2-3.  See Princetl, Transforming 
California, 167-168 and Barbour, Coast Redwood, 188-189.  For a detailed review of the sections of the 
1973 FPA (CA Pub. Res. Code sec. 4511 et seq.) see Duggan, Guide to Forest Practice Act,  6-9 and 790-
796.  The citizen suit provision of the Forest Practice Act is contained within Public Resource Code section 
4514.5.  The ability to challenge discretionary actions is found in Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1085 




cutting in the Redwood Creek watershed did not harm Redwood National Park.  It also 
approved an Arcata National Corporation harvest plan within the watershed.  The Natural 
Resources Defense Council, in line with their federal efforts to clarify and enforce 
NEPA, sued the State Forester and Arcata National, arguing that the plan did not 
adequately consider environmental harm as required by the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA, the state equivalent of NEPA), which required environmental 
impact studies prior to any state agency taking actions that could cause significant 
environmental impacts.  The law also required state agencies to propose mitigations for 
environmental impacts.  Arcata National argued that CEQA guidelines did not apply to 
the Timber Harvest Plans because plan approval was a ministerial duty of Forestry, not a 
discretionary action.  Superior Court Judge Broddus ruled in 1975 that Timber Harvest 
Plans were a discretionary action and thus governed by CEQA, and further ruled that the 
content of the contested harvest plans failed to fulfill the Environmental Impact Report 
requirement of CEQA.  Development-focused corporatism was hit with a second major 
blow when Arcata National unsuccessfully tested the industry and the Board’s autonomy 
in a 1976 appeal of Judge Broddus’ ruling.76  The Arcata case and the surrounding 
controversy led to the expansion of Redwood National Park in 1978 to include Redwood 
Creek within the park’s protected boundaries.77   
                                                        
76 National Resources Defense Council v. Arcata National Corporation and Lewis A. Moran, State 
Forester, Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, July 8, 1976 (59 
Cal.App.3d 945).  58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen 250 (1975).  See Susan R. Schrepfer, The Fight to Save the 
Redwoods: A History of Environmental Reform, 1917-197 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 
194 and 197 for a discussion of the Board’s refusal to heed National Park Service orders to enforce the CA 
Forest Practice Act and stop logging in the watershed.  The California Environmental Quality Act is 
California Public Resources Code (CA PRC) section 21000-21006, 21050, 21060-21072, 21080-21098, 
21100-21108, 21150-21154, 21156-21159.9, 21160-21162, 21165-21177.   
 
77 National Resources Defense Council v. Arcata National Corporation and Lewis A. Moran, State 
Forester, Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, July 8, 1976 (59 
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The Board’s continued resistance to its duties to CEQA and the non-market mandates 
of the Forest Practice Act encouraged citizens to continue their legal challenges to 
corporatism.  In 1978, Sonoma County residents Francine Gallegos and Louise Patterson, 
along with the Camp Meeker Improvement Association, obtained a writ of mandate to 
negate the Board’s approval of a Chenoweth Lumber Company harvest plan, one that the 
Department of Health concluded would “threat[en]…the quantity and quality of water in 
the Camp Meeker area.”  In a sequence of events that became a pattern through the 
1980s, Forestry rejected the Chenoweth harvest plan based on the Department of Health’s 
concerns, but Chenoweth appealed to the Board, the Board overturned Forestry’s 
dismissal, and citizens sued.   
Gallegos et al. successfully argued that the Arcata ruling did not capture all of the 
ways CEQA applied to timber plans.  Specifically, the plaintiffs charged the Board with 
failure to comply with CEQA requirements because the Board had not based its decision 
on “substantial evidence” and had not responded to public comments regarding the 
Chenoweth harvest plan.   The appeals court agreed with Gallegos et al. and the Arcata 
court that harvest plans had to fulfill CEQA requirements for Environmental Impact 
Statements.  The Gallegos court went even farther and demanded that the Board and 
Forestry respond in writing to public comments regarding significant environmental 
impacts of a harvest plan, and that the response needed to explain Forestry’s decision in a 
“reasoned” manner based on “substantial evidence.” Even though official corporatist rule 
                                                        
Cal.App.3d 945).  58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen 250 (1975).  See Schrapfer, Fight to Save Redwoods, 194 and 197 
for a discussion of the Board’s refusal to heed National Park Service orders to enforce the CA Forest 
Practice Act and stop logging in the watershed.  The California Environmental Quality Act is California 
Public Resources Code (CA PRC) section 21000-21006, 21050, 21060-21072, 21080-21098, 21100-21108, 
21150-21154, 21156-21159.9, 21160-21162, 21165-21177.   
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had ended, the industry would continue to appeal to the corporatist-leaning Board when 
bureaucrats threatened to block logging plans. The Board rebuked the industry’s appeals 
only after repeated defeats in court during the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated that the 
Gallegos ruling had to be heeded.78   
Together, the Gallegos and Arcata decisions provided the foundation for nearly all 
subsequent local citizen challenges of harvest plans.  The two rulings required that 
harvest plans fully comply with CEQA, including: the requirements that other relevant 
agencies be consulted, that feasible alternatives and mitigation be implemented, that the 
agency make the harvest plans available to the public, and that the agency respond to 
public comments in a reasoned manner.  Forestry, the Board, and the timber industry 
resisted these mandates, but EPIC and other groups sued to force compliance with the 
laws and court precedents.  It was through these legal channels that local citizens chipped 
away at the Board’s corporatist orientation, and forced it to step away from its traditional 
alliance with the timber industry several times during the late 1980s and 1990s, most 
notably when it came to The Pacific Lumber Company and the battle over Headwaters 
Forest.  Pacific Lumber occupied the center of the conflict because it owned Headwaters 
Forest, because the logging strategy it developed during the early 1980s placed the 
ancient trees under threat of harvest, and because the company placed itself in the sights 
of corporate raiders who elevated the collective anxiety of Northcoast activists.79   
                                                        
78 Barbour, Coast Redwood, 189-190.  A writ of mandate compels a public agency to correct prior actions 
not consistent with the law.  Gallegos v. California State Board of Forestry, California Court of Appeals, 
First District, Division 4, January 19, 1978 (76 Cal.App.32 945). 
 
79 In addition to the published court opinions and regulations, Sharon Duggan offers a detailed analysis of 
codes, laws, and rulings of the 1970s regarding CEQA, the Timberland Productivity Act, and the FPA.  The 
article also provides analysis of a few of the subsequent rulings related to defining the laws regulating 





Long before Charles Hurwitz set his sights on The Pacific Lumber Company, the 
company had set its sights on other firms to diversify its assets and shield itself from 
business cycles and new social pressures.  Throughout the postwar era, the media 
emphasized the company’s differences with other corporations—especially its differences 
with Maxxam Inc. -- but a closer look reveals strong ties to twentieth century trends of 
conglomerate development, especially after 1970.  At the same time, the history of 
Pacific Lumber and its acquisition by Maxxam is not the story of an inefficiently run 
company saved by a financier who tightened the reins on management and trimmed the 
fat like the so-called necessary takeovers described by Harvey H. Segal in Corporate 
Makeover.80  
The 1980s and 1990s environmental challenge to Pacific Lumber generated the 
most lasting images in the popular literature, coverage that unfortunately shaped the 
postwar narrative of Pacific Lumber.  For at least fifteen years, the environmental 
challenge to Pacific Lumber included litigation; direct action such as tree sitting (the 
most well known example is that of Julia Butterfly Hill during 1998 and 1999), 
suspending banners across highways (including the Golden Gate Bridge which Woody 
Harrelson participated in), and trespassing; and legislative advocacy.  The conflict was 
thought to be resolved in 1996, when the Clinton Administration brokered a deal between 
                                                        
California’s Private Land Forest Practice Regulations, Journal of Environmental Law & Litigation, 
Spring, 1994 (8 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 291).  
 
80 Harvey H. Segal, Corporate Makeover: The Reshaping of the American Economy, (New York: Viking 
Penguin Inc. 1989). 
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Pacific Lumber, Congress, the Administration, and the state of California that allowed for 
the public purchase of 7700 acres of the 60,000 acre Headwaters Forest and placed the 
rest of Pacific Lumber’s 200,000 acres under the management of a Habitat Conservation 
Plan.  It was largely out of the news coverage of the conflict over Headwaters Forest that 
the standard narrative of Pacific Lumber was born. 
The popular narrative revolves around the takeover as the key historical event in 
Pacific Lumber’s development, and while too narrow in scope, it does highlight the one 
consistent thread running through the company’s history.  Throughout the twentieth 
century, Pacific Lumber attempted to simultaneously modernize and maintain its small 
town image.  Unfortunately, Pacific Lumber’s history is almost exclusively discussed 
with respect to the pre-1985 and post-1985 company as the only two relevant historical 
configurations.  The standard pre-1985 history focuses on the idiosyncratic and 
anachronistic qualities like the persistence of the company town of Scotia, the land 
donations and sales made to state and national parks, the college scholarship fund, and 
the family-run nature of the business.  The standard post-1985 narrative is about a 
company forced into the conglomerate web of a distant financier looking to sell off assets 
and make a quick buck from unsuspecting and poorly managed companies, and who 
subsequently steered Pacific Lumber toward an unsustainable business model sure to 
doom the workers, the shareholders, the redwoods, and the salmon.  While much of this 
narrative rings true, it does not tell the whole story of the company.  Pacific Lumber was, 
as demonstrated in Chapter 2, almost from the beginning, part family-run business that 
included some unrelated business units.  During the 1970s, the company developed into a 
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conglomerate, and so while the company changed dramatically after the takeover, it was 
not at all unrecognizable from its previous configurations.81   
   In addition to challenging the popular narrative of the pre- and post-Maxxam 
Pacific Lumber Company, the history of Pacific Lumber’s entrée into the modern 
conglomerate world challenges the most prominent framework for analyzing the postwar 
timber industry.  In their history of Weyerhauser, Ralph W. Hidy, Frank Ernest Hill, and 
Allan Nevins asserted that technological advances, scientific management, and 
conservation through waste reduction and tree farming were the primary trends of the 
twentieth century timber industry.  Pacific Lumber’s history supports their contentions, 
but also sets the company apart from the likes of  Weyerhauser, which focused their 
expansion efforts on increasing market share through expanded production and through 
related diversification efforts (i.e. adding paper products to the timber product lines).  
Pacific Lumber improved its market share by slowly cutting its prime asset—1000 year-
old redwoods, and by holding on longest in a war of attrition, gained a monopoly 
position..  While Weyerhauser and others got into the paper business during the postwar 
era, Pacific Lumber behaved like a conglomerate, adding cutting and welding operations, 
a hotel, and a Central California tomato and rice farm.82   
 
Conglomeration as Protectionism and Conservative Fiscalism 
                                                        
81 This popular narrative is so strong that Representatives Pete Stark and George Brown of California 
published an Opinion Editorial in the New York Times describing Pacific Lumber Company as a “model 
corporate citizen” pre-takeover.  George Brown and Pete Stark, "The Last Stand", The New York Times, 
December, 1, 1995 editorial desk, sec. A, pg 33. 
82 Ralph W. Hidy, Frank Ernest Hill, and Allan Nevins, Timber and Men:  The Weyerhauser Story (New 
York: The MacMillan Company, 1963).  Michael V. Namorato, “Lumber and Wood Products, 24.0,” 
Chapter 6 in David O. Whitten and Bessie E. Whitten, eds Manufacturing: A Historiographical and 
Bibliographical Guide, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 117-131; Zaremba, Economics of  
American Lumber,  2-3; and Ellefson U.S. Wood-based Industry,  359 also identifies transportation, 
automation, and conservation as the three major timber industry trends during twentieth century. 
  104 
Beginning in 1970, Pacific Lumber dove headfirst into that era’s conglomeration 
wave more aggressively than most timber companies and contrary to what casual 
observers might expect from a timber company with a small town image.  In effect, the 
firm reinvented itself as a holding company by 1980.  Its diversification plan was 
initiated in 1970 with the acquisition of the Victor Equipment Company, the nation’s 
leading cutting and welding producer.  In 1976, Pacific Lumber purchased 3400 acres of 
tomato, rice, and wheat farmland in the Sacramento Valley.  The goal of the 
diversification was to insulate the company from the housing market cycles by adding 
assets that were thought of as cycle-free, and to protect itself from the pressure of new 
environmental values and politics.  Another major part of the transformation into a 
conglomerate was the company’s change in ownership and management.  In 1975, the 
company was listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and no group, including the 
Murphy family, had more than a 5 percent interest.  Additionally, Stanwood A. Murphy 
died in 1972 as the last Murphy to hold the title of President.  During the rest of the 
twentieth century, the company was managed largely by men with finance and 
accounting backgrounds who kept their eyes on metrics and numbers more than on 
operations.  John Campbell, a new employee during the 1970s, became a central figure in 
the company in part because he bridged the worlds of finance and manufacturing.83 
Those initial forays into conglomeration were only the beginning of the 
transformation of Pacific Lumber.  Between 1977 and 1983, the company acquired a firm 
                                                        
83 John Campbell, interview with author, Fortuna, CA, 24 April 2008 (tapes and notes in possession of 
author).  The Pacific Lumber Company Annual Report, 1981, Washington, DC, The Library of Congress, 
Adams Building, Business and Science Reading Room, Historical Annual Reports, page 2; The Pacific 
Lumber Company Annual Report, 1982, 5; Stanwood A. Murphy Obituary, The New York Times, August 
10, 1972, page 38; The Pacific Lumber  Company Annual Report, 1976, page 1; The Pacific Lumber 
Company Annual Report, 1976, 10; The Pacific Lumber Company Annual Report, 1980, 6; and the 1980 
Annual Report, 18.   
  105 
that produced plasma metal cutting equipment; an automated arc welding company; a 
Swedish arc welding power supply manufacturer; a Massachusetts air-fueled gas torch 
manufacturer; a manufacturer of alloy welding rods; a 140- room hotel in San Francisco; 
and a Kansas manufacturer of electric welding tools.  Subsequently, Pacific Lumber 
created Palco Industries, Inc., to house all of the cutting and welding operations, and in 
1980, the company created Palco International Corporation to market the cutting and 
welding products on the international market.  With its purchase of  shares of additional 
companies (including Amalia Lumber Company and Photon Sources, Inc.),  and Pacific 
Lumber’s transformation from a timber company into a holding company that bought and 
sold assets to maximize returns on shareholder investments was complete.  By 1981, 75 
percent of Pacific Lumber’s sales came from non-timber products.  Two years later, , 
Vice President Garner underscored the new strategy by deeming the firm a “net investor”  
to the New York Times.84 
Despite this aggressive conglomeration, Pacific Lumber still behaved in ways 
atypical of postwar timber companies and of conglomerates and holding companies.  
While the lumber production of its peers fluctuated dramatically with demand during the 
1970s and early 1980s, Pacific Lumber maintained relatively steady production.   From 
1974 to 1985, production levels for West Coast redwood and Douglass fir timber 
operators Louisiana-Pacific, Georgia-Pacific, and Simpson fluctuated on average by 
18.68 percent, 20.66 percent, and 10.67 percent per year, respectively.  Some years, 
production for LP and GP fluctuated by as much as 49%.  During those same years, 
                                                        
84Pacific Lumber Company Annual Report, 1977, page 3; Pacific Lumber Company Annual Report, 1978, 
page 3; Pacific Lumber Annual Report, 1979, page 3;  Pacific Lumber Company Annual Report,1980, page 
2-3; Pacific Lumber Company Annual Report, 1981, pages 2,3, 14; "Briefs: Debt Issues," The New York 
Times, June 16, 1983, Sec. D, Page 8, Col. 4. 
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Pacific Lumber’s production fluctuated on average only 8.68 percent, with a maximum 
change of 16.81 percent.  Simpson’s highest yearly change was 22.27 percent, by 
comparison.  The stated reason for the relative Pacific Lumber stability was the 
company’s commitment to harvesting on a “continuous yield” or “perpetual basis.”  The 
company’s emphasis on continuous yield operations was in part driven by the company’s 
self-proclaimed “unique” redwood production strategy.  Rather than operate under the 
typical business model that involved stimulating demand, expanding operations to 
increase market share, and increasing profit margins via economies of scale, Pacific 
Lumber focused on improving margins by utilization of the entire log and improving its 
position in the market over time by holding onto old growth trees while others cut them 
rapidly and planted tree farms of young trees.  Indeed, the strategy appears unique to the 
Northcoast because trade journals repeatedly published articles about the company’s 
improvements in technology, and  John Campbell repeatedly discussed the need for 
Pacific Lumber to better match industry operations in order to maximize profits.85   
Pacific Lumber’s acquisitions strategy also set it apart from other timber 
companies and other conglomerates during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  The company 
seems to have never bought companies in order to sell off assets and use the remnant 
corporate entity for new business activities.  In fact, Pacific Lumber began selling some 
of its acquisitions in order to refocus its energies on Scotia timber and on its cutting and 
welding manufacturing division.  Accordingly, it sold Victor’s retail welding supply 
                                                        
85  Pacific Lumber Company Annual Report, 1980, page 4-16 and Campbell interview.  Campbell relied on 
the argument that young growth trees grow more each year than old growth, and so a young forest 
produced more new board feet per year.  In 1988, Campbell told the New York Times that increased harvest 
levels were the industry norm and that clearcuts are a responsible form of logging (Robert Lindsey, 
"Ancient Redwoods Fall to a Wall Street Takeover," The New York Times, March 3, 1988, Sec A, paeg 16, 
Col. 1).   In 1990, he told the Sydney Morning Herald that Pacific Lumber’s job in the Timber Production 
Zone was to intensify management and grow more board feet (Wanda Jamrozik, "Black Future for 
Redwoods," Syney Morning Herald, November 11, 1990, pg. 79 
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business, its power fluid business (Stoody Company), and its 70 percent stake in Amalia 
Timber (NM).  When the company put the timber and cutting and welding workers on a 
four-day work week to avoid layoffs during the 1981-1982 recession, it provided further 
evidence of its commitment to manufacturing and longevity.  Finally, despite its 
acquisitions and capital investments, the company maintained low levels of long-term 
debt throughout the 1970s and 1980s.   
Like the company’s early century cooperation with Save-the-Redwoods League, 
this was likely a case of  business  pursuing its long-term self interest, not simply acts of 
goodwill.  A long life in manufacturing requires long-term stability in supply, demand, 
and output.  A focus on continuous yield timber harvesting and slowly cutting old growth 
provided the company with a longer inventory horizon than most timber companies.  The 
company’s sales and donations of groves of ancient trees increased profit margins thanks 
to the lower cost of land sales versus the cost of felling and milling old trees.  
Conservationism and land sales and donations also helped prevent pitched battles with 
environmentalists.  The company also could expect to benefit from rising prices as old 
growth redwood inventories declined nationally, while theirs remained steady.  
Additionally, the cutting and welding division provided the company with some 
insulation from business cycles due to the steady demand for industrial tools.  When 
housing starts fell, the company relied on cutting and welding sales to weather the storm.  
Finally, the college scholarships, free life insurance policies, and an aversion to layoffs 
meant Pacific Lumber, just as most U.S. businesses had in the 1920s, could resist union 
efforts better than most modern companies focused on shorter term margins.86 
                                                        
86 The company’s annual reports are very clear about their redwood strategy, divestiture efforts, and labor 
strategy.  See 1976 report page 3; 1978 report page 3; 1979 report page 4; 1980 report pages 3,4, and 6; 
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Another reason the pre-Maxxam takeover Pacific Lumber Company should not be 
considered strongly committed to worker and environmental justice is the company’s far- 
from flawless record with sustainable yield harvesting.  The company’s 1980 Annual 
Report promoted the Pacific Lumber’s long-standing commitment to its self-defined 120 
million board feet per year sustainable harvest.  However, the company averaged 134 
million board feet per year from 1974 to 1985, hitting the 120 million board feet level 
only twice in those seventeen years.  And in September 1985, before the Hurwitz 
takeover, John Campbell, Pacific Lumber’s Executive Vice President of Forest Products, 
and Bob Stephens, head of the forestry department at the company, proposed a new 
yearly standard of 170 million board feet.  The two executives believed the 1956 timber 
cruise – an aerial survey --  underestimated the company’s timber inventory.  The 
company had also acquired additional acreage during the 1980s and 1990s, though the 
condition of the new land is unclear in the record.  Some of Campbell’s subsequent 
statements, however, possibly point toward a different motivation—keeping up with 
industry trends and standard practices, which did not include sustainable yield harvests.87 
                                                        
1981 report page 2; 1982 report page 2; and “Brief,” The Wall Street Journal, February 20, 1985, Sec. 1, 
Page 16, Col. 3.  The quotes about “continuous yield” and “perpetual basis” come from the 1980 and 1976 
Pacific Lumber Company Annual Reports, pages 4 and 1, respectively. 
87 Pacific Lumber Company Annual Report, 1980, page 4; Harris, The Last Stand, 45-47.  John Campbell, 
interview with author, 24 April 2008.  Campbell told me that he had pushed for clearcuts during the early 
1980s and for increased harvests because he believed that the 1956 timber harvest was inaccurate and 
because clearcutting was a better system for regeneration and to reduce inefficiency – especially the 
inefficiencies created by working around trees to leave standing and because of timber loss due to “blown 
down” of trees left standing that are unprotected from winter storms.  After the takeover, two quotes from 
Campbell corraborate his interview statements that efficiency and not simply achieving sustainable harvest 
levels was foremost on his and Stephens’ minds in 1985.  In 1987, he told Business Week that increasing 
activity was healthy (James R. Norman, "A Takeover Artist Who's Turning Redwoods into Quick Cash," 
Business Week, February 2, 1987, 64).  Campbell relied on the argument that young growth trees grow 
more each year than old growth, and so a young forest produced more new board feet per year.  In 1988, 
Campbell told the New York Times that increased harvest levels were the industry norm and that clearcuts 
are a responsible form of logging (Robert Lindsey, "Ancient Redwoods Fall to a Wall Street Takeover," 
The New York Times, March 3, 1988, Sec A, paeg 16, Col. 1).   In 1990, he told the Sydney Morning 
Herald that Pacific Lumber’s job in the Timber Production Zone was to intensify management and grow 
more board feet (Wanda Jamrozik, "Black Future for Redwoods," Syney Morning Herald, November 11, 
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The company’s historical strategy of old-time paternalism, conservationism, 
cooperation with the League, mergers and acquisitions, capital investments, and fiscal 
conservatism left Pacific Lumber in sound financial shape in 1985.  From 1980 to 1985, 
Pacific Lumber averaged $179 million in net sales, $24 million worth of long-term debt, 
an 18 percent profit margin, a 0.15 debt-to-assets ratio, and approximately $1 dividend 
per share (Table 1).  As a result, in 1983, the S&P gave Pacific Lumber an A+ rating.  
Harvey Segal argued that the late 1970s and early 1980s mergers and acquisitions wave 
was often beneficial to American corporate culture because the acquiring company would 
focus management on improving profit margins instead of increasing output and 
managerial purview.  Pacific Lumber did not fit Segal’s criteria.  The company’s 
managers actively shed divisions they did not think met long-term investment standards 
such as the Victor retail division and the power fluid business.  With respect to profit 
margin, 1982 was the company’s worst year since 1970, but the next two years marked 
record highs, and 1982 was the only year the company’s net percentage was below 12 
percent.88  
Pacific Lumber straddled the worlds of the modern corporation and the nineteenth 
century feudal company throughout the twentieth century in ways that complicate the 
popular narrative about the pre- and post-Maxxam takeover Pacific Lumber.  And its 
postwar history may help modify the framework for analyzing challenges to corporate 
prerogatives.  Though the modern corporation seems more like a shell containing assets, 
investments, cogs, and widgets, the history of Pacific Lumber demonstrates the role that 
                                                        
1990, pg. 79).  These quotes also point to the wide distance between the timber industry and 
environmentalists.  The industry was interested in maximizing output via big harvests and fast-growing 
trees.  Environmentalists were concerned with managing the land for multiple purposes and multiple types 
of ecoysytems. 
88 "corporate balance sheet scoreboard," business week, 8/1/83 pg 64. 
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tradition and culture play in the development of a business.  Long-held values and oft-
told narratives strongly influenced the decision-making process of management and the 
board.  The Pacific Lumber board of directors rejected John Campbell’s 1985 proposal to 
increase harvest levels by nearly 30 percent because of the traditional emphasis on 
restraint and not following industry trends.  Without its early commitment to cooperation 
with the Save-the-Redwoods League, the company may have come under greater scrutiny 
by the state, given its position as the largest old growth redwood landholder in the world.   
All of this gave the company a degree of freedom not enjoyed by all or most of its 
competitors.  That, in turn, left Pacific Lumber  freer to develop its paternalist programs 
and carry out its logging programs.  Without its history of paternal benefits for 
employees, workers may not have sided with the company so strongly during the 
Headwaters Conflict.  Its image allowed Pacific Lumber to bust union efforts and harvest 
above its self-defined sustainable levels without drawing public ire in the era before the 
Maxxam takeover.  At the same time, the company’s self-promotion as a small town 
company belied its truer existence as a diversified corporation early on and a multi-
national conglomerate by the end of the 1970s.   
 The popular narrative of small town “model corporate citizen” turned evil 
corporate cog mostly benefited those frustrated by the Maxxam takeover—
environmentalists, Congressional leaders, common shareholders, pensioners, the Murphy 
family, and critics of the 1980s raider culture.  Vilifying Hurwitz and Maxxam made it 
easier for them to make the case that “old PL” was preferable to the new one.  However, 
the old PL was a “net investor” with a management team looking for ways to increase 
returns.  It is therefore likely that there would have been a showdown over Headwaters 
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Forest with or without Charles Hurwitz’ actions.  A new breed of activist had taken root 
on the Northcoast during the 1970s, one determined to change industrial logging 
practices dating back to the early 1970s.  When Pacific Lumber dove headfirst into 
conglomeration and metrics-oriented operations, a migrant with a keen eye for efficient 
operations and margin maximizing helped shift the company’s vision away from a focus 
on ancient forest retention toward a firm commitment to young growth lumbering.  Given 






The Migration of New Leaders to the Northcoast 
 
 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, at least five key figures in the redwood 
wars migrated to the Northcoast and forever changed redwood politics.   The migration of 
John Campbell, Robert Sutherland, Richard Geinger, Kathy Bailey, Dan Hamburg, and 
others to Mendocino and Humboldt Counties sparked dramatic changes in local politics, 
in the redwood timber industry, and in the local culture.  Like the early century local 
activists, the new residents who became environmental activists were willing to make 
waves, and brought movement experience and a distinct ideology to the Northcoast that 
appealed to back-the-landers, young people, and many long time rural residents alike.   
  112 
 For his part, John Campbell, who immigrated from Australia to Humboldt County 
during this same period, delivered Pacific Lumber an entrepreneurial, erudite, and 
ambitious leader who, like the company itself, straddled two worlds:  that of the worker 
and operator, and that of the modern corporation driven by metrics and massive data 
analysis.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Pacific Lumber and the Northcoast grew 
together; the Northcoast assimilated waves of urban/suburban refugees, and Pacific 
Lumber assimilated its own waves of acquisitions.  The actions of the new residents 
placed the company and the activists on a collision course with what became known as 
Headwaters Forest situated between the two.   
 Many of the new residents of the Northcoast moved directly from the Bay Area to 
escape the crumbling counter culture scene and the increasingly volatile politics of the 
Vietnam War era.  Four migrants from this period played especially important roles in the 
redwood wars and the battle over Headwaters Forest:  Richard Geinger and Robert 
Sutherland in southern Humboldt County (though technically Geinger resided just over 
the border into Mendocino County, he worked out of Garberville in Humboldt), and 
Kathy Bailey and Dan Hamburg in Mendocino County.  The stories of what drove each 
of them to the Northcoast help explain why each engaged redwood politics and why each 
became invaluable activists during the conflict over Headwaters Forest.  Geinger and 
Sutherland helped create the Environmental Protection Information Center that would 
lead the litigation campaign during the Headwaters battle.  Geinger was the lead activist 
during the first major battle of the redwood wars and, along with Sutherland and others, 
organized the rural southern Humboldt community against the logging practices of 
Louisiana-Pacific, Georgia-Pacific, Pacific Lumber and the Board of Forestry.  
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Sutherland, in particular, played a key role developing the early litigation strategy and 
encouraged the use of direct action.  Bailey pushed and pulled the California chapter of 
the Sierra Club to fully engage in the conflict and was instrumental in leveraging the 
prestige and resources of the national group to aid the locals’ cause.  Bailey and 
Sutherland were also founding members of the group that put industrial logging practices 
and Headwaters Forest in front of California voters, and Bailey was instrumental in the 
operation of the Headwaters Forest Coordinating Committee.  Dan Hamburg was elected 
to Congress in 1993 and helped to nationalize the conflict over Headwaters Forest.  Even 
after leaving the House of Representatives, Hamburg influenced the conflict through his 
press work.  Though Northcoast natives and subsequent migrants played prominent roles 
in the activist community, at least one of the four activists who were part of the earliest 
wave of migrants was involved in a leadership role in every phase of the battle over 
Headwaters Forest, save for the massive direct action campaign that dominated the media 
coverage of the conflict. 
 
Richard Geinger:  Developing Eyes on the Ground and in the Halls of State 
 Richard Geinger is a natural activist, though he never intended to be one.  Geinger 
grew up in New York an avid hiking and canoeing enthusiast.  He received a Masters of 
the Arts in Architecture from the University of Pennsylvania, and lived in the Bay Area 
during several summers in the late 1960s.  He moved to the Northcoast in 1971 with his 
wife Ilona “Noni” Chalfa, whom he met in Philadelphia, to work as an apprentice 
homebuilder with Whitethorn Construction, located due west of Garberville.  The 
company went bankrupt, and Richard and Noni moved to the Lost Coast to homestead.  
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In 1973, the family moved into an electricity-free cabin off a foot trail near Whale Gulch 
barely back from the Pacific Coast near Shelter Cove.  His involvement in redwood 
logging politics was a direct result of the location of his cabin, his desire to live a lifestyle 
more like the Native American residents of pre-colonial America, and his work in 
watershed restoration.  The Wolf Creek Timber Company owned the land along the Lost 
Coast until Boise Cascade purchased the land during the early 1970s.  Boise Cascade 
initiated a plan to harvest the coast from the Usal Basin up to the Mattole watershed.  
Before the company finished the planned harvests, it sold its holdings to Georgia-Pacific, 
which continued with its coastal clear cutting plan in 1977.  Concerned about those 
logging plans, some local mountain residents, especially Geinger, organized dozens of 
people to petition the state Park Commission to create a park out of the G-P land along 
the coast.  In part the activists were concerned about landscape preservation as an 
aesthetic and spiritual value.  And as with Pacific Lumber, self interest played a 
prominent role.  The homesteaders worked to prevent industrial forestry from 
encroaching on their countercultural refuge as a way to protect their culture and their 
homesteading livelihoods.  In 1975, the state bought the Bar Harbor Ranch near 
Geinger’s cabin and held hearings to discuss a potential Sinkyone Wilderness Park 
(named after the nearly extinct tribe of local Native Americans).  Geinger took up the 
park cause with great fervor, and in 1979, he lamented “trying to lead three lives: 
homesteader, activist, and watershed restoration as a vocation.”  Geinger conducted 
stream surveys and used his design skills to repair watersheds with log jams and other 
architectural structures that mimicked the fallen logs and woody debris that clear cutting 
and subsequent winter rains removed from the Mattole and Eel River watersheds.  It was 
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his persistent activism, however, that left the most enduring mark on the local redwood 
forest.89 
 
Robert Sutherland:  Strategic Innovation 
 Robert Sutherland, like Geinger, wanted to live a more rural and peaceful 
lifestyle.  Sutherland grew up in Cleveland, Ohio and Saint Louis, Missouri, the son of 
Nobel Laureate Earl W. Sutherland.  Robert went to art school in Cleveland, then moved 
to New York City and tried to make it as a painter for ten years.  Like his father, 
Sutherland was interested in science, especially birds, and it was his combined interest in 
birds and art that led him to California and eventually to the Northcoast.  He worked at 
the Natural History Museum in New York and was the Conservation Chair of the 
Linneaen Society of New York.  Sutherland moved to San Francisco in 1966 after a visit 
during which he “noticed that his friends were looking healthier and happier” than when 
they had lived in New York.  Upon his arrival in San Francisco, Sutherland organized a 
commune on Oak Street in the Haight-Asbury district, and subsequently got involved in 
the music and politics scene of the Haight.  His organizing work there culminated in the 
1968 Human Be-in in Golden Gate Park.  Sutherland was never too removed from the 
politics of aesthetics and nature, however, especially during the Golden Gate Park 
National Recreation Area creation process.  As Sutherland tells it, he “got burned out on 
LSD and trying to keep the scenes together in the Haight” after the community was 
invaded by speed.  After he moved his office out of the Grateful Dead house at 710 
                                                        
89 Richard Geinger, interview with author, Redway, CA, 22 March 2007 (tapes and notes in possession of 
author); Richard Geinger, correspondence with author; Richard Geinger, interview with Greg King, The 
“The Econews Report”, KHSU radio, 1 March 2007 (audio file archived at 
(http://nec.streamguys.us/richardgeinger.mp3 .  Accessed 12/11/2008). 
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Asbury because of the chaos, a friend asked Robert why he wasn’t living in the woods 
somewhere to focus on art and a more peaceful existence.   
 Sutherland did move to the Northcoast, and along with Geinger, was an early 
organizer of the locals.  He spent significant time in Humboldt during the early 1970s, 
but didn’t move to the rural county full time until 1973.  One of the first things he did 
there was begin referring to himself as The Man Who Walks in the Woods because he 
wanted to rid himself of traditional labels and give himself a name that described who he 
was and what he did.  His engagement with local politics grew out of his hikes.  While on 
a hike along the Mattole River, Sutherland, now Woods, spotted Western Timber 
Services workers rinsing out their helicopter pesticide spray tanks directly into the river.  
Woods was already concerned about the effects of aerial pesticide applications on local 
organic gardens, and the hiking incident introduced a new concern about local 
watersheds.  According to Woods, he attempted to negotiate with the timber companies 
that used the helicopter service, but that failed, though the companies eventually did stop 
spraying to avoid bad press.  The pesticide issue was typical of the local politics Woods 
valued most -- issues that affected his immediate neighbors.  In 1977, the herbicide issue 
resurfaced, and this time, Woods, Geinger, and two other locals, Marylee Bytheriver and 
Ruthanne Cecil, created the Environmental Protection Information Center as an ad hoc 
group to respond to local environmental threats.  The new group flourished for about six 
months, during which time they built a pesticide education program for residents, put 
together a lawsuit to stop the aerial use of phenoxy hormones and 245T, and worked with 
Oregon State University and the state of California to conduct pesticide tests in the area.  
After the pesticide campaign, EPIC laid dormant for two years. 
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 Though his interests were always local, logging issues eventually dragged Woods 
into state politics.  Like Geinger, he wanted the Sinkyone protected from logging and 
development for broader ecological and cultural issues as well as out of self interest.  
Because park creation and logging regulations involved state agencies, the local activists 
were forced to engage state politics to protect their neighborhood.  In 1980, Geinger and 
Gregory O’Brian approached Woods to reorganize EPIC.  Woods agreed, but only if he 
could incorporate EPIC as a permanent not-for-profit citizens’ group with by-laws, tax 
exempt status, and a board of directors.  Woods envisioned a “workers’ cooperative, not a 
group for hoity-toity middle class people to tell locals what to do” about local 
environmental issues.  He wanted the people who filed the paperwork and studied the 
proposed timber harvest plans to run EPIC, and he wanted it to be a place where 
everyone in the community could participate if they wanted to.  The second incarnation 
of EPIC would indeed become a powerful tool for local activists, and would help shape 
redwood forestry practices and endangered species law, with the help of Earth First! and 
the Sierra Club.90 
 
Kathy Bailey:  Reluctant Activism and Neighborhood Issues 
 Like Geiger and Woods, Kathy Bailey moved to the Northcoast during the spring 
of 1970 to get away from politics, but was rather quickly sucked back into its 
gravitational field.  Kathy grew up in Minneapolis and was a scholarship student at the 
exclusive Northrop Collegiate School.  From a young age, she was enamored with the 
western United States, and after several family car trips, decided to attend the University 
                                                        
90 Robert Sutherland, interview with author, Arcata, CA, 22 April 2008 (audio tapes and notes in possession 
of author). 
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of New Mexico.  During the second semester of her freshman year, she became aware 
that the United States was conducting a war in Vietnam.  Her reaction was immediate and 
visceral, and motivated her to join a “five-person SDS group [Students for a Democratic 
Society]” on campus.  She organized a demonstration against the Boy Scouts, and was 
then invited to a leadership training program in Severe County, Tennessee, run by the 
Southern Conference Education Fund.  The training involved organizing poor, rural 
whites during the election year.  Instead of going back to New Mexico, she moved to 
New York City to pursue anti-war activism, then enrolled in Franconia College in New 
Hampshire to continue her studies and anti-war work.   
 Seemingly on a whim, she and her then husband moved to the Bay Area in 1968, 
and Bailey began work with Todd Gitlin’s paper, The Dock of the Bay.  The paper folded 
very quickly after Gitlin’s near-nervous breakdown, however.  She worked as an editor 
for Ramparts for a while, but after the bombing of the Chase Manhattan building, the raid 
of the Oakland Black Panthers, and the rise of the Weather Underground, Bailey was 
burned out and ready for a change in her life.  So shaken by the movement’s violence and 
movement in-fighting, she reached the point where she “couldn’t leave the house not 
stoned.”  Separated from her husband, Bailey left the Bay Area in 1969 and moved to 
New Orleans with a friend.  During the spring of 1970, a Bay Area friend called and 
announced that she was going to buy land in Mendocino County and wanted Bailey’s 
help.  Bailey agreed, and like Geinger and Woods, she moved to the Northcoast to live a 
simpler life.   
 Bailey stayed out of politics for a number of years, but in 1976 she received a call 
that shook her back into activist mode.  When she first arrived in Mendocino County, she 
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struggled to get by.  She worked at Clearwater Farms for sub-minimum wage pay and a 
box of surplus government food, and wrote for the Anderson Valley Advocate.  In an 
effort to improve her finances, Bailey obtained a real estate license.  She had a “few 
lucky moments” as a real estate agent, including a sale to the Navarre Vinyards.  Bailey 
moved off the commune on Greenwood Ridge and bought some land of her own with the 
small windfall.  She continued to sell land and to write for the Advocate.  In 1976, Gail 
Lucas, a volunteer with the California chapter of the Sierra Club, pitched Bailey on a 
story about the use of Agent Orange by the timber companies after a clear cut.  Kathy had 
a seven-month old boy, and as she told it, her motherly instincts took over and she 
worked to ban the use of Agent Orange in her community. Bailey organized a county 
ballot initiative, and in 1979, the county passed an ordinance that banned the aerial 
application of pesticides on timberland.  While successful, her foray into local 
environmental politics was brief.  She married a local lawyer, and they had a daughter 
together.  When here daughter was school-aged, Bailey won a seat on the school board, 
and for six years she worked in that role to improve her daughter’s education.  The 
redwood wars finally pulled her back into the fray, however, and neighborhood issues 
once again propelled her involvement.91 
 
Dan Hamburg:  Politics and Organizing 
 Like Robert Sutherland and Kathy Bailey, Dan Hamburg grew up in the Midwest, 
fled the Bay Area during the Vietnam Era, and migrated to the Northcoast to be a part of 
a small, rural community.  Hamburg was raised in a liberal Democrat household in St. 
                                                        
91 Kathy Bailey, interview by author, Philo, CA, 20 March 2007 (tape recordings and notes in possession of 
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Louis.  His dad proudly wore his “hole in the shoe” button in support of Adlai Stevenson, 
and referred to General Eisenhower as “old bubble head.”  His family demonstrated 
against Goldwater in 1964, and when Hamburg began college at Stanford, he dove 
headfirst into student politics.  Hamburg joined a group of campus radicals and organized 
against the Vietnam War, including the April 3rd Movement of 1969 that included the 
occupation of the Applied Electronics Lab.  Through his activism, Hamburg developed 
his political skills and  forged a lifelong friendship and working relationship with 
California native Kate Anderton, who would later become his Chief of Staff while in 
Congress.   
 Heavily involved in radical politics, Hamburg only slowly developed into an 
environmental activist.  His first recollection of concern for humanity’s impact on the 
planet was from his senior year at Stanford.  While hiking up into the mountains above 
Palo Alto, he noticed how much more developed and polluted the city had become during 
the four years he lived in the area.  After graduating in 1970, Hamburg moved to Ukiah, 
the county seat of Mendocino, as a part of the back to the land movement.  He wasn’t 
sure what he wanted to do with his life after college, and some friends, including 
Anderton, had moved to Mendocino to establish the Mariposa School in Ukiah.  So, in 
1971, Hamburg purchased 38 acres of land and taught at the alternative Mariposa School 
that tried to connect kids to the natural world around them.  That year, he met Carol 
“Carrie” Blood and her three children, and the couple married in 1974.  Community 
politics was never far from the new family, however.  In 1972, Hamburg and friends 
staged the first ever Ukiah anti-war demonstration in front of the courthouse.  Hamburg 
unsuccessfully ran for the Ukiah City Council in 1975, but a friend on the council 
  121 
appointed him to the County Planning Commission, where he worked to prevent so-
called leap frog developments that extended beyond city infrastructure.  In 1977, the 
Hamburg’s worked with Kathy Bailey on the Agent Orange initiative.  During the 
campaign Hamburg suddenly became aware of the vast forest “out there” in the 
hinterlands.  In 1980, he was elected to the Mendocino Board of Supervisors, and his that 
experience as a board member pulled him into the forestry arena. 
 The Board of Supervisors exposed Hamburg to the influence the timber industry 
on local politics, and to the related increased level of timber harvests during the late 
1970s and early 1980s.  His lack of support for shopping mall and subdivision 
development put him at odds with the other Supervisors, but it was his lack of support of 
the timber industry that had the most dramatic impact on his political career.  In early 
1981, Hamburg and another Supervisor took their sons to the Weaverville, California, 
Congressional hearing on wilderness designation (the Roadless Area Review and 
Evaluation).  Hamburg spoke out in favor of protecting roadless areas within the National 
Forests, and the assembled crowd was not pleased.  According to Hamburg, his group left 
the hearing with their sons clutched tight and in fear of their lives.  Nearly immediately, 
the Employers Council of Mendocino initiated a recall of Hamburg.  The recall was 
unsuccessful, and Hamburg spent the next four years focused on timber and fishing issues 
related to the Northcoast, especially efforts to prevent the conversion of agricultural and 
timber production land into residential and commercial developments.  In 1985, he left 
the Board so that he and Carrie could pursue other interests.  They spent the better part of 
the next five years in China running a cultural immersion program for American tourists 
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who wanted to experience rural China.  Like Kathy Bailey, Hamburg, would return to 
forestry issues on the Northcoast, however.92 
The wave of early 1970s migrants to the Northcoast were political organizers and 
became environmental activists during the subsequent three decades.  Unlike the 
professional activists commonly portrayed in the historical literature, the first wave of 
Northcoast migrant activists largely rejected middle-class values and middle-class work.  
They focused their activism on local social and environmental issues, yet wound up 
dramatically influencing the development of the modern environmental protection 
regime.93  
 
John Campbell:  Industrial Innovator 
 John Campbell was an unlikely migrant to the Northcoast because he was a 
cosmopolitan and entrepreneurial adventurer.  A native Australian, he grew up on a 
family farm in the Burragorang Valley with the expectation that he would become a 
“gentleman farmer,” as he put it.  However, “the government, in its wisdom,” decided to 
build a dam downstream from the Campbell family farm, and their property was 
confiscated to make way for the project.  The family subsequently moved to a beach town 
near Sydney.  The memory of that event seems to have had a profound effect on John’s 
view of government.  In 1964, after traveling around Europe upon graduation from North 
Sydney Technical College – a trip that apparently included the introduction of surfing to 
the Cornwall coast of England-- John moved to New York City to work for the 
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Australian consulate.  John and some friends decided to move out of the city after the 
murder of a friend, and they rented a car to drive across the continent.  In 1965, while in 
Tahoe, California, John met Cynthia Carpenter.  The two married in September 1966 and 
moved back to Sydney where John worked as a salesman during the day and 
owner/restaurateur of Sydney’s first wine bar at night.  Cynthia, however, wanted to 
move back to the States, and John, unsurprisingly given his adventurous nature, did not 
object, so the young couple moved to her hometown of Scotia, California.   
 John’s marriage to Cynthia, and their subsequent move to Scotia, were the first 
steps in a life that would become synonymous with redwoods and the battle over 
Headwaters Forest.  The Pacific Lumber Company became an obvious employment 
option because Cynthia’s father was Edward Carpenter, an executive at Pacific Lumber, 
and later the company’s CEO.  John soon discovered that there were really only three 
industries in Humboldt at that time:  fishing, logging, and dairy farming.  John accepted a 
job with Pacific Lumber’s sales department in Chicago.  Before they moved there, 
however, the company required that John spend a year working in the lumber mill to 
learn the business.  At the end of the year, the Superintendent of Production asked John to 
stay and work in manufacturing because he had a sharp mind and worked well with the 
loggers and mill hands. 
 It was John’s eye for efficiency, combined with his ability to lead, that apparently 
led the Vice President of Sales, Edward Hoover, to agree to allow John to stay in Scotia 
to build a new mill in Fortuna that would manufacture lumber made from second growth 
redwood timber.  John was also charged with developing a market for second-growth 
lumber, which had more knots and imperfections than old-growth redwood lumber.  
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Previously, Pacific Lumber exported young growth logs to Japan, Korea, and China.  
However, as more of the company’s land was harvested, and because the company had 
purchased cutover land earlier in the postwar era, Pacific Lumber managers decided to 
mill its own second growth lumber rather than export an increasing percentage of their 
harvests.  The new mill opened February 1972 with a brand new computer system to 
track inventory, but no market for its product, save for a local company that wanted to 
use second-growth redwood to build deck furniture and planters boxes.   
 John saw an opportunity to get in on a new market.  As people moved to the Sun 
Belt and purchased second homes in warm climes, and as “outdoor living” grew in 
popularity, Campbell saw a new opportunity for redwood lumber, if only builders and 
carpenters trusted young growth redwood lumber.  To improve his new mill’s position, 
John lobbied the California Redwood Association and convinced them to create a series 
of product grades for second-growth lumber similar to the grading system for old growth.  
The new market took off, and by 1976, Campbell boasted that the mill netted $1 million 
per month.  In 1979, after Campbell and the two other managers of Fortuna had 
computerized the entire mill, Campbell was promoted to the position of Resident 
Manager of Scotia, a job that is part mayor of the company town and part supervisor of 
the logging and milling operations of the company.   
 Campbell shined as resident manager, and developed and implemented many of 
the operational changes that made Pacific Lumber an attractive target for Charles Hurwitz 
as well as an attractive target for environmental activists.  He convinced the board to 
modernize the old growth mill in Scotia despite the economic downturn of 1980-81 and 
the related reduction of lumber demand, and he convinced the board to simultaneously 
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close the plywood plant due to the increased competition from particle board.  Campbell 
believed he could increase profit margins by eliminating a product line that performed 
poorly while improving the production efficiency of a different product that would 
command high prices once the recession ended.  His operating theory was that the timber 
industry would rebound and that Pacific Lumber needed to keep cutting and milling in 
order to be ready when the market turned upward again.   
 Another key part of the strategy was land acquisition.  In 1981, John discovered 
that Louisiana-Pacific wanted to leave the Northcoast, and so he purchased 22,000 acres 
of their land along the Van Duzen, near Rockefeller Forest, as well as a tract outside of 
Rio Dell.  Campbell purchased an additional 27,000 acres from various small holders in 
the area in order to eliminate inholdings in Pacific Lumber land.  He also challenged the 
company’s decades-old policy of selective cutting.  At a time when the company was 
thinning out the second growth and taking out some residual old growth trees on its 
property, Campbell took the firm’s directors there on a field trip.  He pointed out the 
damage to young trees, caused when cats and bulldozers traveled through the area to 
cherry pick the residual old growth trees out of the sea of young trees.  The company 
destroyed the future, Campbell opined, by selective harvesting because it crushed the 
really young trees growing alongside the residual ancient trees.  What he wanted was a 
company that focused on new growth, not holding onto old growth.    
 He then took the board to see an area that had been clear cut during the first sixty 
years of existence.  The trees were all of even age and size, and he recommended that he 
be allowed to go in and clear cut the area again because it would be clean and efficient.  
The board agreed, and in 1982, the company submitted its first clear cut plans to the 
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Board of Forestry for the first time in decades.  In 1984, John was made Vice President of 
Forest Products.  By 1985, when Hurwitz took over the company, Campbell had thirteen 
or fourteen clear cut plans in the Forestry system, and had established himself as the 
lumber leader of Pacific Lumber Company.  But his company was not the first target of 
the redwood wars; Pacific Lumber only became a target after the takeover drama drew 
the eyes of Northcoast activists north after doing battle with Louisiana-Pacific and 
Georgia-Pacific in Mendocino County and along the southern Humboldt border.94 
 
The Redwood Wars Begin:  The Second Wave of Citizen 
Assaults 
 
The redwood wars began in earnest during the early 1980s, when environmentalists, 
the timber industry, and the Board of Forestry forged the patterns of behavior and 
organizational strategies they would employ throughout the Headwaters conflict.  The 
Board of Forestry remained committed to its belief that the agency’s job was to facilitate 
timber production, and resisted its new duties as defined by the Forest Practice Act, the 
California Endangered Species Act, the California Environmental Quality Act, and the 
court precedents that clarified and enforced those duties.  The timber industry fought to 
maintain the autonomy to determine land management practices, and experimented with 
various legal arguments to hold off the rising tide of regulation.  When the legal tactics 
failed, the industry negotiated with legislatures to minimize regulations; and when the 
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legislative efforts failed, the industry leaned on its old ally, the Board of Forestry, to 
approve timber harvest plans quickly in order to turn timber into lumber before the courts 
and the legislature could act.   
For their part. environmental activists developed a comprehensive strategy that 
effectively thwarted the industry’s and the Board’s efforts to operate as they had for the 
nearly eighty years prior to the Bayside decision.  The activists expanded and improved 
their legal campaign to stop specific harvest plans that threatened old growth groves and 
continued what they saw as the unsustainable practices of the industry.  The activists 
worked with the legislature to create new parks and to alter forestry practices, although 
the various citizen groups did not always work toward the same end.  Often, the 
Northcoast activists opposed the Sierra Club’s positions on forestry and park bills.  And 
when groves were threatened with logging, the activists, picking up where Laura Mahan 
left off, “occupied” the groves and laid their bodies in harm’s way to physically prevent 
logging until a stay could be ordered by a local court.   
The result of the various institutions’ strategies followed a predictable pattern:  
industry would file a timber harvest plan, EPIC would challenge the plan, the company 
and the Board would demur, a temporary restraining order would be granted, that 
restraining would expire before the trial, the timber company would send loggers to the 
harvest area, activists would physically prevent loggers from cutting, law enforcement 
would arrest protesters, another restraining order would be granted, a long trial and 
subsequent appeals would deny the harvest plan, the company would file another harvest 
plan, and the cycle would repeat over various harvest plans until either the groves were 
purchased from the timber company or the company sold its land and mills to another 
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timber company and then left the Northcoast.  This pattern was first established in 
Mendocino County with Georgia-Pacific, after which activists took the campaign to other 
companies on the Northcoast, most prominently, The Pacific Lumber Company.  The 
redwood wars grew out of the repetition of that pattern many times over during the late 
1970s through the end of the century.  
 
Organized Localism and the Redwood Wars 
 
Although the Sierra Club was instrumental in the fights over Redwood National Park 
and in the 1976 amendments to the Forest Practice Act and continued to play a major role 
in California logging politics, the legal campaign to destroy the corporatist traditions of 
the Board was largely driven by a small group of Northcoast residents.  The activists 
were committed to Pinchotian conservationism and ecological environmental values, and 
decidedly uninterested in state or national politics or citizen groups.  This cadre included 
Humboldt and Mendocino residents Kathy Bailey, Sharon Duggan (a native Northcoast 
attorney working in the Bay Area), and other activists who established the Environmental 
Protection Information Center (EPIC).95   
EPIC was the unquestioned leader of the litigation campaign that attacked California 
corporatism, and one of the earliest environmental groups on the Northcoast.  The group 
originally was formed in 1977 in Southern Humboldt County (approximately 200 miles 
north of San Francisco along the coast) by residents Marylee Bytheriver, Ruthanne Cecil, 
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and Woods.  In 1981, EPIC was formally incorporated by Woods with a broader set of 
goals:  
1) preserve critical old growth forest remnants and the 
biological diversity they contain; 2) reduce the degradation of 
timberlands through improvement of forest practices (toward 
sustainability); 3) stabilize the local economy through 
sustainable production in healthy, diverse forests; 4) educate 
the citizenry regarding their public interest in the forests, its 
intrinsic value, and the avenues of influence available to them 
through state and federal agencies; and 5) channel information 
on environmental matters of all kind.96   
 
The local organization from the small town of Garberville (population approximately 
2000) quickly became a major player in logging regulation by aggressively using the 
citizen suit provisions of CEQA and the Forest Practice Act to challenge Board actions.  
In doing so, EPIC’s paralleled the legal actions of national environmental groups that 
increasingly turned to the courts in response to the Reagan administrations decreased 
enforcement of environmental laws.  Unlike the national efforts, however, EPIC’s work 
was built on a local vision of responsive government and sustainable communities 
intended to produce timber, jobs, and wildlife habitat in perpetuity.   
 However, forestry operations were governed at the state level, endangered species 
law at the state and national levels, so the local activists were forced to engage litigation 
and politics outside their local region in order to effect local change, just as groups such 
as the Headwaters Alliance and the Oregon Natural Resources Council (ONRC) were 
forced to engage the federal courts and the Forest Service to protect local landscapes on 
federal land during the 1970s and 1980s.  Unlike the Pacific Northwest movement, 
however, nearly all the national environmental groups chose not to engage in the 
                                                        
96 “Organizational History and Goals,” Redway, CA, Environmental Protection Information Center, “EPIC 
Publications” Binder. 
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redwood wars . EPIC drove the litigation strategy, and often split the bills with the Sierra 
Club – but only on the insistence of local Club activists who convinced Sierra officers of 
the importance of the work to California Sierra Club.97  
 Though the locals’ goals were broad, they were focused on local quality of life.  
Bailey, Woods, Richard Geinger, attorney Sharon Duggan, and the other local activists 
involved in the campaign against corporatism were local activists first and foremost, and 
if they could have avoided state and national authorities, they would have.  In fact, 
Woods wanted EPIC to only work on southern Humboldt issues.  Duggan was a 
Northcoast native, and her interest in forestry litigation stemmed from a concern about 
the rapid changes in the landscape and forest health of the Northcoast.  Duggan grew up 
while the local timber companies were selling their land to Georgia-Pacific and 
Louisiana-Pacific, which led to increased industrial timber operations, including greatly 
expanded clearcuts and the related watershed damages.  In addition to a forest health, 
Duggan wanted a healthy forest industry that provided stable long-term jobs for the 
community.  Duggan’s father owned a tax service that catered to Pacific Lumber 
workers, so she and her family were committed to the stability of small town Scotia and 
Rio Dell.  As a law student, Duggan accompanied Geinger and Woods on the field trips 
that engaged Barry Keene, Doug Bosco, and Dan Hauser with the Sinkyone issue.  When 
Woods and Geinger decided to sue the Department of Forestry over the Sally Bell harvest 
plan, they contacted Duggan to lead the litigation along with the experienced local 
                                                        
97 From “Organizational History and Goals”, date unknown , Archives of the Environmental Protection 
Information Center, “EPIC Publications” binder, EPIC offices, Redway, CA..  Roger W. Findley, Farber, 
Daniel A., and Freeman, Jody, Cases and Materials on Environmental Law, 6th ed., St. Paul, MN: 
Thomson/West, 2003.page 688-689.  See Durbin, Treehuggers, for the story of local Oregonians and 
Oregon groups that fought to stop logging on federal lands during the Spotted Owl conflict regarding the 
implementation of NFMA. 
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attorney Michael Solomon and former Ninth Circuit clerk Jay Moller.  That their 
litigation efforts had state and national implications was due to the avenues available to 
the activists to pursue local change, not because they set out to change state or national 
law.98 
 
Sally Bell Grove:  The First Battle of the Redwood Wars 
 
EPIC v. Johnson, EPIC’s first lawsuit, was initiated in 1983, and resulted in a 
landmark appellate decision that further undermined de facto corporatism and paved the 
way for much of the environmental community’s forestry reform efforts in California, 
especially in the state’s remaining unprotected and privately-owned old growth forests.  
The Johnson case challenged the 75-acre harvest plan on Georgia-Pacific land in northern 
Mendocino County, near the Sinkyone Wilderness State Park.  Forestry approved the 
clear cutting of the Sally Bell Grove, an old-growth redwood grove and the last 
remaining stand of trees in the immediate area after G-P clear cut operations moved north 
from the Usal Basin to the edge of the Sinkyone.   
The Sally Bell Grove was traditionally referred to as the Little Jackass Creek 
watershed, but the local environmentalists wanted to name it something that sounded 
worthy of protection.  Sally Bell was one of the last living full-blooded Sinkyone Indians, 
and a person known in the local lore.  When she was a small child, she had witnessed the 
                                                        
98 Kathy Bailey, interview by author (tapes and notes in possession of author); Kevin Bundy, interview by 
author, 26 April 2007, San Francisco, CA (tapes and notes in possession of author); Sharon Duggan, 
interview by author, Oakland, CA, 27 April 2007 (notes and tapes in possession of author); Richard 
Geinger, interview with author; Paul Mason, interview with author by phone, 16 February 2007; Robert 
Sutherland, interview by author, (all tape recordings and handwritten notes in possession of author). 
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murder of her entire family by local whites at Needle Rock.  The child narrowly escaped, 
married Tom Bell, and they lived out on the Lost Coast for the rest of their lives.  The 
grove, like the story, was dramatic in appearance.  It was situated on a steep slope bound 
by the Pacific Ocean to the west and clear cuts on the other three sides.  Thus, the grove 
acted as the hill’s “keystone” by anchoring the slope’s soil and preventing it from wasting 
into the ocean.  The grove also contained a Native American Archeological site.  The 
naming of the grove by Northcoast activists began a pattern: when a grove of redwoods 
was threatened activists gave it an easily identifiable and relatable name.  In the Sally 
Bell Grove case, the name signified the cultural and natural heritage threatened by what 
the activists saw as violent actions by Georgia-Pacific.  The name helped generate public 
support.  During the later battles with Pacific Lumber, activists would name dozens of 
groves in a similar fashion, including Headwaters Grove.99 
The Johnson case was the culmination of nearly a decade of tension over the 
northwest coast of Mendocino and the Sinkyone, and the development of the conflict 
dramatically illuminates how the new constituents, ideas, strategies, and goals of the 
activists gradually worked their way into redwood politics.  Locals grew concerned about 
the state of Northcoast forestry during the early 1970s, when the Atlanta-based Georgia-
Pacific acquired The Union Lumber Company of Mendocino County as well as 
surrounding family ranches in what locals referred to as an “unprecedented consolidation 
of land.”   
In 1976 -- though the Forest Practice Act, CEQA, and the Gallegos case permitted 
citizens and the state to more actively manage private timberland -- the primary means of 
                                                        
99 EPIC v. Johnson, California Court of Appeals, 1st District, 25 July 1985 (170 Cal.App.3d 694, 4 and 12 
re: “keystone” determination. 
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protecting ancient redwoods was still through park acquisition.  Governor Ronald 
Reagan’s Park Director, William Penn Mott, proposed an expansion of the Sinkyone 
Wilderness State Park from approximately 3600 acres to more than 12,000 acres, land 
that included much of Georgia-Pacific’s Mendocino land.  The company’s head forester, 
Jere Melo, in response to the proposal, filed a logging plan with the California State 
Coastal Commission for G-P’s entire seven-mile stretch of coastline in Northwest 
Mendocino and Southwest Humboldt.  The Commission balked, and Melo withdrew the 
plan with the intention of submitting several smaller harvest plans for the coastline.  The 
Commission rejected his subsequent plans.  That same year, the Department of Forestry 
was given jurisdiction over all logging operations in the state – a move that probably was 
welcomed by the timber industry, thanks to the agency’s corporatist, development-
focused tradition.100 
During 1978, EPIC and Georgia-Pacific began to butt heads over the Sinkyone.  In 
March, G-P began to clear cut Jackass Creek and Anderson Gulch.  On the equinox, the 
first Watershed Gathering was held at Needle Rock in the Sinkyone, and the Sinkyone 
Council, headed by Richard Geinger, and EPIC, led by Woods, decided to organize locals 
to oppose logging in the area, with mixed results.  In 1980, California voters passed a 
$3.2 million bond to expand the Sinkyone, the Sierra Club made the Sinkyone a top 
priority, and the Save-the-Redwoods League unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate with 
Georgia-Pacific.  The company was not a willing seller and because activists had not 
fully embraced the new legal tools to enforce the new environmental and forestry laws, 
there was little they could do to prevent the harvest of the old growth in northwestern 
                                                        
100 Carranco, Logging the Redwoods, 77; David Cross, “Sally Bell Redwoods Protected!  Sinyone Coast 
Purchased for Park,” Earth First! Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3, February 2, 1987, 1-4.  
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Mendocino.  Backed into a corner, the activists finally embraced litigation and direct 
action, and in the process they laid the groundwork for the battle over Headwaters 
Forest.101   
 The redwood wars began in earnest in 1983 because that year Earth First!, the 
Northcoast activists, the Sierra Club, the Save-the-Redwoods League, the California 
courts, the California Assembly, the Board of Forestry, and national timber companies 
collided along the Mendocino-Humboldt border.  For the rest of the century, those 
institutions battled for control over the management of the world’s remaining ancient 
redwood forests using the same basic tactics and strategies they developed in 1983.  In 
many ways, 1983 looked like a reprise of 1924.  Local activists took more aggressive 
steps than regional institutions.  Northcoast locals occupied a harvest area to prevent 
logging.   An elected body tried to mediate a conflict in the woods.  The courts were 
called upon as the final arbiter, and a corporate timber company refused to play the role 
of willing seller.  There were two major differences, however.  EPIC developed a 
litigation strategy that could permanently halt timber plans, whereas the 1924 legal 
strategy was to obtain a Temporary Restraining Order to stop logging in order to 
negotiate a land purchase.  EPIC was convinced that old growth could be protected on 
private land via the new environmental regulations.  The second difference was the 
development of direct action as a sustained political strategy and a sustained legal tactic. 
 The pattern of the Sally Bell conflict in many ways foreshadowed the conflict 
over Headwaters Forest a decade later.  The year began with hope that the conflict would 
resolve itself quickly, but by summer, the Northcoast activists and the Sierra Club were at 
odds, the Governor had vetoed the bill that authorized land acquisitions in the Sinkyone, 
                                                        
101 Cross, “Sally Bell Redwoods Protected!” 4. 
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and Georgia-Pacific seemed poised to end the conflict via chainsaw.  Since 1979, Richard 
Geinger had taken elected officials such as Assemblyman Doug Bosco and State Senator 
Barry Keene on several field trips into the Sinkyone, where the groups visited the clear 
cuts around Little Jackass Creek.  In 1983. Geinger and Woods met up with freshman 
Assemblyman Dan Hauser and his Boy Scout troop.  The group hiked through the 
Sinkyone, and the activists pointed out the damage to the watershed from recent logging.  
The field trip seems to have had a significant impact on the hikers because Hauser 
introduced a bill that legislative session to purchase the G-P Sinkyone property.  Geinger 
spoke at the Assembly hearings related to Hauser’s bill, and along with the Sierra Club, 
worked to push a Sinkyone bill onto the floor for a vote.  The bill that reached the floor 
that summer eliminated the $3.2 million bond passed in 1980, and instead gave the state 
the right to lease a one thousand-acre coastal strip from G-P to provide a hiking trail 
through the Sinkyone.  The bill additionally authorized a land swap with G-P; the 
company would receive 300 acres of timberland from the state, plus $420,000 and a 
salvage logging permit within the leased coastal corridor.  In exchange, the state would 
receive the company’s Duffy Gulch property, near Sally Bell Grove.  The Club supported 
the bill as the best that could be achieved.   
Just as they often would during the redwood wars, the Northcoast activists largely 
rejected compromise and solutions that did not meet their vision for the Northcoast.  
Geinger and EPIC opposed the bill, and claimed that Hauser “got woodworked” because 
the salvage logging permit effectively eliminated environmental protections for the 
coastal strip, a logging road had already been built through the strip, and because Duffy’s 
Gulch had already been clear cut by G-P.  Governor George Deukmejian vetoed the bill 
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had been loaded down with pet district projects and the governor vowed to reduce 
spending during the recession.  The events of the spring and summer intensified tensions 
and concerns on the Northcoast.102   The event that truly signaled the beginning of the 
redwood wars, however, was the conflict that erupted when Georgia-Pacific filed a 
Timber Harvest Plan with Forestry for the Little Jackass Creek/Sally Bell Grove.  When 
Forestry approved the Timber Harvest Plan on September 2, 1983, it opened a Pandora’s 
Box of consequences that would transform Northcoast and American environmental 
politics.  The Northcoast activists, Georgia-Pacific, and the Board all appear to have been 
primed for a showdown in Mendocino County that fall, each frustrated by the legislative 
process.  In particular, EPIC and the Sinkyone Council prepared to challenge G-P logging 
plans in Sally Bell throughout the summer.  They prepared on-the-ground resistance as 
well as a legal attack to any logging plans for the Sally Bell Grove.  The on-the-ground 
resistance plan was developed in consultation with the group Earth First!.  During late 
summer, Dave Foremen and Mike Rozelle of the nascent Earth First!, riding high on their 
defeat of the U.S. Forest Service in Oregon at Bald Mountain, journeyed to the 
Northcoast to investigate what was then a relatively minor conflict on the Northcoast.  
The litigation campaign was designed by Sharon Duggan, Robert Sutherland, Jay 
Moeller, and Michael Solomon.  From 1983 until at least 1999, Northcoast activists 
blended direct action and legal action to transform the forestry regulatory regime of 
California and eventually the implementation of the federal Endangered Species Act.103 
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Earth First! was created by Foreman, Rozelle, and others to transform 
environmental politics by circumventing conventional political avenues and working 
directly at the point of production.  Earth First!’s mission was not simply to stop the 
destruction of wild areas, but also to roll back development and expand the geographic 
scope of areas uninhabited by humans and their livestock.  The founders were 
experienced organizers, having either worked with major national environmental groups 
such as the Sierra Club and The Wilderness Society, or with more broadly political 
organizations such as the Yippies.  The original Earth First!ers were frustrated by the 
horse-trading in Washington, D.C., and in the state capitols, and wanted to create a group 
that would not compromise “in defense of the Earth.”  Their strategy employed direct 
action and media stunts – ala Greenpeace of the early 1970s.  Unlike Greenpeace, 
however, Earth First! advocated ecotage – the destruction of property that destroyed 
wilderness.  At Bald Mountain, Oregon, Earth First! built road blocks (some inanimate, 
some human), stood in front of chainsaws or in the path of partially cut trees, sabotaged 
equipment, and generally harassed loggers to prevent them from cutting trees.  The direct 
action accomplished four things:  it cost the timber company money, it slowed logging 
efforts, it attracted the media and offered an audience for their wilderness arguments, and 
it provided time for the group’s attorney to obtain a Temporary Restraining Order that 
halted logging until a court could hear the activists’ challenge to the legality of the timber 
harvest.104 
Woods was convinced that the Northcoast activists needed to combine litigation 
with direct action in order to “hit the donkey” enough to make it move.  The donkey was 
                                                        
104   Geinger, interview with author; Dave Forman, “Earth First!,” Chapter 2 in Confessions of an Eco-
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Forestry and the timber companies.  What transpired during September and early October 
illuminates the ways in which litigation and direct action worked together on the 
Northcoast.  The actions and coordination also demonstrate the rural, communal, and 
political visions of the local activists.   
Woods invited Dave Foreman and Mike Rozelle to visit the Sinkyone, and with 
Rozelle’s assistance, Northcoast locals living around Garberville developed a plan to 
block any G-P activity near Sally Bell Grove.  On September 2, they were put on notice 
by the Department of Forestry that logging would be imminent.  On September 8, the 
California Parks and Recreation Commission apparently asked Forestry to work with 
Save-the-Redwoods League and the Trust for Public Land to “preserve [the] critical area 
of Sally Bell/Jackass Creek.”  Meanwhile, EPIC raised $10,000 in preparation for a 
lawsuit against the California Department of Forestry, and on September 30 they filed the 
suit and challenged the agency’s approval of the Sally Bell harvest plan.  On October 6, 
G-P began logging in the groves.  A “sentry” in the woods radioed to the EPIC office and 
alerted them to the logging activity.  The Garberville Theater then posted a notice on its 
marquee that read, “G-P Cutting Sinkyone.  Help Now.  EPIC.”  When the loggers 
arrived at the grove on the morning of October 7, they were greeted by nearly forty 
activists, who had alerted the Eureka television stations about the action.  According to 
press accounts, the activists “hugged trees and positioned themselves so the giant 
redwoods could not be toppled without falling on them.”  The television crews filmed the 
arrival of the sheriff’s office, and a truce was reached between the activists and the 
company, though two-dozen people were arrested for trespassing.  The same day, a Santa 
Rosa judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order that prevented Georgia-Pacific from 
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logging the grove.  According to Woods, the action that day was only the third instance 
of tree-hugging direct action in the world: the first occurred in India, the second at Bald 
Mountain.105   
Meanwhile, EPIC prepared its court case, and received more assistance from 
direct action later in the month.  The EPIC trial was delayed and G-P apparently thought 
that the restraining order expired, so on October 24, the company resumed logging in 
Sally Bell Grove.  The logging crew showed up with fifty sheriffs, but were still slowed 
down by protestors.  One woman, local Mim Hill, was hit by a falling tree during the day.  
The restraining was reinstated on October 25, and twenty-two people were arrested for 
trespassing on the 24th and 25th.  Dramatically, the sheriffs arrested several activists who 
had surrounded a giant tree known as “Medicine Tree.”  Surrounding that tree was 
particularly dangerous because the logger had removed the wedge that held the tree up 
and was prepared to make the final cut.  The EPIC v. Johnson trial was held in the midst 
of the action, and the odds were long for EPIC.  The trial was thrown out of the 
Mendocino Superior Court and moved to Sonoma County.  A retired judge was recalled 
to hear the case in Sonoma, and he promptly fell asleep during Duggan’s opening 
argument.  Additionally, Georgia-Pacific, hired  attorney was Jared Carter, a former clerk 
for U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglass, former Stanford law professor, and 
former Undersecretary of the Interior for President Nixon – a man with clout in the court 
room.  Probably without much surprise to anyone, on October 27, the judge ruled against 
EPIC, but left the TRO in place until EPIC received a stay from the Court of Appeals on 
October 31.    
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While EPIC prepared for its appeal, local activists embarked on a new campaign 
to pressure Georgia-Pacific to sell Sally Bell Grove and other land to the state in order to 
expand the Sinkyone Wilderness State Park.  In November, EPIC met with Sierra Club 
Executive Committee members to patch up their differences and to shore up the Club’s 
support of their efforts.  The Club endorsed the EPIC suit and asked the Sierra Club 
Legal Defense Fund to write an amicus brief.  In January 1984, Northcoast activists 
traveled to Georgia to meet with G-P officials regarding a potential land deal, and 
Richard Geinger -- using an innovative tactic later adopted by Headwaters activists 
during the 1980s and 1990s and by national environmental groups during the 1990s -- 
attended a G-P shareholder meeting to plead his case to the company.  By July 1984, 
Georgia-Pacific had agreed to postpone its efforts to log anywhere in the Sinkyone until 
1985 in order to provide the time to negotiate a land swap.   
 A full year later, the situation on the Northcoast had not improved.  During the 
early summer of 1985, the California legislature approved a $7 million appropriation for 
a Sinkyone purchase, and Save-the-Redwoods League pledged an additional $3 million, 
but Governor Deukmejian eliminated the appropriation and argued that the state should 
have focused on park purchases “closer to the state’s population centers.”  In July 1985, 
EPIC won its appeal of EPIC v. Johnson.  At that point, Georgia-Pacific was furious, and, 
like Pacific Lumber during the Headwaters conflict, argued that it was unfairly vilified, 
especially because the company had donated $6 million worth of land to the state in 
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1969.  In September 1985, the company refilled the same Sally Bell harvest plan and 
Forestry approved it, despite the prior Johnson ruling.106 
 When it filed the Sally Bell harvest plan for the second time, Georgia-Pacific set 
in motion the tail end of what would become the pattern of conflict during much of the 
redwood wars.  In December, the Department of Forestry again approved the harvest 
plan, despite EPIC’s announcement that it would sue the department again if it approved 
the plan.  John DeWitt, Executive Director of the League, commented on the litigation 
threat by EPIC:  “I imagine they will go out and chain themselves to the trees.”  Geinger, 
more cryptically told the press, “the trees are going to be protected.”  Georgia-Pacific, in 
what would become a common charge by industry spokesmen during the Spotted Owl 
and Headwaters conflicts, among others, accused the activists of trying to stop all logging 
on the Northcoast at the expense of the loggers and mill workers.  On January 17, 1986, 
EPIC, the Sierra Club, Woods, Geinger, and others filed their petition for a Writ of 
Mandate.  Once again, Save-the-Redwoods League and the Trust for Public Land were 
recruited to negotiate a land purchase with G-P.  The trial for the second Sally Bell case 
was never heard.  Instead, the Trust for Public Land purchased 7100 acres of land from 
Georgia-Pacific on December 20, 1986, and donated 3300 of those acres, including the 
Sally Bell Grove, to the Sinkyone Wilderness State Park.   
 The fight over the Sinkyone thus cooled, but the battles between the Northcoast 
activists and timber companies such as Georgia-Pacific and Pacific Lumber had really 
just begun.  The basic patterns established during the Sally Bell fight – Timber Harvest 
Plan, environmental challenge to the plan, Forestry approval of the plan, suit filed to 
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repeal the agency decision, direct action to stop logging and provide time for attorneys, 
activist victory in court, an attempted legislative solution to the escalating conflict – were 
repeated over and over during the Headwaters conflict until, like the Sally Bell conflict, a 
land purchase was orchestrated in an attempt to end the conflict.107 
 
The Sally Bell Model:  Repeat Often for Twenty-plus Years 
 
In addition to the experience of planning successful direct actions and other 
organizing tools, the Sally Bell conflict offered Northcoast activists a strong set of legal 
arguments for challenging the corporatist timber tradition.  The arguments that EPIC and 
the Department of Forestry made during EPIC v. Johnson were notably similar to those 
made by plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, in nearly every case dealing with old-
growth forests between 1983 and 1997.  EPIC and its attorneys successfully argued that 
Forestry, in approving the plan, had violated three CEQA requirements:  first, Forestry 
had not adequately responded to public comments on the harvest plan; second, Forestry 
failed to consider the cumulative impact of the harvests on the hillside; and third, 
Forestry failed to consult with relevant agencies with jurisdiction over the project (in this 
case the Native American Heritage Commission).  Forestry did not dispute EPIC’s 
claims.  Instead, it argued that, according to the Rules, Forestry could only consider the 
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Forest Practice Act when approving plans.  Therefore, CEQA’s requirements about 
consultation, cumulative impact, and public comments were irrelevant to Timber Harvest 
Plans.  It appears that Forestry and the timber industry were hoping for a judgment that 
would overturn the previous rulings because they made the same arguments as in Arcata 
and Gallegos.  At the same time, Forestry contended, contrary to EPIC’s claim, Timber 
Harvest Plan review procedures implicitly addressed the cumulative effects of its 
decisions by minimizing the impact of each individual project.  That assessment of 
cumulative impact analysis -- coupled with Forestry’s continued use of the argument that 
CEQA did not apply to harvest plans -- demonstrates the degree of intransigence within 
the agency.  By definition, one cannot analyze cumulative impact without studying past 
and future plans.  The court ruled for EPIC in 1985 based on the plaintiff’s arguments, 
striking another blow to the Board’s industry-friendly economic development 
priorities.108     
The Johnson cases provided EPIC with valuable experience, a strong precedent, and 
successful arguments.  EPIC and other citizens used the EPIC v. Johnson model with 
increasing frequency and success.  Prior to Johnson, there were only two published 
opinions for cases challenging harvest plans.  After Johnson, environmental groups 
would challenge plans every year.  But if EPIC members thought the Board and the 
timber industry would take this third defeat at the hands of environmental groups as a 
signal to reform the Forest Practice Rules and Forestry methodology, they were wrong.  
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Forestry and the timber industry would continue to argue they were exempt from CEQA, 
despite the growing stack of precedents building against that position.109 
 For the next twenty years, the Board, EPIC, Sierra Club, and the timber industry 
jousted repeatedly over the same issues.  What became known as Headwaters Forest 
became the focal point of many of the battles between environmental activists and 
corporatism, producing two major state legal precedents.  Litigation on the Northcoast 
outside of Headwaters Forest also produced a major state precedent, and the three state 
cases forced the Board to adopt new forestry rules and to twice withdraw its legal support 
from the timber industry and production-focused regulation.  The Headwaters litigation 
additionally and unintentionally produced one major federal precedent (Marbled 
Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber) and the public purchase of part of the forest through the 
“Headwaters Deal” negotiated among the state of California, the federal government, and 
Pacific Lumber.  Headwaters became the focal point because it was the only unprotected 
old-growth redwood forest of significant size left in the world, and because the forest’s 
owner, Pacific Lumber Company, adopted a new forestry policy during the mid-1980s 
that was designed to harvest the company’s remaining old-growth groves within twenty 
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Figure 4: Map of Humboldt – Mendocino coastal border region, including Sinkyone 
















Chapter 4: Expanded yet Contracted: Radical Locals and the 
addition of the “New” Pacific Lumber to the Donkey Train, 
1985 – 1989 
 
 
During the 1980s, the modern environmental protection regime withstood a 
barrage of attacks, and so did California’s de facto corporatist forestry system.  However, 
whereas the business community led the national attacks, it was the Northcoast activists 
who were the aggressors in California.  Federally, big business and industry attacked the 
costs of the new social regulations.  The Reagan administration attacked big government 
and argued environmental laws stifled economic growth.  In response, the mainstream 
national environmental groups established defensive campaigns to prevent rollbacks of 
the 1970s environmental laws.   They prevented Congress from gutting the laws, and they 
worked to improve agency rules when faced with the erosion of bipartisan commitment 
to environmental protection.  The movements towards the defensive and the insider game 
led to the creation of Earth First! in 1980 – to invigorate offensive and idealistic efforts.   
On the Northcoast, it was the Sally Bell Grove case, not the national industry 
offensive or Reagan ascendancy that transformed the redwood wars again.  Previously, 
conflicts over redwood groves were resolved by park land acquisition negotiations, and 
after World War II, conflicts over the redwoods more tightly focused on timber harvest 
practices, with litigation as the activists’ most successful tool.  After 1985, activists 
tightly coordinated a litigation and direct action campaign, and the redwood wars were 
defined by the actions and reactions revolving around those tactics.  Confident in the 
Sally Bell model, activists escalated their attacks, using the same defensive tools of the 




seat.  Those same activists, unlike their national counterparts, also embraced the 
radicalism of Earth First! and biocentrism, especially when faced with a transformed 
Pacific Lumber.  The result was more than a decade of attacks, adjustments, and counter-
attacks as Pacific Lumber and the activists vied for leverage in the battle over Headwaters 
Forest. 
The developments of the second half of the 1980s illustrate the way the redwood 
wars complicate the professionalization and nationalization interpretation of postwar 
environmental policits.  Northcoast activists crafted a local forestry reform campaign that 
forced transformations in larger institutions in order to better accommodate the locals’ 
vision and valuations of the Northcoast redwood belt.  After 1985, the non-middle-class 
nature of the Northcoast redwood movement also came into full view, as did the strategy 
the locals would pursue to force the state to accommodate their local vision for the 
Northcoast.  The local activists – not DC-based environmental organizations or policy 
entrepreneurs -- drove the redwood wars onto more stages, increased their power within 
the state, and pushed the conflicts to new heights of notoriety, but by the end of the 
decade, the battles over forestry regulation in California focused increasingly on Pacific 
Lumber’s land.  The local Northcoast activists pushed their reform agenda up the ladders 
of state power and public visibility, and they shunned middle class values and work even 
as they took their case to the courts, media, and public.  The exponential increase in the 
number of direct actions and lawsuits filed against Northcoast timber companies, and the 
reactions the actions provoked attracted the interest of the media and heightened the 




increasingly centered their efforts on protecting what became known as Headwaters 
Forest on Pacific Lumber property.110 
Local environmental activists increased their numbers, expanded their list of 
industry targets, and adopted an increasingly combative tone and set of tactics.  To a 
large degree, a second wave of migrants to the Northcoast drove the expansion of tactics 
during this period and provided new leadership to the redwood preservation movement 
that, like the first wave of migrants in the 1970s, largely rejected middle class work and 
culture.  The activists embraced direct action against logging companies and the Sally 
Bell model to challenge harvest plans in court.  Their goal was to transform the 
Northcoast timber industry so that it would better consider the long term interests of 
forest inhabitants and workers.  And the activist community increasingly turned their 
attention to Pacific Lumber, especially the Headwaters Forest complex.  From 1985 to 
1989, direct action and litigation strategies, in combination, prevented Pacific Lumber 
from harvesting the heart of Headwaters Forest, forced Forestry (though not the Board) to 
buck corporatist tradition and reject harvest plans that did not consider cumulative effects 
or wildlife mitigations, and pushed the redwood wars onto the “front pages” of state and 
national media outlets to pressure companies and agencies into action. 
The Northcoast activists gained the upper hand in the redwood wars during this 
period largely because of a fundamental transformation within Pacific Lumber -- a 
transformation that led directly to its vilification, and drew the attention of activists from 
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southern and central Humboldt.  The structure of the company and its public image were 
transformed because Charles Hurwitz’ Maxxam Group, backed by the junk bonds of 
Michael Milken, acquired Pacific Lumber.  Almost immediately, the company lost most 
of its benevolent paternal small-town image.  In its place rose the image of a callous and 
greedy corporate timber liquidator – no different than the image of Louisiana-Pacific and 
Georgia-Pacific in the region, and a reputation Pacific Lumber had tried hard to avoid.  
Many workers and environmental activists worried that the “new” Pacific Lumber would 
cut-and-run, leaving the forest and the county in poor economic and ecologic shape.   
As Pacific Lumber labored to restructure its operations to meet John Campbell’s 
vision as well as the company’s new commitments in a highly leveraged business world, 
local activists moved to force the Department of Forestry to reform its practices and 
regulations by challenging the efforts of Pacific Lumber to increase its harvests of old 
growth redwoods.  At stake was whether the state would support Pacific Lumber’s 
contention that younger forests that grew faster were of greater value to the company and 
community, or whether the state would support the activists’ claims that forests of mixed 
ages better served society.  In the collusion of these forces, the battle over Headwaters 
Forest became the epicenter of a conflict that transformed state and national 
environmental politics and the future of the region’s redwood-owning giant.  Because the 
combatants focused on local concerns over private property prerogatives, national 
institutions did not intervene for another ten years when the locals drew them in to break 
the protracted conflict.111 
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Migration:  The Second Wave of Radical Leaders and the Escalation of 
the Redwood Wars 
 
 Another migration wave of activists energized the Northcoast environmental 
movement with their own brand of nontraditional beliefs.  Those activists were largely 
responsible for the widespread adoption of direct action, the increasingly hostile tone of 
the activist community, and the unprecedented legal assault on development-focused 
forestry regulation – de facto corporatism.  From 1977 to 1986, at least five key activists 
moved to the Northcoast and assumed leadership roles in the redwood preservation 
movement.  Cecelia Lanman, Darryl Cherney, Gary and Betty Ball, and Judi Bari arrived, 
like Woods, Kathy Bailey, and the other earlier migrants, with political experience, and 
used that experience to promote grassroots activism in defense of their social and 
ecologic visions for the Northcoast.  Cecelia Lanman brought mass organizing experience 
and eventually became the lead spokesperson and director of EPIC.  Darryl Cherney 
arrived on the Northcoast with a wealth of media experience and a desire to remove 
himself from the perpetual rat race.  Cherney quickly became an organizer and 
spokesperson for North Coast Earth First!, and one of the most nationally visible activists 
in the redwood wars.  Gary and Betty Ball moved to Mendocino after years of organizing 
in Chicago and Colorado.  On the Northcoast they established the Mendocino 
Environmental Center as a clearinghouse and meeting place for myriad environmental 
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activists.  Finally, Judi Bari brought years of experience organizing unions and anti-war 
protests.  She became the matriarch of North Coast Earth First!, and played a vital role 
connecting the biocentric philosophy of Earth First! to the concerns of the Northcoast 
activists for workers and community.  In line with the long tradition of female leadership 
in the Northcoast redwood preservation movement, Lanman, Ball, and Bari, offered 
young Northcoast women powerful examples of female leadership and recruited other 
female activists to become movement leaders. 
Like the early migrants of the late 1960s and early 1970s, most of the newer 
migrants were raised in Midwestern or Eastern middle-class homes and were college 
educated, but turned to the Northcoast in search of an alternative society.  All shared an 
uncompromising constitution and a desire to confront corporate power.  The organizing, 
research, and media skills of this group of activists helped expand the popularity of the 
redwood preservation movement on the Northcoast and beyond.  Their visibility and 
unyielding positions made them easy targets for their opposition, and frequently made 
coalition work and conflict resolution with state and corporate actors nearly impossible.   
 
Cecelia Lanman:  Making EPIC a Permanent Organizing Body 
Cecilia Lanman’s path to the redwood wars was in many ways similar to that of 
Kathy Bailey.  From 1969 to 1972, Lanman studied political science at the University of 
Cincinnati and worked as an intern on political campaigns.  In her early twenties, she and 
her then husband, Gil Gregori, moved to California, where she worked as the East Bay 
Coordinator of the United Farm Workers during the grape boycott.  After the UFW 




Hayward.  In 1974, she abandoned her studies to work as a real estate agent and to 
manage apartment buildings in Oakland with Gregori.  The two were not environmental 
activists, but they attended the very first EPIC meeting in 1977 while up north hunting for 
land.  Woods recalled that at that meeting, Lanman announced she wanted to get involved 
with environmental issues when they finally moved to the Northcoast.  Later in 1977, 
Cecelia, Gil, and their daughters Megan and Mariah, moved from Oakland to a ranch 
house on the Mattole River near Ettersburg in Humboldt County, just west of 
Redway/Garberville.  The Grigoris managed and owned forestland as well as an organic 
apple and chestnut orchard.  Additionally, Cecelia worked in stream restoration, pre-
commercial tree thinning and post-harvest tree planting.  In 1978-1979, Lanman attended 
Merritt College in Oakland as an intern in Early Childhood Education, and also sat on the 
Board of Directors of the Tiny Tots Nursery School Co-op.   
In 1982, Cecelia and Gil finally began working with Richard Geinger, Woods, 
and their colleagues to expand the Sinkyone Wilderness Park, with Cecelia serving on the 
EPIC Board of Directors.  Woods and EPIC promoted the development of a broad and 
inclusive board, and Cecelia, with her organizing experience, fit the bill.  In fact, in 1986, 
Cecelia mediated the settlement among Georgia-Pacific, The Trust for Public Land, and 
the local Sinkyone activists.  In 1986, Cecelia was named president of EPIC due to her 
leadership qualities and possibly due to a rift between Woods and some members of the 
board over the best use of the Johnson case attorneys fees award.  As an EPIC board 
member and president, Cecelia took the litigation reigns away from Woods, and helped 
build EPIC into a full-time litigation, research, and advocacy organization for the 




CDF Director Jerry Partain.  EPIC was well on its way to establishing itself as the leading 
forestry litigation group in California.112   
 
Darryl Cherney:  Reviving Earth First! and Bringing the Media to the Northcoast 
Though he described himself as a late bloomer -- the last kid on the block to kiss a 
girl and to smoke pot -- Darryl Cherney was in many ways a natural entertainer, and that 
trait served him well as an organizer and media contact for the various manifestations of 
North Coast Earth First!.  Cherney moved to Garberville in November 1985 from his 
native Manhattan, where, at age five, Darryl worked with lefty producer Tony Schwartz 
(most famous for the “Daisy” television ads Lyndon Johnson ran against Barry 
Goldwater in 1964) on television and radio commercials.  Cherney described himself as 
“fascinated” with politics from an early age, and volunteered with John Lindsay’s 
mayoral campaign in 1964.  In 1968, at age twelve, he canvassed for Robert F. Kennedy, 
and in 1978 he participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.  By 1985, however, Darryl 
was searching for something else in life.  After stints at the National Football League and 
Capital Sports Marketing, he earned a masters degree from Fordham University.  
Cherney said he fell in love with the redwoods in 1970 on a family vacation and dreamed 
he might one day live among them.  Frustrated with New York City, he packed up and 
left for California in his Dodge Sportsman camper van.   
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 Cherney moved west to reinvent himself and to figure out how he could help save 
humanity from itself.  He intended to go to San Francisco, even pre-rented an apartment, 
but in November he picked up a hitchhiker named Kingfisher along the Oregon coast 
who proved fortuitous.  Kingfisher led Cherney to Garberville because he said that was 
where people were really living off --  and working to save -- the land.  Almost 
immediately, Cherney located the EPIC office where he engrossed himself in redwood 
logging issues – a particularly hot set of issues due to the Sally Bell situation, and 
because Pacific Lumber had just agreed to merge with Maxxam Group.   
 The EPIC office had an Earth First! sticker on the door.  Cherney asked one of the 
local activists, Mokai, about the sticker, and was told that Earth First! was “just a bunch 
of people who do things.”  There was an Earth First! group at Humboldt State University 
centered around Professor Bill Devall, co-author of Deep Ecology, a seminal work of 
biocentric ethics.  But Earth First! had come-and-gone from southern Humboldt after 
EPIC won the Sally Bell court case and the grove was purchased by the Trust.  Darryl 
liked the lack of structure within Earth First!.  When he asked how one became an Earth 
First!er, and how one obtained approval to act, Mokai told him that “you just go ahead 
and do it; it’s cool.”  Cherney did some office work for EPIC for five dollars per hour, 
but found a better niche for himself in 1986, when he participated in his first illegal direct 
action.  From that March day until the early twenty-first century, Cherney’s identity was 
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Betty Ball:  Pulling People Together 
 Betty Ball was trained as a caregiver and student of social behavior, twin 
tendencies that led her and her husband Gary to establish the Mendocino Environmental 
Center as a clearinghouse for local environmental political information and a meeting 
place for activists to cooperate rather than compete.  Born in Milwaukee, the daughter of 
a YMCA Director and special education teacher, Ball was surrounded by community 
service.  At the age of six, the family moved to Nebraska, then to Lubbock, Texas, where 
Betty completed high school.  She attended Colorado University at Boulder for a year, 
then transferred to George Williams College in Chicago, where she earned a degree in 
social work in 1967.  She stayed in Chicago for two more years as the Program Director 
for the Hull House.   
 Her Chicago experience seemed to instill in Ball a distrust of law enforcement; 
she participated in the 1968 Democratic Convention actions, as well as police retribution 
and surveillance resulting from a Hull House protest of a police station after the shooting 
of a program participant.  Ball recalled an incident when police threw a canister of tear 
gas into her office through a door that opened onto the fire escape, and another when a 
colleague’s apartment was repeatedly and covertly entered and searched.  Ball resigned 
from Hull House during the summer of 1969, when the board decided to develop more 
middle-class programs like dance and theater that would generate more funding. 
 Ball moved back to Boulder and continued her care giving and political activism.  
She worked at a nursing home for a while, then moved to Nucla, Colorado to work as a 
welfare caseworker in the uranium mining community.  She returned to Chicago a year 




Boulder after a year, married Gary Ball and worked at a resource center for transients and 
at the National Institute for Criminal Justice and Community Relations.  She and Gary 
later moved to Nederland, Colorado, where Betty worked as a counselor, town clerk, and 
part-time activist for a water renovation project.  Looking for something else to do after a 
failed partnership in an optical retail business with Gary’s father, the two went on 
vacation to the Lost Coast in northern Mendocino and southern Humboldt Counties.  
While on vacation, they developed a plan to open up an environmental center in 
California to help prevent local activists from competing for resources.  In the spring of 
1986, the couple moved to California, and within a year had moved to Ukiah and opened 
the Mendocino Environmental Center, which would become a primary nerve center for 
the redwood preservation movement.114 
 
Judi Bari:  Organizing, Pure and Simple 
 Judi Bari brought a rough and tumble style of politics and organizing to the 
Northcoast, a style cultivated along the I-95 corridor of the eastern metropolis.  Bari was 
born in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1949 and attended the University of Maryland, College 
Park, where she majored in “anti-Vietnam rioting.”  Like Cecelia Lanman, Bari left 
school after three years, though while Lanman was organizing laborers, Bari worked as a 
laborer in a bakery.  She was fired for decorating a cake with a hammer, sickle, and the 
caption, “U.S. Get Out of the War.”  The bakers union successfully fought her dismissal, 
and a few years later when the bakers struck, Bari organized some of her fellow picketers 
to sneak onto the property at night to seal locks with liquid steel and to let air out of 
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managers’ tires.  Later, Bari unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the same bakers 
union, then she left to work as a package handler at the U.S. Post Office.  There, she 
founded her own union to compete with the three existing unions, and eventually 
consolidated them into a single union with herself at the helm.  In 1979, she moved to 
Sonoma County, California, where she met and married Mike Sweeney; like Lanman and 
Geinger, the marriage failed.  Bari worked as a carpenter in Mendocino County, raised 
her two girls, and developed an urge to stop the last ancient redwoods from falling at the 
hands of loggers.  In 1988, Judi Bari joined the North Coast Earth First! activists in their 
efforts to eliminate industrial logging and old growth harvests.  Her energy, organizing 
skill, and brash style won her many followers, cultivated many enemies, made her 
difficult to work with at times, recruited thousands of activists into the movement, and 
left an indelible impact on the course of the redwood wars.115 
 
Taking It To The Streets… And The Woods:  The Rise of Earth First! 
on the Northcoast 
 
 The decisions to progressively escalate a direct action campaign on the 
Northcoast were ultimately the decisions that made the redwood wars a national story, 
and they were ultimately the decisions that protracted the conflict.  Without the direct 
actions, the litigation efforts would have been less effective.  Without the direct actions, 
                                                        
115Judi Bari, Timber Wars (Common Courage Press: Monroe, ME, 1994), “About the Author;”  Rik Scarce, 
Eco-Warriors: Understanding the Radical Environmental Movement (Left Coast Press: Walnut Creek, Ca, 
2006) 81; Nicholas Wilson, “Judi Bari Dies But Her Struggle Continues,” Albion Monitor, March 2, 1997, 




Pacific Lumber and the community would not have reacted as violently to the activists’ 
demands.   
In the late 1980s, direct action and civil disobedience became the most 
identifiable aspects of the redwood wars, in large part due to the leadership of Judi Bari, 
Darryl Cherney, and Greg King, and their increasing focus on Headwaters Forest as the 
place to press their social and ecologic visions for the Northcoast.  The success of the 
Sally Bell Grove actions did not immediately establish a tradition of direct action and 
civil disobedience on the Northcoast, but it didn’t take long for the tactic to resurface 
among redwood preservation activists – certainly not as long as the time that elapsed 
between the 1924 Laura Mahan action and those at Sally Bell.  It is unlikely that direct 
action or Earth First! would have entirely disappeared on the Northcoast, given its 
reputation as a haven for counter-culture types and people shaking off their self-defined 
middle class shackles.  It is undeniable, however, that Bari, Cherney, and King seized 
upon direct action and an uncompromising vision of environmental activism to forge an 
activist culture around radical, biocentric, direct action in support of their social and 
environmental vision.  Once established, the Northcoast remained awash in nearly daily 
direct actions for more than a decade.  The intensity, frequency, and style of the actions 
brought unprecedented media coverage, state scrutiny, and industry backlash to the 
redwood wars. 
 
The Resuscitation of Earth First! on the Northcoast: Giving a Loud Public Voice to an 




 At the, before the conflict became intractable, the revival of Earth First! on the 
Northcoast offered local activists of megaphone from which to broadcast their message of 
social transformation and a vehicle to disrupt timber harvests at the point of production.  
That megaphone proved to be quite effective and helped the movement achieve great 
public support because the first actions were aimed at publicity and not backwoods 
warfare.   
Earth First! and direct action exploded on the Northcoast after 1985 due to Darryl 
Cherney’s arrival in Humboldt County, his encounter with Sonoma native and 
investigative reporter Greg King, and the acquisition of Pacific Lumber by Maxxam in 
late 1985.  Northcoast Earth First! grew rapidly, and quickly developed a national 
reputation as a thorny obstacle to industrial logging in redwood country.  By 1990, 
thousands of activists flocked to the Northcoast to participate in Redwood Summer, a 
month of actions and rallies modeled after Mississippi Summer 1964.  Subsequently, the 
work of the local activists propelled the Headwaters conflict onto the national stage, 
delayed scores of timber harvests, offered EPIC and Sierra Club time to secure 
Temporary Restraining Orders and emergency stays, and inspired Pacific Lumber 
management and many of its workers to harden their stance against the activists. 
 North Coast Earth First! proved to be effective in large part because it tapped into 
a shared set of frustrations and philosophies in the region.  The Northcoast activists 
around Garberville embraced the philosophy of Deep Ecology first articulated by Arne 
Naess in 1976, made popular in the United States by Humboldt State professor Bill 
Devall and George Sessions, and put into political action by Earth First!.  The basic tenet 




inhabitants have an inherent value independent of, and equal to, humanity, and that 
humans have a moral duty to protect and promote the survival of the Earth’s systems as 
living environments.  EPIC kept a copy of chapters of Deep Ecology in its office, and the 
biocentric philosophy immediately struck a chord with Cherney as a nontechnical way to 
understand the need to protect species and forests.  In that respect, the members of EPIC 
and North Coast EF! greatly resembled the wilderness advocates critiqued by Callicott, 
Cronon, Guha and others.  However, while more traditional Earth First!ers adhered 
strictly to the biocentric worldview, often to the point of misanthropy, Cherney, Bari, and 
the other Northcoast activists incorporated social justice values into their environmental 
worldview.  That melding of social concerns and environmental concerns set the actions 
of Northcoast activists apart from other radical environmental groups, and helped turn out  
massive crowds at many of their public actions.116  
 Earth First! was reborn on the Northcoast in March 1986 at the site of its original 
birth – Georgia-Pacific property near the Sinkyone.  Richard Geinger and Mark Mullens 
organized locals to illegally plant approximately three thousand Douglas fir and 
redwoods on a Georgia-Pacific clear cut near the Sally Bell Grove.  Cherney asked if the 
guerrilla planting could be an Earth First! action, and Mokai agreed.  Cherney sent out a 
press release in the name of Earth First!, and a photograph of the action ran in the local 
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paper, The Redwood Record (insert photo).  The day of the action, Greg King, 25, a 
reporter from the West Sonoma County Paper, who was unaware of the tree planting 
action, pulled into the EPIC parking lot to ask for directions to the Sinkyone.  King was a 
fourth-generation Northcoaster, and the King Range was named after his ancestor 
loggers.  Greg recently had won an award for an article he wrote about the industrial 
logging of Sonoma, he had read the coverage of the Sally Bell conflict, and he wanted to 
see the grove.  King drove a four-wheel drive truck, and Darryl walked up to him and 
said, “I’m Darryl Cherney.  Can we borrow your car?”  King agreed to give Cherney and 
other activists a ride to the tree planting, and when they arrived, King headed into the 
forest for a hike.  He apparently hiked through the grove and out into a Georgia-Pacific 
clear cut, a scene that convinced him that the logging of ancient forests had to be stopped 
– period.117   
 King and Cherney wrote to each other throughout the subsequent months 
(Cherney did not have a phone in the geodesic dome he rented for $125 per month), and 
soon became organizing partners on a mission to protect Headwaters Forest.  Greg lived 
in Guerneville, Sonoma County, and was working on an article about Louisiana Pacific’s 
plans to clear cut all the company’s remaining 20,000 acres in Sonoma and to sell the 
cutover land to real estate developers.  He told Darryl that the company’s foresters were 
threatening him.  For his part, Darryl was looking into Maxxam and thinking about the 
implications of the takeover of Pacific Lumber.  He asked EPIC, the Northcoast 
Environmental Center in Arcata, and the Redwood Chapter of the Sierra Club what they 
could do, but all were busy with other work and told Darryl he needed to take it on 
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himself.  During the late spring of 1986, Darryl used the EPIC phone to talk to Greg, who 
told him he thought it was time for Earth First! to meet.  Greg had a copy of the 1986 
Maxxam prospectus and purchased a single share of stock.  The prospectus detailed the 
deal’s financing as well as the plan to harvest Pacific Lumber’s remaining old growth 
within the next two decades.  King was determined to stop Maxxam in that effort.  In 
June, approximately twenty activists met at Annwfn (pronounced On-a-van), a piece of 
land owned by the Church of All Worlds, a pagan church in Greenfield Ranch just north 
of Ukiah in Mendocino County.  Greg, Darryl, Gary and Betty Ball all attended.  At the 
meeting, they decided that some of them would go to the annual Round River 
Rendezvous of the national Earth First! movement to learn more about the larger EF! 
movement and to help build their own work on the Northcoast.  After the Rendezvous, 
North Coast EF! held its second meeting at Greenfield Ranch to plan actions.  Aside from 
a July rally outside the Ukiah offices of the Bureau of Land Management to protest 
logging on federal land, the first big actions on the Northcoast came during the fall.118 
 The decision to focus on Maxxam proved wise because it opened possibilities to 
harness broader community concerns about the takeover with activist concerns about the 
fate of Headwaters Forest.  Once the actions began, North Coast Earth First! grew in size 
and reputation, as the organization publicized what its leaders  saw as the common enemy 
of  the activists and the loggers – Maxxam.  In September 1986, Earth First! and 
Rainforest Action Network organized a national day of rainforest actions focused on 
Pacific Lumber.  North Coast EF! organized a rally in Arcata, where Greg met Larry 
Evans and Kurt Newman, who would become tree sitters, forest mappers, and harvest 
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plan monitors.  In October, after a regional EF! rendezvous near Santa Cruz, many of the 
California EF! activists rallied at Pacific Lumber headquarters in San Francisco to protest 
the new logging regime.  Darryl organized a street theater presentation during which 
Tyrannosaurus Rex blew up the Maxxam monster.  Darryl played Charles Hurwitz.  The  
show included a love story between a logger and an Amazonian-style forest activist.  
Mike Rozelle played the logger, and he fought Hurwitz/Darryl when handed his pink slip, 
a clear display of North Coast EF!’s intention to build alliances with loggers.  In 
December, Darryl helped organize a rally in Scotia near the Pacific Lumber mills.  “Paul 
Bunyan” spoke at the rally, while attendees held signs that said, “Will Jobs Be Gone in 
20 years?”  Prior to the rally, Darryl sent “Save the Loggers League” pamphlets to all the 
P.O. Boxes in Scotia.  The pamphlets were designed by Gary and Betty Ball, and Oberon, 
from the Greenfield Ranch.  Darryl and others continued, largely unsuccessfully, to try to 
build an alliance with workers throughout the redwood wars.119 
 The colorful actions of persistent activists continued to establish roots in the 
community for the direct action movement throughout 1987 and 1988.  The actions also 
provoked strong reactions from Pacific Lumber.  In March, Greg King led activists to a 
Maxxam shareholders meeting in Houston, and North Coast EF! protested at the monthly 
Board of Forestry meeting in Eureka.  Cherney wore a chimpanzee mask and held a sign 
that said, “Monkeywrench the Monkey Business.”  Cherney’s personal vision for the 
campaign was to generate high-profile publicity, to demonize Charles Hurwitz, to 
encourage EPIC and Sierra Club to sue, to develop legislation, and to “kick Hurwitz out 
of Humboldt.”  For their part, Greg King, Kurt Newman, and Larry Evans carried out 
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plans to trespass, map, and identify the ancient forest reserves on Pacific Lumber land in 
order to monitor THPs and to understand the ramifications of Pacific Lumber’s plan to 
turn all its land into a young growth forest.   
Early in the year, however, the headlines reinforced the anti-middle-class image 
of the Northcoast activists.  George Alexander, a Louisiana Pacific mill worker, was 
nearly decapitated when the blade of his mill saw hit a tree spike.  Alexander survived the 
accident, and the local and state headlines blamed Earth First!, referring to the group as 
eco-terrorists.  The tree was a small second growth tree, and it would later be determined 
that the likely culprit was a mentally unstable landowner in the area.  But that didn’t 
matter at the time, given that Dave Foreman and other Earth First!ers promoted tree 
spiking as a tactic.  The image of the Northcoast activists was never fully repaired in the 
wake of that incident.120   
 Despite the Cloverdale tragedy, the direct action campaign continued as planned, 
and was deemed successful by the activists.  In May, Greg and Larry announced that they 
had discovered a vast ancient forest in the middle of Pacific Lumber’s property that they 
named Headwaters Forest because of the numerous “deer streams” that originated out of 
old growth groves.  They described twelve groves of ancient forests in a sea of second 
growth groves and clear cuts.   They named the largest of the groves Headwaters Grove 
because several streams and creeks originated in its belly.  On May 18, approximately 
150 people gathered outside Pacific Lumber’s Fisher Road gate to thwart the company’s 
efforts to log in the old growth groves.  The Fisher Road gate was part of the Louisiana 
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Pacific land and mill Campbell had purchased, and the road led directly to the edge of 
Headwaters Forest.  Six women were arrested climbing up a logging deck, and Mokai led 
a relatively unsuccessful three-person tree sit in All Species Grove.  In late August, Greg 
King and Mary Beth Nearing climbed two trees in Elk Head Springs Grove.  They 
perched themselves 150 feet up in two trees on the edge of the ancient grove and an 
adjacent clear cut, and waited for two days until the loggers noticed their banner, strung 
between their two trees, that read, “Free The Redwoods.”  When a company tree climber 
removed the banner, King unfurled another that read, “2000 Years Old/ Respect Your 
Elders!”  King and Neaher escaped arrest by sneaking down in the middle of the night.  
Weeks later, King and Nearing again went up into the trees to protest logging activity, 
this time at All Species Grove.  They were dubbed Tarzan and Jane by the local media, 
and rather than escaping, they climbed down to be publicly arrested and sued by Pacific 
Lumber for trespassing.  The incident drew major press to the Headwaters campaign and 
firmly established direct action at the point of production as a primary tactic in the 
redwood wars.  Outside Magazine, for example, ran a long article about the tree sitters in 
December 1988.121 
 In 1988, the first major protractions of the Headwaters Forest conflict appeared 
because Pacific Lumber decided to stand firm on its rights to harvest the trees on its 
property, and chose to engage the activists with counter-attacks.  North Coast Earth First! 
had ramped up its tree sitting campaign, took its show on the road, and began crafting 
alternatives to Maxxam/PL ownership of Headwaters Forest.  Pacific Lumber also 
stepped up its defenses against Earth First!.  John Campbell told his woodsmen not to 
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confront the activists, but rather to call the sheriff.  However, he added, it was okay to 
have a little fun with the activists in the meantime.  When activists held rallies at Scotia 
in front of the Pacific Lumber offices, Campbell had the sprinklers turned on.  And, in the 
fall of 1988, PL employees rubbed honey on the trunk of a tree below a sitter to attract 
bees and bears.  The playfulness ran alongside serious hostility, however.  The loggers in 
the woods yelled and cursed at the sitters, and sent climbers up trees to scare them.  
Additionally, PL spokesman David Gallitz began telling reporters that Earth First! was a 
terrorist organization.   
The activists contributed to the protraction because they – like John Campbell -- 
declined to engage in substantive negotiations.  For Greg King, 1989 began not in the 
trees, but with the presentation of a Headwaters Forest Wilderness Complex proposal at 
the Restoring the Earth Conference at the University of California, Berkeley.  Afterward, 
Greg put together a slide show of the pictures he had snapped while hiking PL land, and 
he traveled the state to increase the visibility of, and public support for, the campaign.  
Back in Humboldt, the tree sits continued.  Banners were hung – in the woods and over 
the Highway 101 overpass near the Fisher Road exit.  It was during this time that Darryl 
met Judi Bari while working on a poster at the Mendocino Environmental Center, and 
Bari entered the fray on behalf of Earth First!.  
 Bari brought organizing experience, a fiery spirit to the campaign, and direct 
action down to Mendocino County, which further widened the redwood wars.  In 
October, Bari organized a road blockade on federal land near Cahto Peak, south of the 
South Fork of the Eel River, and staged a protest at the Mendocino offices of the Bureau 




month, a literal tree hugging shut down logging in the Sanctuary Forest of Northern 
Mendocino.  On another occasion, Cecelia Lanman of EPIC and Lynn Ryan of Sierra 
Club were arrested for trespassing on Pacific Lumber land as they monitored THP 
activity.  While on the hike, the two women witnessed the company illegally logging an 
area protected by court injunction.  Six weeks after Bari’s first action, an informant sent a 
letter to the Ukiah police accusing Bari of inciting violence and offering to provide 
additional information.  The letter was attached to a photograph of Bari holding an Uzi, a 
photo she and Darryl claimed was a spoof.122 
 In 1989, the activists of North Coast EF! seemed to hit their stride, but were met 
with growing backlash, which included physical violence --  a combination with near 
deadly ramifications.  In a year that would be defined by instability and escalation, 
protests and worker organizing efforts fueled hostility from timber companies and many 
workers, activists dug in their heels in return, and the cycle renewed and grew stronger.  
In February, Louisiana-Pacific President Harry A. Merlo offered Bari greater incentive to 
increase EF! activity in Mendocino when he told Press Democrat reporter, Mike 
Geniella, that the company was: 
chewing everything up and putting it back together… we don’t need a big tree 
[because we’re making waferboard]…  We need everything that’s out there.  We 
don’t log to a 10-inch top, or an 8 –inch top, or a 6-inch top.  We log to infinity.  
Because we need it all.  It’s ours.  It’s out there and we need it all.  Now.123 
 
Judi Bari used that quote as fodder to recruit and motivate activists in her region, as well 
as to make inroads with Mendocino loggers worried about their jobs.  Her efforts were 
aided by L-P’s November 10 announcement that it was building a $100 million mill in El 
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Suazal, Mexico, to process redwood logs, a plan protested by EF! and millworkers alike.  
In April, a Corporate Finance article discussed a burgeoning alliance between loggers 
and environmentalists on the Northcoast, and in the fall, Judi represented Georgia Pacific 
loggers and millworkers as the International Workers of the World representative in Fort 
Bragg.  Also that fall, Pacific Lumber workers Peter Keyes and John Maurer began 
publishing Timberlyin’, an underground alternative to the company newlestter, 
Timberline.  Historians including Richard White have argued modern environmentalists 
had a problem with workers and labor because environmental activists viewed workers as 
problematic because their work defied the environmentalists’ goals.  On the Northcoast, 
the activist leaders empathized with the workers and seemed to truly want to construct a 
rural society with room for loggers, fisherman, farmers, and homesteaders.  As J. Brooks 
Flippen pointed out, however, economic interests and environmental values were uneasy 
bedfellows in the postwar era.124 
 That summer, the number of actions increased, and violence first reared its head – 
a sign of the expansion and protraction of the wars.  Violence had never before entered 
the redwood wars.  At the annual Round River Rendezvous, the national movement 
decided to organize a national tree sit week to highlight logging and forestry issues 
around the country.  Darryle, Judi, and Greg organized their first mass base camp for 
launching the tree sits and other direct actions.  The base camps, typically at public 
campgrounds in national forests or state parks, acted as home base, where supplies were 
received, plans hatched, meetings held, and where activists were trained to climb trees, 
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resist nonviolently, and so on.  From that first base camp, the Northcoast activists put on 
three of seven nationwide tree-sits:  an all-women’s tree sit, a tree sit in the famous drive-
through redwood on Highway 128 in southern Humboldt, and a seventeen-person tree sit 
in the walnut tree at the Arcata house of Assemblyman Dan Hauser.  Those tree sits were 
designed to draw media attention, not stop production.125 
In addition to hardening Pacific Lumber’s opposition to the activists, the on-the-
ground actions that spring and summer also frayed what fragile worker-activist bonds had 
been cultivated.  By April, a reporter already had described Scotia as a town “torn apart 
by a blaze of protests, lawsuits, and counter-charges.”  In June, King and Cherney 
organized a rally at Calpella, a mill town in Mendocino, where Louisiana Pacific was 
experimenting with chipboard/waferboard production.  At the rally, a logger punched 
King and knocked him to the ground.  Afterward, Dave Galitz wrote John Campbell a 
memo stating: “Enclosed is an article on Cherney and King’s latest stunt.  As soon as we 
find the home of the fine fellow who decked Greg King, he has a dinner invitation at the 
Galitz Residence.”126   
The violence escalated in August.  North Coast EF! set up a road blockade at 
Whitethorn, along the Humboldt-Mendocino border, to stop Lancaster Logging, which 
neighbors complained was logging outside its THP boundary and logging late at night.  
That EF! agreed to set up this blockade is evidence of the group’s desire to work on 
behalf of the local community because Lancaster was not an industrial logging company.  
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The national EF! movement did not share that community vision, and tensions grew 
between the national leaders and the Northcoast activists.  At the Lancaster blockade, 
Mrs. Lancaster and Judi Bari exchanged blows, and the oldest Lancaster son hit 50-year- 
old Mem Hill, knocking her down and breaking her nose.  As Greg King began to take 
pictures, Lancaster threw King to the ground.  King responded by standing up and 
punching Lancaster.  Dave Lancaster, the eighteen-year old son of the owner, arrived 
with a shotgun and fired it into the air, scattering the activists.  Two days later, on August 
18, Cherney and Bari organized a roadblock near Navarro in Mendocino to stop logging 
trucks.  The next day, just east of Navarro in Philo, a logging truck rear-ended the car 
carrying Bari, Cherney, an activist named Pam, and four children.  It was the same driver 
Bari and friends blocked the prior day, and there were no skid marks.  The driver got out 
of his truck yelling, “I didn’t see the children!”  Though still in the skirmish phase, the 
intensity and scope of the redwood wars had jumped up a notch in 1989.127 
 
Back at the Center of the Redwood Wars:  The “New” Pacific Lumber 
and its Vision Confront the Radicals 
 
 In the late 1980s, Pacific Lumber Company – after having avoided conflict with 
redwood activists since the 1930s -- found itself beleaguered on many fronts because of a 
dramatic corporate transformation that placed its forest and corporate vision under local 
scrutiny.  A conflict over Headwaters Forest surely would have arisen without the 
transformation of Pacific Lumber, but the takeover by Maxxam hastened the arrival of 
                                                        





the conflict and allowed for that conflict to grow hotter and more protracted than it likely 
would have been.  In addition to the direct actions of the redwood wars, Wall Street 
scandals brought unwanted attention of a different sort.  The Maxxam takeover of the 
company drew the attention of Northcoast activists to its land, especially John 
Campbell’s work to improve the efficiency and profitability of the company.  More than 
that, Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky’s involvement with Maxxam, coupled with 
Charles Hurwitz’ past, offered the activists a nearly perfect foil for their campaign against 
industrial logging.  Once Pacific Lumber entered the equation, the wars were fought on 
two fronts:  on L-P and G-P’s land in Mendocio and in southern Humboldt, and on 
Pacific Lumber’s land in central Humboldt.  Pacific Lumber, unlike L-P, which had 
worked to remove itself from the Northcoast, dug in and fought the environmental 
activists with vigor and patience, especially as it developed into the primary target of the 
activists, legislators and the press. 
 Early in 1985, John Campbell worked to convince the board of directors to 
increase the company’s use of clear cuts and to increase its harvest levels in general, 
which eventually contributed to the expansion of the redwood wars and the focus on 
Headwaters.  But by the end of the year, Campbell was preparing even larger increases in 
production, and for work under new ownership.  Prior to that year, Campbell had 
convinced the board of directors that clear cutting was a more efficient way to harvest its 
second growth and old growth groves.  He also resized lumber packages down to the size 
one person might use to build a deck;  computerized the company’s shipping and 
inventory processes; and began to sell directly to retailers.  These and other new 




economic recovery and timber boom of the mid-1980s.  From 1980 to 1985, the company 
averaged $179 million per year in net sales and 18 percent net profits, paid a $1 dividend 
per share, with a meager $24 million in long-term debt (a 0.15 debt-to-assets ratio) (Table 
1).  In 1983, Standard and Poors assigned Pacific Lumber’s bonds an A+ rating.  To 
further improve profitability, the company shed divisions its Victor retail operation, its 
power fluid business, and other underperforming divisions outside its core business.  
Pacific Lumber posted record highs in 1983 and 1984, and exceeded nets returns above 
12 percent every year since at least 1970 until 1985 except 1982 (See Chart 1).   Along 
with robust growth came a new thirst for timber.  In September 1985, before the Hurwitz 
tender offer, John Campbell and Bob Stephens (head of the forestry department at the 
company) proposed to increase the annual harvest forty percent, to 170 million board 
feet.  Pacific Lumber had acquired several thousand acres of new land in the 1980s, while 
at the same time becoming increasingly convinced that the 1956 timber cruise 
underestimated the company’s previous timber inventory.  Campbell could not have 
known that the annual harvest levels and projected inventory would become central 
issues in the redwood wars.128 
 The company’s strong balance sheet, outdated timber inventory, and undervalued 
stock caught the eye of Charles Hurwitz, an extraordinarily aggressive if still little- 
known corporate takeover artist.  Hurwitz was born and raised in Kilgore, Texas, and 
graduated from the University of Oklahoma in 1962.  In 1968, at the age of 28, he joined 
with George Parmalee to create one of the nation’s first hedge funds – Hedge Fund of 
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America – which  raised $54 million with its first offering.  George Kozmetsky, co-
founder of Teledyne and later head of the University of Texas business school, backed 
the fledgling fund.  As his reputation in finance began to grow, Hurwitz had left the 
hedge fund in 1971 and purchased his first company, The Summit Group.  But already 
there was trouble.  That same year, Hurwitz agreed to an SEC consent decree that 
enjoined him and Summit Group from further violations of anti-fraud securities laws.  
The decree stemmed from a complaint by the Hair Extension Center that Hurwitz had 
disseminated false and misleading information about the company.  Before the year was 
out, Hurwitz sold Summit Group, but retained the insurance unit, which was 
subsequently liquidated in 1975 after the New York Insurance Superintendent charged 
him  and others with “improperly, illegally, and fraudulently siphon[ing]” funds from 
Summit Insurance.  Undaunted, Hurwitz, backed by $12 million in loans, acquired 
Federated Development Company in 1973 to carry out his acquisition plans.129 
 In 1978, the then 38-year-old financier launched what would become a long 
career of very complex mergers, acquisitions, and reorganizations by purchasing a 13 
percent share of McCulloch Oil from Black & Decker Manufacturing Company.  It was  
a cheap way to get into the energy business.  McCulloch was founded as the Cuban 
American Oil Company in 1955, but became McCulloch Oil in 1960.  The company 
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produced oil, chainsaws, and housing developments.  Most famously, McCulloch built 
Lake Havasu City, Arizona, and in 1968 the company purchased the London Bridge 
From England and relocated it to Lake Havasu.  McCulloch was besieged by legal 
problems related to its myriad developments, and was loaded with debt.  Hurwitz must 
have seen a company primed for reorganization because he quickly insinuated himself 
into the management of the company, though not smoothly.  Hurwitz wanted seats for his 
representatives on the board, but during negotiations, United Realty Trust of Beverly 
Hills accused Hurwitz of securities law violations.  The McCulloch management team 
argued Hurwitz’ past legal problems made him and his representatives inappropriate 
board candidates.  Hurwitz fought back, and by August 1978, he was a Director himself, 
had two additional representatives placed on the board, and Hurwitz and another 
Federated representative were appointed to the Executive Committee.  In January 1979, 
the  Hurwitz group settled the United Realty suit by selling their combined 8 percent 
stake and agreeing not to buy any United stock for five years.  In 1980 Hurwitz became 
CEO and Chariman of McCulloch Oil and appointed his associate, William Leone, 
President.  As CEO, Hurwitz changed the company’s name to MCO Holdings Inc, shed 
its energy holdings, passed nearly insurmountable anti-takeover measures, reduced the 
size of the board from thirteen to seven members, and successfully replaced the entire 
board with his own representatives.  In 1981, Hurwitz further consolidated his control 
when he swapped 850,000 common shares for preferred shares, giving him control of 45 
percent of the voting shares.  As John Campbell said, Hurwitz was “Old Testament;” 
Hurwitz could not be intimidated, and when fired upon, he retaliated with greater 
force.130 
                                                        




 In 1982, Hurwitz further expanded his burgeoning empire, and repeatedly 
reorganized his companies to consolidate his control and generate cash.  In May, MCO 
and Federated Development announced they had reached an arrangement to purchase 33 
percent of Simplicity Pattern Company, outmaneuvering Cook International Inc.  Hurwitz 
replaced the Simplicity CEO and Chairman with himself, and during the summer, MCO 
purchased another 13 percent of the company and placed Bill Leone and Barry Munitz, 
Chancellor of the Business School at the University of Houston and Vice Chair of MCO, 
on the Simplicity board.  When the company eliminated dividends, many shareholders 
publicly worried about liquidation, and like Pacific Lumber shareholders would several 
years later, demanded their share of the profits.  Hurwitz sold the pattern business of 
Simplicity, but retained the real estate division and renamed it Maxxam Group.  MCO 
subsequently purchased approximately 37 percent of Maxxam Group as well as 23 
percent of United Financial Group, the parent company to the second largest Savings and 
Loan in Texas, United Savings of Texas.131 
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 For the next year and a half, Hurwitz attempted additional acquisitions, and he 
again found himself accused of securities fraud, a pattern that would be repeated several 
more times during the 1980s and 1990s.  In 1984, Hurwitz acquired 11 percent of Castle 
& Cook, a division of Dole Foods.  The company sued Hurwitz, alleging that his efforts 
to acquire stock through MCO, Federated, and United Financial disguised his takeover 
intentions, and that the use of the S & L violated securities law by using “excessive 
unsecured loans to bankroll” the takeover effort.  A Hawaii court temporarily enjoined 
Hurwitz and associates from buying more Castle & Cook stock, and in May, the company 
bought back Hurwitz’ shares for $71 million -- a $15 million profit for Hurwitz and his 
companies.  The press accused Hurwitz of greenmail, and in a rare public statement, 
Hurwitz railed against the charge, and asserted that his acquisition efforts were designed 
to build solid businesses out of poorly managed ones.  By the fall, Hurwitz began 
accumulating UNC Resources Inc. shares, a defense contractor in suburban Washington, 
DC, owning 7.45 percent of the company by November.  1985 would also be a busy year 
for Hurwitz.132 
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Hurwitz, like Campbell planned to expand his operations in 1985, and the 
collusion of the two plans eventually combusted on the Northcoast and drug Pacific 
Lumber into the redwood wars.  In January, Maxxam was courted as a white knight for 
AMF Inc, in a failed effort to ward off Irwin Jacob’s hostile takeover effort.  By the end 
of April, Maxxam owned 8.7 percent of UNC and filed papers with the Securities 
Exchange Commission to offer at least $225 million worth of subordinated notes through 
Michael Milken’s shop at Drexel Burnham and Lambert to fund an acquisition.  In May, 
Amsted Industries sued Hurwitz, and two companies he controlled, claiming that Hurwitz 
filed false forms with the Securities Exchange Commission because entities under his 
direct control owned 8.7 percent of Amsted common shares.   Hurwitz’ takeover strategy 
led one New York Arbitrageur to assert, “[i]t’s like Hurwitz has gone public, with 
Maxxam as his tool to pursue takeover bets.”  Indeed, Hurwitz aimed to “expand and 
redeploy” Maxxam’s non-real estate assets and cash by acquiring undervalued 
businesses.  In July, Hurwitz increased his UNC holdings to 12.4 percent, and held steady 
while directing his gaze toward Pacific Lumber.133 
 Monday, September 30, 1985 changed nearly everything for Pacific Lumber.  At 
six in the morning, Hurwitz called Pacific Lumber President, Gene Elam, and told him 
that Maxxam Group was making a tender offer at thirty-six dollars per share, a nearly ten 
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dollar increase on the current trading value of Pacific Lumber stock.  Elam balked at the 
offer, and the company enacted a provision to place the excess pension fund reserves out 
of reach of any acquirer.  After news of the tender offer broke, Pacific Lumber stocked 
jumped to thirty-nine dollars.  Analysts asserted the company was worth closer to fifty 
dollars per share, especially given the sharp increase in cutting and welding earnings 
during 1984.  A few days later, Hurwitz increased his offer to thirty-eight and a half 
dollars per share, while the company flew in potential white knights.  On October 23, the 
board unanimously accepted a forty-dollar per share merger deal from Hurwitz for a total 
of $864 million.134 
 The board capitulated rather quickly, but the deal was not uncomplicated, which 
contributed to the firestorm that later swirled around the company and Headwaters 
Forest.  Campbell believed there were two important forces that drove the board to 
approve the merger:  elements of the Murphy family wanted the merger approved, and 
lingering shareholder disgruntlement after the board cancelled dividends in 1980 and then 
offered ten million shares to board members -- a bad sign for investors who also 
recognized the stock was undervalued.  Campbell believed many shareholders simply 
wanted out because the stock remained undervalued, and they were happy to sell their 
shares above the traded value. As for the Murphy’s, while they owned less than five 
percent of the stock, they were held in high esteem by the board.  At a meeting at Jack’s 
Restaurant in San Francisco, the southern California-based Moran branch of the 
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Murphy’s met with Ed Beck, Pacific Lumber’s General Counsel, and told him not to let 
Hurwitz get away.  A separate branch of the Murphy family, the Schmidts, sold all of 
their stock when it entered arbitrage.  Other observers pointed toward a Maxxam counter-
suit and threatened severance elimination as another factor in the board’s decision.  In 
particular, Campbell was surprised that management and the board never discussed 
greenmailing Hurwitz.  The company could have used the $60 million surplus in the 
pension fund because, according to Campbell, the IRS told Pacific Lumber it had to stop 
depositing funds into the account because regulations didn’t allow companies to shelter 
assets in pension funds.  Campbell thought the company could have bought Hurwitz off 
for $100 million if they wanted to, and that they had the resources to absorb the payment.  
The board, however, decided they couldn’t beat Hurwitz and wanted the shareholders to 
get out with a profit, even if the offer was less than the company was worth.135  
Not all of the shareholders wanted out, however. The company and a group of 
stockholders filed suits to stop the merger, including members of the Murphy family.  
Campbell believed that the investment bankers at Salomon Brothers – whom Gene Elam 
hired earlier in the week to analyze that summer’s sudden increase in the company’s 
stock price and trading volume -- did not serve the board well because they didn’t 
understand the company’s reputation or the loyalty of the shareholders.  The bankers only 
understood the numbers, and how the shareholders would benefit from the sale.  The 
bankers didn’t anticipate shareholder resistance when they recommended the company 
not employ its 1981 anti-takeover measure that required eighty percent shareholder 
approval of any merger.  When the board rejected Hurwitz’ offer on October 9, they also 
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approved additional poison pill measures requiring eighty percent shareholder approval 
of the sale of any assets, vesting the $60 million pension surplus in the employees and 
retirees, and increasing the board’s severance packages.  On October 18, Maxxam sued 
Pacific Lumber over the new measures, threatened the board’s severance packages, and 
the board quickly capitulated.  A group of shareholders then convinced a California 
Superior Court judge to delay finalization of the tender offer until November 25 to give 
them time to consider their options.  Justice William H. Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme 
Court denied the plaintiffs a subsequent emergency stay, and the merger went through, 
but the challenges to the merger did not end.  On November 27, Warren, Woody, and 
Suzanne Murphy, along with other shareholders filed another suit in Portland, Maine, 
where the company was incorporated.  That suit, in a myriad of constructions, continued 
until 1995.  During the first week of December, Maxxam Group accepted 13.1 million 
shares of Pacific Lumber stock, approximately sixty percent of the shares, and planned to 
buy the remaining shares in early 1986.  One of the earliest, if not the earliest, hostile 
takeovers backed by junk bonds was thus completed, but the objections to the takeover 
were not.136 
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While the fight over the merger played out, Campbell prepared for the coming 
changes, and hoped to execute his production plans.  For Campbell, the merger turned 
into his best opportunity to implement his industrial vision.  In October, before the board 
approved the merger, Campbell ordered a new shipping building in Scotia to store 
additional lumber products, and he ordered additional caterpillars to increase the capacity 
of the lumber mills.  Even if unsuccessful, he assumed the acquisition attempt would lead 
to further increases in harvests to drive up the stock price and make the company less 
vulnerable.  Early in the winter, John and another manager, Tom Mularkey, met in San 
Francisco to discuss the future, and prepare for a meeting with MCO executives Robert 
Rosen and William Leone.  Campbell requested a new timber inventory and a modern 
computer inventory system for the timber products division, including a Geographic 
Information System program.  When Leone was put in charge of Pacific Lumber, he 
granted Campbell his requests, and the new timber cruise estimated that the property 
could handle an annual cut of 226 million board feet, versus the older model that 
recommended approximately 130 mmbf.137 
   Discontent and anxiety marred the transition to the new ownership and 
production plan, however.  Hurwitz visited Scotia in December 1985, and drew the ire of 
employees and the community with his ill-fated attempt at humor – the infamous “he who 
has the gold rules” comments during an all-employee meeting.  Company employees 
took out a full-page ad in the Times Standard objecting to the takeover, which was 
followed by an unsuccessful union drive.  Campbell claimed that the union 
misinterpreted the meaning of the ad-petition; the employees objected to change, period.  
The millworkers and loggers weren’t the only employees who objected to the merger.  
                                                        




For three or four months, the office staff did not speak to Campbell, and Warren Murphy, 
a low-level manager, held press conferences in his office protesting the merger.  Though 
a rough time, Campbell took solace in the fact that the veteran millworkers trusted him, 
and gave him their vote of confidence, vowing to make the new company work well.  
That year, Campbell bought a mill from Louisiana Pacific in Carlotta, at the doorstep of 
what became known as Headwaters Forest.  By June, the company hired an additional 
three hundred employees, and announced it planned to log forty-five percent more old 
growth acreage than in previous years, and even more young trees.  In July 1986, the 
company refinanced its junk bond debt with below investment grade notes, and sold 
“substantial numbers of raw logs” in order to meet cash flow needs until the new harvests 
were ready for lumber production.  In 1987, Maxxam sold Palco Industries for $320 
million, escalating fears that Hurwitz was going to dismantle the company.138 
 Federal regulators and legislators, in addition to Greg King, investigated the 
Pacific Lumber takeover and helped push the company into the middle of the redwood 
wars.  In December, the New York Stock Exchange recommended the SEC investigate 
the activity of Herbert Gordon, a music producer in Westport, Connecticut who 
commuted into New York City with Robert Rosen of Maxxam.  Gordon purchased 
16,900 shares of Pacific Lumber in September 1985, just before the tender offer.  In 
January 1987, the SEC asked for the records of a New York accounting firm to review 
payments from Ivan Boesky to Drexel Burnham in exchange for insider stock tips.  The 
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SEC then subpoenaed Maxxam Group, Diamond Shamrock Corporation, Lorimar-
Telepictures Corporation, and Turner Broadcasting System regarding their merger and 
acquisition activities because Boesky owned shares in Pacific Lumber and MGM/UA 
Entertainment, and Drexel Burnham financed the TBS and Maxxam takeover efforts.  In 
May, Congressman John Dingell, prompted into action by Bay Area investigative 
journalist Brian McTigue who was hired by Dingell’s committee to investigate the 
takeover, held the first congressional hearings regarding Milken and Boesky.  The subject 
of the hearings was the Pacific Lumber takeover.  In October, the committee concluded 
that Boyd Jeffries parked Pacific Lumber stock for Boesky to help Hurwitz in his 
takeover quest.  Hurwitz denied that his September 27 purchase of 539,600 shares of 
Pacific Lumber stock from Jeffries for below market price was set up in advance.  
Milken, Boesky, and Jeffries were subsequently convicted of insider trading violations 
and sentenced to prison terms, and the Public Broadcasting System aired a thirty-minute 
documentary about the Pacific Lumber takeover.  As in the past, Hurwitz escaped 
prosecution, but his reputation made him the perfect foil for environmental activists 
working to turn the public and workers against Pacific Lumber’s harvest plans.  The 
“junk” bond scandal propelled the redwood wars to notoriety, and powerfully contributed 
to the intractability of the conflict because the activists used the media to paint the 
company as the evil villain, and the company lashed back accordingly.139 
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 During 1988 and 1989, Pacific Lumber implemented its production increases, but 
bad press, direct actions in the woods, worker unrest, and litigation hindered its efforts.   
As Campbell knew in October 1985, the Maxxam takeover would bring change, and 
indeed it did.  In 1984, the company harvested 3701 acres of land, and in 1985 they 
harvested 5188, evidence of Campbell’s assertion that he planned to increase production 
well before the merger.  But, the merger led to even greater increases:  9447 acres in 
1986, only 4961 in 1987 due to litigation, but up to 10436 in 1988 and 8206 in 1989.  
Previously, Pacific Lumber harvested about 1000 acres of old growth annually.  In 1988, 
7811 acres of the 10,436 total were old growth harvest plans, and in 1989, 5487 acres of 
the 8206 total were old growth.  Campbell claimed the company never doubled the rate of 
logging, but the evidence is clear.  During the early 1980s, Campbell acquired additional 
land for sure, but he did not double the size of the property and added zero old growth or 
ancient forest.  Regardless of the actual rate increase, the increased acreage of old growth 
harvests was enough to fuel environmental opposition.140 
The press coverage and the on-the-ground regime fueled concerns about the 
intentions of Hurwitz and the future of the company.  In February 1988 MCO Resources 
defaulted on $46.6 million of bank debt.  In March, Maxxam announced it had purchased 
$190 million of KaiserTech Ltd. stock, and that it wanted to buy more shares.  The 
combination fueled fears on the Northcoast that Maxxam was solely interested in mergers 
and asset sales, not in running companies.  In March, the New York Times ran an article 
about the takeover and the subsequent doubling of logging activity.  The article described 
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how John Maurer quit the company to protest the new logging regime, and how 
employee George Garibay thought the company was “destroying the future…”  The same 
article described the new pick-up trucks and large paychecks of company employees due 
to sixty-hour work-weeks, but also noted how many employees simultaneously worried 
about Humboldt County becoming “another Appalachia.”  Finally, local attorney for the 
Murphy family, Bill Bertain, was quoted saying, “They (some PL workers) feel Maxxam 
is raping the land and dismembering the company.”  In October, Bertain filed a $2.25 
billion lawsuit in federal and state courts on behalf of former shareholders to invalidate 
the Maxxam – Pacific Lumber merger due to the fraudulent activities of Milken, Boesky, 
and Jeffries.  Earlier that year, Congressman Dingell presented evidence to the Federal 
Trade Commission that showed that Maxxam and Hurwitz may have violated antitrust 
law in the Pacific Lumber takeover, and in March, Business Week ran an article that 
generally praised the effectiveness of 1980s takeovers that resuscitated laggard 
companies, but described the Maxxam takeover of Pacific Lumber as a “horror story 
about the consequences of excess leverage” because Maxxam was cutting down old 
growth to repay its junk bond debt.  By the end of March, Maxxam and Kaiser met to 
discuss the reorganization of Kaiser’s board, and by June Maxxam Group acquired 
Kaiser.  Throughout the swirl of press in 1988, the name and paternal image of Pacific 
Lumber was effectively subsumed by the callous, Wall Street image of Maxxam.141 
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 All of the bad press regarding the takeover and other Maxxam activity, combined 
with two EPIC lawsuits, and another harvest plan rejected by the Department of Forestry, 
led the company to voluntarily reverse its accelerated harvest of ancient forests.  David 
Galitz told the press the company would cease clear cutting inside ancient forests, a 
decision prompted by public concerns and the intervention of State Senator Byron Sher 
and Assemblyman Dan Hauser.  Joe Wild of EF! dismissed the change as a public 
relations stunt, as did Bradlee Welton of the Save the Redwoods League.142 
 The reputation of Pacific Lumber plummeted even further in 1989, often led by 
the business press, encouraged by the actions of the Northcoast activists.  In February, 
Maxxam sold three Kaiser facilities that continued to fuel cut-and-run fears in Humboldt 
County.  Corporate Finance subsequently described a tenuous worker-environmentalist 
alliance in an article with the title, “Angry Harvest.”  Fortune ran an article entitled, “A 
Raider’s Ruckus in the Redwoods,” that described the new logging regime as “felling 
trees so fast that barren clear-cut patches covered only with sluglike tracks of huge log 
haulers, blot the landscape for miles.”  The article also claimed “environmental 
extremists have declared holy war,” while mainstream groups filed lawsuits.  The article 
also asserted security analysts feared the company’s regime would flood the redwood 
market and lead to increased logging restrictions.  The article finally trumpeted the fragile 
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worker-environmentalist alliance, but the article was prophetic only with respect to the 
“holy war” and regulatory claims.143 
 The popular press also undermined Pacific Lumber’s carefully crafted, century 
long paternal image.  The Sacramento Bee Magazine coined the phrase “Redwood Wars” 
in an article about the Northcoast back-to-the land migrants working in forest restoration 
and activism, and about John Campbell and other Pacific Lumber employees working to 
improve the company’s profitability.  Rolling Stone ran “Milken, Junk Bonds, and 
Raping the Redwoods,” by environmentalist author Bill McKibbon.  Reader’s Digest 
published, “California’s Chainsaw Massacre” in November.  The basic narrative of all the 
articles during the late 1980s was that Pacific Lumber was a good employer and good 
steward of the land until a greedy Texan, backed by dubious junk bonds bought the 
company and forced it to clear cut its ancient forests to pay off his debt to Michael 
Milken.  In all of the articles, Campbell defended his logging regime and asserted that he 
had decided to clear cut and expand production well before Maxxam entered the picture, 
and that the company’s old growth would last about two more decades, corroborated by 
Pacific Lumber’s annual reports.  He and Hurwitz also explained that they believed clear 
cutting was good for the forest because it removed old trees that didn’t grow fast with 
young trees that did.  Hurwitz’ and Campbell’s arguments largely fell on deaf ears, 
however, as the actions of the press, the activists, and the state proved over the next 
several years.  The workers would support Campbell as one of their own, but Hurwitz 
was another story.144 
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The Battle against de facto Corporatism Heads Back to Court… Again 
and Again. 
 
 Pacific Lumber’s plans to increase timber harvests prompted local environmental 
activists to direct their resources to Humboldt County in an unprecedented campaign 
against a single lumber company in order to challenge its management prerogatives and 
forest valuations.  In 1986, when Greg King read the Pacific Lumber prospectus detailing 
the company’s plans, he and Darryl Cherney sounded the clarion call and jumped into 
(direct) action.  In 1987, King and Cherney convinced Woods and EPIC to sue Maxxam 
after they discovered two harvest plans within the newly identified Headwaters Forest 
Complex.  As the litigation coordinator and co-founder, Woods did not want EPIC to 
work on issues outside of southern Humboldt, but he went along with King and 
Cherney’s proposal anyway.  Woods had prepared a brief for the then moot second Sally 
Bell case, other EPIC activists had begun monitoring Pacific Lumber harvest plans, and 
he had been working to expand the use of the EPIC v. Johnson model, so while a 
Maxxam suit was not inline with his vision for EPIC, the suit did fit into his broader plan 
to reform timber practices.  From 1987 through 1989, EPIC filed seven suits – six 
challenged Pacific Lumber harvest plans and one challenged the Department of 
Forestry’s pattern of practices on the Northcoast.145 
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From 1985 to 1989, Woods’ actively crusaded on behalf of regulatory reform, 
though his influence within EPIC waned due to inter-organizational and interpersonal 
tensions between him and activists such as Cecelia Lanman.  Woods’ influence on the 
campaign, and his appeal to journalists, were very important none-the-less.  In addition to 
drafting the brief for the first Maxxam THP challenge, Woods loudly beat the drum for 
forestry reform, ancient forests, and endangered species.  In 1986, Woods published, 
“The California Practices Act: Is it Tough Enough?” in Forest Watch Report, an activist 
newsletter run out of southern Oregon.  In late 1987, Woods drafted, “How to Sue CDF,” 
which was made available to citizens challenging THPs.  In March 1988, Woods spoke at 
the annual convention of the California Licensed Foresters Association where he 
excoriated the Department of Forestry, accused the legislature of corruption, cited a state 
Water Quality Board report that found widespread enforcement problems within 
Forestry, and called for the professional foresters to work with environmentalists to solve 
forestry problems related to ancient forests, watersheds, and endangered species like the 
Northern Spotted Owl and the Marbled Murrelet.  He then spoke at the National 
Convention of the National Association of State Foresters in September 1988 where he 
expanded his allegations to include Forestry intimidation of other agencies.  During the 
same speech, Woods challenged the concept of private property rights as the “merest 
legal fiction,” and he called the redwood wars a “crisis of character.”  Woods was quoted 
in nearly all of the 1989 press coverage of the redwood wars, but after 1990, he largely 
pursued other activist interests.146 
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While Woods was engaged, EPIC and Sierra Club filed four major precedent-
setting EPIC cases — EPIC v. Maxxam I, EPIC v. Maxxam II, Californians for Native 
Salmon and Steelhead Association and EPIC v. California Department of Forestry 
(Native Salmon), and Sierra Club and EPIC v. California Board of Forestery, all of 
which forcefully chipped away at that corporatist tradition and strengthened the role of 
citizens as private attorneys general.147 
 
EPIC v. Maxxam I and II:  Pacific Lumber Joins Forestry in the Donkey Pen 
 In 1987, EPIC requested writs of mandate against three Pacific Lumber harvest 
plans (two within Headwaters Forest).  A writ of mandate compels a public agency to 
correct prior actions not consistent with the law; similar to the way an appellate court 
overturns a lower court’s ruling and sends the case back to trial for review.  The two 
Headwaters Forest plans prescribed clear cutting ancient forest along Salmon Creek and 
the South Fork of the Eel River, and the third plan prescribed clear cutting old growth 
Douglas fir in the Mattole watershed.  EPIC petitioned for the writs because the plans 
lacked the CEQA-required cumulative impact analysis and wildlife mitigation 
alternatives, and because the Salmon Creek plan would have, as Greg King wrote, 
“ripped the (Headwaters Grove) stand in half,” diminishing its value to Marbled 
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Murrelets and other species.  The location of the plan – right through the middle of 
Headwaters Grove along Salmon Creek – gave the appearance that the company was 
trying to make the ecologic arguments moot regarding the grove.  The activists, probably 
correctly, viewed the proposed harvests as a grand version of the “shoot, shovel, and shut 
up” defense against the Endangered Species Act.  Rather than arguing directly that the 
Forest Practice Act exempted THPs from CEQA, Forestry tried a new argument; it 
argued that its hands were tied because, even though the harvests would cause significant 
environmental harm, the Timber Production Act, which, according to Forestry, 
superseded the court’s Johnson ruling, had zoned the land for timber production.  In 
November, Humboldt Superior Judge Peterson ruled for EPIC.  Peterson agreed that 
Johnson required Forestry to fulfill CEQA requirements, regardless of timber production 
zoning, and he additionally ruled that Forestry had abused its administrative discretion 
because it “rubber-stamped” harvest plans and intimidated other agencies.  Peterson ruled 
so because Forestry approved the plans before they were completed and had intimidated 
Fish and Game biologists to prevent them from filing non-concurrence opinions that 
objected to the plans.  Fish and Game opposed the plans because they did not contain any 
scientific information about the presence of species of concern, like the Marbled 
Murrelet.  The ruling in Maxxam I bolstered the court’s Johnson decision that CEQA 
rigorously applied to harvest plans, and the decision further discredited Forestry and its 
practices.  It did not by itself, however, halt Pacific Lumber’s logging plans; the ruling 
simply returned the plans to Forestry for further review.148  
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 By the end of 1987, a pattern was developing:  EPIC (with Sierra Club after 1988) 
would challenge old-growth harvest plans based on the Johnson model, local Earth First! 
activists would stage direct actions to delay logging activity, and Pacific Lumber and 
Forestry would experiment with defense arguments.  For example, EPIC challenged two 
more 1987 Pacific Lumber harvest plans within Headwaters Forest along Lawrence 
Creek, and one Simpson Timber plan.  Simpson Timber withdrew its plan rather than 
fight in court, but Pacific Lumber fought the writs of mandate.  On April 1, a Humboldt 
judge denied EPIC a Temporary Restraining Order for the harvest plan, but on April 25, a 
new petition for a TRO was accepted to prevent logging until a hearing was scheduled.  
However Pacific Lumber was able to log most of one harvest area during the delay.  In a 
letter to Forestry, Campbell abandoned the unsuccessful arguments regarding the 
irrelevance of CEQA to harvest plans and the superseding authority of the Timber 
Production Act.  Instead, he challenged the scientific analysis that the company’s land 
was important to species of concern.  Pacific Lumber argued that Fish and Game should 
not have concerned itself with the species on its land because the species were not 
dependent upon old-growth redwood groves.  The company also claimed that the state 
already owned enough redwood land to maintain viable populations of species that were 
dependant on old-growth redwoods.  The second argument, in various permutations, 
remained a mainstay for Pacific Lumber in court and in the media, for a decade.  In May, 
Judge Buffington placed a Preliminary Injunction on the harvest plan, and the logging 
ended.  On July 13, Forestry and Pacific Lumber reached a settlement:  Pacific Lumber 




the harvest area.  EPIC continued to pursue the case in order to keep the pressure on 
Forestry to reform. 
In addition to introducing a new industry argument, EPIC v. Maxxam II marked 
the initial, if seemingly reluctant, split between the timber industry and the Board of 
Forestry.  The trial judge ruled against Maxxam and again accused Forestry of “rubber-
stamping” and intimidation.  The appellate court also disagreed with the company’s 
argument, but the case was dismissed in 1992, for three reasons, two of which were 
victories of sort for EPIC, and one a symbol of the determination of Pacific Lumber to 
carry out its new timber regime:  1) Pacific Lumber felled the trees in one of the harvest 
areas between March 1988 and May 1988—the date EPIC obtained a preliminary 
injunction; 2) Forestry adopted emergency regulations covering old growth timber plans, 
Marbled Murrelet and Northern Spotted Owl habitat, and cumulative impact analysis; and 
3) EPIC and Sierra Club obtained an injunction on the harvest plan for Lawrence Creek 
(the second contested plan) in 1989 via Sierra v. Board (discussed in the next section).  
The appellate court, while dismissing the case, recognized the influence of citizen groups 
on the Board’s behavior, writing:  
The record ... leaves no doubt that environmental litigation, such as EPIC's 
Preliminary Injunction in this case, played an important role in bringing about 
changes in departmental policies. To this extent, the issue of mootness is a 
product of EPIC's own success.   
 
The judge then strengthened EPIC’s position as a private attorney general by forcing 
Pacific Lumber to pay EPIC’s attorney fees.  The company was able to log in the 
disputed area, but the pressure brought on the Board by the litigation caused the agency 
to stray from the hard-line position that CEQA did not apply to Timber Harvest Plans as 




The new regulations played a key role in breaking down development-focused 
corporatism because the Board responded to citizens and courts, not to the wishes of the 
timber industry, and the rules recognized the Board’s responsibility to non-economic 
forestland resources.149  
 
Sierra v. Board of Forestry:  The California Supreme Court Sides with the Locals’ 
Valuations and Takes a Shot at the Donkeys 
 In 1994, The California Supreme Court sided once and for all with citizen groups 
with respect to the relevance of CEQA and wildlife considerations to timber operations 
on private land, but before then, the Board and Pacific Lumber continued to challenge the 
lower courts’ rulings, and EPIC continued to fight back.  In 1988 Pacific Lumber 
remained confident in the corporatist tradition of the Board, but Sierra v. Board seriously 
damaged the allegiance between the Board and industry.  With Sierra v. Board, EPIC and 
Sierra Club teamed up for the first in what would become a long-standing litigation 
alliance whereby EPIC litigated, and the two groups split the costs.  Sierra v. Board 
challenged two more Pacific Lumber plans in the Lawrence Creek area of Headwaters 
forest, and became EPIC’s second major precedent-setting case and the fourth major 
blow to California’s corporatist timber regime.  On April 18, 1988, Forestry rejected the 
two Pacific Lumber harvest plans because they did not include Marbled Murrelet 
surveys, and the agency told the press the decision amounted to a three-month 
moratorium on the approval of any harvest plan proposed in old growth groves.  Pacific 
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Lumber, like Chenoweth Lumber in 1976, appealed to the Board, claiming it did not have 
to provide any survey information because the rules did not specifically require the 
surveys.150 
Forestry may have begun moving away from its production-oriented tradition, but 
the Board was not.  Following their corporatist tradition of showing deference to the 
industry, the Board overruled Forestry and approved the plans.  EPIC and Sierra Club 
filed for a writ of mandate to rescind the Board’s approval of the plans because the 
Murrelet surveys were necessary to determine the appropriateness of the plan’s wildlife 
mitigation measures.  Humboldt Judge Buffington denied the writ because he believed 
that he ought to base his ruling only on the evidence in the administrative record the 
Board reviewed, not what Forestry wished to be able to review.  On July 1, 1988, an 
appellate court overruled Buffington, and on remand in February 1989, Buffington 
returned the THPs to the Board and asked them to assess their impact on wildlife, to 
consider additional mitigation options, and to produce a cost-benefit analysis.  On March 
20, 1989, the Board convinced Buffington that the harvest plans would not result in any 
significant impact on wildlife, and Buffington denied EPIC’s writ of mandate again.  
EPIC and Sierra Club appealed the decision, and after the appellate court again 
overturned Buffington, and when the company appealed to the California Supreme Court, 
the Board withdrew its support of Pacific Lumber.  The Board further distanced itself 
from corporatist tradition when it issued the new regulations that caused the dismissal of 
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Maxxam II.  The two Board actions demonstrate the success of citizen litigation at 
destabilizing the traditional relationship between the Board and industry.151 
 
And the Shots Kept Coming at Corporatism and Development-only Management:  EPIC 
v. CDF, EPIC v. Imboden, EPIC v. Theiss, and Californians for Native Salmon and 
Steelhead Association and EPIC v. California Department of Forestry  
 
EPIC and Sierra Club filed two additional cases during the late 1980s that also 
eventually chipped away at the corporatist traditions of the Board and the defense 
arguments of Pacific Lumber regarding its forest valuations and property rights.  While 
Maxxam II and Sierra v. Board made their way through the courts, EPIC continued to 
monitor old growth harvest plans submitted by Pacific Lumber to Forestry.  During the 
fall of 1988, Sierra and EPIC challenged new Pacific Lumber harvest plans within the 
Salmon Creek watershed, this time near Owl Creek Grove (Sierra and EPIC v. CDF 
[Salmon Creek] and Sierra and EPIC v. Imboden), arguing that Forestry still did not 
adequately consider the cumulative impacts on the Marbled Murrelet population of 
California or implement all “feasible” alternatives and mitigations to protect Murrelet 
habitat as required by CEQA.  Both judges denied the writs of mandate, but appellate 
judges granted EPIC and Sierra Club trials and emergency stays on logging in the harvest 
plan areas, an indication the appellate courts believed EPIC would win the cases.  Both 
cases were dismissed on remand in 1989 for procedural issues, and EPIC and Sierra Club 
appealed the dismissals.  In 1990, the appeals courts reinstated the cases, and returned 
them to the trial courts to present arguments.  EPIC and Sierra Club deemed Owl Creek 
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such an important grove that when Imboden was initially dismissed, they challenged the 
same Owl Creek harvest plan with a new lawsuit, Sierra and EPIC V. Theiss.  Theiss was 
dismissed after Imboden was reinstated because the two cases challenged the same 
harvest plans.  The 1980s ended with yet another set of harvest plans locked up in 
court.152 
Protecting Headwaters Forest was not EPIC’s sole project.  In fact, one of the 
non-Headwaters cases filed by EPIC, Native Salmon, led to one of the strongest 
precedents of the cases begun during the late 1980s.  In November 1988, EPIC, Sierra 
and friends challenged a 1988 Eel River Sawmills harvest plan because Forestry failed to 
analyze cumulative impact, and failed to respond to public comments.  Eel River 
Sawmills withdrew its plans, and the case was dismissed at the end of January 1989.  
However, EPIC and Sierra were determined to demonstrate that Forestry willfully 
ignored CEQA requirements as a matter of policy.  They filed an amended petition that 
included sixty-five Timber Harvest Plans from across the Northcoast and argued that 
because Forestry repeatedly failed to assess the cumulative impacts of logging on 
watersheds and wildlife, and repeatedly waited until after they approved harvest plans to 
issue legally-required responses to public comments, that the agency had a de facto 
policy to ignore CEQA.  On February 17, 1989, Forestry demurred and was granted a 
dismissal by Humboldt Judge MacFarland.  EPIC appealed the decision, and like all of 
the other cases except Maxxam I, the case drug on into the mid-1990s.153   
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 The redwood wars transformed redwood politics for the third time in a hundred 
years.  Because of the Sally Bell case, redwood politics revolved around the conflicts 
created by the activists’ litigation and direct action tactics.  Because of the Maxxam 
takeover of Pacific Lumber, the redwood wars moved north and became an anti-
corporate, anti-corporatist campaign focused on the world’s last remaining ancient 
redwood complex in private hands.  The redwood wars exploded after 1985 and by the 
close of the decade, the Northcoast was awash in protests, direct actions, and litigation, 
with Pacific Lumber once again the center of attention.  Throughout the 1980s, the 
intensity of the redwood wars reached new heights.  The small community of Northcoast 
activists tried to abandon middle-class values and life, drove the process, and they 
simultaneously, though combatively and ungenteelly, took advantage of mainstream 
avenues of political action.  The activists expanded the number of tactics they employed 
to end industrial logging; lawsuits, press conferences, rallies, and direct actions all 
developed into standard political devices during the 1980s.  The tactics succeeded at 
halting Timber Harvest Plans and forcing the Department of Forestry to change its 
practices.  But Forestry, the Board, and the big three Northcoast timber operators – 
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Pacific Lumber, Louisiana Pacific, and Georgia Pacific – resisted the changes mandated 
by court rulings and enforced by citizen activists. 
 The developments of the redwood wars during the 1980s illustrate the bottom – 
up nature of the redwood wars, how different valuations of forestland and Northcoast 
society clashed, and how state and private institutions responded.  Local residents, many 
with past organizing experience, disapproved of the land management systems in place, 
and they took action.  Though they had moved north to escape the nation’s predominant 
cultures, they were very familiar with political action, and used their experiences to 
defend their own visions of the Northcoast.  They attended hearings, wrote to regulators 
and legislators, filed suits, and put their bodies in harms way to stop timber harvesting 
where they felt it was immoral and illegal.  New waves of migrants moved to the area and 
infused the movement with heightened intensity and urgency.  Newcomers like Cecelia 
Lanman, Darryl Cherney, and Judi Bari used the tools developed by Woods, Geinger, 
Duggan and others with greater frequency and with greater public combativeness, 
pushing the conflict into the broader public’s consciousness via the media attention their 
court cases and direct actions attracted.  And, a public relations windfall landed in their 
lap when Charles Hurwitz orchestrated the takeover of Pacific Lumber.  Hurwitz quickly 
offered activists the penultimate villain to whom they could juxtapose their vision of 
sustainable forestry, community control of institutions, a stable working environment, 
and the protection of biodiversity and ecologic health.   
As a result of that political windfall, the redwood wars began to zero in on the 
battle over Headwaters Forest which initially retained the broad reform goals of the 




though the Headwaters acquisition battle was fought out hostilely in public – contrary to 
the manner in which William Kent, Madison Grant, Newton Drury and Stanwood 
Murphy had operated.  The public nature and hostility of the Headwaters acquisition 
campaign is yet another example of the militancy and populist nature of postwar 
environmental politics described by numerous historians of the period, including 
Schrepfer, Fox, Hays, and Rome.  Most of the historiographic analysis addresses the new 
social regulations of the 1960s and 1970s which created new regulatory systems, 
including those dealing with forest practices on public land.  Because the redwood wars 
were fought on private land, however, the public acquisition strategy remained as a viable 
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Chart 2: Summary of Pacific Lumber Timber Harvest Plans, 1980 - 1990 
     
YEAR Total THP acreage Old growth acreage   
1980 1602 na   
1981 1624 na   
1982 3014 na   
1983 2458 na   
1984 3701 na   
1985 5188 na   
1986 8447 na   
1987 4961 na   
1988 10436 7811   
1989 8206 5487   
*1990 4455 2429   
     
     
*includes on first seven month of 1990   
     
Note:  A few trends stand out:  John Campbell had begun to steadily increase harvest 
before the takeover, the harvests increased dramatically after the takeover, the 1986 
and 1987 lawsuits halted the increased harvests temporarily, and old growth harvests 
were a significant portion of the immediate post-takeover strategy. 
The data for this chart was taken from EPIC Summary Sheets for Pacific Lumber 
THP’s 1980 – July 1990;  Kathy Bailey to Ed “Re: Prop 130 effects on Pacific 





Chapter Five:  Busting out of the North Coast and Forcing 
Property Rights and Forestry onto a Broader Public Agenda, 
1990 – 1994 
 
After two terms of the Reagan Administration’s largely unsuccessful but 
prominent attacks on the modern environmental protection regime, environmental 
activism regained broad national popularity, and the battle over Headwaters Forest was 
swept up in the national enthusiasm.  One reason for the relative attractiveness of the 
Headwaters conflict was that nationally and internationally, the protection of rainforests 
and biodiversity demanded attention and drove public support to environmental groups.  
The deforestation of the Amazon rainforest was a hot topic, and in 1992 international 
state and community leaders gathered in Brazil for the United Nations Earth Summit to 
discuss global deforestation and biodiversity.  On the Northcoast, the increased visibility 
of the redwood wars was largely the result of the success of Darryl Cherney and Judi 
Bari’s action campaigns.  But the radical activists were only one, albeit one loud, part of 
the process.  The redwood wars were federalized legally, legislatively, and perceptually, 
driven out of the Northcoast by the local activists and timber industry leaders.  Two 
campaigns developed: one to convince Congress to acquire Headwaters Forest, and one 
to continue challenging de facto corporatism and development-focused timber regulations 
while the industry defended its traditional prerogatives.  
As the volume of activity increased and garnered statewide and then national 
attention, the geographic scope of the redwood protection campaign narrowed, and the 
parkland acquisition strategy regained prominence because the agencies did not act swift 
enough or deeply enough to please the Northcoast activists who continued to ratchet up 




seemed to the activists, and eventually Pacific Lumber, a necessary step to quell the 
redwood wars.  This time, however, taxpayers, not wealthy donors were the first and only 
constituency targeted to foot the acquisition bill.  Both groups of combatants had an 
interest in federalizing the Headwaters conflict because of the increasing protraction – 
due to hardening positions on the Northcoast and the growing inability of the state of 
California to end the conflict.    
The first half of the 1990s powerfully demonstrate the flaws in the top-down 
narrative of modern environmental politics, the exaggerated dichotomy between pre- and 
postwar conservation and environmentalism as explicated most prominently by Samuel 
P. Hays, and the analysis of postwar environmental protection revolving around a 
wilderness ideal that separates human development and society from definitions of 
healthy ecosystems and ideal land preservation schemes.  The major action of the 
redwood wars during the period continued to be driven by the local combatants and 
revolved around conflicts over sustainable forestry, not an absolutist debate over whether 
logging or parks would dominate the Northcoast landscape.  Redwood Summer and the 
Forests Forever initiative, both in 1990, were designed to pressure the state of California 
to adopt a more complex, more actively managed program of private landscape 
regulation, one that promoted the long term health of the timber workers, the ancient 
forest ecosystem, and the Northcoast’s rural society.  The federalization of the litigation 
revolved around questions relating to forestry techniques and standards in threatened 
species habitat, as was the Congressional campaign to purchase Headwaters Forest.155  
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By 1990, the timber wars on the Northcoast had reached a fevered pitch, with no 
end in sight to the cycle of direct actions, protests, and lawsuits.  EPIC and Sierra Club 
continued to sue Pacific Lumber, the California Department of Forestry, and other lumber 
companies to protect old growth habitat and to reform forest practices on the Northcoast.  
Earth First! continued to protest the activities of CDF, Pacific Lumber, and Louisiana-
Pacific.  And, Pacific Lumber continued to fight the litigation and counter the charges 
levied by the environmental activists in the press and in the community. Out of that 
crucible, the Northcoast activists pushed their forestry and old growth protection 
campaign out of the courtroom and into the legislative arenas.  Both major legislative 
efforts incorporated the Northcoast activists’ vision for human integration into the 
ecosystem via active landscape management, values not normally assigned to postwar 
environmentalists by historians of wilderness and wildland preservation.  Through their 
direct actions, public rallies, and litigation, the activists attracted the attention of the 
popular press and elected officials, who focused almost entirely on Headwaters Forest 
and the issue of old growth preservation at the expense of forestry reform.  Despite the 
failures in the legislative arena, the events of 1990 to 1994 made the 1996 deal between 
Pacific Lumber and the state possible because they drove the local conflict over forest 
valuation and property rights into the national consciousness and elevated the conflict 
beyond the point at which the state of California alone was capable of acting.    
To break the logjam in the courts and agencies, Northcoast activists, strengthened 
by the re-engagement of many of the first wave of migrants, developed a new set of 
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protest, direct action, legislative and litigation tactics that engaged a broader spectrum of 
society and the state even as they escalated their attacks on the private property rights 
their new middle-class supporters presumably held in high regard.  The new tactics 
forced Pacific Lumber and CDF to alter their practices and policies.  Unintentionally, the 
new tactics also continued to shift the focus of the redwood wars onto Headwaters Forest 
at the expense of broader forestry reform.  Subsequently, the property rights of Pacific 
Lumber (and all timber companies by proxy) stood center stage because of the action to 
protect and publicly acquire the forest.  Pacific Lumber and the timber industry forcefully 
reacted to the perceived assaults on private property and contributed to the escalation of 
the conflict.  The crisis appeared to be on the verge of resolution in 1990 and in 1994, but 
the possible resolutions were literally lost during the final moments of the opportunities.   
 The 1990 and 1994 opportunities materialized in the legislative arena and were 
born out of the public notoriety created by the litigation and direct actions of the 
Northcoast activists.  In 1990, Northcoast activists, led by a coalition of the first and 
second wave migrants, qualified a comprehensive forest practices reform initiative for the 
November ballot.  The timber industry rallied in opposition, and narrowly defeated the 
initiative.  In 1994, Dan Hamburg, then the first term Congressman from the Northcoast, 
passed a bill out of the House that would have authorized the federal government to 
acquire Headwaters Forest from Pacific Lumber.  Though, the company, local 
environmental activists, and national environmental groups all eventually supported 
Hamburg’s bill, it was defeated on the last day of the 103rd Congress before the Senate 




 By the end of 1994, the timber industry had defeated the activists’ statewide ballot 
initiative, but Pacific Lumber lost out on the opportunity to sell Headwaters Forest and 
end a major conflict within the timber wars.  The industry also failed to pass a set of 
reform bills in the California Assembly that could have quelled much of the uproar 
outside the Northcoast. Meanwhile, state and federal courts halted Pacific Lumber efforts 
to log portions of Headwaters Forest, and established major legal precedents that 
benefitted environmental activists.  The activists failed to pass any logging reform or 
legislation to protect Headwaters Forest, and the local courts began to turn against them.  
However, prior litigation and direct action success forced CDF and Pacific Lumber to 
make some rather large concessions with respect to logging rules and with respect to 
Headwaters Forest, and new mass audience-directed actions gained national notoriety.  
The changes in the activists’ strategy were driven by the failures of 1990 and 1991 that 
had jeopardized the community support of the activists.  The altered strategies, because 
of their high profile, further protracted the conflict and unintentionally drove the conflict 
into President Clinton’s lap where the activists’ anti-corporate, radical reform demands 
were certain to face defeat.  Despite all of the action, the timber wars were still nowhere 
near conclusion. 
Actions for the Masses and Massive Actions: Recruiting the Middle-
class with Anti-Private Property Actions 
 
Redwood Summer 1990: Painting Timber Companies as Immoral Social Actors 
 After the success of the national tree-sit day, the Calpella rally, and the other 1989 




hostile to middle-class values, and successful at garnering publicity in an effort to shame 
timber companies as the Civil Rights Movement had discredited southern state 
governments in 1964.  Those efforts resulted in popular support from environmentalists 
across California and the nation, but did little to engender support from the workers or the 
timber companies, a flaw in the campaign design if a worker alliance was a top priority 
for the activists.  EF! began to organize more road blockades, they took direct action 
against political officeholders, they trespassed to monitor logging activity, and they 
began sustained occupations of a few groves to prevent logging.  Equally important, EF! 
designed their rallies and actions to recruit activists to the movement.  Redwood Summer, 
Ecotopia Summer, and the Albion Uprising increased the number of activists working to 
reform logging practices, and expanded the movement’s demographics to include more 
middle-class participants, though a sizeable core of the movement largely shunned 
middle-class society.  Combined, the more confrontational actions and mass rallies 
brought media and state attention to the Northcoast, helped construct a broad county-
under-siege mentality, and aided the litigation efforts of EPIC and others. 
 1990 was a pivotal year for Northcoast EF! because the group simultaneously 
engaged in middle-class activist recruitment and decidedly non-middle-class direct 
actions which combined to force the state into action to address the local redwood wars.  
The year began with an occupation of Mendocino District Attorney Susan Massini’s 
office when she refused to prosecute Dave Lancaster for breaking Mem Hill’s nose at 
Whitehorn in August 1989.  Later in January, Cherney and Bari performed at an 
American Federation of Labor rally protesting Lousiana-Pacific’s plans to open a mill in 




Assemblyman Dan Hauser’s Eureka office and “ambushed” a Pacific Lumber logging 
truck filled with raw ancient redwood logs.  The actions protested what EF! referred to as 
the “Boskeenhauser” deal with Louisiana-Pacific and Pacific Lumber, a deal that 
imposed voluntary restrictions on the Mexico mill and Headwaters logging plans.  EF! 
removed the hinges from Hauser’s door and implemented an “open door” policy for the 
office.  Then, seventy-five activists “stormed” and occupied the Eureka offices of State 
Senators Barry Keene and Doug Bosco.  The next day, approximately fifty activists 
surrounded Don Nolan’s logging truck while five activists chained themselves to logs to 
protest the deal.  Also in February, EF! trespassers discovered what became known in 
activist circles as “Death Road,” a thirty-foot wide access road on Pacific Lumber land 
that pierced the heart of the Headwaters Grove of Headwaters Forest.  The public outrage 
over logging in the Northcoast had captured the attention of state officials, but it was 
clear to activists that Headwaters Forest was in serious jeopardy and elected officials 
could not be counted on to dramatically reform Northcoast logging practices.156 
 It was also during the middle of winter that Cherney, Bari, King, and Northcoast 
EF! began planning for Redwood Summer, modeled after the 1964 Mississippi Freedom 
Summer, and designed to draw attention to their campaign, recruit new activists, show 
the depth and breadth of support the redwoods could garner, and flood the region with 
direct actions to disrupt logging season.  The plan to recruit the masses to the Northcoast 
catapulted the group of local activists and the redwood issue onto the national stage.  
Sometime in January 1990, as told by Cherney, Walking Rainbow, a “white guy who 
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wore a robe and beard, and was full of himself, and a little psychotic, maybe,” showed up 
at Gary and Betty Ball’s Mendocino Environmental Center to talk to Bari.  Bari was at 
the hospital visiting her sick daughter, and Betty sent Walking Rainbow to find her.  
When he found Bari at the hospital, he told her that he thought they should recruit people 
to the Northcoast for a summer of activism like Freedom Summer.  By February twenty-
fifth, Bari and Cherney were attending a student conference in Sacramento to recruit 
students to spend their summer doing actions on the Northcoast.  That recruitment effort 
was a major step by an organization composed primarily of Cherney, Bari, Greg King, 
Larry Evans, Karen Pickett, and whomever they could locally recruit for specific 
actions.157 
 In March, Bari attended the Oregon Law Conference in Eugene and made 
Redwood Summer more palatable to middle class Americans, but divided the national 
Earth First! movement because her comments betrayed biocentrism by revealing that the 
Northcoast activists desired to harmoniously integrate the local human and nonhuman 
communities.  Bari spoke on a panel discussing workers and environmentalists, and 
millworker Gene Lawhorn challenged her on the issue of tree-spiking.  Dave Foreman 
and others in EF! had argued that tree-spiking was legitimate and non-violent because 
they warned a company or agency when a grove had been spiked, which prevented 
logging while doing no harm to the trees or workers.  The George Alexander case had 
raised the stakes.  How could a nonviolent group endorse a tactic that was potentially 
violent when that same group was anarchic in nature and refused to police its followers?  
Bari responded by denouncing tree-spiking at the conference, a decision that angered EF! 
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activists outside of Northern California but which seemed to alleviate some of the 
concerns of more mainstream activists like the Sierra Club and California college 
students.  For Bari and many in North Coast EF!, the decision was likely easy, and likely 
necessary.  Endorsing actions the public began to perceive as tantamount to terrorism 
would have severely weakened the support of the Northcoast community for the 
activists.158 
 The denouncement of tree-spiking by Bari, and the organizing of Redwood 
Summer did not dampen the enthusiasm for confrontation within North Coast EF!, 
however.  Later in March, activists hung a banner on an Okestrom feller-buncher at the 
annual Redwood Region Logging Show in Ukiah that read, “This Thing Kills Jobs & 
Forests.”  The new feller-bunchers were mechanical clippers on cranes that could snip a 
tree at it’s base, grab a hold of the trunk, and carry it to a log landing in one series of 
motions operated by a single logger.  They cost $700,000 at the time, and a few weeks 
later, one was found burned in the woods.  When asked if EF! burned the feller-buncher, 
Bari replied, “I didn’t do it, I was home in bed with five witnesses.”  It appeared Bari was 
trying to secure the allegiances of radicals and more mainstream activists 
simultaneously.159   
Despite the rhetorical bone Bari threw to the more radical elements of EF!, the 
more organizing-focused Northcoast EF! sharply divided the national Earth First! 
movement as preparations for Redwood Summer moved forward.  On April 11, 
Northcoast EF! planned several press conferences to denounce tree-spiking, an effort to 
preserve what worker sympathy remained, as well as an effort to convince potential 
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activists and the local community that Redwood Summer would be peaceful and safe.  
Additionally, they hoped the announcement would “take the wind out of the timber 
industry’s publicity sails.”  Later in April, EF! activists, including Bari, International 
Workers of the World members, and Louisiana-Pacific workers attended a Mendocino 
Board of Supervisors meeting to protest LP layoffs, and demand that the county seize the 
company’s property.  Actions like that led many in the national EF! movement to regard 
Northcoast EF! as too-anthropocentric, leftist, and hippie-dippy.160 
Yet the Northcoast radicals were simply too unwilling to truly embrace middle-
class mores, and rather than quelling the anger of the timber industry or the locals who 
opposed EF!, the tree-spiking announcement, logger outreach, and Okestrom incidents 
fueled even greater hostility.  Cherney, Bari, and King began to receive more death 
threats.  Fliers calling for violence and falsely attributed to EF! were knowingly 
distributed to millworkers, and Louisiana-Pacific installed barbed wire around its mill.  
Local officials turned against Bari, Cherney and King, and refused to investigate the 
death threats, according to Bari’s memoirs.  She recounted one Mendocino Board of 
Supervisors meeting when the Board discussed Redwood Summer, and a gyppo logger 
called for violence against the activists.  When Bari protested and showed Supervisor 
Marilyn Butcher the death threats she had received, the Supervisor retorted that Bari had 
brought the violence onto herself.  After the meeting, Bari tried to establish meetings with 
the gyppos to prevent violence during the summer demonstrations.161  
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 It was in that crucible that one of the most violent actions of the redwood wars 
occurred, and it changed the direction and tenor of the conflict.  On May 24, 1990, a 
bomb exploded under the driver’s seat of Bari’s car while she and Cherney drove from 
Oakland to Santa Cruz to recruit students to attend Redwood Summer.  Oddly, the FBI 
accompanied the Oakland Police Department to the bombing location, and the two 
activists were placed in custody while in the hospital.  The Oakland Police and FBI 
immediately presumed the bomb was Cherney and Bari’s.  Cherney was treated and 
released from the hospital, but Bari had fractured her pelvis in several locations, crushed 
her tailbone, and suffered serious nerve and tissue damage.  The police guarded Bari’s 
Intensive Care Unit room.  Two months later, the Alameda District Attorney dropped the 
charges against Bari and Cherney due to a lack of evidence, and a year later, frustrated by 
the lack of investigation to solve the bombing, coupled with a year’s worth of FBI 
harassment, Bari and Cherney filed suit against the FBI and Oakland Police Department 
for false arrest at the politically-motivated behest of the FBI.  In 2002, a federal jury 
granted Cherney and the estate of Judi Bari $4.4 million and ruled the FBI and Oakland 
police had indeed framed the two activists in an attempt to quiet Earth First! and quell 
enthusiasm for Redwood Summer.  The bombing and the arrests of Cherney and Bari in 
1990 brought the national, mainstream environmental groups to Bari and Cherney’s 
defense, attracted the national media to Redwood Summer, created a leadership void in 
the Redwood Summer preparations, and drove Greg King to quit EF! and move back to 
Sonoma.162 
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 Despite the loss of King, the bombing strengthened the movement over the long 
term because of the interest of mainstream groups in the Northcoast, and more 
immediately, because it forced North Coast EF! to develop a broader base of leaders who 
could improve the work of the organization.  With its main three organizers absent during 
the 1990 summer, others picked up the reigns, including Karen Pickett, Anna Marie 
Stenberg, Naomi Wagner, Mokai, Zack Stentz, Tracy Kattleman, Betty Ball, and 
Sequoia, all of whom played major roles in the redwood wars for years to come. 
Redwood Summer began in June with a smattering of small affinity group actions.  One 
group organized a rally at the export docks in Sacramento to protest the exportation of 
raw logs, subsequent mill jobs losses, and related increases in harvest levels.  Humboldt 
EF! organized cat-and-mouse actions on Pacific Lumber property to disrupt logging 
operations by placing “civilians” in harms way.  The Squirrel Affinity Group organized a 
treesit in what they named Murrelet Grove on Pacific Lumber property, and were 
promptly arrested.  Urban Earth Women were arrested for trespassing at the Marin 
County offices of Maxxam.  On July 18, tipped off by a local resident, more than 20 
Redwood Summer activists hiked into Osprey Grove on Louisiana-Pacific property in 
Mendocino to halt the harvest of old growth trees in violation of THP 1-89-468 MEN.  
Over two days, twenty-two activists were arrested, a vigil was established in front of the 
jail, and within a week, a judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order halting the harvest 
operations.  Redwood Summer officially began on June 20th at a 700-person rally at the 
Samoa docks of Louisiana-Pacific between Eureka and Arcata.  Forty-four activists were 
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arrested for blocking trucks at the docks.  After the rally, small woods actions persisted, 
but the majority of participants visited mills to engage workers and then marched in the 
Mendocino Fourth of July parade with anti-clearcutting banners.163 
 In July, Redwood Summer largely rooted itself in Mendocino and prepared for the 
main event – a rally in Fort Bragg that culminated in a march through town to the 
Georgia-Pacific mill.  On July 21, an estimated two thousand environmental activists 
marched through Fort Bragg chanting, “Earth First! Profits Last!”  Waiting at the other 
end of town were approximately fifteen hundred Yellow Ribbon Coalition supporters, an 
organizing founded by timber interests to rally loggers and supporters against the 
proposed Northern Spotted Owl protection plan for federal land in Oregon and 
Washington.  When the two crowds met, Cherney invited the hecklers to use the EF! 
sound truck to air their concerns.  No violence occurred, and few took up Cherney on his 
offer.  It was reported that logger Duane Potter took the microphone and complained that 
there were no logs in the forest and no fish in the streams.  After the Fort Bragg rally, 17 
activists were arrested in Carlotta, and while in jail, angry officers shaved the heads of 
the activists, and the American Civil Liberties Union subsequently sued the officers.  The 
“official” Redwood Summer ended at the end of July when approximately 400 activists 
stopped logging at eight locations in Sequoia National Forest in the Sierra Nevada 
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Mountains -- hours to the east of the redwood belt -- a clear indication that overall 
logging reform remained at the heart of the conflict.  The action in Sequoia also 
demonstrated how media-focused Cherney and Bari were at the time.  They attenuated 
the Northcoast roots of the redwood wars by traveling far away and addressing non-
redwood logging in order to solicit wider public sympathy for their work.  It was that 
kind of flexibility and savvy that enabled the Northcoast movement to federalize the 
Headwaters conflict when it determined California could not act strongly enough for their 
tastes.164 
 In August, the actions moved back to Humboldt and Pacific Lumber, and tensions 
escalated.  The largest action was back in Murrelet Grove when fifty to seventy activists 
snuck into the grove during the middle of the night and awaited sunrise and the arrival of 
the logging crews.  At Murrelet Grove, the activists unveiled a new tool and a new 
willingness to take chances.  They used Kryptonite bike locks to chain themselves to 
logging equipment, and one man stopped a logger by placing his hand under a chainsaw 
to prevent the logger from turning on the machine.  Other activists surrounded an old 
growth tree to keep the loggers away.  Judi Bari reported that one activist was run over by 
a truck, and that others were chased by bulldozers.  EF! also organized a seventy-person 
rally outside a meeting in Korbel between Humboldt State University professors and 
timber executives.  The crowd surrounded John Campbell’s car, one activist, Serina, laid 
on the hood and refused to let go, and Campbell drove down the drive with the activist on 
the hood until the police arrived to remove her.  Serina spent four months in jail, EF! 
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established a round-the-clock and noisy three-day vigil at Campbell’s home, and 
Campbell and his wife came and went with a police escort.165  
 The actions of Redwood Summer brought attention to the timber wars, and it 
briefly halted some logging operations; maybe its most lasting effect was the escalation 
of the vitriol coming from the industry and its allied workers that contributed to elevating 
the conflict beyond the purview of the state of California after 1994.  In addition to the 
public opposition and hostility of the Fort Bragg Yellow Ribbon crowd, the loggers at 
Murrelet Grove, and the police officers, timber executives, county supervisors, and other 
residents amplified their opposition to Earth First! and its campaign. Some of the public 
posturing of Earth First!’s opponents was an effort to tie the more radical EF! to the 
logging reform initiative on the 1990 ballot, but much of the backlash was in response to 
the success of EF! organizing a broader public network.  Shep Tucker of Louisiana-
Pacific told a USA Today reporter that the Redwood Summer activists were an 
unreasoning “terrorist group.”  John Campbell told the Santa Rosa Rotary Club that 
Pacific Lumber was preparing to mount an “aggressive counterattack.”  More ominously, 
police arrested two men carrying rifles at an anti-EF! counter-protest in Fortuna.  Loggers 
and millworkers were not the only opponents of EF!.  Candice Boak, whom Cherney and 
Bari charged with organizing the death threats they received by mail and phone, founded 
Mother’s Watch, a pro-timber women’s group.  One local paper reported that Mother’s 
Watch organized a “Dirty Tricks Workshop” in July 1990 to teach members how to 
harass environmentalists and plant false information in the press.  Later in the summer, a 
fake bomb was found in the Arcata EF! office.  The Northcoast, and Humboldt County in 
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particular, was increasingly a county under siege, with both sides vilifying the other in 
the press and working to intimidate the other into submission.166 
 In what appears to be an effort to soften the emotions of the local worker 
community, EF! backed off of actions that engaged loggers and millworkers.  During the 
fall and winter of 1990 and 1991, EF! held at least monthly actions associated with its 
“Corporate Fall” campaign that targeted timber company executives.  In September, EF! 
rallied in Ukiah to demand that Louisiana-Pacific leave Mendocino County, and Cherney 
with one hundred twenty-five others rallied outside of Maxxam’s Houston headquarters.  
In October, EF! organized a protest at LP chief Harry Merlo’s house near Cloverdale.  
The activists hung banners, dumped wood chips in the driveway, and played Cherney’s 
music loudly.  At one point, a group of activists stripped naked and jumped into Merlo’s 
hot tub.  In December, the Corporate Fallers descended on Campbell’s house and 
delivered presents of ash and sawdust to the house while singing “endless” renditions of 
“Hang Down Your Head, John Campbell” until Candice Boak showed up with a crew of 
people and chased the activists off the property.  Things then appear to have settled down 
a bit until the summer of 1991.167 
 
Redwood Summer II/Ecotopia Summer: The Move North to Headwaters Forest and the 
Broadening of Local Support for the Activist Vision 
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 Earth First! lost some of its popular appeal after Redwood Summer and after 
Dave Foreman left the national Earth First! movement in large part because of the way 
Cherney, Bari and Northcoast EF! organized rallies for the masses and for workers.  
However, on the Northcoast, EF! continued to attract activists, they developed new 
campaigns, and they received broad support from the southern Humboldt community, 
especially in Garberville.  Lieb Austro and Linda Dylan, proprietors of Music for Little 
People, a recording studio and store in Garberville, founded the TREES Foundation.  The 
foundation was an effort to organize the business community of Garberville to financially 
support local grassroots environmental activism.  The organization developed into a 
major force in the redwood wars.  Judi Bari focused on her and Cherney’s civil rights 
lawsuit, and Cherney organized a tour of the California State University system to put 
pressure on the Board of Regents to remove Chancellor Barry Munitz, a Maxxam officer.  
The activists who took the reigns of Redwood Summer, primarily many of the younger 
males, organized the 1991 direct actions, and they began taking greater risks than ever 
before.  In fact, Redwood Summer II was also known as Ecotopia Summer, a reference to 
Ecotopia, the 1975 novel by Ernest Callenbach that glorified the formation of a new 
nation when Oregon, Washington, and Northern California seceded from the United 
States.  While the president of Ecotopia was a woman, the culture of the imagined culture 
was based on many of the masculine motifs of the wilderness movement and the 
counterculture of the 1960s.168 
 North Coast EF! planned to follow up the success of Redwood Summer with 
another flurry of actions during the Summer of 1991,  but the plans lacked mass appeal, 
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likely the result of the loss of the three mainstay organizing visionaries – Bari, Cherney, 
and King.  They were the ones with the media and public opinion savvy.  Without them, 
the actions developed into more technical, more direct actions designed solely to stop 
production, without popular appeal.  The major action of Ecotopia Summer was in early 
July, and took place deep inside Pacific Lumber property.  Earlier, a group of fourteen 
EF! activists attempted to stop a clearcut project at the edge of Headwaters Grove.  The 
company was prepared for the activists, and equipped the loggers with diamond saw 
blades to cut through the Kryptonite locks the activists used to lock themselves to 
bulldozers.  The company additionally deputized the loggers and authorized them to 
capture trespassers.  According to Bari, the loggers caught all of the activists and 
threatened to cut their hair.  Later in July, the “boys playing soldier” who organized the 
backwoods operations, developed a plan to march forty activists ten miles into Pacific 
Lumber land – deeper into the woods than they had ever operated.  The action was a 
disaster because the company was again prepared for actions, and because the distance of 
the actions from the nearest road increased the physical risk to the activists.  The forty-
odd activists attempted to ambush the logging crew, but they were instead ambushed by a 
group of deputized loggers who captured twenty-two activists using violence and 
physical force.  The twenty-two activists were arrested, while the nearly twenty activists 
who escaped found their way, often alone, through the dense, damp, and dark forest 
without much food or water, until they reached a main road.  Cherney, Bari, and King’s 
absences contributed to the disasters.  Consensus organizing broke down at basecamp, 
and the actions were designed in secrecy by young activists John Williams Garcia, Robert 




created a dangerous situation that was more of a military-style set of actions than ones 
designed to delay logging, shine the publicity spotlight onto the operation, and generate 
public sympathy for the campaign.  After the disasters in the woods, Bari re-engaged, and 
unsurprisingly, EF! moved the remaining summer actions to safer locations largely out of 
Humboldt County and out of the woods.169 
The most enduring event of 1991 was the arrival of Alicia Littletree Banes on the 
Norhtcoast, because she helped bring order to EF!’s planning, and she focused on 
recruiting activists, not daring backwoods adventures.   Littletree was a seventeen-year 
old high school student, and she arrived on the Northcoast in early July with an affinity 
group from Sacramento, where she lived.  Her Ad Hoc Committee for Peace was looking 
for activist projects after the 1991 Gulf War faded.  Littletree went to the basecamp for 
Redwood Summer II/Ecotopia Summer because a couple of friends had gone up earlier in 
the summer and participated in the disastrous actions deep in Pacific Lumber land.  
During her visit to Ecotopia Summer, Littletree stayed at the basecamp, swam, and 
listened to people play music.  She participated in her first action later in July at the state 
capitol in Sacramento.  Littletree and four other women, naked and covered with mud, 
created a distraction outside the capitol, drawing the attention of all nearby police and 
security.  Simultaneously, activists John Williams Garcia and Zach Stentz locked 
themselves to the statue of Columbus inside the capitol, while Brian Wyott and an 
activist named Richie hung a banner over the second floor rotunda calling for the 
protection of Headwaters Forest.  Littletree and one other woman, Fiona, “got bored” and 
streaked through the capitol.  Williams and Stentz escaped capture, but Littletree, Fiona, 
Richie, and Wyott were not as fortunate.  According to Littletree, the police used a 
                                                        




cherry-picker to remove Wyott and Richie from the second floor railing.  Littletree was 
taken to a juvenile detention center, and her mom convinced the police not to press 
charges, but she also refused to allow Littletree to live at home.  She subsequently moved 
north to Garberville, lived in Tracy Kattleman’s trailor, and worked for Kattleman as an 
administrative assistant at the Institute for Sustainable Forestry.  In the fall, Littletree 
enrolled at Whale Gulch Independent School, tucked back into the community upslope of 
Shelter Cove near the Sinkyone Wilderness.  In addition to working as an administrative 
assistant, Littletree work-traded for a backwoods cabin without electricity, and charged 
food on her mom’s credit card at the Chevron in Garberville.170 
Littletree spent much of her time at Earth First! meetings, however, and quickly 
became a fixture in the Northcoast organization.  Bari kept a list of people to whom she 
mailed meeting and fundraising notices, and most of the meetings were in Willits, in 
Mendocino County.  During the fall of 1991 and winter of 1992, approximately fifteen 
people regularly attended the meetings, and Littletree remembered that most of the EF! 
activists were “sixties radicals.”  The main cohort included Bari, Cherney, Naomi 
Wagner, Dave Biebe, and Mary Corte, and they talked a lot about Louisiana Pacific and 
Harry Merlo.  The women, in particular, seemed to appreciate Littletree’s engagement, 
and in turn, Littletree found EF! to be a group of funny, strong women.  That winter, 
Littletree also experienced the dysfunctional side of EF! at an activist conference in 
Portland in 1992.  Bari, Littletree, and other Northcoast EF! activists at the conference 
were disturbed by the inability of the attendees to run a coherent meeting or make 
decisions due to the number of disruptions.  In particular, Judi Bari grew frustrated that 
the group did not take her concerns about the disruptions seriously.  The Northcoast 
                                                        




group left the conference concerned about the state of the national movement, and not 
knowing whether “agents or assholes” were the source of disruption.  Her concerns 
coming out of those meetings probably contributed to the ever-increasing amount of time 
and energy Bari put into the bombing lawsuit.171 
Littletree adopted a more visible role that spring, and Northcoast EF! made a 
major splash as well, again propelling the redwood wars to prominence in California.  In 
February 1992, Louisiana-Pacific began logging near Albion, on the Mendocino Coast, 
and planned to log the forest surrounding what was known as Enchanted Meadow, a 
popular spot for picnics and hikes.  Northcoast EF! organized  a nine-week set of actions, 
including daily actions for fifty-four consecutive days.  EF! set up roadblocks in the 
woods that attracted young and daring activists, and they organized sixteen tree-sits with 
multiple tree-sitters each.  One activist, Dark Moon, sat in a tree for thirty consecutive 
days.  The actions became known as the Albion Uprising, and effectively shut down LP’s 
logging plans in the area.  Littletree and Cherney were both tree-sitters during the actions.  
In fact, Littletree did the first naked EF! treesit, and became the spokesperson for the 
actions because she was positioned in a very visible location on the river.  She sat in the 
tree for nine days.  Anna Marie Stenberg’s presence also aided the actions.  Stenberg, a 
some time EF! activist, was running for County Supervisor and the local sheriff, Tony 
Craver, shut down logging activity to protect the candidate.  After the Uprising, 
Louisiana-Pacific filed trespassing charges against one hundred John and Jane Does, and 
fifteen named EF! activists.  The suit was settled via an essentially meaningless 
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injunction agreement between LP and the EF! activists – meaningless because trespassing 
was illegal anyway and LP didn’t need an injunction to make it so.172 
After the Albion Uprising, Littletree developed into the primary EF! organizer in 
Humboldt and helped draw attention and resources to the Headwaters conflict as the 
place where the corporate timber vision and the Northcoast activist vision diverged most 
dramatically.  Littletree graduated from Whale Gulch that summer, and moved down to 
Albion until she and her affinity group were kicked off of land where they squatted.  
Littletree moved in with Bari, learned politics and organizing from Bari, and helped 
prepare the court case against the Oakland Police and the FBI.  In June, Pacific Lumber 
began logging the Owl Creek Grove of Headwaters Forest, and later that summer 
Littletree moved north to organize actions because of her affinity for Humboldt as the 
place she moved when she left home.  Kurt Newman took her deep into Pacific Lumber 
land to see the figure eight-shaped road the company had cut into the ancient grove.  
Littletree recalled that the road was so steep she could hardly walk on it, and that the silt 
and dust was nearly a foot deep and littered with dead “critters.”  On the hike, Littletree 
and an EPIC activist, Lori Sarazchek, photographed the road, logging, and log decks.  
The photos were later used by EPIC in pamphlets and in support of their 1992 alternative 
writs in Sierra v. BOF.  After her sojourn into Owl Creek, Littletree organized nightly 
hikes into Owl Creek to publicize the campaign and monitor logging.  To recruit people, 
Littletree, Ecotopia EF! and Arcata EF! tabled at the co-op in Arcata to build a list of 
potential activists.  They called themselves the Owl Creek Protection Association to 
avoid the EF! stigma while recruiting a broader base of activists.  Pacific Lumber entered 
Owl Creek Grove again over Thanksgiving weekend, and EF! activists rushed into the 
                                                        




woods to slow down the loggers until the courts could stop the operation, which appeared 
to be in violation of a court order.  Littletree estimated thirty activists hiked into the 
woods and witnessed ancient trees falling.  The police and loggers awaited the activists.  
John Williams Garcia put his hand on the blade of a chainsaw to prevent the logger from 
starting it.  Some activists stole gas cans, others played cat-and-mouse with the loggers 
and police.  Littletree had been in Sacramento at her mother’s house when she received 
the call about the logging.  Despite her mother’s anger, Littletree immediately drove 
north and entered the woods, where she, along with a “truckload” of activists were 
arrested and taken to Eureka.  On Monday, EPIC and Sierra obtained a Temporary 
Restraining Order against Pacific Lumber, and on December 1, an appeals court granted 
the environmentalists an emergency stay.173 
The election of Dan Hamburg to Congress, the logging of Owl Creek, and 
Littletree’s move to Garberbille solidified Headwaters Forest as the primary focus of 
Earth First! on the Northcoast for nearly the rest of the century.  Life for EF! and 
Littletree in Humboldt were fairly quiet until August 1993, when Littletree organized the 
Week of Outrage Against Maxxam in response to a bill proposed by Congressman Dan 
Hamburg and Pacific Lumber’s continued logging of the areas Hamburg’s bill proposed 
to protect.  The winter of 1992-1993 was not easy for Littletree and Northcoast EF!.  
Cherney continued his publicity work around Barry Munitz and the “Seven Sins of 
Maxxam,” Bari was focused on her and Cherney’s court case, and EPIC, Sierra, and 
Pacific Lumber were entangled in court actions.  The local buzz and enthusiasm for direct 
action faded.  Littletree recalled one March 1993 meeting she organized at the EPIC 
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office by sending out dozens of fliers in the mail.  Littletree, “the crazy person, the speed 
freak, and the homeless person” were the only attendees.  That year, Littletree built an 
affinity group of young hikers and climbers, and in August organized a basecamp of 
approximately thirty people with funding help from Randy Ghent and Karen Pickett’s 
EF! groups in Arcata and Berkeley respectively.174  
The Week of Outrage was Littletree and EF!’s response to Dan Hamburg’s 
proposed bill to protect nearly forty-five thousand acres of the Headwaters Forest 
Complex.  From August 21 through 28, Littletree organized daily actions promoting 
EF!’s proposal to protect ninety-eight thousand acres of forest and protesting Pacific 
Lumber’s logging operations in the Headwaters Complex.  A few of the major actions 
included hanging a banner on a cliff above Highway 101 across from the Pacific Lumber 
mill in Rio Dell that read, “Jail Hurwitz!;” a forty activist rally in front of the Humboldt 
District Attorney’s office where one landowner from Ettersburg, dressed in a Charles 
Hurwitz costume, chained himself to a bench; and at least three actions the following day, 
August 25.  “Charles Hurwitz” attended a CDF review meeting for a Pacific Lumber 
harvest plan and demanded CDF build a drive-up window for same-day approval of 
harvest plans, and then threatened to chain himself down if they didn’t meet his demands.  
That morning, Pacific Lumber employees discovered one of their gates entirely entangled 
in yarn, and fifth generation logger Ernie Pardini began a tree-sit on Pacific Lumber 
property near Headwaters Grove.  At the same time, a group of activists blocked one 
entrance to the harvest area and hung the banner, “Blame Hurwitz, Not Spotted Owls.” 
Finally, Littletree organized a road blockade where Highway 36 intersected with 
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Highway 101 coming out of Pacific Lumber property.  The Week of Outrage, as nearly 
all of the EF! actions during the redwood wars, was clearly the product of North Coast 
EF!’s anti-corporation, anti-corporatist, and middle-class materialistic outlook.  The 
actions also clearly demonstrate EF!’s commitment to logging reform, and not solely 
traditional wilderness protection.  As such, the actions help us understand some of the 
weaknesses in the more traditional narratives about modern environmental protection and 
wilderness politics. 
The Week of Outrage, coupled with Cherney’s work on “the Seven Sins of 
Maxxam,” signified a significant shift in EF! strategy that appealed to a broader 
audience, a shift that benefitted the local movement in the long run.  The actions were 
once again designed to draw attention to themselves and the campaigns as well as impede 
timber harvests, and information was more broadly shared at the Salmon Creek basecamp 
so that, as Littletree explained, individuals could “make a good decision about what to do 
with their bodies.”  The message changed as well, becoming far more focused on 
demonizing Hurwitz than it was on sustainable forestry or forest protection.  That change 
was a conscious decision to appeal to the common fears and grievances of 
environmentalists, Pacific Lumber workers, and other Humboldt residents.  After the 
Week of Outrage, EF! activity declined temporarily; Hamburg’s bill moved through 
Congress, EPIC and Sierra blocked key harvest projects in court, and Littletree traveled 
to Guatemala by herself until the summer of 1994.  Late in 1994, all of the action 
surrounding the redwood wars and the battle over Headwaters Forest boiled over again 




and dying trees on all of its property, and the company began logging in the Yager Creek 
drainage.  Out of legislative options, EF! ramped up its direct defense of the forests.175   
 
Going above the Heads of Agencies and Timber Corporations: 
Legislative Action 
 
Forests Forever:  Giving the Voters a Crack at Forestry Reform 
 The Northcoast activists not only stepped up their attacks on private property 
rights and their appeal to the media, they also forced the redwood wars onto the 
legislative table beginning in 1990, a set of decisions that significantly added to the 
influence of the locals on the state.  While Cherney, Bari, King and Northcoast Earth 
First! built their organization and generated press coverage and backlash at the end of the 
1980s, some of the activists from the first wave of migration collaborated in an attempt to 
extract the timber wars from the courtrooms and place the issue of forest management 
and property rights in front of the state’s voters.  Their initiative narrowly failed, but like 
Redwood Summer, it provided the redwood preservation movement with an enormous 
boost, and helped push the timber wars out of the Northcoast.  The manner by which the 
activists came together, built a statewide organization, and placed private logging reform 
on the state agenda befitted the 1960s backgrounds of the activists.  A bit of fate, a lot of 
voter outreach, some good theatrics, and a lot of bravado helped them construct a major 
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campaign for significant reform that captured the attention and imagination of the state 
for a brief while.  More importantly, the campaign drew Kathy Bailey and other older 
activists back into the redwood wars to work with the subsequent migrants, and that 
coalition continued to press their social vision that included the  reformation of logging 
practices and the end to logging in ancient redwood groves, especially Headwaters 
Forest. 
The Northcoast activists’ legislative campaign was not the first effort to 
legislatively resolve the redwood wars, but it was the most comprehensive and the most 
successful.  As early as 1987, the California legislature acted to understand and address 
the redwood wars.  A joint assembly of the Senate and Assembly Committees on Forest 
Resources and Natural Resources, respectively, listened to testimony about the 
sustainability of logging practices on the Northcoast.  In 1988, two unsuccessful bills 
were introduced in the California legislature to prohibit “large companies” from 
harvesting more timber than they annually grew, and Senator Byron Sher introduced a 
bill to prevent the clearcutting of old growth, but the bill was reportedly pulled from 
consideration after Pacific Lumber agreed to voluntarily end the practice.  In early 1989, 
Sher re-introduced his bill after learning that Pacific Lumber had reneged on their verbal 
agreement, though Campbell denied the claim.  In February, the Sacramento Bee 
Magazine ran an article entitled, “The Redwood Wars,” that told the story of back-to-the-
landers in Humboldt County doing battle with “titans of consumptive society.”  The 
article outlined the political organizing backgrounds of activists such as Woods, Ronald 
Snodgrass, and Cecelia Lanman (then Cecelia Gregori).  The article also described the 




that they were applying their skills to “issues that are in our immediate environment,” a 
clear example of the locally-minded nature of their activism.  In the article, Woods 
decried more mainstream environmental groups because one lobbyist told Woods he had 
no right to influence legislation “looking the way he does.”   
For its part, Pacific Lumber told the journalist that EPIC was blackmailing them 
in court, and the Eel River Sawmills claimed protesters were trying to run timber 
companies in Humboldt County out of business.  The article also quoted a rancher from 
Humboldt who told the reporter that the Earth First! activists “get on welfare and grow 
pot and make good money at it.  I think the buggers ought to go get real jobs.”  That 
article clearly established the redwood wars as a local conflict over local social and 
economic values, pitting the rural working class and the timber industry against a group 
of activists who largely rejected traditional middle-class life and values.  The conflict 
retained those local characteristics, but when the activists took the issue into the 
legislative arena, mainstream and middle-class environmentalists also entered the fray.176 
 More than anything, a sense of frustration seemed to have imparted a strong sense 
of urgency in Kathy Bailey, The Man Who Walks in the Woods, and the other activists 
who created Forests Forever.  By 1989, EPIC was winning lawsuits against CDF and 
Pacific Lumber, and was blocking logging with restraining orders; the national press had 
taken up the cause of vilifying Charles Hurwitz, Maxxam, and their logging practices; 
there was an active direct action campaign on the Northcoast that delayed logging and 
publicized the grievances of the activists; and the state legislature grew interested in 
resolving the conflict.  However, the logging rates remained high (in 1988, PL logged 
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10,436 acres, more than any year since at least 1979), court cases took many years to 
conclude, and state agencies did not seem enthusiastic about changing their policies or 
relationships.  During the late spring or early summer, Kathy Bailey became aware there 
were more logging trucks on route 128 in Mendocino, and that the size of the logs had 
decreased.  A logger acquaintance told Bailey she “wouldn’t believe what [they’re] doing 
in the woods,” which made sense to her because there was a harvest operation upstream 
from her water well source that left few trees or shrubs on the ground and filled her creek 
with slues.  Bailey called Meca Wawona (an adopted name in the tradition of many 
Northcoast migrants) whom she knew from the pesticide initiative of the 1970s.  Meca 
told Bailey about a meeting at Grapewine Station north of Laytonville to discuss a 
possible ballot initiative to reform Northcoast logging practices.  Woods, phasing out his 
EPIC work, came up with the idea for an initiative and had organized the meeting.177 
 The meeting during the early summer of 1989 led directly to the formation of the 
organization Forests Forever to run the qualifying and electoral campaigns for the 1990 
initiative.  Woods, Bailey, Cecelia Lanman, Darryl Cherney, Jama Chapin (EPIC 
volunteer), Gary and Betty Ball, John Llewallen, Bill Mannix, Eric Swanson, and a few 
others attended the Grapewine Station meeting.  Within a few meetings they decided to 
create an organization, and that Woods, Llewallen, and Mannix would develop the 
language of the initiative.  At Eric Swanson’s home west of Willits in Mendocino, the 
group held hands and stood in a circle brainstorming potential names for the organization.  
Someone blurted out “Forests Forever,” and the name stuck.  That fall, Woods, Bailey 
and a few other Forests Forever activists took their draft initiative to the annual Planning 
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and Conservation League conference in Sacramento.  PCL was a very influential 
statewide environmental group, and many current and former Forestry leaders attended 
the conference.  Forests Forever showed the initiative to a group that included former 
BOF member Phil Berry, former CDF Director Dave Pesonen, and former CA Resources 
Secretary Huey Johnson, and they each tentatively agreed not to oppose the initiative if it 
qualified for the 1990 ballot.   
Later in the fall, Forests Forever caught a game-changing break – a break created 
by their decision to take their forestry ideas to the statewide voters.  Hal Arbit, an 
investor from San Mateo, approached the forestry expert at the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, David Edelston, to discuss his options for contributing to a campaign to 
protect old growth redwoods.  According to Bailey, Edelston pitched Arbit on what was 
known as the Big Green initiative.  The Big Green initiative was put together by 
organizations including the California Public Interest Research Group and PCL, and was 
supported by State Senator Tom Hayden and former San Francisco mayor Dianne 
Feinstein.  The initiative addressed greenhouse gas emissions, pesticide use, toxic waste 
cleanup, and clearcutting.  Arbit didn’t think Big Green did enough on forestry and 
ancient forests, and so Edelston told Arbit about the Forests Forever initiative and 
arranged a meeting with Woods, Bailey, Lanman, Llewallen, and Mannix.178 
 The pairing of the San Mateo investor with the self-described “country-folk” from 
the North must have been a sight to behold, and the relationship changed the fortunes of 
the Northcoast activists.  Woods’ hair was down the middle of his back, but the group 
was less hippie than it was country bumpkin by Bailey’s account.  After the meeting, 
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Arbit agreed to finance the campaign, but demanded his contributions remain 
anonymous, and that attorneys review and approve the draft language of the initiative.  
The budding partnership almost immediately fell apart.  Back north, Richard Johnson, 
proprietor of a very small paper entitled Mendocino Environmentalist, convinced 
Llewallen that it was elitist not to reveal the name of their funder and that Llewallen 
ought to give him an interview and talk about Arbit.  Despite the small readership, the 
incident soured the relationship between Arbit and Forests Forever.  Lewallen was 
removed from the steering committee, and Arbit remained committed, but he never truly 
trusted the country folk again, and he grew less interested in their ideas and input.  Tom 
Lippe, an attorney used by EPIC, was hired to redraft the initiative, and Bailey 
remembered sitting at his office on Christmas Eve 1989, with Lippe, Carl Pope -- the 
President of the Sierra Club, and Woods, finalizing the draft so they could meet the 
Secretary of State’s deadline and get Tom to the hospital for the birth of his first child.  
Once the Secretary of State accepted the language of the ballot question, Forests Forever 
formed a statewide campaign committee and hired professional signature-gathering and 
campaign experts to carry out the on-the-ground operations.179 
 The campaign did not get off to an auspicious start, and the poor beginning played 
a crucial role in the eventual failure of the Forests Forever Initiative.  The organization 
established a statewide steering committee comprised of Dave Edelson, Cecelia Lanman, 
Woods, Kathy Bailey, Warren Chabot, and Jerry Meral, who had previously managed a 
successful parks bond initiative for PCL.  At Meral’s suggestion, the campaign hired Leo 
McElroy, a Sacramento-based campaign manager who worked with Meral on the park 
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bond.  Forests Forever hired Ken Masterton to run the signature-gathering operation.  
From the beginning, the initiative, Proposition 130, garnered the attention of the press.  In 
January, The Press Democrat ran an article about the initiative.  In the article, Campbell 
accused the Department of Fish and Game of appeasing “Earth First! and their 
supporters,” after DFG lobbied against a Pacific Lumber harvest plan because it would 
have jeopardized wildlife habitat.  The article positioned the Forests Forever initiative as 
the vehicle for putting the long-running conflict on the Northcoast in the hands of 
statewide voters.  Campbell and the timber industry continued to tie the initiative to Earth 
First! throughout the election season, an especially important tactic because the timber 
industry submitted its own initiative to compete with Forests Forever and Big Green.180 
The San Francisco Examiner also ran a large piece on the redwood wars in 
January.  The article introduced the arguments from the industry that the economic value 
of second growth forests was greater in the long run because they grow faster than old 
growth trees, and that the land was zoned for timber production as a renewable crop, a 
designation they believed precluded other uses for the land.  The coverage also allowed 
space for environmentalists to point to the old growth forests’ ecological values and their 
desire to focus on longer-term sustainability issues with respect to timber harvests and 
ecological health.  Unsurprisingly, the press paid gravitated toward the cultural and social 
conflicts of the war, highlighting for example, the fact that Lanman’s children were 
teased at school, that some parents had petitioned a local school board in Humboldt to 
remove The Lorax from the book shelves, and that Don Nolan, a logging truck business 
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owner, told reporters that the environmental activists were Communists, terrorists, and 
long-haired intruders who were his “worst enemy.”  Some articles also described a fragile 
alliance between some loggers and the environmental activists.  In all, the coverage 
offered Bay Area residents a glimpse into the personalities and conflicts of the redwood 
wars, with the environmental activists portrayed as the most sympathetic figures.181   
Despite the generally sympathetic press coverage, all was not well inside the 
Forests Forever campaign due to internal and external obstacles.  At the end of January, 
Woods stopped working and threatened to permanently resign unless the campaign paid 
him more than the seven dollars per hour he earned at the time.  Approximately a week 
later, Congressman Fortney “Pete” Stark drew the ire of the timber industry when he 
proposed an amendment to the tax code that banned deductions for expenses related to 
the harvesting of old growth redwoods, a change directed specifically at Pacific Lumber 
because they owned almost all the remaining old growth in private hands.  On February 
8, Pacific Lumber and Louisiana-Pacific announced they had reached a voluntary 
agreement with State Senator Barry Keene, State Assemblyman Dan Hauser, and 
Congressman Doug Bosco.  Pacific Lumber agreed to a two-year moratorium on logging 
within the 3000 acre Headwaters Grove, and LP agreed to limit the amount of raw logs it 
exported to its new Mexico mill.  Both companies agreed to a moratorium on clearcuts in 
old growth groves.  In exchange, the elected officials agreed not to support the Forests 
Forever initiative.  The deal became known as the “Boskeenauser” napkin deal.  In 
addition to the tensions with Woods, the organization grew weary of Leo McElroy and 
his inability to coordinate all the moving pieces of the campaign, including his own pre-
occupation with convincing the Northcoast activists to denounce Earth First!.  
                                                        




Meanwhile, the Yellow Ribbon Coalition distributed fliers in Humboldt claiming that all 
three of the timber initiatives would stop timber harvests in Humboldt and cause 
thousand of people to lose their jobs.  In May, the qualifying signatures were in the 
Secretary of State’s office, Bari and Cherney’s car was bombed, and Dave Foreman and 
other EF! activists were arrested in Arizona after a failed attempt to cut down a power 
line in the desert.   Hal Arbit did not believe Bari and Cherney had not placed the bomb 
in their car, McElroy continued to obsess about the perceived connection between EF! 
and the initiative, and Woods left for Siberia because he felt Arbit fenced him in and 
disapproved of Woods’ statements to the media regarding “timber corporadoes” and the 
fallacy of private property rights.  The prospects of the initiative did not seem good as 
summer began.182 
 During the early summer, the initiative’s fortunes were resurrected, but apparent 
success was unexpectedly snatched away on Election Day, a defeat that contributed to the 
subsequent escalation of the conflict by the Northcoast activists, eventually forcing 
federal Executive Branch intervention.  The campaign hired Steve Glazer, an experienced 
initiative manager from Southern California.  Glazer agreed the association of the 
initiative with Earth First! was not helpful, especially because of the arrest of Foreman in 
Arizona and the tensions swirling around the upcoming Redwood Summer actions.  
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However, EF! was not involved with Forests Forever, and Glazer was not obsessed with 
convincing the campaign to denounce EF!.  Instead, Glazer focused on courting moderate 
and conservative endorsements, and refocusing the campaign on the content of the 
various forestry initiatives.  Regardless, Bailey, Glazer, Arbit and others were concerned 
about how Redwood Summer would play out and what effect it might have on their 
efforts.  They were pleasantly surprised when no violence erupted on the Northcoast, and 
when none of the media coverage tied EF! to the ballot initiative.  For their part, Forests 
Forever focused on delivering the message that their initiative was better than the timber 
industry’s initiative – for workers and for the forest.  They hand-delivered pamphlets 
across the Northcoast, and with the help of Arbit and Frank Wells of the Disney family, 
the campaign hired Syd Galanty to produce several television ads.  Additionally, Frank 
Green produced the documentary, “The Forest through the Trees,” which ran on Channel 
9 in San Francisco leading up to the election.  For the activists, the comparison of the 
initiatives was straight forward:  their initiative provided for the purchase of the 3000 
acre Headwaters and Elk Head Springs Groves via a bond, banned clearcutting, required 
wildlife surveys for all harvest plans in old growth stands, gave DFG authority to require 
wildlife protections in harvest plans, required every timber company develop a Sustained 
Yield Plan before it could conduct any new logging, and reduced the number of seats on 
the BOF dedicated to timber industry representatives, among other reforms.183 
The campaign needed to win a majority of votes and defeat the timber industry’s 
initiative because the industry initiative contained a provision invalidating the Forests 
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Forever Initiative.  Part of the campaign effort thus evolved into convincing the public 
that the industry measure was a wolf in sheep’s clothing.  Primarily, Forests Forever 
emphasized the “Global Warming and Clearcutting Reduction, Wildlife Protection and 
Reforestation Act of 1990” provided for the acquisition of only 1600 acres of ancient 
redwood forest that weren’t even within Headwaters Forest, included no funding 
mechanism, limited clearcutting in old growth stands to ten acres at a time with no 
restrictions on time or distance between clearcuts, reduced by only fifty percent 
clearcutting on all other properties, provided for a public bond for the rehabilitation of 
private and public forests, merely created a task force to evaluate forestry and wildlife 
issues, and replaced individual Timber Harvest Plans with a single Timber Management 
Plan for a landowner’s entire holdings.  The TMP was automatically approved unless 
CDF took action to deny the plan.  The clearcutting ban did not apply to TMP holders.  
The late-summer efforts of Forests Forever paid enormous dividends, and on Election 
Day Bailey recalled one industry lobbyist congratulated her on her victory.  In the end, 
neither initiative passed.  Forests Forever garnered forty-eight percent of the vote (Big 
Green garnered just thirty-four percent by comparison), probably a last-minute victim of 
the Republican electoral victories in other statewide elections that day, though Bailey and 
Woods also argued that McElroy’s obsession with EF!, and the diminished influence of 
the “country folk” with Arbit also played large roles in the defeat because both situations 
caused management to move more slowly than was required.184  
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The initiative experience offered the activists valuable lessons in public campaign 
management and increased their power on the state level, tools they would use effectively 
during the later national campaigns to protect Headwaters Forest.  After the failure of 
Proposition 130, Hal Arbit, Kathy Bailey, and others continuted to pursue comprehensive 
forestry reform in the state legislative arena, but were only successful at blocking bills 
they opposed.  Kathy Bailey resigned from Forests Forever due to internal tensions and 
Lanman kept the organization alive, but it eventually transformed into a Bay Area 
signature-gathering and ballot initiative campaign outfit.  However, the Prop 130 
campaign forced the timber industry to recognize the widespread unpopularity of their 
practices, and Arbit used his new influence to help push the legislature to reform timber 
harvest practices.   
Arbit used the threat of a 1992 ballot initiative to spur legislative action.  Bailey 
and another Northcoast activist, Connie Best, drafted the language for a new initiative 
and gathered the statewide signatures required to qualify the initiative.  Simultaneously, 
Arbit and Meral hired long-time Northcoast Sierra Club volunteer and former Forests 
Forever spokesperson, Gail Lucas, to recruit legislators and industry representatives to 
negotiate a package of logging reform bills.  Lucas and Eric Swanson signed on 
legislators Byron Sher, Dan Hauser, Barry Keene, and Don McCorkdale to negotiate with 
Lucas, Tom Nelson from Sierra Pacific Industries, Mike Anderson with Georgia Pacific, 
and representatives from Pacific Lumber and other timber companies.  Dr. Hans J. 
Burkhardt and Swanson, veterans of the Northcoast activist movement, developed the 
technical package of reforms that Lucas presented to the legislators and industry 




engineer for Remco in Mendocino.  With the package created, Arbit withdrew the 
initiative from consideration.  Because Lucas was identified with the Sierra Club, and 
because of a history of animosity between Lucas and EPIC (Lucas had, during the 
Sinkyone battles, told the press she didn’t think old growth was as important as 
sustainable forestry), the package of reforms was derisively referred to as the Sierra 
Accord.  For more than a year, the package worked its way through the Assembly, 
accreted dozens of amendments that watered down the bill from the environmentalists’ 
perspective, Sierra dropped its endorsement, and Lucas went to work for PCL and 
continued working on the legislation that developed into the Grand Accord, or Wilson 
Accord, because the Governor shepherded the bills beginning in January 1992.  Bailey 
and the California Sierra Club convinced Speaker Willie Brown to kill the bills in 
January 1992, and again in the spring of 1992.  Thus, the first serious round of efforts to 




The Headwaters Forest Protection Act:  Pushing the Feds to take a Crack at Resolving 
the Conflict over Headwaters Forest 
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Later in 1992, the election of then-Democrat Dan Hamburg offered Northcoast 
environmental activists new hope for protecting Headwaters Forest, if not for statewide 
forestry reform, and they nearly immediately forced the issue onto the national stage.  
Hamburg was part of the earliest wave of 1960s activists who moved to the Northcoast, 
and was elected on a broad platform of universal health care, reduction of the Defense 
budget, and social justice.  As Hamburg explained, his campaign was caught up in the 
enthusiasm for Presidential candidate William Jefferson Clinton.  Democrat Doug Bosco 
was defeated in 1990 by Republican Frank Riggs, and in 1992, Hamburg ran unopposed 
in the Democratic primary, presumably because the national party forced Bosco to back 
out due to his involvement in the Congressional check kiting scandal of 1992.  
Additionally, Riggs held a position in the so-called Gang of Seven demanding an 
independent investigation of the scandal. Though the redwood wars were not a part of 
Hamburg’s campaign platform, he sensed the Headwaters conflict would be an issue for 
his office.  Democratic Congressman Fortney “Pete” Stark from the Bay Area had 
introduced bills during at least the previous two Congresses targetting the Pacific Lumber 
controversies.  Stark’s  bills would have authorized Congress to purchase all 200,000 
acres of Pacific Lumber land, and would have altered the federal tax code to penalize old 
growth redwood logging.  Late in the 1992 Congressional session, Riggs also introduced 
a bill authorizing the acquisition of a few thousand acres of Headwaters Forest, providing 
that Pacific Lumber was a willing seller.  None of Stark’s or Riggs’ efforts ever received 
time on the House floor, and Congressional action was not a priority for the Northcoast 
activists, but that quickly changed in 1993.186   
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It was the Northcoast activists who forced Hamburg to take up the Headwaters 
issue, not an issue his DC staff pushed toward him.  The distinction is crucial because 
much of the literature describes national environmental politics as driven from inside the 
Capital Hill beltway.  During Hamburg’s term in Congress, after their unsuccessful 
efforts at the state level, the Northcoast activists poured energy and resources into solving 
the Headwaters conflict federally, frustrated by the power of the timber industry locally.  
Shortly after his election, Hamburg travelled to Arcata for an interview on Humboldt 
State University’s radio station.  A caller asked Hamburg when he was going to introduce 
a Headwaters Forest protection bill.  Hamburg replied that he intended to, but wanted to 
take the time to develop a bill that could actually pass.  In January 1993, Hamburg and 
his office began meeting with Kathy Bailey, Darryl Cherney, Judi Bari, Woods, Cecelia 
Lanman, and other Northcoast activists from EPIC, EF!, and the Redwood Chapter of the 
Sierra Club.  The activists took on the task of writing a federal proposal, and Larry Evans 
worked on computer-generated maps documenting the changes in the Headwaters Forest 
landscape since the Maxxam takeover.  Many of the meetings took place at the EPIC 
offices.  The activists divided up responsibilities of crafting the proposal with Kurt 
Newman in charge of the acreage committee, Lanman in charge of the land management 
specifics, Bari focused on a workers package, and Cherney leading the committee to 
develop a funding mechanism.  Hamburg’s office would put the proposal into legislative 
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language.  As the Northcoast working group developed its plan, Stark re-introduced his 
tax code bill in March, placing Headwaters in front of Congress again. 187 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1993, Stark’s bill, word of Hamburg’s bill, 
and other Congressional action buzzed through the Northcoast, forcing the timber 
industry and the activist community to enter the federal fray.  John Campbell told the 
Associated Press that Stark and Hamburg were “captive of the special interests of the 
radical environmental community,” and had no regard for workers on the Northcoast.  
The company hired Doug Bosco, at the rate of fifteen thousand dollars per month, to 
lobby against the bills.  The Humboldt Beacon editorial staff referred to Hamburg as 
arrogant and callous, and accused him of developing his proposal without the input of 
Humboldt residents.  When Hamburg introduced H.R. 2866 on August fourth, even Earth 
First!, whose primary organizers participated in crafting the proposal Hamburg worked 
from, protested the bill.  Hamburg’s bill proposed to protect approximately sixty 
thousand acres of Headwaters Forest through acquisition, National Forest designation, 
and wildlife study areas.  Earth First! wanted to create a ninety-eight thousand acre 
wilderness area, and despite, or maybe because, of Cherney’s and Bari’s involvement 
with the Hamburg bill, Alicia Littletree told local reporters that while she appreciated 
Hamburg’s efforts, the bill did not remove enough acreage from “corporate control” to 
ensure the community could decide how to protect the ancient redwood ecosystem and 
the local logging industry.  The dropping of Hamburg’s bill, and the recognition that they 
needed to target Maxxam as the villain, led to the late August Week of Outrage Against 
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Maxxam.  Congress indirectly added fuel to the controversy when it eliminated the tax 
loophole rewarding the timber industry for exporting raw logs, and when H.R. 1664, the 
Forest Biodiversity and Clearcutting Prohibition Act was introduced, a bill that would 
have thwarted development on nearly sixty million acres of National Forest land in 
addition to the prohibition of clearcutting on federal land.  188 
Hurwitz and Pacific Lumber, in addition to Hamburg’s election and the actions of 
local activists, also propelled the conflict into the federal arena.  In December 1992, 
Pacific Lumber filed a new bond offering with the SEC, and the company reorganized its 
operations so that the mills, the old growth groves, and the town of Scotia were Pacific 
Lumber property, while a new wholly owned subsidiary, Scotia Pacific Holding 
Company, owned the young forest.  According to activist analysis, the filings included a 
provision ensuring the proceeds of a Headwaters Forest sale would be used to pay the 
bond debt, a sure sign, they believed, that Hurwitz intended to sell Headwaters and 
dismantle the company.  The activists’ analysis was partly corroborated by the press.  In 
early August 1993, after Hamburg introduced his bill, Wall Street Journal writer, Charles 
McCoy, wrote an article about Hurwitz asserting the Maxxam chief wanted the federal 
government to purchase 4500 acres of Headwaters Grove for hundreds of millions of 
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dollars, or the company would move ahead with plans to log the grove.  With Hurwitz 
and the Northcoast activists eyeballing Congress, most of the redwood war action 
revolved around Washington, DC during 1994.189 
  The place all eyes rested was the office of Dan Hamburg.  Hamburg’s bill, “The 
Headwaters Forest Act,” as introduced in August 1993, required the federal government 
to acquire approximately forty-four thousand acres of Pacific Lumber and Elk River 
Timber lands by donation, donated funds, exchange, and/or public appropriations.  The 
acquired land was to be included in the Six Rivers National Forest, with a portion 
designated for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System, and the rest 
governed by a management plan that excluded timber sales of old growth redwood, 
provided for the restoration of previously harvested areas that impaired marbled murrelet, 
northern spotted owl, native salmon stocks, and other species.  Unemployed timber and 
commercial fishery workers were to conduct the restoration work.  The bill also provided 
annual payments to Humboldt County and the State of California for lost Timber Yield 
Tax revenues.  Finally, the bill required a federal study of an additional acreage of 
approximately 14,000 acres to identify any old-growth forests and habitat of endangered 
or threatened species.  Not specifically in the bill, but endorsed by Hamburg and 
Representative Stark, was a plan to fund the acquisition with a so-called debt-for-nature 
swap, an idea given prominence by the efforts of Darryl Cherney.  In 1992, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Company informed United Financial Group, parent company to the 
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failed United Savings Association of Texas (USAT), that the company and its former 
officers were liable for any breach of fiduciary duty.  Hurwitz was the CEO of United 
Financial, and Maxxam was a major shareholder.  USAT regularly purchased “junk” 
bonds from Michael Milken, including those offered to finance the Pacific Lumber 
acquisition.  The idea, additionally spurred on by the newly founded Rose Foundation in 
Los Angeles, was to force Hurwitz to give up Headwaters Forest in exchange for some of 
the more than $1 billion claims against USAT in the S&L failure.  Hamburg, Stark, and 
the Northcoast activists believed the debt-for-nature swap was the best way to acquire 
Headwaters because it required no appropriation and exacted justice on Hurwitz for his 
role in the Texas S&L failure.190 
 The positions of Pacific Lumber and the activists were well known after the 
October 1993 subcommittee hearings for The Headwaters Act, a hearing that offered the 
locals a national platform to discuss the local conflict.  John Campbell expressed the 
company’s outrage that the bill required Congress to acquire the land regardless of the 
company’s willingness to sell.  Campbell argued the Redwood National Park purchase 
decades earlier had already left the county in economic ruins, and that Hamburg’s bill 
would crush the county’s largest remaining private employer by confiscating nearly thirty 
percent of its land.  The company contended that enough ancient redwoods were already 
protected in state and national parks, and that Hamburg’s proposal was thus unnecessary 
and too expensive for taxpayers during a time of enormous budget deficits.  Finally, 
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Campbell asserted the company was willing to sell 4500 acres – the Headwaters Grove 
and a surrounding buffer – at a price equivalent to what the logs on the property were 
worth.  The two-year voluntary moratorium on logging Headwaters Grove had expired, 
and Campbell told the committee the company would be forced to log the area due to its 
responsibility to its shareholders unless an agreement could be reached.   
Stark, Hamburg, and the activists who testified argued that fair market value was 
not equivalent to the value of the logs because many of them could not be harvested due 
to the restrictions of the Endangered Species and Forest Practices Acts.  Kathy Bailey and 
Cecelia Lanman testified about the need to protect the last ancient redwood groves in 
private hands; the crucial role the Headwaters complex played for marbled murrelet, 
northern spotted owl, and salmon; and the need to reform timber practices to more 
sustainably harvest the forests of the Northcoast.  The activists and Hamburg leaned 
heavily on a set of wildlife biologists to make their cases– Peter Moyle and Kim Nelson 
especially.  They additionally relied on the Thanksgiving 1992 Owl Creek timber 
operation and the press accounts about the doubled rate of logging to vilify Maxxam and 
Hurwitz.  Bailey particularly focused on the company’s logging since 1986, and pointed 
out that of the 44,000 proposed acres, Pacific Lumber had logged more than 23,000 acres 
since 1986, with only 900 of those young growth acres, and argued if any ancient and 
residual old-growth groves were to be saved, immediate action was necessary.  Lanman 
highlighted the inaction of CDF and BOF, the resistance of Pacific Lumber to court and 




by surrounding ancient forest with clearcuts and puncturing ancient groves with roads, 
thus reducing their value to wildlife.191 
 By early 1994, the action surrounding The Headwaters Forest Act quickened, 
driven by Northcoast residents.  Had their influence not been as great, and had Hamburg 
not embraced their agenda, the issue probably would have died early in 1994.  It was, 
after all, an election year, and political operatives and Northcoast supporters believed the 
Congressman needed to avoid a campaign referendum on the Headwaters issue; it was 
too volatile.  However, the Northcoast activists formed the Headwaters Forest 
Coordinating Committee – another reference to the Civil Rights Movement -- to 
coordinate efforts to pass Hamburg’s bill, and the effort was extraordinarily successful 
given the locals lack of federal experience.   Bailey, Cherney, Lanman, Jill Ratner from 
Rose Foundation, Tom Lippe, and others orchestrated the advocacy efforts.  In February 
1994, HFCC produced its own proposal for the Headwaters Forest complex.  It was very 
similar to the Hamburg bill, though HFCC wanted to explicitly use a debt-for-nature 
swap, and they wanted to acquire additional lands over time using private funds, 
including the so-called Northern Headwaters Grove from Elk River Timber, owned by 
Sierra Pacific, the largest private landowner in California.  The HFCC went so far as to 
assign a negotiating team to work with Red Emerson of Elk River Timber on a plan to 
alter logging plans for the Northern grove, negotiate a purchase price, and avoid an EPIC 
lawsuit.  In April, Doug Bosco started running ads for the District One Democratic 
primary that attacked Hamuburg on his economic vision for the county.  John Campbell 
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and his wife thought the primary important enough to re-register as Democrats and 
supported Bosco.  Later in the spring, the PALCO Family Defense Fund signed a contract 
with the DC-Based American Land Rights Association to organize national opposition to 
the Hamburg bill.  Meanwhile, HCFF geared up for a round of lobby meetings in DC.  
Kathy Bailey, Cecelia Lanman, Darryl Cherney, and others from the Northcoast spent 
considerable time in Washington, trying to convince other groups and members of 
Congress to support Hamburg’s bill.192 
In that busy environment, The Headwaters Forest Act moved through the House 
committees and onto the floor.  In early April, the Agriculture Committee’s 
subcommittee on Special Crops and Natural Resources, and the Natural Resource’s 
subcommittee on National Parks, forests and public lands each passed the bill.  On May 
11, the full House Natural Resources Committee marked up the bill and ordered it 
scheduled for a voice vote.  At this point, John Campbell and Red Emerson, along with 
other timber industry executives and Political Action Committees lobbied against the bill 
and donated heavily to Bosco’s campaign in an effort to derail support for Hamburg and 
the bill.  Doug Thron, a student at Humboldt State University who had begun trespassing 
on Pacific Lumber land in 1992 to photograph the forest and the timber harvests, 
embarked on a summer tour of his photographs to drum up public support and 
Congressional cosponsors for the bill.  Thorn used the national infrastructure of the Sierra 
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Club to recruit viewers across the country.  In mid-July, the Agriculture Committee 
marked up the bill and reported it to a vote.  Pacific Lumber had former Congressman 
Bosco, DC-Democratic lobbyist Tommy Boggs, and President Clinton’s advisor, Vernon 
Jordan working to defeat the bill, and the bill languished. On August ninth, with no vote 
scheduled in either the Agriculture or Natural Resources Committee, Hamburg and 
Hurwitz met in DC.  On August fifteenth, Pacific Lumber reversed its position and 
publicly endorsed a new version of the bill stating it had reached an agreement with 
Hamburg to insert “willing seller” language, but that they were not going to sell forty-
four thousand acres to the public.  John Campbell said they just wanted to end the 
conflict and get paid for giving up company land.  On that same day, many of the 
national environmental groups joined EPIC, California Sierra Club, and Earth First! in 
their lobbying efforts in DC.193 
On August sixteenth, both committees reported the bills, and the bill was placed 
on the House calendar for debate.  At 4:40 PM on September 21, 1994, the House 
approved The Headwaters Forest Act 288 to 133 after the bill was amended to include 
“willing seller” language, a $200,000 purchase cap, a “buy union” provision, and a 
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provision allowing the Forest Service to acquire land as it became available for sale 
instead of requiring them to purchase all of the land at once.  The Senate received the bill 
on September 23rd, and it was reported to the Energy and Natural Resources Committee 
where Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) had introduced her nearly identical version on July 
14.  On the last day of the Senate session, Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming 
filibustered California Senator Dianne Feinstein’s California Desert Lands Act, with 
Majority Leader George Mitchell (ME) calling Senators back to town to vote before they 
went home to finish their re-election campaigns.  At 5:11 pm the filibuster broke, the bill 
passed, and the Senate adjourned.  The Desert Lands Act, covering various degrees of 
protection for six million acres, was a major priority for national environmental groups 
and the California delegation, especially Feinstein who faced re-election that fall, and the 
Headwaters bill was subsumed by the efforts to pass Feinstein’s bill.  On that final day of 
the Senate, the Headwaters bill was placed on the unanimous consent calendar where at 
least one anonymous Senator blocked its passage as time ran out on the second session of 
the 103rd Congress.  Kathy Bailey, and Darryl Cherney sat in the galley of the Senate and 
watched impotently, and any hopes of reintroducing the bill in 1995 died when Hamburg 
lost his re-election bid to Frank Riggs.  His presence, and his subsequent focus on 
Senator Boxer as the one who killed the bill, often distracted the Northcoast activists 
from positive campaign work.  It is telling that two activists who largely rejected middle-
class life sat in the galley of the most powerful legislative body in the nation that day.  
The efforts of the locals – company leaders and activists – had pushed the Headwaters 
conflict out of the Northcoast forests and courtrooms and into the national arena.  For 




and traditional- ideas and tactics.  The defeat of the Hamburg bill highlighted the local 
parochial nature of the conflict, but the bill’s existence highlighted the power of the 
locals to influence national debates, a power underappreciated by scholars who generally 
have emphasized the top-down nature of the construction of the modern environmental 
protection regime.194 
 
Going above the Head of the State:  Litigating Actions Spiraling 
Toward the Federal Courts 
 
EPIC Victories Begun During the 1980s:  Native Salmon, Maxxam II, Sierra v. BOF 
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 The locals’ direct action and legislative strategies pushed the redwood wars out of 
the Northcoast, and so too did the litigation action from 1990 to 1994.  The Sacramento-
based Board of Forestry intervened as a result of timber harvest litigations; the California 
Supreme Court intervened in the conflict between the Northcoast environmentalists and 
the timber industry and its agency ally, CDF and the Board; and finally, frustrated by the 
persistent efforts of Pacific Lumber to log the old growth within Headwaters Forest, 
EPIC filed suit in federal court.  By the end of 1994, after four years of public relations, 
legislative, and legal attacks on its policies and practices, the Board of Forestry and the 
Department of Forestry had taken several steps to cut its corporatist ties, yet remained 
under attack from the Northcoast activists who wanted the agency to take even greater 
action, especially after the state Supreme Court validated their legal arguments once and 
for all.  By the end of 1994, all interested parties on the Northcoast awaited a federal 
ruling that would determine the fate of Owl Creek Grove and Pacific Lumber’s rights in 
that grove. 
In addition to introducing new industry arguments that questioned the validity of 
classifying murrelets as old-growth dependent species and the need to expand redwood 
park land, Maxxam II – begun in 1988 -- marked the initial, if seemingly reluctant, split 
between the timber industry and the Board.  The trial judge ruled against Maxxam and 
again accused Forestry of “rubber-stamping” and intimidation. The appellate court also 
disagreed with the company’s argument, but the case was dismissed in 1992, for three 
reasons, two of which were victories of sort for EPIC, and one a symbol of the 
determination of Pacific Lumber to carry out its new timber regime.  The case was 




areas between March 1988 and May 1988—the date EPIC obtained a preliminary 
injunction; 2) Forestry adopted emergency regulations covering old growth timber plans, 
marbled murrelet and northern spotted owl habitat, and cumulative impact analysis; and 
3) EPIC and Sierra Club obtained an injunction on the harvest plan for Lawrence Creek 
(the second contested plan) in 1989 via Sierra v. BOF.  The appellate court, while 
dismissing the case, recognized the influence of citizen groups on the Board’s behavior, 
writing:  
The record ... leaves no doubt that environmental litigation, such as EPIC's 
Preliminary Injunction in this case, played an important role in bringing about 
changes in departmental policies. To this extent, the issue of mootness is a 
product of EPIC's own success.   
 
The judge then strengthened EPIC’s position as a private attorney general by forcing 
Pacific Lumber to pay EPIC’s attorney fees.  The company was able to log in the 
disputed area, but the pressure brought on the Board by the litigation caused the agency 
to stray from the hard-line position that CEQA did not apply to Timber Harvest Plans as 
evidenced by the agency’s creation of the new regulations without a direct court order.  
The new regulations played a key role in breaking down development-focused 
corporatism because the Board responded to citizens and courts, not to the wishes of the 
timber industry, and the rules recognized the Board’s responsibility to non-economic 
forestland resources.195  
The Native Salmon case also concluded during the early 1990s, and again, the 
conclusion bolstered EPIC and Sierra’s legal arguments and drove a wedge between the 
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timber industry and the forestry agency, undermining de facto corporatism.  The parties 
signed an out-of-court agreement on 23 September 1993.  Forestry agreed to further rule 
changes that put the agency in compliance with CEQA regarding cumulative impact 
analysis, mitigation, and public comments.  Additionally, The appellate decision that 
legitimized the case opened the door for environmental groups to challenge policies 
wholesale, not simply individual harvest plans.  The settlement forced written changes in 
Forestry practices that EPIC had been fighting for over a decade to achieve. 196   
 
Sierra v. Board of Forestry:  The Donkey in the California Supreme Court, continued 
 In 1994, The California Supreme Court sided once and for all with the citizen 
groups with respect to the relevance of CEQA to timber operations on private land, and 
the Board of Forestry, long the stronghold of industry influence, backed away from 
Pacific Lumber.   EPIC and Sierra Club appealed Judge Buffington’s 1989 denial of their 
writ of mandate, and after the appellate court overturned Buffington’s ruling, the Board 
withdrew its support of Pacific Lumber in the case.  The Board further distanced itself 
from corporatist tradition when it issued the new regulations that caused the dismissal of 
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Maxxam II.  The two Board actions demonstrate the success of citizen litigation at 
destabilizing the traditional relationship between the Board and industry.197 
When the state Supreme Court ruled against Pacific Lumber, it delivered industry 
independence and property prerogatives a staggering blow.  As it ended one conflict, the 
court escalated another when it increased the legal demands on the industry and the 
Board to protect non-timber forest resources.  Like previous lower courts, the court ruled 
the Board had to comply with CEQA and the Forest Practice Act alike and that the Board 
had the authority to require new information from timber companies (such as wildlife 
surveys) that the Forest Practice Rules did not explicitly require but that Forestry deemed 
necessary to comply with CEQA guidelines.  In fact, the court further underscored the 
Board’s non-timber responsibilities when it argued that not requiring timber companies to 
submit enough information to assess and prevent environmental damage violated CEQA.  
The victory for EPIC and Sierra Club forced the Board to further reform its practices 
regarding ancient forests, and it forced the agency to recognize its responsibilities for old-
growth-dependent species.  During the ten years after Johnson, citizen litigation exposed 
and discredited the de facto corporatist regime, destroyed the autonomy the Board and the 
industry once enjoyed, and drove a wedge between the industry and the agency.  
However, legal battles over non-timber resources escalated because the agency, and 
especially the timber industry yet again failed to embrace the ruling.198 
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Owl Creek: Endangered Species and the Nationalization of the Conflict over Private 
Forest Management 
The fight over corporatism was played all over the Northcoast, but the fight over 
non-timber responsibilities on private timber land was mainly fought in the Headwaters 
Forest arena, and it was a fight citizen groups largely won when they moved the legal 
venue to federal court.  In particular, Owl Creek Grove continued to play a crucial role in 
the litigation campaign of Northcoast activists.  While Sierra V. BOF worked its way 
through the courts, EPIC and Sierra filed a challenge to a new harvest plan in Owl Creek, 
THP 90-237 HUM.  When the case stalled in state court, EPIC filed suit in federal court 
to use the Endangered Species Act to stop the logging plan.  The federal court case 
reinforced the Board’s obligation to citizens and non-timber forest values, revised 
endangered species case precedent, and unintentionally drove President Clinton, 
Governor Wilson, and Charles Hurwitz to the negotiating table in an attempt to end the 
conflict over Headwaters Forest.  EPIC filed suit in federal court because three things 
changed in northern California.  First, the murrelet was protected under both the 
California and federal Endangered Species Acts.  Second, Pacific Lumber seems to have 
decided that it could no longer count on the Board to protect its interests so it became 
more aggressive and independent with its court actions.  And third, state judges began to 
rule against EPIC.     
The listing of the marbled murrelet as a “threatened” species on 1 October 1992 
proved to be vital to EPIC’s challenge of Pacific Lumber’s old growth harvesting plan.  
The state case challenging an old growth harvest plan in the Owl Creek Grove of 




after the murrelet’s federal status changed and Pacific Lumber worked feverishly to log 
the area.  For example, on 2 November, Superior Judge Morton Colvin rejected Pacific 
Lumber’s motion to dismiss the state case due to what the company perceived as Judge 
Ferroggiaro’s anti-company bias.  However, Pacific Lumber simultaneously persuaded a 
court clerk to schedule a hearing with a visiting judge on a motion to dismiss the case, 
and on 22 November, despite Judge Colvin’s prior rejection of Pacific Lumber’s 
dismissal motion, visiting Judge Hatch dismissed the case.199 
 Then the conflict turned even uglier.  On 24 November 1992 California Fish and 
Game spoke to Pacific Lumber and told them not to resume logging in Owl Creek 
without complying with federal Endangered Species law, and the company agreed to 
consult with U.S. Fish and Wildlife before logging.  With Earth First! activists 
conducting nightly hikes to Owl Creek, Pacific Lumber resumed logging on 28 
November, Thanksgiving weekend, without consulting Fish and Game or Fish and 
Wildlife.   It was the first time in the sixteen-year career of Pacific Lumber’s chief timber 
operations manager, Dan McLaughlin, that the company logged over Thanksgiving, and 
he asserted that Owl Creek was the only area harvested.  The next day, Fish and Wildlife 
sent EPIC a letter informing it that the harvest constituted a “taking” in violation of the 
Endangered Species Act.  The agency had told Pacific Lumber before the 28th that the 
company’s partial surveys indicated Murrelet occupation of Owl Creek.  On 1 December 
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1992 the California appeals court issued an emergency stay of logging operations in Owl 
Creek.200  
On 16 April 1993, EPIC filed suit against Pacific Lumber, Forestry, the Board, 
Fish and Game, Fish and Wildlife, and Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt in federal 
court, arguing that all the parties were responsible for allowing “harm” to a listed species 
in violation of section 9 of the Endangered Species Act.  EPIC filed suit in federal court 
because they were frustrated about the state court proceedings and Pacific Lumber 
logging activities.  Additionally, Macon Cowles – an environmental attorney in the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill litigation – suggested that EPIC sue in federal court after he read 
Charles McCoy’s 1993 Wall Street Journal article about the conflict over Headwaters 
Forest.  EPIC attorney Sharon Duggan agreed the claimants had a better shot in federal 
court because the Humboldt County judges were growing weary of EPIC and Pacific 
Lumber in their courtrooms, and that the Superior Courts did not have the resources or 
time to thoroughly review the massive administrative records compiled in the cases.  The 
cases against the agencies were dismissed later in 1993, and the federal case against 
Pacific Lumber was tried in August and September 1994, but a ruling would not come 
down until early 1995.201    
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The legislative opportunities to end the timber wars, or one front of the wars, 
during the early 1990s developed because the local Northcoast activists pursued new 
strategies and developed new tactics in their dogged pursuit of logging reform and 
ancient redwood protection in their Northcoast community.  Their efforts highlighted 
their commitment to active land use management and human integration into their 
biocentrist vision.  The campaigns also illustrate their nonmiddle-class values as well as 
their flexibility – their willingness to swallow their pride and work the traditional avenues 
and halls of power in order to protect their rural community and their vision of 
Northcoast sustainability.  The opportunities were not constructed by the agenda-setting 
and organizational development priorities of the national environmental groups or their 
allied Congressional staffers.  The success of the direct actions and litigation forced the 
state and the industry to attend to the issue, undermining de facto corporatism.  The 
failure of the efforts is testimony to the resources and political effectiveness of Pacific 
Lumber and the timber industry.  In 1995, the Marbled Murrelet case concluded and the 
aftershocks pulled President Clinton into the orbit of the redwood wars.  The intervention 
of the Executive Branch transformed the way the environmental protection regime acted 
upon private landowners.  All the while, the Northcoast activists pursued their two 
primary local goals:  protecting old growth groves of redwoods, and reforming timber 





Chapter 6:  The Transformation: Engaging the Federal 
Executive Branch, 1995 – 1999 
 
In 1994, Republicans led by Newt Gingrich took control of Congress and 
launched an assault on the modern environmental protection regime that powerfully 
influenced the Headwaters Forest conflict.  The attacks galvanized public support for 
mainstream environmental organizations and contributed to the success of the 
movement’s defensive campaigns.  Still, Congress slashed agency budgets and loudly 
threatened federal forestry policy and the Endangered Species Act.   Combined with the 
spotted owl conflict, the attacks led the new Clinton Administration to fear it might 
preside over the dismantling of the environmental protection regime.  The president 
evaded Congress by negotiating an administrative resolution to the spotted owl conflict.  
In doing so, the Clinton Administration hoped it could undercut Republican popularity 
and also avoid risky Endangered Species Act litigation.   
While federal agencies worked on the Northwest Forest Plan, the federal courts 
ruled Pacific Lumber could not harvest the old-growth within Owl Creek, and the stage 
was set for a face-off between the company and the Executive Branch.  As a result of 
presidential intervention, redwood politics were again transformed.  The citizen-driven 
regulatory reform and park acquisition pattern became a private negotiation between the 
Executive Branch and private landowners over the implementation of the Endangered 
Species Act.  The resulting “Headwaters Deal” subsequently helped transform 
environmental politics by thrusting the Executive Branch into the center of private 




dominant themes in postwar environmental history, and the Deal helped propel that 
process during the 1990s.  Contrary to the dominant interpretation of modern 
environmental politics, it was the local actors who drove the Capitol Beltway into action, 
not vice versus.  Additionally, the activists who dominated the conflict were not middle-
class professionals.  The Northcoast activists largely rejected middle-class work and 
values as demonstrated by their actions during the mid- to late 1990s.  Despite their 
ideals, the activists operated inside and outside the professional political world.202 
The intervention of the Executive Branch benefitted Pacific Lumber more than it 
did the Northcoast activists.  Since 1986, each set of local combatants had refused to 
surrender their steadfast visions for the Northcoast and had successfully adapted to the 
other’s tactical innovations, leaving little to no opportunity for direct mediation between 
the activists and the company.  Because Pacific Lumber held the trump card – a takings 
suit -- they were able to extract a steep price from the government.  Because of their 
stubborn commitment to their vision for the Northcoast, the activists wound up shutting 
themselves out of the administrative negotiations over the fate of Headwaters Forest.  To 
be fair, a major reason for their stymie was the success of their litigation and direct action 
innovations.  John Campbell and Charles Hurwitz were at their wits end and refused to 
engage the activists any longer, and the federal government could not risk the 
negotiations by inviting the radical Northcoasters to the table.  Ironically, the Deal 
universally disappointed the activists, but their success leading up to 1995 made the Deal 
possible 
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As the midpoint of the decade approached, tensions simmered and the Northcoast 
combatants in the redwood wars searched for new ways to break the logjam.  The 
activists had largely driven the activity to that point and had forced the company and state 
to adjust accordingly.  By the end of 1995, Pacific Lumber and the government reclaimed 
the reins and forced the activists to adapt, just as the activists previously won control 
when they moved the conflict from state to federal court.   In 1995, Pacific Lumber 
decided it could no longer wait for the courts to determine the fates of their timber 
harvests and initiated plans to log the residual old-growth groves of Yager Creek within 
the Headwaters Forest complex.  The company also applied for a salvage logging 
exemption for its entire holdings and steeled themselves for prolonged litigation in the 
federal Owl Creek case.  The activists responded by exponentially scaling up their 
protests and direct actions.  Equally important, they developed new legal angles to 
pursue.  Responding to a threatened Pacific Lumber lawsuit against the United States of 
America, President William Clinton directed the Department of the Interior and other 
agencies to intervene and resolve the conflict by negotiating directly with the firm.  What 
became known as the “Headwaters Deal” transformed the operation of the Endangered 
Species Act from a system largely directed by the legislature and courts into one directed 









Evading the Federal Edict: Pacific Lumber initiates its own “train 
wreck” strategy 
 
 During the partially contemporaneous spotted owl conflict in the Pacific 
Northwest, many environmentalists and government officials accused the G.W. Bush 
Administration and the timber industry of avoiding resolution in order to cause 
Endangered Species law and timber economics to destructively collide, creating a crisis 
over timber profits and jobs as a result of logging restrictions imposed by the ESA.  The 
theory posited that the industry and conservative lawmakers hoped the “train wreck” 
would spark a powerful movement to gut the Endangered Species Act.  In 1994, Clinton 
officials developed the Northwest Forest Plan to administratively resolve the spotted owl 
conflict.  By late 1994, Pacific Lumber seems to have initiated its own version of the train 
wreck strategy with the hope of evading judges and activists by catapulting its conflict 
into the Executive Branch as well.203 
While the Northcoast awaited U.S. District Judge Bechtle’s ruling in Marbled 
Murrelt v. Pacific Lumber, the firm and Northcoast activists worked as if the ruling 
would favor their opponent.  The trial ended September 7, 1994, and Pacific Lumber 
wasted no time harvesting what they could under a salvage logging exemption to remove 
dead, diseased, or dying trees across most their property, excluding Headwaters Grove.  
Much of the company’s activity was inside the Headwaters Forest complex however, and 
on November 29, CDF informed the company it was violating the exemption by 
removing healthy trees.  Environmentalists seized the CDF letter to argue Pacific Lumber 
                                                        




was not fit to manage the forest and that public acquisition of the land was thus 
necessary.  Undeterred, the company obtained a new salvage exemption for their entire 
holdings in December.  By executing the salvage exemptions, Pacific Lumber forced 
activists to change tack and develop a legal strategy against salvage exemptions while 
also increasing resources toward a renewed acquisition campaign.  As a result, Pacific 
Lumber regained much of the leverage in the conflict because they had legal and 
regulatory authority to log inside Headwaters.204 
Northcoast activists quickly responded with their own train wreck strategy.  The 
plan was to expand litigation and direct action, forcing CDF to unilaterally ban all 
logging in ancient and residual old-growth groves.  In January, EPIC asked Kathy Bailey, 
then the volunteer State Chair of Forestry for California Sierra Club, to convince her 
organization to once again join EPIC’s litigation against Forestry’s de facto corporatism.  
The litigation strategy developed by Brian Gaffney for EPIC attacked the continued 
failure of CDF to address the cumulative effects provisions of CEQA.  The plan had three 
important components: 1) EPIC and Sierra would file a new breed of suits preventing 
harvests within the residual old-growth groves of Headwaters Forests; 2) if successful, 
the cumulative judgments would leave CDF no alternative but to prohibit all ancient or 
residual old-growth harvest plans due to their serious negative cumulative impacts; and 3) 
the suits would seek to enforce the Endangered Species Act, including designation of 
critical habitats and recovery plans for the threatened and endangered species on the 
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Northcoast.  True to their reformist ideals, the ultimate goal of the plan was to reignite the 
great debate over the economic and social implications of Northcoast logging practices.  
Gaffney’s plan was evidence that EPIC was gearing up for a major round of fights over 
salvage exemptions, logging residual old-growth, and a rumored Pacific Lumber 
application for an Incidental Take Permit from the U.S. Department of the Interior that 
would allow the company to log endangered species habitat.205 
 The strategy for 1995 was an incredibly ambitious escalation of the donkey-
hitting strategy explicated by Woods a decade earlier.  The number of donkeys increased 
dramatically, as did the number of vehicles incorporated into the legal plan.  The strategy 
recognized that ancient groves were virtually off limits for Pacific Lumber due to the 
series of preceding and current lawsuits, which made residual old-growth groves the 
company’s priority logging target.  The plan also applied the Marbled Murrelet case the 
rest of Headwaters complex in order to increase habitat protections across the landscape.  
Alongside the litigation plan, EPIC and Bailey courted national and western 
organizations to pressure the Clinton administration into acquiring the forest.  All the 
major national groups urged Clinton’s Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta, to pursue a debt-for-
nature and/or land swap to remove the forest from the management of Pacific Lumber. 
Their efforts may have paid some quick dividends. When Congress reduced the 
Endangered Species enforcement budget by $2 million, Interior Secretary George 
Frampton, former President of The Wilderness Society, announced he planned to pursue 
more public-private land partnerships.  Frampton’s announced strategy was presumably a 
means of avoiding the Gingrich Congress when dealing with conflicts such as the one 
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over Headwaters.  In California, the activists used growing concern over the plight of 
salmon runs to put pressure on timber regulators to change forestry practices near 
Northcoast salmon streams, many of them originating inside Pacific Lumber property. By 
the end of 1995, EPIC challenged state and federal policies, twelve harvest plans, and 
two salvage logging exemptions during the course of eight lawsuits.  The new strategy 
recognized the predicament the Gingrich Congress put Clinton officials in, and it sought 
to expand their legal entry points to choke off Pacific Lumber’s ability to continue its 
old-growth logging strategy.206 
On February 27, Judge Bechtle handed out his verdict in Marbled Murrelet v. 
Pacific Lumber, and the ruling for EPIC prompted Pacific Lumber to escalate their train 
wreck strategy, resulting in six of the 1995 EPIC lawsuits as well as a new round of 
major direct actions on the Northcoast.  His ruling was devastating for the company and 
de facto corporatism.  Bechtle’s decision reinforced the responsibilities of CDF and the 
Board to nonmarket timber values – issues the anti-corporatist campaign pressed for more 
than two decades.  Judge Bechtle placed a permanent injunction on the Owl Creek 
harvest area; found that “EPIC (had proved) by a preponderance of evidence” that 
murrelet occupied the area.  He also ruled Pacific Lumber had tried to minimize its 
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detections of the birds by neglecting Pacific Seabird Group protocol, intimidating 
surveyors, sending fraudulent data sheets to state and federal agencies, and intimidating 
government witnesses. The permanent injunction was the first time the Endangered 
Species Act was used to stop logging on private land.  The opinion also broadened the 
Palila standard for “harm” and “harass” by ruling that “reasonable certainty” of 
“imminent” injury or death, not the discovery of actual injury or death -- the standard the 
Palila cases established -- was enough to warrant an injunction.  The Endangered Species 
Act gave EPIC grounds to argue substantively and obtain permanent protection (rather 
than only forcing Forestry to review its decisions).  By doing so, EPIC and the federal 
courts sent a strong message to the Board and the timber industry that they could not take 
their responsibilities for non-timber forest values lightly.207 
On March 2, Pacific Lumber launched its counter offensive with a surprise 
announcement that the company intended to begin logging Headwaters Grove via a new 
salvage exemption.  John Campbell told the press, “…after nearly eight years of 
[voluntary] delay, it’s time for us to move forward…”  Specifically, the company 
announced it intended to harvest eight acres of Headwaters Grove and extend an existing 
logging road into the ancient grove.  Within hours, Earth First! sent out a call to arms 
over the internet calling for a “full-fledged occupation” of Headwaters Forest.  That same 
day, Kathy Bailey sent a letter to Lloyd Keefer, the CDF Region Chief, requesting an 
immediate stop work order.  Bailey also asked Darryl Cherney to call State Senator Tom 
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Hayden to request the senator call CDF Director Richard Wilson.  Bechtle’s decision thus 
set off a five-bell alarm to Northcoast activists and Pacific Lumber, and the tensions that 
had simmered for so long finally began to boil. The actions of the company and the 
activists testify to just how protracted the conflict had begun.  There was no time allotted 
for deliberation after the Bechtle decision, no time for mediation.  The two sides acted 
decisively in the same manner they had for a decade.  For Pacific Lumber, the decision 
was to log in ways that defended their traditional prerogatives and escalated conflict to 
the point of emergency.  For the activists, the decision was to choke off the company’s 
activities in court and in the woods, driving Campbell and Hurwitz to negotiate out of 
sheer frustration.  In doing so, the activists fell into a trap John Campbell had set because 
he needed logging activities restricted in order to use his nuclear option.208 
For the next five days, a flurry of activity devoured the Northcoast.  On March, 
EPIC sent out a press release regarding the THPs, stressing that only one needed approval 
(the road), and that both harvest plans would violate the Endangered Species Act based 
on Bechtle’s ruling because the new THP was based on the same “incredulous” murrelet 
surveys rejected by the federal court.  Cecelia Lanman told the press, “this is a bid to cut 
every bit of murrelet habitat before they are stopped.”  On the same day, Senator Hayden 
sent a letter to Director Wilson, the Director of California Fish and Game, and Bruce 
Babbitt, demanding a stop work order.  California Sierra Club also issued a press release 
arguing there was nothing dead or dying about the Headwaters Grove.  Essentially, the 
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Northcoast activists argued the salvage plans were a backdoor effort to enter the ancient 
groves of Headwaters Forest and remove old-growth trees because many old-growth trees 
no longer grew upward, or were dead “snags” that stand for centuries.  Even the snags, 
they argued were important for old-growth animal species and the ancient forest habitat.  
For its part, Pacific Lumber published an opinion-editorial in the San Francisco 
Chronicle that determinedly proclaimed its right to manage company land as they had for 
one hundred years.  Finally, Earth First! organized rallies at the Santa Rosa and Fortuna 
offices of the CDF, and announced their intentions to “indefinitely” occupy Headwaters 
Grove beginning March 13.209 
 As the controversy grew more feverish and chaotic the activists and the company 
increasingly appealed directly to the chief executive offices of the state and federal 
governments.  On Monday, March 6, CDF returned Pacific Lumber’s exemption filing, 
requesting additional information about the company’s plans to avoid taking murrelets 
and spotted owls.  The following day, Campbell told the press he’d be willing to swap 
Headwaters Grove for federal and/or state land so the company could move on with its 
work.   On March 15, CDF issued a salvage exemption to Pacific Lumber for 5994 acres 
inside of Headwaters.  An important piece of the exemption was a moratorium on logging 
inside murrelet habitat during the breeding season – April 1 to September 15.  That same 
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day, State Senators Byron Sher and Tom Hayden requested President Clinton exhaust all 
administrative options to acquire Headwaters, especially debt-for-nature options.  The 
following day, Kathy Bailey, on behalf of California Sierra Club, wrote to Governor 
Wilson to inform him Northcoast activists felt backed into a corner with no option but to 
sue CDF.  She pointed out that current California law did not allow for “known sites of… 
threatened or endangered species [to] be disturbed, threatened or damaged.”  Governor 
Wilson refused to intervene in the salvage controversy because salvage exemptions 
specifically prohibit damage to endangered species habitat and green trees, leaving the 
court as the only option to stop salvage logging in protected habitats.  Wilson, however, 
had earlier announced his desire to settle the conflict out of court.  More and more, the 
activists and Pacific Lumber appealed to the governor and the president, gradually 
shifting the foci of the conflict into the core of the Executive Branches.  It was the locals 
who pushed the conflict up the power ladders.210 
 Pacific Lumber had previously violated its salvage exemption, the company had 
ignored court and agency orders regarding murrelet habitat, and the activists were not 
about to leave the fate of Headwaters in the hands of a company and agency they did not 
trust.  Littletree, Bari, and Cherney organized a mass protest at the Carlotta logging decks 
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on Pacific Lumber land.  On March 28, one day before a scheduled visit by the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, the CA Department of Fish and Game, and CDF, approximately 
five hundred activists gathered at the company gates.  Adding fuel to the mistrust and 
tension, Governor Wilson created a special task force to make “one last run” at 
preserving Headwaters Grove, and simultaneously proposed legislation to reform the 
California Endangered Species Act to would make it easier to log Headwaters.  Wilson 
proposed to shift oversight of the law to county officials, prohibit fines for the inadvertent 
killing of endangered species, exclude habitat modification and destruction from the 
definition of a “take” (prohibiting the Bechtle ruling from affecting species  listed only as 
threatened under California law), make the burden of proof for listing species greater, and 
exempt projects from ESA review that had cleared through CEQA.  The governor 
effectively told the legislature and activists they needed to figure out how to quickly buy 
the land because the state was going to ensure Pacific Lumber could log as quickly and 
easily as possible.   
True to historic pattern, EPIC and Sierra added to the pressure, and helped delay 
logging plans in the main Headwaters Grove.  The organizations filed a suit challenging 
both the 1994 and the Headwaters salvage exemptions.  EPIC and Sierra argued that 
salvage exemptions violated CEQA because they can have significant negative impacts 
on the environment, yet are exempt from public review or Environmental Impact Reports.  
Simultaneously, EPIC filed a federal suit against the exemptions under the federal 
Endangered Species Act.  The federal suit alleged that when FWS approved the 
restrictions on the Pacific Lumber exemption during murrelet breeding season, it 




under section 7 of the ESA.  Ratcheting up the pressure on Pacific Lumber, EPIC 
amended the federal complaint on March 20 to include eight harvest plans approved by 
FWS under the company’s Northern Spotted Owl Management Plan.  The amended 
complaint alleged the THPs constituted a take of the spotted owl and violated section 9 of 
the ESA.  All together, the suit challenged the legitimacy of salvage logging exemptions 
and Habitat Conservation Plans.  On March 27, Pacific Lumber agreed not to log the 
ancient groves until a judge could review the cases.  Unknowingly, the activists had just 
set up Pacific Lumber to file a takings suit against the federal and state governments by 
filing additional litigation, which along with the Bechtle ruling, prevented the company 
from logging a large portion of their acreage.211 
 The Carlotta rally proceeded as planned the following day, sparking an April 
dominated by escalated brinksmanship and hostility.  CDF approved five Pacific Lumber 
harvest plans in the residual old-growth groves of the Yager Creek drainage of 
Headwaters Forest.  The watershed was important to activists because it supported one of 
the last coho salmon and steelhead trout runs on the Northcoast.  EPIC, local 
photographer-activist Doug Thron, and the Bald Eagle Restoration Project filed suit 
alleging the plans violated murrelet, spotted owl, and bald eagle regulations.  On April 
12, Humboldt Judge Buffington issued a temporary restraining order on the five THPs, 
and the company responded by closing their old-growth mill and laying off 105 mill 
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workers.  Buffington and environmentalists became public enemy number one on the 
Northcoast and Pacific Lumber recruited the laid off workers to attend an April 28 
hearing for the Yager Creek case.  Meanwhile, U.S. District Judge Bechtle awarded EPIC 
$1.1 million in attorney fees from the Marbled Murrelt case.  On April 21, Buffington 
recused himself from the Yager Creek case and cited the company’s “crude application of 
political power” when it closed the mill and organized locals to intimidate him despite 
having logged part of the harvest area for two days before he halted operations.212 
The Headwaters Forest conflict became a metaphorical hot potato because of the 
actions of the activists and the company.  The recusal left no judge in the county able to 
hear the case because the company routinely disqualified Judge Ferrogiaro, and the third 
Humboldt judge, J. Michael Brown, disqualified himself from Pacific Lumber cases 
because the company used to be a client of his.  April ended, and the situation was a 
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mess.  Pacific Lumber played hardball with the state, activists invaded the forest, EPIC 
had five active suits on the Northcoast, and the appearance was that of a lawless county – 
without judges, without legislative intervention, and without administrative intervention.  
But the Yager Creek harvest plans were under a restraining order until June, and the 
Headwaters Grove was off limits temporarily as well, offering some potential breathing 
room during the late spring.  Instead, the activists continued their assaults on the 
company’s property rights, further hardening the company and its sympathizers against 
the activists.  That spring was a major step forward in the local combatant’s progressive 
march into the Executive Branch.  The activists wanted to choke off Pacific Lumber in 
court and force CDF and the Board of Forestry to address industrial logging once and for 
all.  The company challenged the state’s loyalty by logging aggressively.  In doing so, 
Pacific Lumber almost begging EPIC to tie it up in court so it could file a takings suit and 
force the chief executives of California and the United States into action.  The actions of 
the activists and the company speak to the bottom-up nature of the federalization process 
of the Headwaters conflict.213 
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In addition to the new litigation strategy, the Northcoast activists more tightly 
coordinated their overall actions, but they did not always maintain a united front.  The 
myriad anti-corporate and anti-authority sentiments, coupled with a general commitment 
to consensus decision-making, highlight the activists’ lack of adherence to middle-class 
work and values.  Those same characteristics also made it more difficult at times to 
confront the single voice and strategy coming fro Pacific Lumber.  Earlier in 1995, the 
Headwaters Forest Coordinating Committee was revived, and in May the coalition agreed 
to run a joint fundraising campaign to raise $1 million, managed by consensus decision-
making.  The goal of the organization was to acquire 60,000 acres of Headwaters Forest, 
and it immediately looked to the federal government as the best available purchaser.  
Kathy Bailey wrote to Washington, DC-based Sierra Club advocate Katie Merril and 
suggested the national organization push California Senators to propose swapping federal 
land and/or federal timber contracts to Pacific Lumber in exchange for the ancient groves 
owned by the Salmon Creek Corporation.  Salmon Creek was created in 1993 as a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Pacific Lumber and owned approximately ten thousand acres of 
land, including the main Headwaters Grove and other ancient groves.  Bailey agreed with 
the 60,000-acre goal, but she saw no “clear path to the greater goal,” and wanted some 
group working to at least acquire what Forests Forever had proposed in the 1990 ballot 
initiative.214 
HFCC received some unintentional and troubling assistance from their opponents.  
After the 1994 Spotted Owl Summit, the early 1995 Marbled Murrelet ruling, and the 
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U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Sweet Home overturning a lower court ruling restricting the 
power of the Endangered Species Act, California Congressman Richard Pombo 
organized seven national hearings to discuss the Endangered Species Act.  While the 
hearings were an attack on the main federal law supporting the Northcoast activists’ 
campaign, they also acted as motivation for elected officials to resolve the Headwaters 
conflict quickly to stave off arguments that the ESA did not work and was unfair to 
landowners.  On the heels of the attacks on the ESA, CDF charged Pacific Lumber with 
violating a Timber Harvest Plan, a criminal charge that further supported the activists’ 
accusations the company could not be trusted to manage the old-growth groves or to 
abide by the stipulations of their salvage logging exemptions.  Pombo and Pacific 
Lumber had unintentionally delivered additional sources of urgency to the campaign to 
protect Headwaters, giving activists a boost in a difficult period of legal and public 
relations losses.215 
On the Northcoast, leverage in the conflict ebbed and flowed during the summer.  
In mid-May, visiting Judge Kleaver ruled against EPIC in its state challenge of the 
Pacific Lumber salvage exemptions, adding to the anxiety of activists already preparing 
to challenge as many as twenty-six harvest plans, many in the residual old-growth groves 
of Headwaters Forest, such as the Yager Creek drainage.  Then in mid-June, a California 
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appellate court lifted the temporary restraining order placed on the Blanton Creek harvest 
plan inside the Yager Creek drainage.  Pacific Lumber spokeswoman Mary Bullwinkle 
told the press the case proved that “state-approved harvest plans meet all obligations 
required by law…and that properly regulated timber harvest activities do not have 
significant adverse impacts on the environment.”  The statement must have driven 
Northcoast activists mad because it ignored the many prior rulings to the contrary, and it 
also positioned Pacific Lumber on the side of the law the activists once held.  Pacific 
Lumber worked additional routes to generate leverage with the public when it publicized 
the release of 42,000 king salmon into the Yager and Lawrence Creek watersheds.  The 
company also blamed activists and the weather for the closing of the mill in April, after 
the Buffington TRO.  With a few deft maneuvers, the company tried to eliminate the new 
salmonid habitat tactics of the activists, as well as any claims the activists made as allies 
of timber workers and timber society.216 
 Northcoast activists responded with their own legal innovations, aided by the 
stalling tactics of Earth First! in the woods.  As was true in 1983 and throughout the late 
redwood wars, direct action and litigation formed a powerful toolset for the activists.  In 
the midst of the legal wrangling, North Coast Earth First! occupied the forest, organized 
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rallies and protests, and directed actions toward CDF and Pacific Lumber alike.  At the 
end of June, ten activists were arrested for blocking a logging road by chaining 
themselves to a bridge over Blanton Creek.  After the incident, Representatives Pete 
Stark, Nancy Pelosi, and Ron Dellums asked Secretary Bruce Babbitt to stop the logging 
near Blanton Creek because the USFWS believed Pacific Lumber had filed fraudulent 
maps, among other ethical breaches.  On June 26, the First District Court of Appeal in 
California placed an emergency stay on Blanton Creek logging when EPIC filed suit 
against the company for violations of the Unfair Business Practices Act.  Early in July, 
California hosted the national Round River Rendezvous.  At the retreat, Littletree and 
others planned a series of actions to block road gates, lock activists down in the 
backwoods, occupy CDF offices, and conduct a mass arrest event. 217 
Earth First! tried desperately to regain public support and frustrate Pacific 
Lumber.  However, the organizers misjudged public sentiment.  They seem to have 
believed they could continue to challenge Pacific Lumber property rights and CDF 
authority through direct actions and appeal more broadly to the public via civil 
disobedience displays.  The result was great national sympathy for their cause, but eroded 
local support.  On July 5, thirty-four protesters were arrested for trespassing and shutting 
down the CDF office in Fortuna, and nine activists were arrested in the Yager Creek 
drainage.  The police used pepper spray on a group of activists who blocked the road out 
of the CDF offices.  Five activists were treated and released from Redwood Memorial 
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Hospital.  The Times-Standard in Eureka published the names, ages, and hometowns of 
the arrestees.  Activists criticized the published list and use of pepper spray as attempts to 
intimidate supporters of the redwood movement.  Pacific Lumber continued to try to shift 
public support away from the activists, telling the press Earth First! civil disobedience 
was a drain on county resources.  After the July actions, Earth First! orchestrated several 
more civil disobedience actions to “highlight the group’s return to mass politics.”  In 
addition to civil disobedience, Earth First! launched a nationwide boycott of all redwood 
products.  In the midst of the actions, visiting judge John Golden denied a temporary 
restraining order on another of the Yager Creek harvest plans, further enraging local 
activists.218 
The actions generated attention and frustrated CDF and Pacific Lumber, but 
momentum abruptly swung in Pacific Lumber’s favor due to the overwhelmingly 
negative press coverage of the actions.  As their support waned, a group of activists, 
including Doug Thron and EPIC, entered into mediation with Pacific Lumber and CDF to 
resolve the growing conflict over the residual old-growth groves in the Yager Creek 
drainage.  The mediation failed, and the company used the opportunity to continue to 
paint the activists as unreasonable obstructionists.  Bullwinkel told the press the activists 
walked out, but the company believed cooperation would yield better results for the 
community than continued wrangling in court.  Again, she decried the conflict as a waste 
of resources.  The company was clearly working build their case as the aggrieved party – 
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a seemingly deliberate plan to gain leverage in the acquisition negotiations Pacific 
Lumber was encouraging.  John Campbell had met with California Senator Dianne 
Feinstein in March and asked her to be, as he told it, the “ombudsman” for a round of 
negotiations between Pacific Lumber, and the state and federal agencies.  Feinstein had 
agreed, but the plan had not preceded any further.219 
 By late July, the tide was running hard against the activists, driven by an 
aggressive Pacific Lumber public relations campaign and EPIC losses in court.  A new 
visiting judge, Charles Henry, rejected a preliminary injunction on a third Yager Creek 
harvest plan, a week after Judge Kleaver required EPIC to post a ten thousand dollar 
bond to pay Pacific Lumber’s defense costs in exchange for an emergency stay.  
Campbell told the press, “It is unfortunate, that EPIC and Doug Thron continue to raise 
money from the public in order to pursue dilatory and wasteful litigation.”  A Pacific 
Lumber press release went even farther and charged the activists with harassing 
endangered species when they flew planes at low levels above Pacific Lumber land to 
assess the company’s logging efforts.  Indeed, Mark Harris, an Arcata attorney and 
member of the legal team in the federal Marbled Murrelet case, learned to fly in 1992 so 
he could monitor the company’s compliance with court injunctions.  The strategy 
Campbell devised appeared to be working, but the strategy of the Northcoast activists to 
compel the federal government to acquire Headwaters Forest evolved as well, and 
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combined, Pacific Lumber and the activists forced President Clinton to act during the 
following year because of the increasingly hostile and protracted conflict.220 
 During the late summer months, background events conspired to elevate the 
urgency and anxiety levels of Pacific Lumber and Northcoast activists.  The HFCC 
planned a massive rally for September 15, the day the moratorium on salvage logging in 
Headwaters expired.  The various Earth First! splinter groups on the Northcoast prepared 
backwoods actions following the rally.  Littletree and Josh Brown, who had recently left 
his job as a campus organizer for the California Public Interest Research Group, 
organized two trial basecamps in July and August to prepare for what they hoped would 
be hundreds of participants in the September actions.  During the trials, internal tensions 
bubbled to the surface.  It appears many of the newer activists – those who joined the 
movement while Littletree traveled Central America – resented her no-nonsense 
leadership.  They developed a fondness for Brown, whom Littletree viewed as someone 
the activists trusted, but who did not really work hard or strategically.  Littletree ascribed 
some of the animosity to male chauvinism, similar to the displays of masculinity during 
the 1991 backwoods actions of Redwood Summer II.  The Northcoast Earth First! groups 
had developed into highly technical cohorts who prided themselves on backwoods 
innovation and brinksmanship – a characteristic Littletree inadvertently promoted when 
she recruited hikers and climbers during the winter of 1992 and 1993.  In the end, the 
internal tensions and mixed strategy of technical direct actions with public rallies 
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fractured the united direct action front and left the activists vulnerable to Pacific Lumber 
and law enforcement actions.221 
 While EF! prepared to take to the woods, other activists worked to further the 
acquisition campaign.  In theory, the direct actions and rallies should pressured property 
owners to negotiate, but because of the eroded public support, negotiators were hesitant.  
Kathy Bailey and the HFCC set their sites on Elk River Timber, owned by Red Emerson, 
the largest landowner in California through Sierra Pacific Industries.  As noted, Elk River 
owned the second-growth forest adjacent to the Headwaters Grove.  Elk River had 
submitted harvest plans to log the area, and activists wanted to stop them in order to 
protect the salmon run on the South Fork of the Elk River and the drainages within 
Headwaters Grove.  In August, Kathy Bailey tried to convince Save-the-Redwoods 
League to purchase the 1,000 acres immediately adjacent to Headwaters, but SRL 
rejected the proposal because the protection of the Headwaters Grove itself was 
uncertain.  In September, HFCC  authorized Jill Ratner of the Rose Foundation and 
Cecelia Lanman of EPIC to negotiate with Emerson.  Also in early September, a lawsuit 
against Maxxam by long-time southern Humboldt activist Bob Martel was made public.  
Martel asked the court to exchange 4,500 acres of Headwaters Grove for the assumed 
debt Maxxam owed the taxpayers from the Savings & Loan collapse.  Debt-for-nature 
was now in the courts as an option, but 4,500 acres seemed to many activists far too small 
a price for the absolution of the company’s alleged crimes.  By mid-September, the 
activists were pressuring Pacific Lumber and the state agencies via the impending 
demonstrations, pressing forward with acquisition plans, and were in the courts pressing 
the debt-for-nature alternative.   
                                                        




Because of the diversity of activist tactics and the success of Pacific Lumber 
public relations, many in the public began to perceive the activists as impetuous idealists 
who would not stop the disruptions until Maxxam was out of Humboldt County and all of 
Headwaters Forest was out of corporate control.  The perception was, of course, largely 
accurate, and it hurt the activists’ standing.  Their public support may have eroded on the 
Northcoast, but the train-wreck strategy was working.  Pacific Lumber was on the attack, 
but it was still frustrated by the court wranglings.  That the activists were largely 
undeterred by the growing negative perceptions is testimony to their rejection of 
professional opinion and their belief that their blend of resource conservation and 
ecologic health goals were the best prescription for the Northcoast.222 
 Debt for nature, demonstrations, and litigation enraged Pacific Lumber during the 
final months of 1995 and drove it to pursue its federal nuclear option.  Martel’s case was 
made relevant because of the attention given to the upcoming demonstration and because 
of the actions of at least two federal agencies in August.  On August 2nd, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation filed FDIC v. Maxxam, arguing Maxxam and Hurwitz 
were negligent because they “had been obligated to dump more money into a Maxxam-
controlled S&L that collapsed in 1988.”  Hurwitz had long argued no capitalization was 
required.  The FDIC also alleged Hurwitz and colleagues covered up the condition of 
USAT via “deceptive” reporting and “balance sheet manipulation.”  The suit, if 
successful, would establish that Maxxam indeed owed the FDIC damages from the 1988 
S&L bailout, a circumstance necessary for any debt-for-nature scheme.  Adding to 
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Pacific Lumber’s frustration, the USFWS published its map of critical habitat for the 
marbled murrelet, which included all of the ancient redwood groves on the firm’s 
property.  The designation, combined with the permanent injunction placed on Owl Creek 
in the Marbled Murrelet case, threatened Pacific Lumber’s ability to log any of its 
ancient groves. Between the court cases and the habitat designation, Pacific Lumber must 
have felt under fire from all sides, a condition that only intensified on September 15.223 
 Beginning in mid-September, the pressure on Pacific Lumber and the government 
to resolve the Headwaters conflict reached another boiling point.  On September 15, 
outside the log decks in Carlotta and the Fisher Road gate leading into Headwaters, more 
than two thousand people rallied to protest the salvage logging exemption.  The 
protestors were flanked by angry loggers, and motivated by Bonnie Raitt, Bob Weir and 
Mickey Hart from the Grateful Dead, Darryl Cherney, and Ed Bagley, Jr, among other 
speakers and performers.  Two hundred people were arrested during a symbolic 
trespassing event, and the rally launched an action campaign designed by EF! focused 
entirely on Headwaters.  Adding to the symbolic power of the rally, the California Senate 
passed a bill the same day as the rally forcing Governor Wilson to negotiate the 
acquisition of Headwaters Grove.  Before the Assembly voted, however, Wilson 
promised to move ahead without legislation, and the Assembly backed down.224 
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The day after the Carlotta demonstration, Northcoast Earth First! activists 
launched an unprecedented two-month base camp producing press coverage, an 
astronomical escalation in arrests, and a resurgence of violence against the activists.  As 
with the earlier Yager Creek actions, the efforts backfired from a public relations 
perspective.  From September 17 to October 9, Humboldt police arrested nearly 400 
activists on Pacific Lumber and Elk River Timber property.  The police reported that 
activists drove cars deep into the woods, blocked logging roads with the abandoned cars, 
and locked themselves to gates and logging equipment.  The loggers responded with 
threats of violence.  Sherriff Dennis Lewis recalled one logger telling the police to, “go 
have some donuts and coffee, and be happy – that he had his rifle and would take care of 
things himself…And he wasn’t joking.”  By October 11, the arrest total reached 550, and 
the Humboldt County Board of Supervisors requested emergency aid from President 
Clinton come to because the daily arrests were costing the county $2,000 a day.  On 
October 14, two EF! treesitters climbed down after a six-day sit, and Elk River Timber 
reportedly announced they were ready to negotiate.  The new strategy of Earth First! 
appeared to be working with Red Emerson at least.225 
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During November and December, tensions continued to escalate, and the activists 
suffered, though events again conspired in ways that should have helped their efforts.  
The severity of the tension was exposed not only by the Supervisor’s request for federal 
law enforcement help, but also when the Times-Standard of Eureka, the largest 
newspaper in the county, defended Pacific Lumber and its development since 1986.  The 
article reminded readers of the company’s position as the largest private employer in the 
county, and that the company made good on its promise to pensioners after Executive 
Life collapsed.  While the local press sided with Pacific Lumber, many of the national 
environmental groups finally engaged the conflict over Headwaters Forest and worked to 
convince Vice President Albert Gore to stump for a debt-for-nature swap.  For its part, 
EPIC believed the California Department of Fish and Game, once an ally in court, was 
working to prevent it from successfully prosecuting its federal Endangered Species suit 
against the Headwaters salvage exemption.  The activists believed there was a backroom 
deal in place between Pacific Lumber and the agencies to approve a Habitat Conservation 
Plan and head off the activists in court.  While the state agency appeared to turn on the 
activists, the federal Office of Thrift Supervision weighed in firmly on their side when it 
notified Maxxam on November 1 that it intended to file suit for the company’s role in the 
1988 failure of USAT.226 
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The problems for Pacific Lumber also mounted and ironically paved the way for a 
dramatic turn of events in early 1996.  After nearly ten years, Maxxam settled the 
shareholder lawsuit filed by Bill Bertain, agreeing to pay former shareholders $17 million 
($10 per share).  Maxxam, Milken, Boesky, Drexel Burnham, and Salamon Brothers each 
contributed to the settlement fund, a tacit acknowledgement of the fraudulent handling of 
the 1985 Maxxam takeover bid.  A week later, CDF finally rejected the so-called Death 
Road plan Pacific Lumber had filed along with the Headwaters salvage exemption nearly 
a year prior.  However, Lloyd Keefer of CDF, in a letter to Pacific Lumber, 
recommended the company finalize its Incidental Take Permit and Habitat Conservation 
Plan applications.  He informed the company that if the ITP was approved, he could 
approve the Death Road THP.  The letter was clear evidence that Pacific Lumber was 
indeed working on a deal with the federal wildlife agencies, a fully legal process 
established by the 1982 amendments to the Endangered Species Act.  Still, company 
plans were stalled by the murrelet rulings, and Maxxam’s legitimacy had absorbed yet 
another blow.  Adding to the company’s woes, Dianne Feinstein was working to get Vice 
President Gore to agree to the debt-for-nature scheme as well.227   
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With the activists on the ropes locally, the year ended with a dark cloud over 
Pacific Lumber as well.  In 1996, the company would miraculously gain the upper hand 
because the success of the activists played right into the company’s nuclear option 
strategy.  Collectively, the locals would help transform American environmental politics 
over the subsequent three years.  The transformation is important because it marks a 
significant shift in Executive Branch activity within the modern environmental protection 
regime.  The process that led to administrative intervention in the Headwaters conflict 
demonstrates the ways in which local actors helped build the regime. 
 
Transforming American Environmental Politics:  “The Deal” 
 
 The local combatants in the redwood wars drove the Headwaters Forest conflict 
into the arms of the Executive Branch of the federal government at just the right time.  
1996 was a presidential election year, and President Clinton wanted to solidify the 
eroding support of environmentalists for his administration.  The Headwaters conflict 
eventually looked like the best opportunity for the president because of the popularity of 
redwood preservation nationally and because he wanted to avoid a showdown over the 
Endangered Species Act.   
The Northcoast activists and Pacific Lumber had for years groped for a successful 
strategy to resolve the redwood wars.  During the 1990s, the redwood wars increasingly 
focused on Headwaters Forest because it was the last significant ancient redwood forest 
complex in private hands and the management of the complex stood proxy for activists’ 




federal government paid enormous dividends.  For the activists, the return toward federal 
resolution of the Headwaters conflict was not entirely unappealing either, and they 
quickly adjusted their game plan to influence the outcome of the negotiations between the 
company and the state.  However, the final agreement did not resolve the Headwaters 
conflict for Pacific Lumber, the state, or the activists, and the battles raged for the rest of 
the century. 
 Early in 1996, the Northcoast activists remained focused on generating pressure 
on Governor Wilson and on continued state litigation.  HFCC closely monitored the 
progress of THP 1-95-099 – Death Road -- which CDF continued to reject.  The activists 
appeared set to continue doing battle in the familiar grounds of the state branches of 
government and to negotiate with Red Emerson to purchase North Headwaters Grove.  
Additionally, the activists expanded their charges against Pacific Lumber to attack the 
use of pesticides on clearcuts as further evidence of the destructive management of the 
forest.228 
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 While EPIC and HFCC plotted against THP 099, Pacific Lumber poised itself for 
a major power grab using that same harvest plan as the vehicle.  The company discussed 
an ITP with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and continued to propose THP 099 to 
CDF.  In early January, Jared Carter, a Pacific Lumber attorney and former deputy 
undersecretary of the Department of the Interior, sent CDF a letter declaring FWS would 
not approve an ITP in murrelet groves, CDF did not have the authority to ask for 
mitigations (an argument renounced in 1994 by the California Supreme Court in Sierra v. 
BOF), and the company was prepared to file a regulatory takings lawsuit against the state 
and federal government if THP 099 was denied.  Hurwitz himself contacted Interior that 
winter and arranged a meeting in Washington, DC that included himself; John Campbell; 
Red Emerson; Terry Gorton, Deputy Director of the California Resources Agency; 
Michael Mantel of the California Department of Natural Resources; Phil Dietrich from 
FWS; and John Garamendi, Deputy Director of the Interior.  The participants discussed 
the public acquisition of Headwaters and Elk Head Springs Groves – the approximately 
three thousand acres Campbell had repeatedly announced the company was willing to 
sell. 229  
Rather than a sign of imminent resolution, the elevation of the conflict to higher 
orders of power belied an escalation of confrontation.  In early April, CDF again levied a 
fine on Pacific Lumber for violations of the Forest Practice Rules inside Headwaters 
Forest.  On April 22, BOF denied the company’s appeal of THP 099, and Pacific Lumber 
then filed its reverse condemnation, or regulatory takings, lawsuit against the state of 
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California.  The following week, Congressman Riggs delivered a speech on the House 
floor alleging a connection between the Northcoast activists and the Una-bomber Ted 
Kacyznski.  He was later forced to apologize for knowingly citing fraudulent evidence, 
but the damage was done.  On May 7, the Ninth U.S. Circuit upheld the permanent 
injunction on Owl Creek and simultaneously ruled against the suit challenging the Pacific 
Lumber salvage logging exemption.  Moments later, Pacific Lumber filed a takings suit 
against the United States of America, a clear indication the nuclear option was long-
planned.  Adding fuel to the growing fire, a federal court approved a $7 million 
settlement for present and past Pacific Lumber employees for the endangerment of their 
pensions.  The settlement stemmed from the annuities the post-takeover company 
purchased from the failed Executive Life Company, a company heavily invested in 
Milken junk bonds, including those issued in the Pacific Lumber takeover.  The takings 
suits, and other events of spring, propelled the activists into more fevered action, while 
the company seemed to sit back and await the governments’ responses, knowing their 
actions would bring the state to the table.230 
In one fell swoop, Pacific Lumber had derailed the activists’ local campaigns and 
forced them to accommodate the catapulting of the conflict into the Executive Branch.  
The activists pulled together a complex effort to pressure the government to acquire the 
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full 60,000-acre Headwaters complex.  Their efforts were aided by FWS who designated 
3.9 million acres in Oregon, California, and Washington as critical habitat for the 
marbled murrelet, noting the Pacific Lumber land was especially important – 
approximately 44,000 acres of company land.  The habitat designation and takings suits 
offered the activists a way into the negotiations, and HFCC assigned its member groups 
varying responsibilities to generate public support and governmental pressure.  Nearly 
immediately HFCC activists began to meet with Interior officials and petitioned as 
interveners in the federal takings suit.  Interior balked at the activists’ demands.  Over the 
next several months, the activists embarked on a door-to-door and telephone canvassing 
outreach operation in the Bay Area; developed full-page ads for the New York Times and 
other papers; distributed Headwaters Forest videos, brochures, and postcards; developed 
a Northcoast media campaign; and began organizing another massive public rally set for 
September 15, the day the annual logging ban during murrelet nesting season ended.  
Meanwhile, Earth First! planned basecamps to disrupt Pacific Lumber’s salvage logging 
efforts and support the September 15 rally.231 
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By July, the company and Northcoast activists each courted the national media, 
and on the national stage, the activists held the upper hand because far away residents 
empathized more with the ancient trees than Pacific Lumber.  The company created the 
Headwaters Consensus Council and hired a public relations firm to generate stories about 
an imminent deal for approximately 8,000 acres of Headwaters Forest.  The company 
apparently wanted to generate an upwelling of widespread public support for such a deal 
in order to force Interior’s hand in the stalled negotiations.  One major result was Charles 
McCoy’s article in the Wall Street Journal entitled, “Maxxam’s Hurwitz Nears Pact to 
Swap Redwood Grove for Thousands of Acres.”  The activists launched their own media 
offensive.  David Brower, the nation’s most well known postwar environmental activist, 
wrote an opinion-editorial for the Los Angeles Times stating he would not vote for Bill 
Clinton if he supported land deals that administratively weakened the Endangered 
Species Act (i.e. Habitat Conservation Plans).  Later in the month, HFCC ran a full-page 
advertisement in the New York Times, designed and submitted by Dan Hamburg, urging 
President Clinton to use a debt-for-nature swap to acquire all 60,000 acres of Headwaters 
Forest.  The ad famously stated, “We need a forest, not a tree museum” (Figure 8).232 
 A three-way version of brinksmanship thus emerged after two July meetings 
between the company and the administration.  Interior, the company, and the activists 
each tried to generate the leverage needed to close the negotiations in their favor – a 
game won by Pacific Lumber due to its ability to walk away and log under its salvage 
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logging exemption.  The activists continued to press for the purchase of 60,000 acres 
despite the advice of their attorney and the Save-the-Redwoods League.  As a result, they 
marginalized themselves from the Administration and gave Garamendi ground cover to 
walk away entirely.  In fact, many Northcoast activists would have preferred to kill the 
deal rather than accept an 8,000-acre purchase that enriched Hurwitz (See Figure 9).  The 
activists also convinced Ralph Nader, whom pundits trumpeted as a real threat to 
Clinton’s electoral votes, to send Clinton a letter demanding the president orchestrate a 
debt-for-nature swap for the full 60,000 acres.  Nader subsequently placed an 
advertisement to that effect in the New York Times leading up to the Democratic 
Convention in Chicago. 233  
  Deputy Secretary Garamendi also used the press to improve his leverage with 
Hurwitz.  In the New York Times, Garamendi pronounced the pressure was on Pacific 
Lumber to accept a land swap because Hurwitz was the one who would face an angry 
public if he logged the groves.  Garamendi told the reporter, “He [Hurwitz] is the one 
who is going to incur the wrath of anyone who knows anything about Headwaters if he 
goes in and logs.”  The statement appears to be a direct reference to the Northcoast 
activists’ backwoods actions as well as the public relations nightmare Hurwitz 
experienced since his takeover of Pacific Lumber.234 
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 John Campbell and Charles Hurwitz knew they had the upper hand, however, and 
the company’s August and September strategy was born out of that confidence.  On 
August 5, the firm announced it would begin salvage logging on the first lawful day – 
September 16 – unless the government picked up the pace of negotiations and sealed a 
deal before then.  Two Pacific Lumber officials were quoted in the New York Times 
article where Garamendi challenged Hurwitz, stating there was no debt-for-nature deal 
because there was no debt, the company had legal permission to enter all of Headwaters 
outside Owl Creek, and they planned to carry out their harvests.  The government was 
simply moving too slowly for Hurwitz’ taste.  When the August Congressional recess 
began, Campbell met with Senator Feinstein in San Francisco and again asked her to help 
in the negotiations.  She agreed, and convened weekly meetings with the company, the 
Clinton Administration, and California officials.  Pacific Lumber was in control of the 
negotiations, and never really relinquished that position.235 
 The leverage of the company frustrated the activists, and they scrambled – in 
some constructive and other not so constructive ways – to gain traction in negotiations 
conducted without them.  The activists had created the conflict and had largely driven the 
action to that point, and to be shut out was especially hard to swallow.  HFCC hired a 
campaign consultant to ramp up their public outreach efforts, and Kathy Bailey wrote to 
Garamendi bemoaning HFCC’s lack of input and restating the orgainization’s position.  
The activists demanded a ban on logging and road-building in three areas:  the virgin 
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groves inside the Marbled Murrelet Conservation Area (the formal name of the critical 
habitat designated by the FWS), North Headwaters Grove, and 300-foot buffers around 
every murrelet-occupied grove on Pacific Lumber property.  Additionally, Bailey 
informed Garamendi that every watercourse within the 60,000-acre Headwaters Complex 
and North Headwaters Grove had to be protected from logging due to the listing of the 
Coho salmon and Steelhead trout.  The activists would not support any deal limiting the 
authority of the Endangered Species Act.  The frustration of a few anonymous Northcoast 
residents boiled over Labor Day weekend.  Campbell’s house was vandalized with “Save 
Headwaters” graffiti, and his pool was covered with gasoline and set ablaze.  The press 
speculated that either environmentalists did it, or individuals inside the timber industry 
who wanted to sully the reputation of the activists had.  Either way, frustration then led 
activists down a perilous path.236  
 Shut out of the official negotiations, the activists enlisted new tactics to undercut 
Pacific Lumber’s leverage.  The Northcoasters recruited mainstream, DC-based groups to 
pressure Clinton not to concede the authority of the Owl Creek injunction or the 
Endangered Species Act.  To aid that effort, the activists stopped targeting Clinton 
directly in the press and refocused on vilifying Hurwitz.  Finally, the activists appealed to 
the California Board of Forestry to suspend salvage logging across the state.  The Board 
rejected the petition because they deemed the Headwaters conflict did not constitute a 
statewide emergency.  Despite the loss at the hand of the Board, the activists’ strategy 
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seemed to pay dividends because the government negotiators repeatedly balked at 
Hurwitz’ demands.237 
Though government officials balked, Pacific Lumber held firm because it held 
nearly all the leverage.  The company had legal permission to salvage log Headwaters – 
which by company definition could include old-growth trees because they defined those 
trees as dying.  Additionally, the company had the Clinton Administration in a catch-22.  
If negotiations failed, many Americans would be outraged that ancient redwoods fell.   
Additionally, the government would be forced to fight a takings suit in a Supreme Court 
increasingly siding with property owners.  Finally, the Gingrich Congress was clamoring 
to dramatically reform the Endangered Species Act, so a federal victory in court or a deal 
offensive to landowners might provide Republicans with the capital to push a bill through 
Congress.  As negotiations stalled, Congressman Riggs introduced legislation to require 
the government to pay property owners for land designated critical habitat under the 
Endangered Species Act – a not so subtle bill to benefit Pacific Lumber.  On Friday, 
September 13, the company again announced it planned to log Monday, and Governor 
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Wilson pleaded with Pacific Lumber to delay cutting until a deal was done.  The Wilson 
and Clinton Administrations, along with Cambell and Dianne Feinstein, huddled in DC 
over the weekend.  The company agreed to postpone logging for two weeks.238 
The Northcoast activists used the September 15 rally to repeat their demand for 
public acquisition of 60,000 acres.  An estimated 5,000 people attended the rally in 
Carlotta, with 300 to 400, including the singer Bonnie Raitt, arrested in a symbolic 
crossing of the Pacific Lumber property line.  The sheer size of the rally -- the largest 
forestry-related protest in United States history -- must have attracted the attention of the 
negotiators.  The massive protest was just the beginning of the next round of the redwood 
wars.  Earth First!, as planned, launched a set of multi-week actions to disrupt logging 
and publicize their 60,000-acre demands.  The actions, organized to a large degree by 
Alicia Littletree, included activists locked down to every logging gate leading to 
Headwaters.  They used handcuffs inside of metal pipes set into cement-filled oil drums 
to secure themselves to, and around, logging gates.  They placed an old Toyota in front of 
one logging gate, complete with activists handcuffed to the car.  And they orchestrated a 
“wailing wall” of women in downtown Scotia.  Forty people were arrested during the 
first four days of post-rally actions, costing the county an apparent $10,000 a day.239 
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  The situation turned increasingly tense during the subsequent week.  Negotiations 
among Garamendi, Hurwitz, and Director Wheeler of the California Department of 
Natural Resources resumed in DC Friday, September 20.  The Northcoast activists and 
Congressman Riggs each submitted unsuccessful requests to participate in the 
negotiations.  The Congressman’s and the activists’ failures only added to the frustration, 
because county officials and residents were locked out of the process.  Contributing to the 
rising tensions, the Rose Foundation held a press conference requesting that OTS freeze 
Maxxam’s assets to ensure the company had the money to pay any fines associated with 
the S&L proceedings. Meanwhile, Senator Boxer continued to plead with Governor 
Wilson to stop salvage logging in Headwaters, and Earth First! was in the midst of a ten-
day tree sit of Owl Creek that included ten sitters and five tree platforms.  On September 
18, local police hired a tree climber to remove half the tree sitters and much of their 
supplies.  The police were accused of injuring activists during various backwoods 
actions, as they had been throughout the 1990s era.  In Sacramento, state officials met 
with Red Emerson to include North Headwaters Grove in the deal.  Emerson agreed to 
temporarily halt operations in the grove – a nod to the imminent end of negotiations.  By 
the September 26, the negotiations were at fish or cut bait status.  Campbell, Garamendi, 
Feinstein, and Wheeler met for eighteen hours Thursday and Friday.  The government 
negotiators threatened to walk out because Hurwitz refused to reduce his asking price, 
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and Pacific Lumber came out of the negotiations announcing it would begin logging 
Monday if no deal was reached.240 
 On Saturday, September 28, 1996, what became known as “the Deal” was 
announced, and it outlined the price and process for completing an unprecedented land 
acquisition and endangered species habitat management agreement.  The federal and 
California governments agreed to purchase 7470 acres of Pacific Lumber land, including 
the ancient Headwaters and Elk Head Springs Groves, for $380 million.  Part of the cash 
would be used to purchase 9600 acres from Elk River Timber, of which Pacific Lumber 
would receive 7755 acres.  As part of the acquisition, the company agreed to file a 
Habitat Conservation Plan and Sustained Yield Plan for the rest of its property.  Pacific 
Lumber also agreed to suspend its taking suits against the United States and California.  
Finally, the company agreed not to log the 7470 acres for ten months while the financing 
was negotiated.241   
Northcoast activists immediately criticized the deal as insufficient for the ancient 
redwoods and its inhabitants.  The HCP would be the first multi-species HCP approved 
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under the 1982 amendments to the Endangered Species Act, and it opened the doors for a 
new Clinton Administration strategy to resolve private land conflicts outside of the courts 
and Congress.  National commentators and local activists argued that Clinton approved 
the agreement, and the strategy of negotiating with landowners over the enforcement and 
implementation of the Endangered Species Act, because he feared the Gingrich Congress, 
its Wise Use allies, and the increasingly conservative Supreme Court.  The Clinton 
process had begun with the Northwest Forest Plan to resolve the Spotted Owl conflict on 
federal lands in Oregon and Washington.  The Headwaters Deal implemented the 
administrative strategy on private land, and activists believed it was simply a backdoor 
way to gut the Endangered Species Act.  The activists’ strategy to force the acquisition 
issue had succeeded, but they had failed to secure their goals for the forest complex and 
the reformation of industrial logging.  The Deal demonstrated the power of local actors – 
company and activist – as well as the lack of leverage the activists had with the federal 
Executive Branch.  Protecting the president and the Endangered Species Act from 
Republican attacks was the top priority, and the activists’ goals were anathema to those 
motives.242   
 True to the pattern of the redwood wars, the announcement of a proposed 
resolution to part of the conflict only re-escalated the wars.  Alhough the press – and 
undoubtedly the negotiating parties – viewed the preliminary agreement as an end to the 
redwood wars, nearly all the local and national environmental groups objected to the 
Deal.  HFCC struggled to develop a campaign to amend the agreement and influence the 
financing.  Earth First! launched a barrage of actions – the backwoods actions lasting for 
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the better part of two and a half years – to protest the Deal and protect the forest not 
included in the Deal.  Pacific Lumber began its salvage operations in Headwaters Forest, 
hastening backlash from federal and state agencies, as well as the public.  Cumulatively, 
the direct actions, mass rallies, and litigation had driven the conflict into federal hands, 
and had also shut the activists out of the negotiations.  Because they adjusted their tactics 
after 1996, the activists greatly influenced the final form of the Deal by 1999 when it was 
consumated.243 
Earth First!, historically an asset to EPIC, Sierra Club and HFCC, reacted so 
strongly to the Deal that it almost derailed the revised campaign before it got off the 
ground.  On September 29 and 30, Cherney, against the advice of Kathy Bailey and other 
HFCC leaders, organized rallies in San Francisco, Arcata, and Scotia to protest the deal 
and demonize Feinstein.  1,500 protestors attended the San Francisco rally and marched 
to Feinstein’s office.  Locally, approximately three dozen EF! activists invaded the 
Eureka headquarters of the Democratic Party and spread cow manure and feathers about 
the office.  In Scotia, Bari and Cherney circled Pacific Lumber headquarters after 
Campbell and Riggs held a press conference touting the virtues of the Deal.  The 
California press referred to the Earth First! activists as arrogant, Cherney as whiney, and 
their actions as detrimental to their allies.  Despite the criticism, EF! continued to 
organize daily actions in the backwoods – tree sits, road blockades, rallies, and 
reconnaissance efforts to identify and stop old-growth logging on Pacific Lumber land.  
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More than 1,200 activists were arrested between September 15 and the end of November, 
including actor Woody Harrelson who climbed the Golden Gate Bridge and hung a 
banner.244 
Meanwhile the Headwaters Forest Coordinating Committee developed a new 
strategy to ensure the final deal would protect endangered species and ancient redwoods.  
Stubbornly, they remained committed to protecting the full 60,000-acre complex from 
unsustainable forestry – for humans and wildlife alike.  True to form, the activists would 
not separate their social and ecologic vision for the Northcoast.  The activists wanted the 
final deal to bolster the Endangered Species Act and provide for the restoration of the 
entire forest complex, and they wanted to remove the corporate owners from the county.   
To achieve their goals, they revised their strategy from one addressing state agency action 
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to stop THPs to one focused on public support; coalition-building to the broadest possible 
swath of environmental, conservation, sporting, political, and religious groups; and 
pressuring Hurwitz to sell via a Maxxam boycott, promotion of the OTS asset freeze 
action, and divestment actions.   The HFCC consultant, Michael Shellenberger believed 
the groups needed to stop attacking the Deal and encourage all efforts to protect 
Headwaters Forest, even if they thought the efforts didn’t provide adequate protections.  
To some degree, Kathy Bailey agreed with Shellenberger, but thought it was HFCC’s job 
to work toward the best plan for managing the forest, not the one most politically 
expedient. 245 
By the end of December, and for the subsequent fourteen months, the conflict 
over Headwaters Forest focused on the financing of the acquisition of Headwaters Groves 
and the management proscriptions for the portion of the Headwaters Complex left under 
Pacific Lumber control.  Pacific Lumber played into the hands of the environmentalists in 
October when they resumed salvage logging in the complex, logging five harvest areas 
inside or just outside the Marbled Murrelet Conservation Area, and by submitting new 
old-growth and residual old-growth grove Timber Harvest Plans.  Senator Feinstein, 
Secretary Garamendi, and the Environmental Protection Agency all pleaded with the 
company and the Board of Forestry to halt old-growth logging during the final 
negotiations.  They feared public backlash that might impede the negotiations.  The 
Board rejected the appeals, and Pacific Lumber forged ahead with its operations, no 
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doubt hoping the final negotiations would conclude quickly.  On December 5, the state 
and federal agencies submitted to Hurwitz a list of public properties it was willing to 
swap for Headwaters and Elk Head Springs.  On December 18, the company submitted 
its 120-year Sustained Yield Plan to CDF, and the final march to concluding the Deal was 
apace.246 
 
Stalemate in the Woods and the Negotiating Room: 1997 – 1999 
 
The draft land management plans and list of possible land exchanges seemingly 
marked the inevitability of a final Deal, however the local activists and the company 
challenged California’s – and national environmental groups’-- terms until March 1999 
when the federal appropriation expired.  Without the actions of the California legislature, 
forced by the local activists, the Deal would have undoubtedly concluded sooner and with 
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much greater local environmental objections.  All told, the two years prior to the 
consummation of the Deal help underscore the powerful, yet underappreciated, roles 
local activism and local concerns have had on the development of the modern 
environmental protection regime.  Additionally, those years call attention to the 
commitment of local activists to their decidedly anti-corporate, ant-corporatist vision for 
the Northcoast, chinking to some degree the nationalization and professionalization 
narrative of the development of national environmental politics.  Finally, the final years 
of the negotiation also highlight how committed the Northcoast activists were to resource 
conservation methodologies, timber industry longevity, active landscape management, 
and ecologic health. 
During the twenty-six months preceding consummation, lawmakers and local 
combatants debated the public and private valuation of Pacific Lumber land and the 
nature of private property rights.  The price of the public land acquisition, the relative 
values of salmonids, ancient trees, murrelets, spotted owls, and shareholder wealth were 
contested.  The goals and reach of the Endangered Species Act were debated.  And the 
private role promoting the public good was challenged.  These were the same issues that 
framed the redwood wars from their inception, and the negotiation of the final 
Headwaters Deal simply offered a finite and brief platform to intensely attend to those 
issues.  Additionally, the more than two years beginning September 15, 1996 with the 
massive rally and the late fall arrest of Woody Harrelson on the Golden Gate Bridge 
provided some of the most enduring images of the redwood wars.  In the end, the state 




were disappointed with the final agreement and continued to challenge its terms well into 
the twenty-first century. 
 The Northcoast activists pursued their goals of a 60,000-acre public forest 
managed for timber and endangered species.  The HFCC produced its own Citizens’ 
Proposal, Earth First! took to the woods to protect the ancient groves not included in the 
Deal as well as many of  the other old-growth trees on Pacific Lumber property.  HFCC, 
led by EPIC, developed its own Habitat Conservation Plan., and it monitored and 
challenged the official HCP by playing the “agency game,” as Josh Kaufman wrote.  
Many of the activists continued to challenge the acquisition price, arguing Hurwitz 
should not be rewarded for a business model that led to the public bailout of the Texas 
Savings & Loan industry.  Finally, the HFCC devised new policy approaches using their 
greater influence on the California legislature.  The activists walked away frustrated that 
the vast majority of Headwaters Forest remained in Pacific Lumber hands and that the 
government had surrendered part of the authority of the Endangered Species Act.  
However, many of the activists were grateful to have protected more ancient groves than 
they had proposed in the Forests Forever initiative while also strengthening the land 
regulations above what the federal government had accepted.247 
 The company used its leverage to hold its ground, but in the end agreed to accept 
restrictions beyond the HCP requirements in order to secure nearly $500 million in cash 
and end one very frustrating portion of the redwood wars.  The company withstood 
continued public relations nightmares not because it effectively navigated those incidents 
(it did not), but because the salvage logging exemption and the tentative Deal gave it 
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enormous leverage.  Pacific Lumber drove a hard bargain with the state and federal 
governments because it retained the ability to walk away and begin logging any time it 
chose.  The company believed they received fair compensation and regulatory certainty. 
 While the details of the final agreement between the state and Pacific Lumber 
were ironed out, North Coast Earth First! and related activists worked to stop all 
clearcuts, old-growth harvests, and streamside operations with dramatically expanded 
direct actions.  The escalation was uncontrolled and the movement splintered, leading to 
a decline in public sympathy for the activists.  The activists were intent on highlighting 
the destructive logging practices of Maxxam/Pacific Lumber and placing their bodies in 
front of loggers to protect old-growth trees and endangered species such as the coho 
salmon and marbled murrelet.  The small size of the proposed land acquisition and the 
inclusion of a Habitat Conservation Plan –which they, like EPIC and most environmental 
groups viewed as undermining the Endangered Species Act– created a sense of urgency 
because they believed the Deal would not prevent the degradation of the ancient redwood 
ecosystem or the local community.  During 1997 and 1998, activists expanded their tree-
sits to protect residual old-growth groves within and without 60,000-acre Headwaters 
complex such as Bear Creek, Grizzly Creek, and the Mattole watershed, and they ramped 
up their installation of road blockades.  The move outside the Headwaters Forest complex 
only gave credence to their portrayal as obstructionists intent on stopping all Pacific 
Lumber logging.  For the activists, the moves reflected their intentions to end industrial 
logging they viewed as unsustainable.  However, their actions only contributed to 
unsympathetic local press coverage.  For example, the pieing of  Charles Hurwitz and of 




for the Northcoast movement.  Even the colorful road blockades, tree-sits, and Maxxam 
protests, due to their persistence and growing hostility, seemed to wear thin on the local 
press – though the actions remained relevant news.248   
The actions kept the conflict in the news, yet they divided the movement.  The 
activists differed in their strategic opinions, and due to the anarchic nature of Earth First!, 
many affinity groups struck out in their own directions.  For every incident that tilted 
public opinion in their favor, some action erased the gains.  For example, the December 
31, 1996 mudslide that originated from a Pacific Lumber clearcut and literally buried 
nearly the entire town of Stafford resulted in greater working class frustration with 
Pacific Lumber and aided environmentalists.  The mudslide eventually led to the 738-day 
tree sit by Julia “Butterfly” Hill that drew national attention to the protests over the Deal 
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but alienated many workers and activists who viewed the tree sit as a distraction and self-
aggrandizing.  Even the death of Judi Bari in 1997 from breast and liver cancer had 
negative unintended consequences.  Her death prompted the California Senate to adjourn 
for the day in her honor, but left the movement without one of its rudders.  Afterward, 
Littletree and Cherney increasingly focused on the car bomb litigation.  The loss of their 
leadership opened the doors for splinter groups with uncoordinated efforts and messages, 
something the movement could not afford.  Finally, the initiation of the use of pepper 
spray by Humboldt County sheriffs to remove locked-down, peaceful protesters drew the 
ire of the California Attorney General and the national public alike.  The subsequent 
heckling of Congressman Riggs at a Veteran’s Day event for his support of the pepper 
spray tactics, however, diminished public support for the activists.  By the end of 1998, 
Bari, Cherney, and Littletree were largely absent from the Earth First! movement on the 
Northcoast, and the backwoods actions were directed by myriad smaller cohorts often 
without using the EF! moniker.  The new action groups were fearless, inventive and 
reckless, leading to the death of David “Gypsy” Chain in September 1998 when a logger 
felled a tree in his direction and subsequently landed on the activist.  Chain’s death 
occurred during cat-and-mouse actions near Grizzly Creek to stop old-growth logging of 
an area they hoped would be included in the final Deal.249 
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 HFCC shared the concerns of the direct action-oriented activists regarding the 
HCP and the acquisition, but it worked to influence the terms of the two plans through 
public advocacy, and that was the movement’s most powerful tool, as litigation had been 
from the 1970s through the early 1990s.  HFCC worked feverishly to demonstrate the 
inherent flaws in the HCP process, the Pacific Lumber HCP, and the acquisition deal.  It 
used at least three discreet tactics to flag the flaws:  maintaining public pressure on 
officials by courting celebrity spokespeople and continuing the annual September rallies 
in Carlotta, submitting its own scientific comments on the HCP as well as acquisition and 
management proposals, and lobbying the California legislature to impose strict 
management guidelines on the entire MMCA and coho salmon runs.  If those efforts 
failed, EPIC prepared to challenge the HCP in court under the Endangered Species and 
National Environmental Policy Acts.  Some in HFCC, including Earth First! and EPIC, 
wanted to block the entire Deal because they did not want Hurwitz rewarded, enabling 
him to move to another town to create another cataclysmic conflict over his business 
practices.  That they achieved what they did in the final month of the negotiations is 
miraculous given the power Pacific Lumber wielded combined with the conflicts within 
HFCC250. 
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 In the end, the consummation of the Deal on March 1, 1999 was nearly lost 
because the activists convinced the California legislature the HCP did not offer enough 
protections for the murrelet and salmon.  To the end, many Northcoast activists held on to 
their plan for reform in the Redwood Empire, and their disdain for professional politics 
shined brightly at times.  Pacific Lumber also greatly contributed to the chaos because it 
continued its brinksmanship until the last possible moment, extracting a few final 
concessions and then finally blinking.  The federal appropriation expired at midnight on 
March 1, 1999, and the permits, deeds, and contracts were signed at nearly the stroke of 
midnight, if not well after.  Nothing ever came easy during the redwood wars, especially 
after World War II, and the drama and intrigue was the result of local action, not beltway 
insistence.   
The final negotiations were never easy.  The all-cash federal appropriation had 
been signed by President Clinton on November 14, 1997.  Senator Feinstein had 
convinced Congress and the Administration to pursue an all cash deal to avoid further 
strife with Pacific Lumber over land swaps.  Under the all-cash appropriation, the federal 
government would contribute $250 million toward the acquisition of the agreed upon 
groves, and the state of California would contribute the remaining $130 million.  The 
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agencies and the company negotiated the terms of the HCP and Sustained Yield Plan for 
all of Pacific Lumber’s land throughout 1998, and the company repeatedly threatened to 
walk away from the deal due to requests for tighter and tighter restrictions on timber 
harvests, especially the requests for wider no-logging zones along coho salmon 
watercourses.  How the stalemate of 1998 broke is testament to the power of the 
Northcoast activists in California by that time, and to the desire of Pacific Lumber to sell 
the property and enter a more certain regulatory future.251 
 
Breaking the Stalemate: Policy Innovations and Cash 
 
The California legislature, at the behest of environmental activists, included 
additional land management stipulations in its appropriations bill, passed on the final day 
of the 1998 session, and subsequently demanded Pacific Lumber sign a contract with the 
California Wildlife Conservation Board to enforce the state appropriation prescriptions.  
The federal appropriation had signaled trouble in California; Senator Byron Sher and 
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Assemblywoman Carol Migden warned President Clinton that unless an additional 2,300 
acres of old-growth were protected, they wouldn’t have the votes to pass the California 
appropriation.  Despite the uphill battle, Sher introduced a Headwaters appropriations bill 
during the summer of 1998, and his bill divided Northcoast activists.  Sher’s bill 
increased the no-logging buffers along streams to levels above Pacific Lumber’s draft 
HCP but below those prescribed by the Federal Ecosystem Management Asset Team that 
developed the Northwest Forest Plan.  Sher’s bill also prohibited logging in Owl Creek 
until California could figure out how to acquire that grove, and it stipulated the company 
could not log old-growth inside the MMCA for fifty years.  Kathy Bailey and Sierra Club 
decided they would work to improve the legislation with an eye toward supporting the 
bill.  EPIC, EF!, and others wanted to kill the bill in 1998 because the official draft HCP 
had not yet been released.  Pacific Lumber also rejected the terms of the bill, and in early 
August the California budget passed without the Headwaters appropriation.  It looked 
like the Deal was dead.252 
Later in August, Sher introduced a new bill, and though divided, the Northcoast 
activists influenced the final language and passage of the bill.  Pacific Lumber continued 
to refuse any deal requiring them to do more than the final HCP prescribed.  On the final 
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day of the session, the bill was amended to appease the company, and Kathy Bailey 
convinced Carl Pope to sign a letter to all legislators requesting they oppose the bill as 
amended.  Senate President pro tempore John Burton knew Carl Pope well, and when he 
saw the draft letter, he went back to the table with Pacific Lumber.  Burton returned with 
company approval for revised terms similar to Sher’s bill from earlier in the summer.  
Burton also included an additional appropriation of $100 million to acquire the Grizzly 
Creek and Owl Creek groves.  The additional money swayed Pacific Lumber in the end, a 
sign the company knew its regulatory restrictions diminished the value of its old-growth 
holdings.  Bailey never dropped the Pope letter, but she didn’t actively support the bill 
either.  EPIC and Tom Hayden opposed the bill, but just after midnight, both houses 
approved the bill. The day’s events show how important California Sierra Club was to the 
local movement.  When needed, local Sierra volunteers could harness the resources of the 
national group for litigation.  And despite Northcoast opposition to the bill, Bailey called 
on Pope to reduce the negatives in the bill, something even EPIC and EF! had to 
appreciate.  However, the Club engaged only at the request, and under the direction of the 
local volunteers.253 
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The Deal was not out of the proverbial woods yet, however, largely due to the 
persistence of the activists.  The relentlessly pursued a means to further improve murrelet 
and salmon protections.  Northcoast activists and some legislators were unconvinced the 
stipulations in the final California appropriation were enforceable because the HCP had 
the force of law.  They decided to use the contract between the California Wildlife 
Conservation Board and Pacific Lumber as their enforcement tool. The WCB was the 
entity that acquired all wildlife conservation land for California, and was thus the 
signatory to the land deeds and contracts with Pacific Lumber.  In February 1999, 
legislators and activists convinced Governor Grey Davis and the WCB to discuss crafting 
a contract to enforce the terms of AB 1986 -- the Headwaters appropriation.  
Simultaneously, the state and federal agencies were negotiating the final HCP/SYP, 
attempting to reduce the annual harvest along waterways.  Pacific Lumber rejected their 
demands and just days before the federal appropriation was set to expire it threatened to 
walk away.  Senator Feinstein leapt into the void and convinced the company to accept a 
compromise that inserted an “adaptive management plan” clause in the HCP/SYP 
allowing the company to change plans in the future without going through the normal 
agency bureaucracy.  Pacific Lumber relented to the stronger watercourse protections in 
the HCP in exchange for the adaptive management section.   
Meanwhile, Kathy Bailey told Senator Sher that Sierra would oppose the Deal if 
the WCB contract was insufficient.  On February 25, 1999, the WCB unanimously 
approved the deed contract banning logging the MMCA groves for fifty years and 
widening the watercourse protections as delineated in AB 1986.  Campbell was 




evidence of the influence of the activists’ work, CDF Chief Richard Wilson steeled 
himself to force Pacific Lumber into agreeing to a nearly thirty percent reduction in the 
proposed annual harvests across the property, and the Department of Interior altered the 
language of the adaptive management plan making it more difficult for Pacific Lumber to 
implement future changes to the HCP.  Hurwitz announced the Deal was off.254 
On the final day of the federal appropriation, the leverage of Pacific Lumber was 
on full display, as was the company’s desire to close the Headwaters chapter of its 
history.  On February 27, the California Department of Fish and Game, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, National Marine Fisheries Service each sent Director Wilson letters 
pressuring him to lower his demands for the Sustained Yield Plan.  On March 1, an 
apparently angry Wilson sent John Campbell a letter agreeing to an approximately fifteen 
percent reduction in planned annual harvests instead of thirty percent.  Additionally, on 
March 1, Interior sent Campbell a letter assuring him the agencies would devote enough 
resources to the adaptive management process to accommodate reasonable requests for 
changes to the plan.  The department also offered the personal availability of the 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce and the General Counsel for Interior, on a quarterly 
basis, to ensure the company could meet its now-approved 176 mmbf annual harvest.  
Just before midnight --some allege hours after midnight because the California Assembly 
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The final Deal was monumental in American environmental political history; it 
helped transform the way land conflicts were handled and demonstrated the powerful 
influence of the local Northcoast activists.  Late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
redwood conflicts were resolved privately, and early postwar conflicts were resolved 
legislatively – some after court orders pursued by citizen activists.  The Headwaters 
conflict was resolved by Executive negotiation after years of stalemate on the Northcoast. 
The activists and the company backed the Clinton Administration into a corner through 
relentless and often unconventional pursuit of conflict resolution.   
The final Deal included numerous transactions.  The federal and state 
governments paid $380 million for 7470 acres of company land, including 3000 old-
growth acres.  The land was transferred to the Bureau of Land Management and named 
the Headwaters Forest Reserve.  California agreed to pay an additional $100 million for 
approximately 1600 acres of old-growth in Grizzly Creek and Owl Creek.  Pacific 
                                                        
255 Mike Spear and William T. Hogarth to Richard Wilson, “Re: SYP 96-002 Determination,” February 27, 
1999, papers of Kathy Bailey, Philo, CA; L. Ryan Broddick to Richard Wilson, “Subject: SYP No. 96-002 
Determination,” February 27, 1999, papers of Kathy Bailey, Philo, CA; Richard Wilson to John Campbell, 
March 1, 1999, papers of Kathy Bailey, Philo, CA; David Hayes and Terry Garcia to John Campbell, “Re: 
The Pacific Lumber Company Habitat Conservation Plan,” March 1, 1999, papers of Kathy Bailey, Philo, 
CA; Jim Carlton, “After Maxxam Spurns Headwaters Deal, Government Agencies Prepare for Battle,” 
Wall Street Journal, March 1, 1999, A6; Andrew Gumbel, “Ancient Californian Forests Under Threat as 
Deal Collapses,” The Independent (London), March 1, 1999, pg. 10; David J. Hayes, “Saving the 





Lumber, in addition to cash, received 7755 acres of second growth forest from Elk River 
Timber Company.  The federal government agreed to approve the HCP and ITP.  The 
other ancient groves still owned by Pacific Lumber would be off limits for fifty years to 
help the murrelet recover.  The state approved the SYP.  The company signed the WCB 
contract and agreed to drop its takings lawsuits.  
The Deal was expansive and contested, and Clinton and Secretary of the Interior 
Bruce Babbitt believed it provided a model for resolving other private land conflicts, 
especially because it included the nation’s first multi-species Habitat Conservation Plan.  
Indeed, even before the Deal was consummated, Clinton used it as the impetus for 
negotiating eighteen million acres worth of HCPs in 1997 alone.  Before 1994 when the 
federal government first actively engaged the Headwaters conflict, only thirty-nine HCPs 
had been produced since the passage of the 1982 ESA amendments.  From 1994 to 1998, 
the federal government negotiated more than 230 HCPs.   
However, it was the persistent activism of Northcoast locals working to transform 
their local communities, who forced the redwood wars, and the conflict over Headwaters 
Forest in particular, onto the radar of state and federal officials.  The locals’ rejection of 
middle class values enabled them to press for radical forestry reform using radical means 
at times.  Their values also drove them to utilize all available means to challenge the 
entrenched system, including conventional tactics such as litigation and lobbying.  From 
1995 to 1999, the activists pushed the state to dramatically transform Northcoast logging, 
and while they were largely displeased with the final Deal and continued to challenge its 




permanently protecting the Reserve and forestalling logging in the other ancient groves 
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Figure 7: Map comparing Headwaters Forest Reserve with the Headwaters Forest 
Complex (from The Trees Foundation, “The Headwaters Forest Stewardship Plan: A 
Citizens’ Alternative to Maxxam Management of Headwaters Forest,” (Redway, CA: The 


















Conclusion/Epilogue:  The Uncertain Future of Headwaters 
Forest, yet a Certain Impact on Environmental Politics 
 
The Post-Deal Battle over Headwaters Forest 
 
The consummation of the Headwaters Deal among California, the federal 
government, and Pacific Lumber emphatically marked a shift toward Executive Branch 
policy-making and conflict resolution of Endangered Species law, but it did not end the 
redwood wars or the battle over Headwaters Forest.  The impact of the redwood wars on 
national politics diminished thereafter, but their impact on the Northcoast continued to 
develop.  The activists innovated and realized newfound success regarding both 
Headwaters Forest and logging reform.  Their innovations followed their previously 
defined path:  investigate local developments and concerns, and pursue all available legal, 
political, and extralegal means of addressing those concerns.  For its part, Pacific Lumber 
was again transformed as a result of its operations, and entered the second decade of the 
twenty-first century with a new lease on its corporate life.  On March 1, 1999, President 
Clinton, Governor Grey, Charles Hurwitz, and John Campbell had hoped that the battle 
over Headwaters Forest was complete, but in fact, the Deal marked only one benchmark 
in the redwood wars over industrial logging on the Northcoast and the type of community 
it engendered. 
Even before the Deal was completed, Northcoast activists embarked on a plan to 




Salmonid habitat as a vehicle to restrict logging on Pacific Lumber land and the rest of 
the Northcoast.  By the end of March, EPIC and Sierra Club filed suit against the state for 
approving Pacific Lumber’s Sustained Yield Plan that lacked cumulative impact analysis.  
The suit also challenged a Streambed Alteration Permit, and the Incidental Take Permit 
despite California law forbidding incidental takes.  The activists also vowed to pursue 
their goal of acquiring all sixty thousand acres of Headwaters Forest, and before 1999 
ended, they had filed suit in federal court arguing that EPA and NMFS for alleged 
violations of NEPA and ESA with respect to the Pacific Lumber HCP – the first time 
activists used NEPA in the timber wars.  The year ended when Julia Butterfly Hill came 
down from her two hundred foot perch on Pacific Lumber land after more than two years.   
Hill’s tree sit highlighted activists’ anger about the Deal and the lack of 
protections afforded the broader redwood forest and its human communities.  Even as she 
descended, the splinter groups of Earth First! flocked back to backwoods of Pacific 
Lumber land to continue thwarting logging along salmon streams and in mature groves of 
redwoods and Douglas firs.  The lawsuits continued, and the activists’ strategy evolved 
over the ensuing years, attacking Northcoast timber operations via the Regional Water 
Quality Control Boards.  The Boards were not signatories to the Headwaters Deal, and 
they used their authority to further restrict logging operations near streams.  By 2008, 
Pacific Lumber had filed for bankruptcy and was under new ownership.  The California 
Supreme Court had invalidated the company’s Sustained Yield Plan and forced it to work 
on a new plan.  The new ownership, the Humboldt Redwoods Company, vowed not to 
harvest trees living prior to 1800, and the Northcoast activists continued to press the 




lawsuits, regulatory proposals, and legislative action, but the direct actions died down 
considerably.  Northcoast residents accepted all of the news of 2008 with a sigh of relief 
and a nervous air of optimism that the war would die down and that some sense of 
stability would prevail.257 
The post-Deal history of the redwood wars largely reinforces the important 
historical findings established by the pre-Deal history.  Sustainable forestry remained a 
top priority for Northcoast activists, and unsatisfied with the Habitat Conservation Plan 
and the Sustained Yield Plan, they continued to agitate and press their demands at the 
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local, state, and federal levels.  Like Robert Dudley, they were interested in the fusion of 
preservation and conservation ideals.  Also true to historical form, the activists innovated 
in response to the Deal.  When the Endangered Species Act was cut off as a tool because 
of the HCP, they turned to the Regional Water Quality Control Board to assert its local 
authority on timber operations – a tactic never used prior on private timber lands.  In 
response, Pacific Lumber filed suit against the government alleging it breached the terms 
of the Deal.  It was that spirit of innovation and response that had propelled the redwood 
wars onto the national scene, what made them so protracted, and what gave them the 
wide influence on state and federal agencies.  Finally, the post-Deal events reinforce the 
independence and often radical nature of the Northcoast activists.  When faced with a 
nationally praised Deal, they fought back because it did not conform to their vision for 
the Northcoast.  Maxxam still owned Pacific Lumber.  Only a handful of the ancient 
groves were permanently protected.  Salmon runs were not as tightly protected as they 
hoped.  They commented on and litigated the terms of the Deal.  And, they rushed back 
into the forests to stop logging at the point of production.  And so, in 2008, when the last 
treesitter emerged from Headwaters Forest and the Mattole Watershed, detente was 
finally reached in the redwood wars.   
 
Conflicts over the Redwoods: Patterns and Trends 
 
The long history of conflicts over logging in the redwoods is defined by its 
continuities, its rootedness in locale, and the importance of the independent and often 




actors of the redwood wars played a major role transforming American environmental 
politics by aiding the ascension of the Executive Branch creating and implementing the 
modern environmental protection regime.  At their core, the conflicts arose when citizen 
activists challenged the state and the timber industry over the relative value of intact 
ancient redwood forests versus the timber those forests could produce.  Despite political 
and social transformations, four generations of redwood activists remained committed to 
conservation methodology, demonstrated by their persistent work to promote the long 
term feasibility of Northcoast timber operations as part of their more preservationist 
activism.  They also developed a successful set of private land acquisition strategies that 
remained a constant source of temporary conflict resolution incapable of ending the 
redwood wars.  Most often, actors outside the Northcoast most doggedly pursued the 
acquisition strategies.  The intensity of the conflicts and the final forms of the 
compromise, however, were most powerfully influenced by the interactions between the 
local industry leaders and local activists over the development of specific plots of land.  
Finally, the conflicts over the redwoods were continually pushed and prodded by local 
Northcoast women, and by independent actions taken by Northcoasters that challenged 
corporatist development and traditional private property rights. 
Because of the long-running and fairly consistent drama that ran for more than 
one hundred years, the sentiment of release and anxious hope in 2008 was the repetition 
of reliefs of past generations each time crisis in Redwood Country seemed averted.  
Similar to those of the Murphy Family, Laura Mahan, and the other members of the 
Northcoast redwood preservation movement of the early twentieth century.  Similar to 




the Redwood National Park purchase in 1968 and again in 1978.  Similar to the relief felt 
by the Sempervirens Club and William Kent during the first decade of the twentieth 
century.  If nothing else, the long history of strife in Redwood Country is the story of 
seemingly irrepressible conflict over the value of the redwoods – standing and fallen – 
and over competing social visions for the Northcoast.  During each moment of crisis, the 
conflicts bound Redwood Country to the broader political and economic trends of the 
nation, and they also highlighted how local the conflicts over redwoods truly were.   
Nowhere was that trend more evident than during the last third of the twentieth 
century when local activists battled local timber companies over the future of Northcoast 
industry, society, and redwoods, especially over the fate of Headwaters Forest.  The 
concerns of the combatants were informed by broader intellectual forces including 
ecology, civil rights, and industrial efficiency, but they were local in nature.  Still, the 
combatants – activist and company alike -- pressed their agendas to the highest levels of 
government searching for an institution capable of releasing the intractable conflict from 
its moorings.   
That the Headwaters Deal of the final years of the twentieth century did not end 
the redwood wars is not a surprise because the wars were a product of the stubborn 
insistence of activists and lumber leaders that their vision alone was best for the 
Northcoast communities.  The intractable nature of the conflict was a product of that 
stubborn commitment to ideals, the willingness to explore tactics and strategies, and the 
successes of those strategies.  It is also not a surprise that the conflict over Headwaters 
Forest helped transform national environmental politics.  The redwoods have long held 




audience for the redwood wars was no difficult task.  Additionally, because the redwood 
wars took place on private land, they more easily prompted political concerns from 
business leaders and politicians.  Combined with the popularity of ecological health as a 
major social goal, the increasingly divergent philosophies of the two major political 
parties with respect to environmental protection during the 1980s and 1990s, and the 
increasingly deadlocked legislative system with respect to environmental protection, and 
the situation was ripe for the expansion of Executive Power.  And, the local combatants 
pushed the Headwaters Issue into center of the fray. 
From its earliest years, the conflicts over the redwoods revolved around whether 
particular groves of giant ancient trees ought to remain standing.  The defining features of 
the first seventy years of conflict were the resolution mechanisms, the investment of 
wealthy citizens, professional scientists, parks boosters, and philanthropists, and the 
emphasis on preventing the tallest and grandest groves from falling to the lumberjack so 
they could offer the nation’s residents places for recreation, spiritual renewal, and 
scientific research.  All of the conflicts were fought on private property.  The battles were 
over the literal and philosophical boundaries of American industrial and urban 
development.  The campaign to protect Big Basin occurred during the emergence of the 
national movement to conserve the nation’s natural resources, but it remained somewhat 
separate from those discussions about efficiency and wise-use to ward of a timber famine.  
Robert Dudley and the Sempervirens Club wished to permanently protect from the axe 
the giant trees so the urban residents of the San Francisco Bay area could visit them and 
escape the city for a while.  Those visits were deemed regenerative for society, a time to 




undeveloped Northcoast seemed to offer the nation an endless supply of redwood timber, 
so the concerns of the activists were whether the heavily developed Bay Area offered 
enough public park space outside of the city.  Only Dudley seemed to publicly warn of 
the dangers Northcoast timber operations posed to the redwood forest.   
The activists developed a campaign strategy during the Big Basin conflict that 
was replicated throughout many twentieth century conflicts over the boundaries of 
development in the West, including the late twentieth century redwood wars.  The 
Sempervirens Club physically hiked the groves of ancient trees, mapped their boundary, 
documented the landscape, and developed a photographic presentation for public and 
legislative viewing.  In short, they used modern publicity to generate public and 
governmental support.  Different from the postwar era, the prewar redwood movement 
privately raised the funds necessary to acquire ancient redwood groves and then donated 
the lands to the state for public management.  In that way, the early movement was 
directly aligned with that part of the progressive movement committed to private-public 
partnerships and corporatism, what became known as Associationalism during the 1920s.  
Similarly, that early strategy linked the redwood preservation movement to the national 
conservation movement led by wealthy white male professionals.   
Even early on, however, the Northcoast residents committed themselves to more 
local concerns than the wider redwood movement.  During the interwar period, the 
redwood activists turned their attentions northward to Pacific Lumber property and 
implemented their public relations and private negotiation strategy to great effect.  
Despite the predominance of the well-funded Save-the-Redwoods League, that early 




irascible Northcoast activists, as demonstrated by the 1924 direct actions conducted by 
Laura Mahan and other Humboldt women.  As the redwood action continued to move 
north, the influential, and sometimes radical, role of Northcoast activists on larger 
political systems, despite their stubbornly local interests, continued to froth. The fractures 
between what developed into the mainstream environmental movement and the 
Northcoast would blow wide open during the redwood wars 
The immediate postwar period marked a transition in both the conflicts and the 
resolutions, driven by the evolution of citizen activist goals and expanded timber 
operations on the Northcoast.  The evolution of activist goals coincided with the 
evolution of the conservation movement’s goals, in particular, those goals associated with 
protecting landscapes not for human benefit alone but also for the benefit of the 
landscape systems themselves – ecosystem health.  The Northcoast, though remote and 
heavily isolated behind the “redwood curtain” and its shroud of fog, was deeply 
connected to national economic trends.  The timber industry dramatically increased the 
scale and scope of its timber operations to take advantage of the postwar building boom.  
Accordingly, during the 1950s, the redwood preservation movement focused their 
resources on watchdogging timber harvest practices on private land and protecting 
watersheds and larger units for ecological health instead of the single-minded focus on 
the tall groves along the river flats.  Because the activists wanted to remove larger tracts 
of forest from timber production at the same time the industry planned to increase its 
harvests while prices were high, tensions escalated with no détente until the twenty-first 




The activists – driven by the Sierra Club and David Brower -- targeted the 
National Park Service and Congress to resolve the conflicts, and they attempted to 
extrapolate the public-private partnerships of the earlier era to the national stage.  
Eventually, the activists leaned on Congress to foot the entire bill.  That development was 
no surprise; the cost of acquiring tens of thousands of acres was enormous, and the public 
increasingly turned to federal funds and institutions to finance public interest programs in 
other areas such as Medicare, unemployment benefits, and pollution control.  Still, the 
basic strategy of the campaign for Bull Creek, Redwood National Park, and other groves 
remained true to the Sempervirens’ strategy: publicize, pressure lawmakers, negotiate 
with private landowners.  And again, the Northcoast resisted exterior resolutions.  In 
1968 it was Miller Timber Company and Louisiana-Pacific that remained defiant, 
clearcutting right up to the proposed park boundary.  After 1968, both the Northcoast 
activists and Northcoast timber companies bristled at regulatory options that came from 
either outside their own ranks or outside the Northcoast. 
After the National Park battle, the politics of redwood conflicts were transformed 
from park acquisition campaigns into battles over the regulation of private property and 
management prerogatives on private land.  During the 1970s, the redwood wars began, 
led by a migration of residents who rejected middle class work and culture, and became 
intensely focused on Northcoast and statewide regulatory reform.  Those migrants were 
part of the constituency swept up in the rising tide of environmental activism during the 
late 1960s.  In most histories, the high tide of insurgent, grassroots environmentalism was 
Earth Day 1970.  However, the migrants to the Northcoast retained and even increased 




Citizen activists attacked the official and de facto corporatism of the California Board of 
Forestry through the successful innovation of litigation strategies.   
The Northcoast citizen efforts were related to the broader trend of using the 
National Environmental Policy Act and the federal courts to prod agency compliance 
with the new social regulations of the 1970s.  Unlike the national movement, the 
Northcoast activists first attacked the constitutionality of the law establishing the Board 
of Forestry.  Once that was accomplished, the activists attacked the de facto corporatism 
of the Board and the Department of Forestry by challenging their decisions under the 
umbrella of the California Environmental Quality Act – the state version of NEPA.  
Where the national litigators challenged the production of Environmental Impact 
Statements and compliance with Congressional deadlines, the state activists focused 
specifically on the forestry agency’s failure to analyze the cumulative effectives of timber 
operations when they approved specific Timber Harvest Plans.  In essence, the 
Northcoast activists alleged abuse of agency discretion, while the national activists 
litigated missed deadlines.  At the core of the Northcoast activists’ transformed campaign 
was a challenge to the very core of Northcoast society – development-focused timber 
harvests and self-regulation.   
After the successful challenge to Georgia-Pacific’s logging plans for the Sally 
Bell Grove, the redwood wars transformed again.  Concurrently, national environmental 
politics was changing in similar ways.  During the Reagan years, the administration and 
industrial interests publicly attacked environmental laws and the costs associated with 
them.  Environmentalists established defensive campaigns to prevent the undermining of 




accountable to the goals of the modern environmental protection regime’s laws, and they 
influenced the rule-making processes inside the agencies when faced with the erosion of 
the bipartisan commitment to environmental protection.  Those circumstances were a 
major reason Dave Foreman, Mike Roselle, and others created Earth First! in 1980 – to 
invigorate offensive and idealistic efforts.  On the Northcoast, activists used the courts 
and agency meetings to attack de facto corporatism and industrial logging, while 
legislative campaigns took a back seat.  Those same activists, unlike their national 
counterparts, also embraced the radicalism of Earth First! and biocentrism. 
After 1985, the litigation campaign grew dramatically in scale and frequency, 
direct actions at the point of timber production exploded upon the Northcoast as they did 
across the western United States, and attentions gravitated toward Pacific Lumber as 
proxy for the ills of industrial logging on Northcoast ecosystems and communities.  The 
Maxxam takeover of Pacific Lumber drew activist attentions to the company’s land as it 
drew the attention of Congressional lawmakers to the acquirer’s balance sheets.  And, as 
the “junk” bond scandal involving Charles Hurwitz, Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken, and 
Boyd Jeffries grew, so did the conflict over Pacific Lumber’s redwood lands.  The two 
controversies were entangled and grew together.  Because of the high interest debt, 
activists worried the new owners would cut the forest and run, leaving Humboldt County 
without its largest employer and without what was discovered to be the world’s largest 
ancient redwood forest in private ownership.  Activists worked frantically to map the 
forest and thwart the company’s logging plans via direct action and litigation.  Both 
efforts were successful; the direct actions drew attention to the forest and the litigation 




voluntarily prohibit logging inside the largest grove – Headwaters Grove, the lawsuits 
virtually halted ancient redwood harvests elsewhere on the property, and the combination 
led the Board of Forestry and the Department of Forestry to grudgingly step back from its 
de facto corporatist traditions.   
As the volume of activity increased and garnered statewide and national attention, 
the geographic scope of the redwood protection campaign narrowed, and the parkland 
acquisition strategy regained prominence because the agencies did not act swift enough 
or deeply enough to please the Northcoast activists who continued to ratchet up their 
direct action and litigation efforts including the production of Redwood Summer in 1990 
to protest de facto corporatism and logging ancient redwoods.  Placing Headwaters Forest 
into public hands seemed a necessary step to quell the redwood wars.  This time, 
however, taxpayers, not wealthy donors were the first and only constituency targeted to 
foot the acquisition bill.  In 1990, activists attempted to end the redwood wars via 
Proposition 130, a ballot question that would have dramatically reformed timber 
operations on the Northcoast, reformed the structure and operations of the state forestry 
agencies, and authorized a park bond to acquire approximately 3300 acres of Headwaters 
Grove.  The initiative narrowly failed, and the wars continued, led partly by an ever-
growing cohort of female activists such as Kathy Bailey, Judi Bari, Cecelia Lanman, and 
Betty Ball. 
After 1990, the redwood wars were federalized legally, legislatively, and 
perceptually, driven out of the Northcoast by the local activists and timber industry 
leaders.  In many ways, for the activists it was the ideal time federalize the redwood wars.  




prepared for the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit in Brazill to discuss global 
deforestation and biodiversity losses.  Endangered species and ancient forests were 
incredibly popular issues, and incredibly controversial in America as demonstrated by the 
spotted owl conflicts in the Pacific Northwest during the same era.  On the Northcoast, 
two campaigns developed: one to convince Congress to acquire Headwaters Forest, and 
one to continue challenging de facto corporatism and development-focused timber 
regulations while the industry defended its traditional prerogatives.   
Both groups of combatants had an interest in federalizing the acquisition effort 
because of the amount of acreage and money involved.  That effort was dramatically 
aided by the election of Dan Hamburg to the Northcoast Congressional seat, and even 
though his bill failed, it pushed the conflict onto President Clinton’s radar.  Even with 
respect to the litigation, both parties benefitted from federalization.  The activists were 
shut out of Northcoast courtrooms, and when inside, the volume of administrative record 
produced was beyond the capacity of the local courts.   The federal system was far more 
capable of handling the record and was more inclined to do so because of the listing of 
the marbled murrelet on the federal threatened species list.  For Pacific Lumber, 
federalization was an asset because they needed and wanted a bargaining chip to end their 
involvement in the redwood wars.  If the federal courts sided with the company, they 
could restart timber operations in their ancient groves.  If the federal courts sided with the 
environmentalists, the company could file a takings suit against the government and 
either win compensation outright while upholding their traditional private property rights, 
or drive the President to negotiate a buyout to avoid a federal court battle over the 




The federal courts sided with the environmental activists, and the subsequent 
actions of the Executive Branch transformed American environmental politics.  After 
1994, the battle over Headwaters Forest retained its dual campaign identity, and the 
activists’ federal litigation led to a major precedent-setting ruling on Endangered Species 
Act law that further restricted the rights of property owners.  Pacific Lumber’s takings 
suit then drove the Clinton Administration to intervene, furthering the encroachment of 
the Executive Branch on environmental protection policy-making.  For endangered 
species law and regulations, that process began with the 1982 Congressional amendments 
to the Endangered Species Act that authorized Executive Branch negotiations with 
private landowners.  Those provisions were rarely used prior to the Headwaters Deal.  
President George H.W. Bush asserted Executive authority over the law when he 
convened the “God Squad” to attempt to deal with the spotted owl conflict on public land 
in the Pacific Northwest.  President Clinton pushed Executive power by personally 
negotiating an administrative compromise intended to end the spotted owl conflict in 
order to ward off Congressional attacks on the Endangered Species Act as an unworkable 
system.   
The Headwaters Deal was unprecedented, however, in price and scope.  The Deal 
authorized the first multi-species Habitat Conservation Plan and was a major experiment 
with what became Clinton’s 1999 “No Surprises” and Safe Harbor Agreement rules 
designed to encourage landowners to negotiate with the federal government.  Under 
Clinton, the use of administrative tools to implement and alter Endangered Species policy 
exploded, including a dramatic increase in the granting of Habitat Conservation Plans and 




attacks by the Gingrich Congress and its successors from attacking the ESA, and to 
prevent a high stakes court battle over regulatory takings in a more conservative Supreme 
Court than during the 1970s.  The Clintonian expansion of Executive power also included 
the designation of individual de facto wilderness areas via National Monument 
designation, and designation of wilderness writ large via the Roadless Rule in 2000 that 
prohibited development on nearly sixty million acres of National Forests. 
That the administrative actions to end the battle over Headwaters Forest did not 
work is testimony to the widely divergent valuations of the redwood forest at odds during 
the conflict, and the stubborn confidence of the Northcoast activists and Pacific Lumber 
that they could force their wills upon each other.  In the end, only the collapse of the 
Hurwitz-owned Pacific Lumber and the accommodation of the Northcoast activists’ 
demands by the new owners quelled the redwood wars, a testimony to the powerful 
influence of the Northcoast activists who largely rejected middle class work and culture, 
yet skillfully, if gruffly, navigated the structures of power they moved to the Northcoast 
to avoid.  The peace is sure to last so long as the Humboldt Redwood Company’s timber 
operations and revenue goals don’t ride up against their voluntary commitment to leaving 
the remaining ancient trees standing.  That the resolution of the battle over Headwaters 
Forest was so tenuous and riddled with nervous optimism is testimony to the reality that 
the modern environmental protection regime had not, as of 2008, adequately defined the 







The history of the conflicts over the logging in the redwoods offers new 
perspectives on American environmental history.  First, the patterns found throughout the 
conflicts highlight the continuity of conservation ideas and methodology.  Due to the 
persistence of that conservation goal, the redwood wars help complicate our 
understanding of the evolution of the so-called wilderness ideal by inserting forestry 
techniques and landscape management into the historical discussions about landscape 
protection.  Second, the redwood wars offer a prominent example of local activists 
fighting a local battle and unintentionally transforming national politics and the 
implementation of the modern environmental protection regime, in opposition to the 
standard narrative about the professionalization and DC-ification of environmental 
politics.  Nowhere is the influence of the locals more evident than during the battle over 
Headwaters Forest where decidedly non-middle class activists and timber company 
leaders locked horns and pressed their demands up the ladders of power – often against 
their better judgments, given the combatants preference for local governance.  Finally, 
the battle over Headwaters Forest helps identify how, when, and where the regulation of 
private property with respect to environmental protection began to shift into the hands of 
the Executive Branch. 
During the fight over Redwood National Park and Humboldt Redwoods State 
Park, the continuity of Pinchotian and Muirian influences stand out in stark relief from 
the once-standard narrative about the transition from “conservation to environment” and 
the extrapolation of the tensions between Muir and Pinchot to represent the false 
dichotomy within the twentieth century environmental protection movement.  More 




continuities between the pre- and postwar eras in American environmental politics, and 
the Northcoast conflicts offer powerful examples of such continuity.  The conflict over 
Bull Run during the 1950s was the result of the Sierra Club’s insistence that the state 
regulate logging operations on private land to protect ancient forests protected by the 
state park system.  Similarly, the 1978 expansion of Redwood National Park was the 
result of litigation over the impacts of logging on private land adjacent to the park.  In 
both instances, the local activists’ desires were to reform private logging operations on 
the Northcoast despite the acquisition of additional park lands designed to end the 
conflicts. 
The redwood wars of the final quarter of the twentieth century also highlight the 
commitment of Northcoast activists to active landscape management.  The redwood wars 
began not over the harvest of a particular grove, but over the development of industrial 
logging and the dramatic deforestation of the landscape that had begun during the 
postwar housing boom.  Northcoast activists worked to protect their rural lifestyles and 
their rural communities by working to reform logging practices on the Northcoast.  Their 
landscape vision was similar to Aldo Leopold’s vision of a landscape matrix comprised 
of myriad ecosystems and land use patterns.  Creating a landscape that included timber 
harvests, salmon runs, ancient redwoods, mature second growth forests, stable slopes, and 
long-term employment was a vision for intense landscape management.  In that way, the 
late twentieth century activists of EPIC, Northcoast Earth First!, and Forests Forever 
differed greatly from the image of wilderness advocates as activists working to keep 
humanity out of the woods.  To the contrary, though they wanted logging and road-




to work in the forests to supply timber and to rehabilitate slopes and streams.  What they 
most desired was to protect their bucolic, small town society and the health of the 
landscape they defined as one rich in biodiversity.  Additionally, they wanted to rid 
Northcoast logging of the presence of large corporate owners. 
The persistence of sustainable forestry and conservation methodology complicate 
our understanding of the so-called wilderness ideal.  Though the activity on the 
Northcoast was contemporaneous with the passage of the Wilderness Act and Roderick 
Nash’s seminal work on the intellectual history of wilderness ideas, the Northcoast 
activists’ ideas and goals with respect to redwood preservation did not comfortably fit 
into Congress’ or Nash’s definitions.  They were more like the inter-war activists 
described by Sutter who founded The Wilderness Society.  Aldo Leopold, Benton 
Mackaye, Robert Sterling Yard, and Robert Marshall viewed roadless wildlands – their 
notion of wilderness – as resources worthy of conservation, alongside timber and water.  
Leopold, in particular, envisioned landscapes as matrices of myriad land uses, including 
roadless areas.  As a group, they saw in wilderness places where humans could escape 
cars and industrial society to rejuvenate their souls.  In that way, their motivations were 
similar to Muir’s decades earlier.  They also saw in wilderness places where men could 
challenge themselves and retain survival instincts.  And Mackaye, saw in his original 
plan for the Appalachian Trail a way to physically connect rural working communities in 
ways that reinforced their connections to the land.258  
Sutter sees some of the origins of the modern environmental movement in the 
Wilderness Society founders, and the Northcoast activists reinforce some of his analysis, 
but also differ in significant ways.  The Northcoast activists were interested in efficiency 
                                                        




and conservation as methodologies toward the promotion of wildland protection and 
ecological health (an idea Leopold hinted at in his writings).  And they viewed the 
ancient redwood forest as a place humans might escape and refill their spirits with 
optimism.  The Northcoast activists, however, were also deeply committed to sustainable 
forestry practices, and created organizations committed to both wildland protection and 
forestry reform.  Those concerns with logging methodologies, sustainable development, 
and ecological health remained hallmarks of Northcoast activists during the redwood 
wars.  And, though Earth First! was a major organizational actor in the redwood wars, the 
local Northcoast chapter strayed dramatically from the often misanthropic views of the 
original founders and many of the other national chapters.  The Northcoast EF! activists 
blended labor organizing, sustainable rural, anti-corporate, feminist, and biocentric ideals 
into their work, aiding their mass movement goals. 
The successes of the late twentieth century activists in Earth First!, EPIC, and 
Forests Forever at least partially chink the narrative regarding the dominance of middle-
class professional organizations and their Capital Hill counterparts at making and 
implementing the modern environmental protection regime.  The migrants and locals who 
led the citizen movement to break corporatism and reform timber operations were largely 
individuals who rejected middle-class work, politics, and culture.  Some wanted to live 
out their counterculture goals and values.  Later migrants wanted to escape corporate 
work and culture.  They were largely individuals who moved to the Northcoast precisely 
because it lacked (or at least was perceived to lack) strong middle-class tendencies.  At 
the very least, the Northcoast offered refuge to those individuals seeking an alternative to 




consistent, regular employment.  They rejected middle-class work not because they were 
independently wealthy, but because they rejected to a large degree consumer culture and 
the materialism of modern American society.  They bartered and work-traded, and they 
earned wages as needed to secure a material lifestyle of their choosing.  The activists of 
the Northcoast enthusiastically embraced direct action at the point of production as a 
means to achieving their forestry and political goals, many to the point of syndicalism.  
Often, their actions crossed the boundaries of “good taste,” and at other times they 
performed civil disobedience. 
But the activists were largely not anarchists, they were organizers, and used more 
traditional political avenues to push their goals, even so far as pushing Congress and the 
President of the United States.  The Northcoast activists were tactical pragmatists, though 
unwilling to compromise the specifics of their vision for Northcoast society and 
landscapes.  The trajectories and strategies of the redwood wars were not the product of 
middle-class activists working for relatively well-funded and established organizations.  
Nor were the redwood wars the product of policy entrepreneurs in Washington, DC.  The 
redwood wars, and especially the battle over Headwaters Forest, were legally, 
legislatively, and promotionally the product of Northcoast activists.  Kathy Bailey, 
Woods, and others took their Forests Forever proposal to Sacramento and then forced 
their issues into the voters’ consciousness.  Likewise, Northcoast activists pressed Dan 
Hamburg to adopt their Congressional resolution for the battle over Headwaters Forest.  
It was Northcoasters who advocated their cause in DC and organized a nationwide 
constituency when they decided to pursue their Headwaters protection strategy at the 




their vision for the redwood forests wherever a potential decision-maker resided.  Their 
paths, against personal political preference, led them higher and higher up the hierarchy 
of government because the conflict protracted as the activists and the company adjusted 
to each others’ moves and the moves of the local and state institutions.  Like the activists, 
Pacific Lumber pursued its own strategies to defend its prerogatives and traditions in 
court and in the halls of government at progressively higher levels of authority.   
Because of the persistence of the locals, the state and national governments were 
forced to accommodate Northcoast actors more often than the Northcoast was forced to 
accept edicts handed down to them.  In the case of Headwaters Forest at least, national 
policy and politics was driven to the beltway from afar.  In many ways, the process was 
similar to the way rural residents of the Pacific Northwest – logger and activist alike – 
drove the spotted owl conflict onto the national stage.  The major differences were that 
the owl conflict was federal in nature because it was conceived of as a public lands issue.  
The Northcoast activists largely treated the Headwaters conflict as a local conflict and 
only federalized the conflict when local institutions grew incapable of governing. 
The Headwaters Deal marks a pivotal development in the ascension of the 
Executive Branch inside the modern environmental protection regime.  The Headwaters 
Deal was not the first instance where the Executive Branch asserted its influence over 
environmental protection policy, rather it marked the branch’s most forceful foray into 
private land management conflicts.  As environmental historians and political scholars 
have noted, Congress and the courts drove the early process of creating, defining, and 
refining the regime by passing laws and holding agencies accountable to legislative 




increasing influence of the Executive Branch as law was settled, implementation and 
innovation became rooted in the agencies, and bipartisan commitment to the regime 
faded, especially with respect to air, water, and toxic pollution clean-up.  Since the 
creation of the modern environmental protection regime during the 1970s, presidents 
have exerted tremendous influence over the implementation of the programs through 
their control over agency budgets and priorities.  With respect to Endangered Species 
policy and law, the Executive Branch had largely intervened on public land or in conflicts 
over federal projects, most notably when the so-called God Squad was convened to 
consider overriding court injunctions regarding the snail darter and northern spotted owls 
during the late 1970s and early 1990s, respectively.   
Executive influence on the environmental protection regime progressively 
increased under President Clinton.  Clinton asserted direct control over Endangered 
Species policy in 1994 when he and Vice President Al Gore convened a conference in 
Portland, Oregon to negotiate a compromise forest plan for the National Forests affected 
by spotted owl habitat designation.  The Headwaters Deal was the Clinton 
Administration’s response to the first ever federal court order halting logging on private 
land because of Endangered Species policy, the presence of a noisy Congressional 
opposition to reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act, and the takings suit filed by 
Pacific Lumber -- to be heard by a court increasingly reducing the power of the 
Endangered Species Act.  In that way, the Headwaters Deal was similar to the Clinton 
Administration’s response to the increasing difficulties passing new wilderness bills and 
legislatively reforming National Forest Service budget shortfalls in an increasingly 




executing an end-around Congress to pass a sweeping set of new policies for National 
Forests.  The Headwaters Deal was more complicated in that it required a Congressional 
act to purchase the Headwaters and Elk Head Springs Groves, but it nonetheless was the 
product of an increasingly rigorous Executive Branch exerting policy influence on the 
modern environmental regime.   
In the end, the redwood wars speak to the persistent tension over private property 
rights, competing social visions, and the development of American politics.  Just as 
Irving Berlin and Woody Guthrie promoted contrasting visions of their contemporary and 
ideal societies, so did the Northcoast redwood activists and leaders of Pacific Lumber.  
Unlike Berlin and Guthrie, the activists and loggers fought their battles in the forest, in 
the courtroom, and in the legislature.  They were long and bloody wars, and in the end, 
though the locals transformed environmental politics, nobody won.  Pacific Lumber was 
bankrupt, vast acreage of Headwaters Forest had been harvested, mudslides buried towns 
and choked salmon runs, a new corporation owned the forest, and a county was left 
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